控制性股东治理风险与预警研究
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摘要
大量实证研究成果表明,现代公司所有权结构呈现越来越集中的趋势,集中股权结构已经取代分散股权结构而成为现代公司治理结构的主要特征。集中股权结构下,股东和经营者之间的代理问题的重要性已经被控制性股东和中小股东之间的代理问题所取代,控制性股东引发的代理问题成为现代公司治理的主要矛盾,控制性股东治理风险也因此成为现代公司治理风险重要之源。因此,规避控制性股东治理风险,建设以公司长期业绩和价值增值为导向的良性公司治理体制,实现控制性股东与其他利益相关者之间的良性互动,在当前的世界和包括中国在内的东亚市场显得尤为重要。
已有相关研究的不足是,缺乏将控制性股东治理风险纳入公司治理风险体系中的系统研究,对控制性股东在不同股权结构下的治理风险特征研究较少,对控制性股东治理风险产生的行为机理以及相应风险水平预警研究不多。
基于上述考虑,本论文以中国上市公司控制性股东治理风险预警作为研究主题,通过对中国违规公司的控制性股东治理风险实证分析,系统研究不同股权结构下的控制性股东治理风险特征,发现影响控制性股东治理风险的显性因素,在此基础上,根据中国资本市场的公司治理特征,构建控制性股东治理风险预警模型。
论文在对已有文献进行述评的基础上,应用混合博弈分析了控制性股东治理风险形成的行为机理,在此基础上从内外部公司治理机制对控制性股东治理风险传导的体制诱因进行了探讨。研究结果表明,控制性股东在对治理风险行为选择时,需要对所能获得的控制权超额私有收益额做出均衡,只有预期超额私有收益超过一定阈值时控制性股东治理风险才会发生。影响超额私有收益阈值水平的因素有:风险损失、公司内外部治理机制形成的风险约束、控制性股东治理风险行为选择偏好等因素。各种影响因素的相互作用可以降低控制性股东治理风险,不同股权结构下,各种因素发挥作用的机理不同。从公司长期、持续发展的视角看,控制性股东与中小股东及其他利益相关者应该建立共赢、和谐的公司治理机制。提高控制性股东对公司未来剩余收益的预期水平,加大控制性股东在公司的直接持股比例,优化股权结构,有利于公司持续发展。
在理论分析的基础上,利用中国上市公司2001-2007年7年中违规上市公司的数据,采用神经网络智能计算方法、方差分析等多元统计分析方法,对违规上市公司的控制性股东治理风险影响因素进行了实证分析和数据挖掘,辨识控制性股东治理风险的关键性影响因素,在此基础上构建了控制性股东治理风险的预警模型。应用2007年《沪深两市上市公司专项自检报告》所反映的公司治理质量水平对预警模型进行了效度检验。运用模型预警结果对2007年中国上市公司控制性股东治理风险进行了实证分析,实证结果验证了理论分析得出的结论。
过上述的研究工作,本文得到了如下结论:
第一、控制性股东治理风险是在不确定的内外部治理环境下,由风险损失、风险偏好以及风险约束等行为诱因,通过一定的公司治理途径形成的。在中国目前的公司治理体制中,公司股权结构、股东大会机制、董事会机制、监事会机制、公司股权流通状态、公司控制权与现金流权的偏离状况、公司资产规模、负债杠杆、公司投资价值、控制性股东类型特征、区域信用水平、法律环境等因素是影响控制性股东治理风险的重要因素。不同股权结构下,这些影响因素以不同的组合机制影响着控制性股东治理风险的风险损失、风险偏好以及风险约束,进而决定着控制性股东治理风险强度。
第二、不同股权结构控制性股东治理风险的特征是不同。相对而言,股权绝对集中型公司,公司内部的监事会机制、法律环境、区域信用环境等外部治理机制,以及公司内部人控制强度和控制性股东类型等因素的作用比较显著;股权相对集中型公司,股东之间的制衡机制、内部人持股状况、董事会机制、外部的市场机制、信用机制等因素作用比较显著;股权相对分散型公司,公司控制权与现金流权的偏离状况、董事会机制、监事会、以及控制性股东类型等因素对控制性股东治理风险的作用比较显著,而外部治理机制对控制性股东治理风险没有显著作用。
第三、我国信用机制、产品市场竞争机制等外部机制是法律治理机制的重要补充,对控制性股东治理风险的抑制具有较为显著的效果,加强我国信用体制、产品市场等外部机制建设有利于减低控制性股东治理风险;不同类型的控制性股东治理风险强度不同,相对而言,国有控股公司控制性股东身份信息披露比较透明,控制性股东治理风险相对弱化,因此加强我国上市公司控制性股东类型及相关的信息披露机制建设有利于抑制控制性股东治理风险。
From the beginning of 21st century, the governance risk of world-known companies, such as Enron, WorldCom, Xerox, and Pamalet caused the volatility to the capital market and the financial market, which makes people realize that corporate governance risk reduces the value of the company, furthermore, with the cumulative corporate governance risk, it will lead to the emergence of the financial crisis. Therefore, how to define the corporate governance risk, and prevent its accumulation and amplification becomes a key issue of corporate governance in the post-Enron era.
