策略型内生网络博弈及其演化研究
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摘要
网络是描述和揭示自然界及人类社会中各种复杂关系及功能的一个有效工具,如小世界网络、无标度网络、网络生成博弈等模型。其中,借助博弈论研究社会网络形成问题可以揭示网络成员的微观决策机制,对于正确地理解和认识现实网络系统具有重要的意义。当前的博弈模型大多探讨外部环境对经济行为的影响,强调个体所处的网络结构对个体行动的作用,忽视了个体行动决策对网络结构的影响。本文从个体链接选择和行动决策两个方面研究微观博弈与网络结构的相互作用,探讨了基于两人对称博弈的内生网络模型的研究框架,证明了若干模型的结果,并将其应用于实际问题的分析;在此基础上,提出了一个网络结构与个体策略的协同演化模型。
论文首先研究了策略型内生网络博弈的基础理论。结合现实情景中的若干现象,在对基于两人对称博弈的网络形成问题进行规范描述的基础上,依据链接成本分担的方式,将模型划分为单边连接和双边连接;依据博弈对象的选择范围,将模型划分为直接连接和间接连接,并据此分别给出了有效性和稳定性的概念。这些概念和分类是策略型内生网络博弈研究的基础之一。
其次,分别针对单边连接和双边连接模型,研究了基于囚徒困境博弈、协调博弈和鹰鸽博弈三种两人对称博弈的内生网络模型。对于存在唯一Nash均衡的博弈,链接成本对参与者的行动选择没有影响;而对存在多个Nash均衡的博弈,较高的链接成本可以促使群体达到帕累托最优状态;两类模型中,稳定网络主要表现为完全网络、最小连通网络、中心发起者网络或空网络。
然后,在满意决策规则以及个体具有链接选择权利假设下,提出了一个基于个体有限理性的网络演化模型,从博弈角度对复杂网络的形成给出了新的解释。分别以囚徒困境和协调博弈作为基博弈研究了合作演化和制度演化问题,并采用基于多主体建模的方法对模型进行了仿真,结果表明在某些参数条件下,演化网络会表现出复杂网络的属性。在此基础上进一步探讨了复制者动态模型与网络演化模型的内在机理和区别。
最后,探讨了间接连接双边模型在水电工程项目管理信息集成方案推行中的应用。文中将信息集成方案的推行工作描述为一个异质性间接连接双边模型,分析了方案推行中的瓶颈,并从激励机制角度给出了改进建议。研究表明信息集成方案的制定,不能仅仅强调信息分解体系之间的关系,还需要从管理单元的微观决策角度分析信息集成方案的稳定性,这样才能保证方案的顺利实施。
The study of the network structure is one of the ways to disclose the complex system structures and functions in natural and social world. Examples include the small world network, scale-free network and network formation games and so on. This methods based on game theory can disclose the individual’s microcosmic decision mechanics and has distinct significances for correct understanding of networks in real environments. Currently, most researches focus how the external environments affect the economic behaviors, on the assumption that the players lie on fixed network etc, ignore the fact that players’action and network structure can interact. In this dissertation, the endogenous network models based on 2×2 game are developed to analyses how the link decision and action selection can interact. Some helpful conclusions are given and used to resolve some practical problem. Furthermore, a model for co-evolution of microcosmic game and network is developed.
First, the basic frame is built for strategic-form symmetric 2×2 game endogenous network game. After giving the stragetic-form description of the network formation problem based on 2×2 game according as the realistic situations, the models are classified to unilaterally link models and bilaterally link models by the way of link cost paying, and classified to direct link models and indirect link models. The definitions of efficiency and stability are given. These works provide the foundation for father research.
The results of unilaterally and bilaterally link models are studied using three classical games as the underlying games, which are Prisoner’s dilemma, hawk-dove game and coordination game. The conclusions show that the link cost has no effect on the actions selections for the game that has only single Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, the high link cost may cause the players to select Pareto dominance action for the game that has two equilibriums. The stable networks emerge mostly as the complete network, minimal connection network, star network and empty network.
On the assumption that agents adopt satisfaction decision rules and have ability to decide which link can be built, the network evolution models are developed based on bounded rational, which can provide a new explanation for the formation of the complex network. The prisoner’s dilemma and coordination game are respectively used to study the cooperation and convention evolution. By the way of multi-agent modeling tools, the simulations show the networks will exhibit the small world character on some parameter ranges. Furthermore, the intrinsic mechanism and difference between the Replicator Dynamics, exogenous and endogenous network evolution model are analyzed.
