企业技术专利商业化经营策略研究
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摘要
专利是法律概念之下无形知识资产的一种。在知识经济时代,专利是最具附加价值的商业资源,具有天然的资源属性和与之相应的经营属性。专利的经济价值的充分实现不仅依赖于法定权利保障与战略制度,更重要的是依赖于一个强必要条件——挖掘专利的优质资源属性,并加之以科学的经营与运作,即,企业可以在充分研究和利用专利的法律属性的基础上,通过恰当的经营策略,使得专利资源充分服务于利润、价值和能力的增长。为此,企业需要有系统性、微观化、全面且高效率的决策方案来合理经营专利这种优质资源,帮助企业提高专利产生能力、专利运用能力、专利扩张能力。现有文献的相关研究大多从制度和战略角度进行规划,量化研究的文献比较零散,而且大量微观问题还存在研究空白。
本论文在目前没有系统性、针对性、立足企业来研究企业技术专利商业化经营的研究现状下,依据其它研究领域的提示,以及对现实运作的观察,基于挖掘技术专利作为企业优质资源的经营属性,构建了一个企业技术专利商业化经营策略的研究和分析平台,从两大问题层面展开研究:“创造专利”策略问题层面和“专利成果”策略问题层面。“创造专利”策略主要探讨两个问题:专利权项目研发投资价值评估问题和专利介入(参与专利竞赛,为创新争取专利权)的策略问题;“专利成果”策略主要探讨的也是两个问题:专利成果的商业化价值判断和专利成果的商业化转化方法与策略问题。
本论文共八章,第一章是研究主题的概述,解释了论文的研究背景和研究意义,回顾了论文研究的理论基础和研究现状,并在综述现有文献的优势和不足的基础上,发现研究机会,提出论文的研究目标、研究方法,并概括论文的组织构架、研究内容、研究成果等。
第二章探讨专利权项目研发投资价值评估问题。本章用模糊理论来优化专利权项目研发投资价值评估方法,目的是改善现有评估方法的刚性化特征,实现柔性评估。提出和论证了一个分阶段模糊组合期权定价模型,算例结果证实了分阶段能够考虑到项目进行中可能的延迟、停止、中断、转移等灵活期权价值,且比NPV和不分阶段的模糊期权定价更有助于挖掘风险高、耗时长的项目的深度价值。
第三章研究企业是否以及何时进入专利权项目的研发投资程序并为其成果申请专利。根据专利关系的不同,首次区分竞争性专利和互补性专利分别讨论专利权介入决策。
(1)竞争性专利权介入决策的关键问题是研发投资时机的选择。本论文的博弈分析结果认为介入时机取决于延迟的期权价值和抢先行动的期望收益。单头垄断的投资时机是一个简单的等待期权,而双头垄断有两种均衡,当合作价值始终大于先动价值,形成合作均衡,两家企业同时等到投资临界点时进入(晚于单头垄断时);当合作价值与先动价值存在交点时,两家企业都有先动动机,其中一家在先动临界点处投资,另一家则在跟随临界点处跟进,形成先动者-跟随者均衡。
(2)互补性专利权介入有两种策略:分开申请专利和捆绑申请专利。本论文认为,分散成本c和研发耗时对决策起关键作用:①如果项目期望利润足够高、研发耗时足够短,竞争的两家企业都会参与整个项目的研发竞赛,并选择分开申请专利,否则,没有赢得创新1的企业会放弃创新2;②当c不是很高,耗时过长的互补性创新适合采用分开申请策略,发展迅速项目的则适合采用捆绑申请策略;③当c很高,如果贴现率r较大,研发耗时就成为一个主要衡量指标,耗时短的适用捆绑申请策略,否则未赢得创新1的企业放弃创新2;而如果r很小,无效的重复性研发成本是关键衡量因素,为了避免这个成本,互补性创新适用分开申请策略,且一家企业申请创新1的专利后,另一家企业退出竞赛。
第四章探讨专利成果的商业化价值判断。首先考虑多种影响因素同时综合作用,尤其是被现有评估模型忽略了的专利的时间贬损性和可替代性因素的影响,改进了专利成果初始价值的实物期权评估方法。此外,对专利成果价值判断的两个延展问题进行了深入研究,得到了相应的结论:①延迟投产的专利商业化开发行为会影响专利价值。除非企业有无限生产或供应能力,否则需要基于专利技术相关的新产品项目价值最大化来优化选择生产水平。优化的生产水平随着新产品价格、无风险利率以及延迟期限时间的增加而增大,随单位生产成本的增加而减小,随需求波动率的增大先增大后减小,但基本不受初始需求的影响;②为了提高利益各方促进专利成果转化的积极性,本论文从专利价值的角度提出和论证了专利商业化转化多方利益分配模式。当专利权属于科学家个人,Nash议价方法适用,而当专利权属于第三方组织,Shapley值法分配方式适用。
第五章和第六章研究专利成果商业化转化方法和策略。
专利资本化转化(专利融资)在我国还是一种几乎全新的专利经营概念和专利转化方式,第五章分析了专利融资各种运作形式的社会经济效率和价值、原理、风险、运作模式,以及运作过程中的重点和难点,并有针对性地提出完善我国专利融资制度的建议和对策。
第六章针对专利商品化交易中的逆向选择问题,提出并论证了两种优化价格契约的新的解决方案:约束供方诚信的“有代价承诺”信号机制,以及激励需方信任并接受供方良品契约的“委托-代理”价格契约机制。论证结果表明:①供方声称良品时,只要根据信号博弈机制伴随发出一个承诺信号,诚实的供方只产生很少的成本,而冒充良品的劣品供方因不能承受“承诺”成本而放弃冒充,从而保证良品的分离市场;②委托-代理价格契约机制能够保证信任供方良品的需方获得优化的生产水平和收益,从而激励需方信任并接受供方良品契约,抑制其接受劣品的侥幸心理和投机取巧行为。实践中,两种方案可以组合使用,先根据委托-代理机制优化设计专利商品化交易价格,然后根据信号机制设计一个伴随良品信号的承诺信号,全面保证良品的分离市场。
第六章对专利产品化策略问题的研究集中在产业化方式选择决策和新产品的定价:①提出和论证了基于实物期权的合作产业化价值增值评估模型,帮助量化分辨不同成本状态下合作产业化的优势,判断是否以及何时合作更体现专利价值;②消费者认知价值是创新产品定价的重要影响因素。基于此,本论文建立的“需求概率函数”巧妙联结产品价格、顾客保留价格和购买行为之间的内在关系,并用它修正利润函数,从而得到优化定价。论证结果表明“需求概率函数”能准确体现并影响新产品的市场扩散过程,即,适当低价会激励跟风购买者并扩大潜在市场规模,但过分低价又会损害自主购买者的效用,从而损害市场扩散;而如果提高产品的公认效用而价格不变,顾客保留价格会提高,从而加速市场扩散。