Many achievements of empirical studies indicate that the ownership structure of the modern companies presents the tendency of more and more centralized in the post-Enron era. The concentration of ownership structure which has replaced the dispersion of ownership structure becomes the main feature of modern corporate governance. In the concentrated ownership structure, the importance of agency problem between stockholders and managers has been replaced by the agency problem between the controlling shareholders and minority stockholders. The agency problem caused by the controlling shareholders becomes the principal contradiction, and the controlling shareholders governance risk also becomes the important source of the modern corporate governance risk. Therefore, it is very important to avoid the controlling shareholder governance risk, and construct the benign government environment orientated by the long-term performance and the value increment of the company, and realize the positive interaction between the controlling shareholders and other stakeholders in the current world and the East Asia market including China.
The deficiency of the related studies is that there is no systematic study on the integrating of the controlling shareholders governance risk into the corporate governance risk system, and there is less study on the controlling shareholders' governance behavior and function in the different ownership structure, and the behavior mechanism as well as the corresponding risk level measure caused by the controlling shareholders governance risk.
Based on the above thoughts, taking the early warning of the controlling shareholders governance risk of Chinese listed companies as the research topic, and by empirically analyzing the controlling shareholders governance risk of Chinese violated companies, this paper systematically studies the characteristics of the controlling shareholders' governance risk in the different ownership structure, and finds the dominant factors that influence the controlling shareholders' governance risk. On this basis, according to the characteristics of the Chinese capital market corporate governance, the early warning index system of the controlling shareholders' governance risk and the model of the risk warning are constructed.
Based on the review of the literature, this paper analyzes the controlling shareholders governance mechanism by using mixed gamble, and on this basis studies the cause of internal and external corporate governance mechanism to the controlling shareholders governance risk. The results show that when the controlling shareholders choose the governance risk behavior, it needs to make a balance to the available excess amount of private income of controlling right, when the expected excess return surpasses a certain level threshold, the controlling shareholders governance risk will be produced. The factors that influence the expected excess return threshold level include: the risk loss cost (violation penalties), risk-control mechanism due to internal and external governance mechanism (the probability of violation that may be found, the probability of small and medium-sized shareholders and other stakeholders to monitor), the controlling shareholders' risk preference (the probability of controlling shareholder to choose risk behaviors),ownership structure(controlling factors). Increasing the expected return of controlling shareholder risk management threshold levels can reduce the risk of shareholder governance. The interaction of various factors can reduce the risk of controlling shareholder governance, but the function of all factors is related to the ownership structure. In the different ownership structure, the mechanism of the function of all factors is different. From the company's long-term and sustainable development perspective, controlling shareholders and medium or small shareholders and other stakeholders should establish a cooperation, win-win situation, harmonious corporate governance mechanisms. If we want to keep sustainable development, we should increase the future level of the remaining proceeds and the ratio of direct holdings, and optimize the ownership structure.
