科技人才定价复杂性研究
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摘要
在快速变革,飞速发展的知识经济时代,国家和地区之间的竞争,是科技和知识的竞争,归根到底是科技人才的竞争。高素质创新型的科技人才是知识经济最稀缺的资源。本文以相关理论为基础,将现代非线性复杂性理论、预期理论和博弈理论运用到科技人才定价分析中,并结合人才市场和企业的实际情况,依次建立相关的模型,分析主体之间的互动策略和均衡,根据不同情况下供需双方的相互关系,分析科技人才定价预期的动态变化,进行仿真模拟,最后从科技人才定价激励和期权价值评估的角度对我国企业科技人才定价进行了探索性研究。本文的创新工作如下:
首先,当今时代,企业对科技人才的争夺日益激烈,本文应用博弈理论的相关知识,探讨了科技人才招聘过程的相关问题,建立了科技人才外部招聘博弈模型,并进行了博弈均衡规律的相关分析;同时建立了科技人才市场价格博弈复杂性模型,分析了其均衡点的特征,最后提出博弈定价策略,以保证企业与科技人才双方效用最大化。
其次,结合国内外研究工作,针对我国科技人才市场的不完善和信息不完全对称,本文在介绍相关理论的基础上,应用非均衡蛛网模型和预期理论建立科技人才预期动态博弈定价,并通过不同参数情况下的数值仿真分析了博弈主体间的复杂定价行为。
第三,由于企业中科技人才与企业所有人之间存在激励不相容的代理问题。本文应用委托代理理论分析委托人(企业所有者)和代理者(科技人才)之间的关系,建立确定环境和不确定环境情况下的委托-代理的最佳收益合同,并进行实证研究,以期对科技人才定价的激励问题进行修订定价探讨。
最后,科技人才管理活动具有明显的多阶段性,科技人才期权应该是基于人力资源管理活动的多期复合实物期权。本文借鉴期权理论方法,界定了科技人才复合实物期权的有关基本概念与特征,建立了科技人才价值复合实物期权评价模型,确定最终定价方式,以体现科技人才在企业价值创造中的重要作用。
本文较为系统地将科技人才定价理论与方法应用到科技人才市场和企业实际中,并专门针对科技人才进行科技人才定价模型的探索性研究,具有很强的实践指导意义以及较重要的理论研究和实际应用价值。
Under high dynamic knowledge economy backgrounds,competition among countries and regions the final analysis,are the competition between science and technology technology talents.High-quality science and technology are the most scarce resources in knowledge economy.In this paper,according on human theory, applied modern non-linear complexity theory and expect theory,game theory to scientific and technology talents pricing analysis,combin the actual situation of the technology talents market,establish relevant models,analysis of interaction strategy and balance between the main;according to different circumstances of both relationship between supply and demand,analysis of its dynamic change and simulation, Also from the point of view of the technology talents pricing incentives and options pricing of enterprises technology talents pricing carry out the exploratory research,with a view to the state,enterprises and scientific and technological technology talents supply and demand sides must provide strategic decision-making.
In this paper,the results are as follows:
First,Under the today era of increasingly intense competition for technology talents,technology talents technology talents price recruit aspect is critical.many enterprises and institutions are in agenda of procedure.Using the knowledge of the game theory,the article discusses existing conditions,builted model of outside recruitments,and analyses the game equilibrium,At the same time set up the complexity the game model of the scientific and technological technology talents’market,Analysis of the characteristics of its equilibrium points,Finally,put forward game pricing strategy,so as to ensure both sides can maximize their utility.
The second,On the basis of research work at home and abroad, Because of imperfections and information asymmetry completely China's technology talents market,In this paper,takes non-equilibrium cobweb model theory and expections to create dynamic game model of technology talents,analysis the main game between the complex causes complexity of behavior through numerical simulation,studies the formation mechanism of and strategies,In order to provide corresponding reference basis for decision-makers.
The third, Owing to the incompatible incentives of the agency problem between technology talents and business owners, This paper analysis of the relationship between principal-agent client(business owners) and agents (technology talents personnel) under the certain environment and uncertain environment to determine the best revenue contracts,and carry empirical research,In order to explore to revise the price incentives about technology talents technology talents.
4. There are clear multi-stages in Scientific and technological technology talents of technology talents management activities, technology talents options should be based on technology talents management activities of the multi-phase composite of real options. From options theory,This article defines the basic concepts and features of the the technology talents's real compound option,taking into account the technology talents management activities of the multi-stage features,under variable rate fluctuations the conditions of technology talents value of real compound options evaluation model,through effective methods. To reflect the scientific and technological technology talents technology talents important role in creating the value, To determine the final price.