第七章初探性讨论了本论文研究成果的实践应用——构建一个企业技术创新专利商业化决策系统。本章设计了该决策系统的结构,归纳了其战略特征,以及本论文研究成果对该决策系统的贡献和支持,不过还未及时实现决策系统及其子模块的软件设计与实施,相关的应用研究可作为后续研究与实践方向之一。
第八章总结了本论文研究的结论、贡献、创新点和不足,并提出未来进一步研究的方向。
本论文研究的创新之处主要体现在:
(1)专利权项目的研发投资价值实物期权评估方法的分阶段模糊优化
提出和论证了一个分阶段模糊组合期权定价模型,目的是改善专利权项目投资价值评估方法的刚性化,实现柔性评估。论证的结果说明了这种分阶段的模糊优化评估方法的有效性和可行性,特别是有助于挖掘那些风险高、耗时长的专利权项目的投资机会。这种改进对研发项目投资价值评估方法的发展和完善也很有意义。
(2)根据专利关系不同,首次区分竞争性专利和互补性专利两个角度分别对企业技术专利商业化的专利权介入决策进行博弈分析
竞争性专利的专利权介入决策博弈分析研究了单头和双头垄断时的研发投资时机问题,详细分析了各自的均衡条件,是在现有研究基础上做的更深入的探讨。互补性专利的专利权介入决策博弈分析讨论了分开申请专利策略和捆绑申请专利策略的条件和时机,弥补了对该问题量化研究的空白。
(3)改进现有专利成果初始价值评估方法,并首次对专利成果商业化价值的两个延展问题进行量化研究
综合考虑专利的可替代性和时间贬损性这两个重要特征在内的多种特征因素的共同综合作用,而不是单独作用,修正专利成果商业化期权价评估模型,这使得对专利成果初始价值的评估更趋于合理和贴近现实。并首次对专利商业化价值的两个延展问题进行量化分析:对专利成果延迟商业化开发如何影响专利期权价值的研究结果解释了新产品价格、无风险利率、延迟期限时间、单位生产成本等多重因素的影响趋势,这会有助于企业理性决策创新产品的引进和投资计划;另外,探讨了专利权属不同时,为促进专利成果顺利转化,专利商业化利益如何在科学家、组织、生产企业之间进行分配,这是从利益分配的角度研究保护知识产权、保护创新动力,并且推动专利技术向生产力转化的有效方法或模式。
(4)针对技术专利成果的商品化交易过程中劣品驱逐良品的逆向选择问题,从约束供方诚信经营和激励需方信任良品两个角度提出新的、更具可行性的解决方案,全面保证良品的分离市场
“有代价承诺”信号博弈机制是约束供方、使之自觉诚信经营、提供真实而非虚假专利技术品质信息的机制。这种机制使得卖方不需要透露过多的技术秘密,买方也不需要尽可能多地了解卖方的质量信息就能达到分离市场的目的。而从激励需方的角度优化价格契约是本论文对该问题理论研究的重要补充和丰富。委托-代理价格契约机制能激励需方信任并接受供方良品契约,而不是放任接受劣品的投机取巧行为。实践中,两种方案组合使用可以更全面地保证良品的分离市场。
(5)专利产品化策略的量化研究极大丰富了专利商业化经营策略的理论研究成果
专利权人选择自主产业化还是合作产业化的相关量化研究是一个研究空白,本论文提出可以通过判断合作产业化相对于自主产业化的利润增值来判断是否合作及合作的条件,并提出和论证了合作产业化价值增值实物期权评估方法;此外,对创新产品的定价策略提出了新的方案,即基于消费者认知价值,构建了一个体现新产品价格、保留价格、市场需求三方关系的需求概率函数,以此修正相应的利润函数模型,得到优化的创新产品价格,讨论创新产品市场扩散过程中企业如何通过定价来影响新产品信息的扩散和产品利润。
Essentially, patent is one of the intangibly intellectual assets with legal concept. In the age of knowledge economy, patent is regarded as a kind of commercial resources with highly extra value, and with inherent resource attribute and relevant operational attribute. Achieving the economic value of patent not only depends on legal protection and strategical system, but more importantly depends on a strong necessary condition: drawing out the attribute of patent as excellent resource, and operating it with scientific solution, namely, based on utilizing adequately the law attribute of patent, enterprises make patent resources as an engine for improving their revenue, value and competence by appropriately operational polices of patent. Therefore, systemic, particular, comprehensive and efficient solutions are necessary for enterprises to operate this excellent patent resource, which include the solutions to improve the ability of creating patent, utilizing patent and outspreading patent. Some researches in present literatures have been done by academic experts and enterprises from the macro-strategic perspectives, mainly. However, quantitative researches are infrequent and scattered, and so many detailed problems are still blank in academic research field.