The application of indirect bilaterally link model to engineering project information integration at last. The problem for implementation of information plan can be described by heterogeneous indirect bilaterally link model. The bottlenecks are pointed out using the definition of stability and the solutions are provided by the way of benefit distribution or perquisite. The results show that the successful desigh of the information integration plan must not only focus on the information breakdown system but also analyze the stability of the plan based on the managers’decision.
论文首先研究了策略型内生网络博弈的基础理论。结合现实情景中的若干现象,在对基于两人对称博弈的网络形成问题进行规范描述的基础上,依据链接成本分担的方式,将模型划分为单边连接和双边连接;依据博弈对象的选择范围,将模型划分为直接连接和间接连接,并据此分别给出了有效性和稳定性的概念。这些概念和分类是策略型内生网络博弈研究的基础之一。
其次,分别针对单边连接和双边连接模型,研究了基于囚徒困境博弈、协调博弈和鹰鸽博弈三种两人对称博弈的内生网络模型。对于存在唯一Nash均衡的博弈,链接成本对参与者的行动选择没有影响;而对存在多个Nash均衡的博弈,较高的链接成本可以促使群体达到帕累托最优状态;两类模型中,稳定网络主要表现为完全网络、最小连通网络、中心发起者网络或空网络。
然后,在满意决策规则以及个体具有链接选择权利假设下,提出了一个基于个体有限理性的网络演化模型,从博弈角度对复杂网络的形成给出了新的解释。分别以囚徒困境和协调博弈作为基博弈研究了合作演化和制度演化问题,并采用基于多主体建模的方法对模型进行了仿真,结果表明在某些参数条件下,演化网络会表现出复杂网络的属性。在此基础上进一步探讨了复制者动态模型与网络演化模型的内在机理和区别。
最后,探讨了间接连接双边模型在水电工程项目管理信息集成方案推行中的应用。文中将信息集成方案的推行工作描述为一个异质性间接连接双边模型,分析了方案推行中的瓶颈,并从激励机制角度给出了改进建议。研究表明信息集成方案的制定,不能仅仅强调信息分解体系之间的关系,还需要从管理单元的微观决策角度分析信息集成方案的稳定性,这样才能保证方案的顺利实施。
The study of the network structure is one of the ways to disclose the complex system structures and functions in natural and social world. Examples include the small world network, scale-free network and network formation games and so on. This methods based on game theory can disclose the individual’s microcosmic decision mechanics and has distinct significances for correct understanding of networks in real environments. Currently, most researches focus how the external environments affect the economic behaviors, on the assumption that the players lie on fixed network etc, ignore the fact that players’action and network structure can interact. In this dissertation, the endogenous network models based on 2×2 game are developed to analyses how the link decision and action selection can interact. Some helpful conclusions are given and used to resolve some practical problem. Furthermore, a model for co-evolution of microcosmic game and network is developed.
First, the basic frame is built for strategic-form symmetric 2×2 game endogenous network game. After giving the stragetic-form description of the network formation problem based on 2×2 game according as the realistic situations, the models are classified to unilaterally link models and bilaterally link models by the way of link cost paying, and classified to direct link models and indirect link models. The definitions of efficiency and stability are given. These works provide the foundation for father research.
The results of unilaterally and bilaterally link models are studied using three classical games as the underlying games, which are Prisoner’s dilemma, hawk-dove game and coordination game. The conclusions show that the link cost has no effect on the actions selections for the game that has only single Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, the high link cost may cause the players to select Pareto dominance action for the game that has two equilibriums. The stable networks emerge mostly as the complete network, minimal connection network, star network and empty network.
On the assumption that agents adopt satisfaction decision rules and have ability to decide which link can be built, the network evolution models are developed based on bounded rational, which can provide a new explanation for the formation of the complex network. The prisoner’s dilemma and coordination game are respectively used to study the cooperation and convention evolution. By the way of multi-agent modeling tools, the simulations show the networks will exhibit the small world character on some parameter ranges. Furthermore, the intrinsic mechanism and difference between the Replicator Dynamics, exogenous and endogenous network evolution model are analyzed.
The application of indirect bilaterally link model to engineering project information integration at last. The problem for implementation of information plan can be described by heterogeneous indirect bilaterally link model. The bottlenecks are pointed out using the definition of stability and the solutions are provided by the way of benefit distribution or perquisite. The results show that the successful desigh of the information integration plan must not only focus on the information breakdown system but also analyze the stability of the plan based on the managers’decision.
引文
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