This paper applys more systematic technology talents pricing theory and methods to science and technology market,and specifically for science and technology technology talents to carry out technology talents pricing exploratory research,with strong practice guiding significance,This study is the more important theoretical and practical value.
首先,当今时代,企业对科技人才的争夺日益激烈,本文应用博弈理论的相关知识,探讨了科技人才招聘过程的相关问题,建立了科技人才外部招聘博弈模型,并进行了博弈均衡规律的相关分析;同时建立了科技人才市场价格博弈复杂性模型,分析了其均衡点的特征,最后提出博弈定价策略,以保证企业与科技人才双方效用最大化。
其次,结合国内外研究工作,针对我国科技人才市场的不完善和信息不完全对称,本文在介绍相关理论的基础上,应用非均衡蛛网模型和预期理论建立科技人才预期动态博弈定价,并通过不同参数情况下的数值仿真分析了博弈主体间的复杂定价行为。
第三,由于企业中科技人才与企业所有人之间存在激励不相容的代理问题。本文应用委托代理理论分析委托人(企业所有者)和代理者(科技人才)之间的关系,建立确定环境和不确定环境情况下的委托-代理的最佳收益合同,并进行实证研究,以期对科技人才定价的激励问题进行修订定价探讨。
最后,科技人才管理活动具有明显的多阶段性,科技人才期权应该是基于人力资源管理活动的多期复合实物期权。本文借鉴期权理论方法,界定了科技人才复合实物期权的有关基本概念与特征,建立了科技人才价值复合实物期权评价模型,确定最终定价方式,以体现科技人才在企业价值创造中的重要作用。
本文较为系统地将科技人才定价理论与方法应用到科技人才市场和企业实际中,并专门针对科技人才进行科技人才定价模型的探索性研究,具有很强的实践指导意义以及较重要的理论研究和实际应用价值。
Under high dynamic knowledge economy backgrounds,competition among countries and regions the final analysis,are the competition between science and technology technology talents.High-quality science and technology are the most scarce resources in knowledge economy.In this paper,according on human theory, applied modern non-linear complexity theory and expect theory,game theory to scientific and technology talents pricing analysis,combin the actual situation of the technology talents market,establish relevant models,analysis of interaction strategy and balance between the main;according to different circumstances of both relationship between supply and demand,analysis of its dynamic change and simulation, Also from the point of view of the technology talents pricing incentives and options pricing of enterprises technology talents pricing carry out the exploratory research,with a view to the state,enterprises and scientific and technological technology talents supply and demand sides must provide strategic decision-making.
In this paper,the results are as follows:
First,Under the today era of increasingly intense competition for technology talents,technology talents technology talents price recruit aspect is critical.many enterprises and institutions are in agenda of procedure.Using the knowledge of the game theory,the article discusses existing conditions,builted model of outside recruitments,and analyses the game equilibrium,At the same time set up the complexity the game model of the scientific and technological technology talents’market,Analysis of the characteristics of its equilibrium points,Finally,put forward game pricing strategy,so as to ensure both sides can maximize their utility.
The second,On the basis of research work at home and abroad, Because of imperfections and information asymmetry completely China's technology talents market,In this paper,takes non-equilibrium cobweb model theory and expections to create dynamic game model of technology talents,analysis the main game between the complex causes complexity of behavior through numerical simulation,studies the formation mechanism of and strategies,In order to provide corresponding reference basis for decision-makers.
The third, Owing to the incompatible incentives of the agency problem between technology talents and business owners, This paper analysis of the relationship between principal-agent client(business owners) and agents (technology talents personnel) under the certain environment and uncertain environment to determine the best revenue contracts,and carry empirical research,In order to explore to revise the price incentives about technology talents technology talents.
4. There are clear multi-stages in Scientific and technological technology talents of technology talents management activities, technology talents options should be based on technology talents management activities of the multi-phase composite of real options. From options theory,This article defines the basic concepts and features of the the technology talents's real compound option,taking into account the technology talents management activities of the multi-stage features,under variable rate fluctuations the conditions of technology talents value of real compound options evaluation model,through effective methods. To reflect the scientific and technological technology talents technology talents important role in creating the value, To determine the final price.
This paper applys more systematic technology talents pricing theory and methods to science and technology market,and specifically for science and technology technology talents to carry out technology talents pricing exploratory research,with strong practice guiding significance,This study is the more important theoretical and practical value.
引文
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