Based on digging out the predominant resource and operation attribute of patent, this dissertation constructs a comparatively integrated framework to study and analyze the tactics of commercialization operation for enterprises’technological patent, according to the hints from other research fields and the observations of enterprises’activities in real business because there are no more systematic and exact references in this research field. The reaserch of this dissertation is outspreaded from two problem layers:“creating patent”tactics layer and“patent achievement”tactics layer.“Creating patent”layer discusses two tactics problem: the R&D valuation of patent project; and patent competition.“Patent achievement”layer also discusses two tactics problem: the judgment of commercial value for technological patent; and the tactics of commercial transform and utilization for patent achievement.
This dissertation consists of eight chapters. Chapter one is introduction. It explains the background and significance of this dissertation, and reviews the present literatures. Based on summarizing the predominances and shortages of present research, this chapter describes the research opportunities, and gives a research proposal of this dissertation, including the research target, research methodology, research framework, contents and chievements.
Chapter two discusses the R&D valuation of patent project. The fuzzy theory can be used to optimaize the method of R&D valuation for patent project investment, thereby, to improve the rigidity of present method with flexiblility of fuzzy theory. This chapter put forwards and demonstrates a pricing model of multi-phase real options optimized with fuzzy arithmetic.“Multi-phase”considers the option value of delay, stop, interruption, and transfer in the process of project operation. This method is superior to NPV method and one-pahse method in valuating the time-consuming projects and the projects with high venture.
Chapter three discusses whether and when the enterprises start the process of R&D and apply patents for their achievements. Based on the patent relationship, the relevant policies of competitive patent and complementary patent are different. This differentiation is showed initially in this dissertation.
(1) The key point of racing policies of competitive patent is the opportunity selection of R&D investment. The analysis in this dissertation shows that investment opportunity is depend on the comparison of the expected revenue of preemption and the expected value of delayed options. The investment opportunity of Monopoly is just a simple waiting options, while there are two equilibriums for duopoly: the cooperative equilibrium, which is invested later than on monopoly condition, when the value of cooperation is always more than that of preemption; and the leader-follower equilibrium when the two values have intersection. Moreover, Critical point of investment is ahead because of the competition.
(2) There are two policies for complementary patent, one is applying patent for the complementary innovations separately, namely apply patent for any one of these complementary innovations immediately when it is completed. The other is bundling them until both of complementary innovations are completed, in order to apply a whole product patent. The scattering cost c and the expected time to achieve the innovation are the key effective factors for decision-making:①If the expect revenue is high enough, and the expect time is short enough, both competitors persist in two innovations, and apply patent separately, otherwise, the firm which lost the innovation1 will give up the innovation2;②If c is not too high, separate policy is appropriate for the complementary innovation which will take more time adopts, while bundling policy is right for the one that develops rapidly;③If c is too high, when the discount rate r is large, expect time is the main index, namely, separate policy for short time, otherwise, the firm which lost the innovation1 will give up the innovation2; And when the r is small, the ineffectively repeated R&D cost is the main index. To avoid this cost, separate policy is appropriate, and after one firm applies the patent of innovation1, the other firm quits.
Chapter four studies the judgment of commercial value for technological patent. Firstly, considering the simultaneously synthetic effect of multi-restriction, especially the restrictions of substitutability and time depreciation of patent which are always ignored by the previous valuation methods, this dissertation improves on the valuation model of patent initial value. Moreover, this chapter studies deeply two outspread problems of patent value, and gives the relevant conclusions:①Delayed commercial development has impact on the value of patent, manufacturers have to optimize their produce level based on maximized value of new product project related that patent, unless their ability of produce or supply is unlimited. The optimized produce level increases as the price of new product, risk-free interest rate, time expiration of delay increasing, while decreases as the unit cost increasing. As the volatility of demand increasing, the optimal produce level increases first, and decreases then. The primary demand has no impact on the optimal produce level generally;②To improve the activity of“stakeholders”to anticipate in the marketing transform of patent, this dissertation has put forward and demonstrated a multi-point profit distribution model for the commercialization of patent from the perspective of patent value. Nash bargaining solution is appropriate if the patent property belongs to scientist, and Shapley value algorithm is appropriate if the patent property belongs to the third-party organization. Chapter five and chapter six study the methods and tactics of commercial transfer of patent achievement.
Patent capitalization (patent financing) is almost a bran-new concept of patent operation and method of patent commercial transform in practice. Chapter five analyzes the economic efficiency and value, principle, venture, operation mode of some all kinds of patent financing, and their important points in operating process. Some pertinent suggestions for establishing and rectifying the institutions of patent financing in our country have been provided in this dissertation.