Based on the theory analysis, using the data of Chinese violated listed companies from 2001 to 2007, utilizing the multiple statistical analysis methods, such as the intelligent neural network calculating method, variance analysis, the controlling shareholders governance risk factors of violated listed companies are empirically analyzed and data-mined, also the dominance factors that influence the controlling shareholders governance risk are determined, and on this basis, its warning model is instructed, and also the validity of the warning model is examined by using the quality of corporate governance reflected by The Special Self-Report of Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2007, and using the model warning results, the Chinese listed companies governance risk is empirically analyzed the results , the conclusions of theoretical analysis are confirmed by the empirical results .
Base on the above research work, the following conclusions are drawn:
Firstly, under the uncertain internal and external circumstances of governance, the governance risk of the controlling shareholders is come into being by the governance risk, governance preference and risk restriction. Under the current corporate governance system, the factors such as the control intensity of the controlling shareholders, the corporation ownership structure, the board of shareholders mechanism, the board of directors mechanism, the board of supervisors mechanism, the companies ownership circulating status, the deviation degree of the controlling shareholders' voting rights and cash flow rights, the capital size, the debt lever, the companies investment value, the actual controller type, the level of regional credit, the legal environment are important factors that influence the controlling shareholders governance risk cost, risk preference, the risk chance and the risk income. In the different ownership structure, these influencing factors in the different forming mechanism influence the controlling shareholders governance risk cost, risk preference, the risk chance and the risk income, and then decide the level of the controlling shareholders governance risk.
Secondly, the characteristics of the controlling shareholders' governance risk are not the same in the different ownership structure. Relatively, the ownership absolute concentration companies: such as the internal mechanism of the board of supervisors, the external legal environment and market environment, as well as the regional credit environment have the important effects to the forming and inhibiting of external governance mechanism; the ownership relative concentration companies: the factors such as the balancing mechanism among shareholders, the insiders ownership status, the board of shareholders mechanism, the external market environment and the credit mechanism have the important effects to the forming and inhibiting of the risk. The ownership relative concentration companies: the factors such as the balancing mechanism among shareholders, the insider ownership status, the board of shareholders mechanism, the external market environment and the credit mechanism have the important effects to the forming and inhibiting of the risk. The ownership relative dispersion companies: the factors such as the deviation degree of corporate control right and the cash flow right, the board of shareholders mechanism, the board of supervisors, as well as the type of controlling shareholders have the prominent function to the controlling shareholders' governance risk, and external governance mechanism has no significant inhibitory effect to the controlling shareholders' governance risk.
Thirdly, in China, external mechanisms such as credit mechanisms, product market competition mechanisms are important complementary law governance mechanisms, which have a significant inhibitory effect on risk management of the controlling shareholders. The strengthening of external mechanisms such as our credit system, market mechanisms product market mechanisms will help reduce the risk of controlling shareholder governance. Different types of controlling shareholder have different risk capacity. Relatively speaking, controlling shareholder of state-owned enterprises have better transparent information disclosure, and due to the existence of state-owned asset management sector and the corresponding role in the regulatory impact of state control, the risk of state-owned shareholder governance is relatively weak .Therefore, strengthening the controlling shareholder's information disclosure will help curb the risk of controlling shareholder governance.