In chapter six, two new solutions are put forward and demonstrated for restraining adverse selection in patent trading market:“price-promise”signaling mechanism for patentee and“principles-agents”contract for licensee. The conclusions of analysis show that①if the patentee claim that the quality of licensed patent is“good”, an accompanied promise signal is necessary, which is designed according to the signaling game mechanism. So, there is little cost for the honest patentee, but the counterfeiter has to give up his counterfeit behavior because of the unbearable counterfeit cost in“Price-promise”signaling mechanism;②the“principles- agents”contract insures the licensee who trusts the patentee’s“good”patent gain the optimal revenue. Consequently, the licensee would like to accept the price contract of“good”patent, and give up the fluke and opportunistic mind for accepting“bad”patent. The combination of these two solutions can ensure the separate market of“good”patent comprehensively. Traders may design the contract of patent trading based on the“principles-agents”mechanism, and then design a“promise”signal accompanied with the“good patent”signal.
The research on patent industrialization in chapter six focuses on the decisions of the mode selection of patent industrialization and the pricing policy of new product:①putting forward and demonstrating the valuation model of cooperative industrialization value based on the real options theory. This model helps to distinguish the advantage of cooperative industrialization with different cost, sequentially helps to judge whether or when the cooperation reflects the patent value best;②the perceived value of customer is one of the most important influencing factors. According to this concept, a“probability of demand function”provided in this dissertation describes the inherent relationship in the price of innovative product, the reserved price of customer and the purchasing action. The optimal price induced from the profit function which is modified by the probability of demand function reflects exactly and effects the market diffusion. The conclusions of analysis show that appropriately low price motivates the imitative consumers’innovative purchasing action, and expands the potential market scale. However, the very low price damages the innovative consumers’purchasing utility, furthermore, damages the market diffusion. Moreover, the reserved price of consumers increased if increasing the public utility of product while the price was unchanged, therefore promoted the market diffusion of innovative product.
Chapter seven is the primary research about the application of achievements of this dissertation——constructing a patent commercialization decision system of technological innovation for enterprises. The framework of this decision system is designed in this chapter. The stratieigc characters of this decision system and the contribution and support of this dissertation to this decision system are also demonstrated. However, the design and practice of software about the decision system and its sub-module has not been actualized in time. The relevant application research will be one of the sequent research subjects in the future.
Chaper eight summarizes the conslusions contributions, original points and shortcoming of this dissertation. The sequent research directions in the future are also put forward.
The original points of this dissertation are presented as follows:
(1) Optimizing the investment valuation model for the project of patent technology with the multi-phase real options theory and the fuzzy arithmetic
Putting forward and demonstrating a pricing model of multi-phase real options optimized with fuzzy arithmetic to improve the rigidity of present method with flexible methodology. The conclusion shows the feasibility and efficiency of this improvement. It is significant for extracting out the deep value of the projects with high uncertainty and developing the valuation method theoretically.
(2) Base on the patent relationship, this dissertation discusses originally the policies of patent race about commercialization operation of technological patent with games theory from two perspectives: competitive patent and complementary patent
The research about the policies of patent race for competitive patent with game theory focuses on the opportunity selection of R&D investment for monopoly and duopoly, and analysis the respective condition of equilibrium. It is a great improvement on the previous researches. While the corresponding research for complementary patent forcuses on the condition and opportunity about applying patent for the complementary innovations separately, or bundling them until both of complementary innovations are completed in order to apply a whole product patent. This research fills in the blank of quantitative research about this problem.
(3) Improving present valuation method for patent achievement, and studies originally the two outspread problems about commercial value of patent with quantitative method
The valuation model of patent initial value is modified considering the simultaneous effect of multi-restriction, especially the substitutability and the time depreciation of patent. The valuating result from new valuation model is proved being more reasonable and realistic. Moreover, the quantitative analysis of two outspread problems about patent value is discussed originally: the reaserch on how the delayed development of patent to influence the patent’s option value explains the effects respectively from price of new product, risk-free interest rate, time expiration of delay, unit cost, and so on. This research will contribute to decide the introduction and investment plan of new product with new patent technology rationally; moreover, how the profit of patent commercialization to be distributed in scientist, organization, and manufacturer with different patentees is discussed, in order to impelling the patent transform. It is the efficient mode for protecting intellectual property, protecting motivation of innovation, and impelling the transform from technological patent to actual productivity, on the perspective of profit distribution.
(4) In order to constrain the adverse selection in the patent trading, put forwarding two new and more feasible solutions from the perspective of restricting patentee to be honest and the perspetive of motivating licensee to trust in the high qulity patent, therefore, protecting the separate marketing for“good”patent
The“price-promise”signaling mechanism ensures the patentee to be honest, namely, to provide the ture quality imformation of the licensed technology. In this mechanism, the“good”patent has its own separate market naturely, while the patentee keeps his technological secret, and the licensee doesn’t have to do his best to learn the quality information of the licensed technology. On the other hand, optimizing the price contract from the perspective of motivating the licensee is a important complementarity for the academic research about constraining the adverse selection. The“principles-agents”mechanism leads the licensee to accept the“good”patent contract rather than to give up his fluke mind. In practice, the combination of these two solutions provides comprehensive protection for the separate market of“good”patent.
(5) The quantitative research on the industrialization policies of patent in this dissertation enrichs the academic achievements about the commercial policies of patent
The quantitative research on the judgement of industrialization by cooperation or by itself for the patentee is blank in academic researches. The increment valuation model of cooperative industrialization value based on the real options theory which is put forward and demonstrated in this dissertation provides an efficient method to distinguish the advantage of industrialization by cooperation and by itself. Moreover, a new solution for pricing new product is proposed. Based on the perceived value of customer,“probability of demand function”which reflect the relationship of the price of innovative product, the reserved price of customer and the purchasing action is founded to modify the profit function, consequently induce the optimal price of new product, and discuss how the price to influence the marketing transform of new product and profit.
本论文在目前没有系统性、针对性、立足企业来研究企业技术专利商业化经营的研究现状下,依据其它研究领域的提示,以及对现实运作的观察,基于挖掘技术专利作为企业优质资源的经营属性,构建了一个企业技术专利商业化经营策略的研究和分析平台,从两大问题层面展开研究:“创造专利”策略问题层面和“专利成果”策略问题层面。“创造专利”策略主要探讨两个问题:专利权项目研发投资价值评估问题和专利介入(参与专利竞赛,为创新争取专利权)的策略问题;“专利成果”策略主要探讨的也是两个问题:专利成果的商业化价值判断和专利成果的商业化转化方法与策略问题。
本论文共八章,第一章是研究主题的概述,解释了论文的研究背景和研究意义,回顾了论文研究的理论基础和研究现状,并在综述现有文献的优势和不足的基础上,发现研究机会,提出论文的研究目标、研究方法,并概括论文的组织构架、研究内容、研究成果等。
第二章探讨专利权项目研发投资价值评估问题。本章用模糊理论来优化专利权项目研发投资价值评估方法,目的是改善现有评估方法的刚性化特征,实现柔性评估。提出和论证了一个分阶段模糊组合期权定价模型,算例结果证实了分阶段能够考虑到项目进行中可能的延迟、停止、中断、转移等灵活期权价值,且比NPV和不分阶段的模糊期权定价更有助于挖掘风险高、耗时长的项目的深度价值。
第三章研究企业是否以及何时进入专利权项目的研发投资程序并为其成果申请专利。根据专利关系的不同,首次区分竞争性专利和互补性专利分别讨论专利权介入决策。
(1)竞争性专利权介入决策的关键问题是研发投资时机的选择。本论文的博弈分析结果认为介入时机取决于延迟的期权价值和抢先行动的期望收益。单头垄断的投资时机是一个简单的等待期权,而双头垄断有两种均衡,当合作价值始终大于先动价值,形成合作均衡,两家企业同时等到投资临界点时进入(晚于单头垄断时);当合作价值与先动价值存在交点时,两家企业都有先动动机,其中一家在先动临界点处投资,另一家则在跟随临界点处跟进,形成先动者-跟随者均衡。
(2)互补性专利权介入有两种策略:分开申请专利和捆绑申请专利。本论文认为,分散成本c和研发耗时对决策起关键作用:①如果项目期望利润足够高、研发耗时足够短,竞争的两家企业都会参与整个项目的研发竞赛,并选择分开申请专利,否则,没有赢得创新1的企业会放弃创新2;②当c不是很高,耗时过长的互补性创新适合采用分开申请策略,发展迅速项目的则适合采用捆绑申请策略;③当c很高,如果贴现率r较大,研发耗时就成为一个主要衡量指标,耗时短的适用捆绑申请策略,否则未赢得创新1的企业放弃创新2;而如果r很小,无效的重复性研发成本是关键衡量因素,为了避免这个成本,互补性创新适用分开申请策略,且一家企业申请创新1的专利后,另一家企业退出竞赛。
第四章探讨专利成果的商业化价值判断。首先考虑多种影响因素同时综合作用,尤其是被现有评估模型忽略了的专利的时间贬损性和可替代性因素的影响,改进了专利成果初始价值的实物期权评估方法。此外,对专利成果价值判断的两个延展问题进行了深入研究,得到了相应的结论:①延迟投产的专利商业化开发行为会影响专利价值。除非企业有无限生产或供应能力,否则需要基于专利技术相关的新产品项目价值最大化来优化选择生产水平。优化的生产水平随着新产品价格、无风险利率以及延迟期限时间的增加而增大,随单位生产成本的增加而减小,随需求波动率的增大先增大后减小,但基本不受初始需求的影响;②为了提高利益各方促进专利成果转化的积极性,本论文从专利价值的角度提出和论证了专利商业化转化多方利益分配模式。当专利权属于科学家个人,Nash议价方法适用,而当专利权属于第三方组织,Shapley值法分配方式适用。
第五章和第六章研究专利成果商业化转化方法和策略。
专利资本化转化(专利融资)在我国还是一种几乎全新的专利经营概念和专利转化方式,第五章分析了专利融资各种运作形式的社会经济效率和价值、原理、风险、运作模式,以及运作过程中的重点和难点,并有针对性地提出完善我国专利融资制度的建议和对策。
第六章针对专利商品化交易中的逆向选择问题,提出并论证了两种优化价格契约的新的解决方案:约束供方诚信的“有代价承诺”信号机制,以及激励需方信任并接受供方良品契约的“委托-代理”价格契约机制。论证结果表明:①供方声称良品时,只要根据信号博弈机制伴随发出一个承诺信号,诚实的供方只产生很少的成本,而冒充良品的劣品供方因不能承受“承诺”成本而放弃冒充,从而保证良品的分离市场;②委托-代理价格契约机制能够保证信任供方良品的需方获得优化的生产水平和收益,从而激励需方信任并接受供方良品契约,抑制其接受劣品的侥幸心理和投机取巧行为。实践中,两种方案可以组合使用,先根据委托-代理机制优化设计专利商品化交易价格,然后根据信号机制设计一个伴随良品信号的承诺信号,全面保证良品的分离市场。
第六章对专利产品化策略问题的研究集中在产业化方式选择决策和新产品的定价:①提出和论证了基于实物期权的合作产业化价值增值评估模型,帮助量化分辨不同成本状态下合作产业化的优势,判断是否以及何时合作更体现专利价值;②消费者认知价值是创新产品定价的重要影响因素。基于此,本论文建立的“需求概率函数”巧妙联结产品价格、顾客保留价格和购买行为之间的内在关系,并用它修正利润函数,从而得到优化定价。论证结果表明“需求概率函数”能准确体现并影响新产品的市场扩散过程,即,适当低价会激励跟风购买者并扩大潜在市场规模,但过分低价又会损害自主购买者的效用,从而损害市场扩散;而如果提高产品的公认效用而价格不变,顾客保留价格会提高,从而加速市场扩散。
第七章初探性讨论了本论文研究成果的实践应用——构建一个企业技术创新专利商业化决策系统。本章设计了该决策系统的结构,归纳了其战略特征,以及本论文研究成果对该决策系统的贡献和支持,不过还未及时实现决策系统及其子模块的软件设计与实施,相关的应用研究可作为后续研究与实践方向之一。
第八章总结了本论文研究的结论、贡献、创新点和不足,并提出未来进一步研究的方向。
本论文研究的创新之处主要体现在:
(1)专利权项目的研发投资价值实物期权评估方法的分阶段模糊优化
提出和论证了一个分阶段模糊组合期权定价模型,目的是改善专利权项目投资价值评估方法的刚性化,实现柔性评估。论证的结果说明了这种分阶段的模糊优化评估方法的有效性和可行性,特别是有助于挖掘那些风险高、耗时长的专利权项目的投资机会。这种改进对研发项目投资价值评估方法的发展和完善也很有意义。
(2)根据专利关系不同,首次区分竞争性专利和互补性专利两个角度分别对企业技术专利商业化的专利权介入决策进行博弈分析
竞争性专利的专利权介入决策博弈分析研究了单头和双头垄断时的研发投资时机问题,详细分析了各自的均衡条件,是在现有研究基础上做的更深入的探讨。互补性专利的专利权介入决策博弈分析讨论了分开申请专利策略和捆绑申请专利策略的条件和时机,弥补了对该问题量化研究的空白。
(3)改进现有专利成果初始价值评估方法,并首次对专利成果商业化价值的两个延展问题进行量化研究
综合考虑专利的可替代性和时间贬损性这两个重要特征在内的多种特征因素的共同综合作用,而不是单独作用,修正专利成果商业化期权价评估模型,这使得对专利成果初始价值的评估更趋于合理和贴近现实。并首次对专利商业化价值的两个延展问题进行量化分析:对专利成果延迟商业化开发如何影响专利期权价值的研究结果解释了新产品价格、无风险利率、延迟期限时间、单位生产成本等多重因素的影响趋势,这会有助于企业理性决策创新产品的引进和投资计划;另外,探讨了专利权属不同时,为促进专利成果顺利转化,专利商业化利益如何在科学家、组织、生产企业之间进行分配,这是从利益分配的角度研究保护知识产权、保护创新动力,并且推动专利技术向生产力转化的有效方法或模式。
(4)针对技术专利成果的商品化交易过程中劣品驱逐良品的逆向选择问题,从约束供方诚信经营和激励需方信任良品两个角度提出新的、更具可行性的解决方案,全面保证良品的分离市场
“有代价承诺”信号博弈机制是约束供方、使之自觉诚信经营、提供真实而非虚假专利技术品质信息的机制。这种机制使得卖方不需要透露过多的技术秘密,买方也不需要尽可能多地了解卖方的质量信息就能达到分离市场的目的。而从激励需方的角度优化价格契约是本论文对该问题理论研究的重要补充和丰富。委托-代理价格契约机制能激励需方信任并接受供方良品契约,而不是放任接受劣品的投机取巧行为。实践中,两种方案组合使用可以更全面地保证良品的分离市场。
(5)专利产品化策略的量化研究极大丰富了专利商业化经营策略的理论研究成果
专利权人选择自主产业化还是合作产业化的相关量化研究是一个研究空白,本论文提出可以通过判断合作产业化相对于自主产业化的利润增值来判断是否合作及合作的条件,并提出和论证了合作产业化价值增值实物期权评估方法;此外,对创新产品的定价策略提出了新的方案,即基于消费者认知价值,构建了一个体现新产品价格、保留价格、市场需求三方关系的需求概率函数,以此修正相应的利润函数模型,得到优化的创新产品价格,讨论创新产品市场扩散过程中企业如何通过定价来影响新产品信息的扩散和产品利润。
Essentially, patent is one of the intangibly intellectual assets with legal concept. In the age of knowledge economy, patent is regarded as a kind of commercial resources with highly extra value, and with inherent resource attribute and relevant operational attribute. Achieving the economic value of patent not only depends on legal protection and strategical system, but more importantly depends on a strong necessary condition: drawing out the attribute of patent as excellent resource, and operating it with scientific solution, namely, based on utilizing adequately the law attribute of patent, enterprises make patent resources as an engine for improving their revenue, value and competence by appropriately operational polices of patent. Therefore, systemic, particular, comprehensive and efficient solutions are necessary for enterprises to operate this excellent patent resource, which include the solutions to improve the ability of creating patent, utilizing patent and outspreading patent. Some researches in present literatures have been done by academic experts and enterprises from the macro-strategic perspectives, mainly. However, quantitative researches are infrequent and scattered, and so many detailed problems are still blank in academic research field.
Based on digging out the predominant resource and operation attribute of patent, this dissertation constructs a comparatively integrated framework to study and analyze the tactics of commercialization operation for enterprises’technological patent, according to the hints from other research fields and the observations of enterprises’activities in real business because there are no more systematic and exact references in this research field. The reaserch of this dissertation is outspreaded from two problem layers:“creating patent”tactics layer and“patent achievement”tactics layer.“Creating patent”layer discusses two tactics problem: the R&D valuation of patent project; and patent competition.“Patent achievement”layer also discusses two tactics problem: the judgment of commercial value for technological patent; and the tactics of commercial transform and utilization for patent achievement.
This dissertation consists of eight chapters. Chapter one is introduction. It explains the background and significance of this dissertation, and reviews the present literatures. Based on summarizing the predominances and shortages of present research, this chapter describes the research opportunities, and gives a research proposal of this dissertation, including the research target, research methodology, research framework, contents and chievements.
Chapter two discusses the R&D valuation of patent project. The fuzzy theory can be used to optimaize the method of R&D valuation for patent project investment, thereby, to improve the rigidity of present method with flexiblility of fuzzy theory. This chapter put forwards and demonstrates a pricing model of multi-phase real options optimized with fuzzy arithmetic.“Multi-phase”considers the option value of delay, stop, interruption, and transfer in the process of project operation. This method is superior to NPV method and one-pahse method in valuating the time-consuming projects and the projects with high venture.
Chapter three discusses whether and when the enterprises start the process of R&D and apply patents for their achievements. Based on the patent relationship, the relevant policies of competitive patent and complementary patent are different. This differentiation is showed initially in this dissertation.
(1) The key point of racing policies of competitive patent is the opportunity selection of R&D investment. The analysis in this dissertation shows that investment opportunity is depend on the comparison of the expected revenue of preemption and the expected value of delayed options. The investment opportunity of Monopoly is just a simple waiting options, while there are two equilibriums for duopoly: the cooperative equilibrium, which is invested later than on monopoly condition, when the value of cooperation is always more than that of preemption; and the leader-follower equilibrium when the two values have intersection. Moreover, Critical point of investment is ahead because of the competition.
(2) There are two policies for complementary patent, one is applying patent for the complementary innovations separately, namely apply patent for any one of these complementary innovations immediately when it is completed. The other is bundling them until both of complementary innovations are completed, in order to apply a whole product patent. The scattering cost c and the expected time to achieve the innovation are the key effective factors for decision-making:①If the expect revenue is high enough, and the expect time is short enough, both competitors persist in two innovations, and apply patent separately, otherwise, the firm which lost the innovation1 will give up the innovation2;②If c is not too high, separate policy is appropriate for the complementary innovation which will take more time adopts, while bundling policy is right for the one that develops rapidly;③If c is too high, when the discount rate r is large, expect time is the main index, namely, separate policy for short time, otherwise, the firm which lost the innovation1 will give up the innovation2; And when the r is small, the ineffectively repeated R&D cost is the main index. To avoid this cost, separate policy is appropriate, and after one firm applies the patent of innovation1, the other firm quits.
Chapter four studies the judgment of commercial value for technological patent. Firstly, considering the simultaneously synthetic effect of multi-restriction, especially the restrictions of substitutability and time depreciation of patent which are always ignored by the previous valuation methods, this dissertation improves on the valuation model of patent initial value. Moreover, this chapter studies deeply two outspread problems of patent value, and gives the relevant conclusions:①Delayed commercial development has impact on the value of patent, manufacturers have to optimize their produce level based on maximized value of new product project related that patent, unless their ability of produce or supply is unlimited. The optimized produce level increases as the price of new product, risk-free interest rate, time expiration of delay increasing, while decreases as the unit cost increasing. As the volatility of demand increasing, the optimal produce level increases first, and decreases then. The primary demand has no impact on the optimal produce level generally;②To improve the activity of“stakeholders”to anticipate in the marketing transform of patent, this dissertation has put forward and demonstrated a multi-point profit distribution model for the commercialization of patent from the perspective of patent value. Nash bargaining solution is appropriate if the patent property belongs to scientist, and Shapley value algorithm is appropriate if the patent property belongs to the third-party organization. Chapter five and chapter six study the methods and tactics of commercial transfer of patent achievement.
Patent capitalization (patent financing) is almost a bran-new concept of patent operation and method of patent commercial transform in practice. Chapter five analyzes the economic efficiency and value, principle, venture, operation mode of some all kinds of patent financing, and their important points in operating process. Some pertinent suggestions for establishing and rectifying the institutions of patent financing in our country have been provided in this dissertation.
In chapter six, two new solutions are put forward and demonstrated for restraining adverse selection in patent trading market:“price-promise”signaling mechanism for patentee and“principles-agents”contract for licensee. The conclusions of analysis show that①if the patentee claim that the quality of licensed patent is“good”, an accompanied promise signal is necessary, which is designed according to the signaling game mechanism. So, there is little cost for the honest patentee, but the counterfeiter has to give up his counterfeit behavior because of the unbearable counterfeit cost in“Price-promise”signaling mechanism;②the“principles- agents”contract insures the licensee who trusts the patentee’s“good”patent gain the optimal revenue. Consequently, the licensee would like to accept the price contract of“good”patent, and give up the fluke and opportunistic mind for accepting“bad”patent. The combination of these two solutions can ensure the separate market of“good”patent comprehensively. Traders may design the contract of patent trading based on the“principles-agents”mechanism, and then design a“promise”signal accompanied with the“good patent”signal.
The research on patent industrialization in chapter six focuses on the decisions of the mode selection of patent industrialization and the pricing policy of new product:①putting forward and demonstrating the valuation model of cooperative industrialization value based on the real options theory. This model helps to distinguish the advantage of cooperative industrialization with different cost, sequentially helps to judge whether or when the cooperation reflects the patent value best;②the perceived value of customer is one of the most important influencing factors. According to this concept, a“probability of demand function”provided in this dissertation describes the inherent relationship in the price of innovative product, the reserved price of customer and the purchasing action. The optimal price induced from the profit function which is modified by the probability of demand function reflects exactly and effects the market diffusion. The conclusions of analysis show that appropriately low price motivates the imitative consumers’innovative purchasing action, and expands the potential market scale. However, the very low price damages the innovative consumers’purchasing utility, furthermore, damages the market diffusion. Moreover, the reserved price of consumers increased if increasing the public utility of product while the price was unchanged, therefore promoted the market diffusion of innovative product.
Chapter seven is the primary research about the application of achievements of this dissertation——constructing a patent commercialization decision system of technological innovation for enterprises. The framework of this decision system is designed in this chapter. The stratieigc characters of this decision system and the contribution and support of this dissertation to this decision system are also demonstrated. However, the design and practice of software about the decision system and its sub-module has not been actualized in time. The relevant application research will be one of the sequent research subjects in the future.
Chaper eight summarizes the conslusions contributions, original points and shortcoming of this dissertation. The sequent research directions in the future are also put forward.
The original points of this dissertation are presented as follows:
(1) Optimizing the investment valuation model for the project of patent technology with the multi-phase real options theory and the fuzzy arithmetic
Putting forward and demonstrating a pricing model of multi-phase real options optimized with fuzzy arithmetic to improve the rigidity of present method with flexible methodology. The conclusion shows the feasibility and efficiency of this improvement. It is significant for extracting out the deep value of the projects with high uncertainty and developing the valuation method theoretically.
(2) Base on the patent relationship, this dissertation discusses originally the policies of patent race about commercialization operation of technological patent with games theory from two perspectives: competitive patent and complementary patent
The research about the policies of patent race for competitive patent with game theory focuses on the opportunity selection of R&D investment for monopoly and duopoly, and analysis the respective condition of equilibrium. It is a great improvement on the previous researches. While the corresponding research for complementary patent forcuses on the condition and opportunity about applying patent for the complementary innovations separately, or bundling them until both of complementary innovations are completed in order to apply a whole product patent. This research fills in the blank of quantitative research about this problem.
(3) Improving present valuation method for patent achievement, and studies originally the two outspread problems about commercial value of patent with quantitative method
The valuation model of patent initial value is modified considering the simultaneous effect of multi-restriction, especially the substitutability and the time depreciation of patent. The valuating result from new valuation model is proved being more reasonable and realistic. Moreover, the quantitative analysis of two outspread problems about patent value is discussed originally: the reaserch on how the delayed development of patent to influence the patent’s option value explains the effects respectively from price of new product, risk-free interest rate, time expiration of delay, unit cost, and so on. This research will contribute to decide the introduction and investment plan of new product with new patent technology rationally; moreover, how the profit of patent commercialization to be distributed in scientist, organization, and manufacturer with different patentees is discussed, in order to impelling the patent transform. It is the efficient mode for protecting intellectual property, protecting motivation of innovation, and impelling the transform from technological patent to actual productivity, on the perspective of profit distribution.
(4) In order to constrain the adverse selection in the patent trading, put forwarding two new and more feasible solutions from the perspective of restricting patentee to be honest and the perspetive of motivating licensee to trust in the high qulity patent, therefore, protecting the separate marketing for“good”patent
The“price-promise”signaling mechanism ensures the patentee to be honest, namely, to provide the ture quality imformation of the licensed technology. In this mechanism, the“good”patent has its own separate market naturely, while the patentee keeps his technological secret, and the licensee doesn’t have to do his best to learn the quality information of the licensed technology. On the other hand, optimizing the price contract from the perspective of motivating the licensee is a important complementarity for the academic research about constraining the adverse selection. The“principles-agents”mechanism leads the licensee to accept the“good”patent contract rather than to give up his fluke mind. In practice, the combination of these two solutions provides comprehensive protection for the separate market of“good”patent.
(5) The quantitative research on the industrialization policies of patent in this dissertation enrichs the academic achievements about the commercial policies of patent
The quantitative research on the judgement of industrialization by cooperation or by itself for the patentee is blank in academic researches. The increment valuation model of cooperative industrialization value based on the real options theory which is put forward and demonstrated in this dissertation provides an efficient method to distinguish the advantage of industrialization by cooperation and by itself. Moreover, a new solution for pricing new product is proposed. Based on the perceived value of customer,“probability of demand function”which reflect the relationship of the price of innovative product, the reserved price of customer and the purchasing action is founded to modify the profit function, consequently induce the optimal price of new product, and discuss how the price to influence the marketing transform of new product and profit.
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