已有相关研究的不足是,缺乏将控制性股东治理风险纳入公司治理风险体系中的系统研究,对控制性股东在不同股权结构下的治理风险特征研究较少,对控制性股东治理风险产生的行为机理以及相应风险水平预警研究不多。
基于上述考虑,本论文以中国上市公司控制性股东治理风险预警作为研究主题,通过对中国违规公司的控制性股东治理风险实证分析,系统研究不同股权结构下的控制性股东治理风险特征,发现影响控制性股东治理风险的显性因素,在此基础上,根据中国资本市场的公司治理特征,构建控制性股东治理风险预警模型。
论文在对已有文献进行述评的基础上,应用混合博弈分析了控制性股东治理风险形成的行为机理,在此基础上从内外部公司治理机制对控制性股东治理风险传导的体制诱因进行了探讨。研究结果表明,控制性股东在对治理风险行为选择时,需要对所能获得的控制权超额私有收益额做出均衡,只有预期超额私有收益超过一定阈值时控制性股东治理风险才会发生。影响超额私有收益阈值水平的因素有:风险损失、公司内外部治理机制形成的风险约束、控制性股东治理风险行为选择偏好等因素。各种影响因素的相互作用可以降低控制性股东治理风险,不同股权结构下,各种因素发挥作用的机理不同。从公司长期、持续发展的视角看,控制性股东与中小股东及其他利益相关者应该建立共赢、和谐的公司治理机制。提高控制性股东对公司未来剩余收益的预期水平,加大控制性股东在公司的直接持股比例,优化股权结构,有利于公司持续发展。
在理论分析的基础上,利用中国上市公司2001-2007年7年中违规上市公司的数据,采用神经网络智能计算方法、方差分析等多元统计分析方法,对违规上市公司的控制性股东治理风险影响因素进行了实证分析和数据挖掘,辨识控制性股东治理风险的关键性影响因素,在此基础上构建了控制性股东治理风险的预警模型。应用2007年《沪深两市上市公司专项自检报告》所反映的公司治理质量水平对预警模型进行了效度检验。运用模型预警结果对2007年中国上市公司控制性股东治理风险进行了实证分析,实证结果验证了理论分析得出的结论。
过上述的研究工作,本文得到了如下结论:
第一、控制性股东治理风险是在不确定的内外部治理环境下,由风险损失、风险偏好以及风险约束等行为诱因,通过一定的公司治理途径形成的。在中国目前的公司治理体制中,公司股权结构、股东大会机制、董事会机制、监事会机制、公司股权流通状态、公司控制权与现金流权的偏离状况、公司资产规模、负债杠杆、公司投资价值、控制性股东类型特征、区域信用水平、法律环境等因素是影响控制性股东治理风险的重要因素。不同股权结构下,这些影响因素以不同的组合机制影响着控制性股东治理风险的风险损失、风险偏好以及风险约束,进而决定着控制性股东治理风险强度。
第二、不同股权结构控制性股东治理风险的特征是不同。相对而言,股权绝对集中型公司,公司内部的监事会机制、法律环境、区域信用环境等外部治理机制,以及公司内部人控制强度和控制性股东类型等因素的作用比较显著;股权相对集中型公司,股东之间的制衡机制、内部人持股状况、董事会机制、外部的市场机制、信用机制等因素作用比较显著;股权相对分散型公司,公司控制权与现金流权的偏离状况、董事会机制、监事会、以及控制性股东类型等因素对控制性股东治理风险的作用比较显著,而外部治理机制对控制性股东治理风险没有显著作用。
第三、我国信用机制、产品市场竞争机制等外部机制是法律治理机制的重要补充,对控制性股东治理风险的抑制具有较为显著的效果,加强我国信用体制、产品市场等外部机制建设有利于减低控制性股东治理风险;不同类型的控制性股东治理风险强度不同,相对而言,国有控股公司控制性股东身份信息披露比较透明,控制性股东治理风险相对弱化,因此加强我国上市公司控制性股东类型及相关的信息披露机制建设有利于抑制控制性股东治理风险。
From the beginning of 21st century, the governance risk of world-known companies, such as Enron, WorldCom, Xerox, and Pamalet caused the volatility to the capital market and the financial market, which makes people realize that corporate governance risk reduces the value of the company, furthermore, with the cumulative corporate governance risk, it will lead to the emergence of the financial crisis. Therefore, how to define the corporate governance risk, and prevent its accumulation and amplification becomes a key issue of corporate governance in the post-Enron era.
Many achievements of empirical studies indicate that the ownership structure of the modern companies presents the tendency of more and more centralized in the post-Enron era. The concentration of ownership structure which has replaced the dispersion of ownership structure becomes the main feature of modern corporate governance. In the concentrated ownership structure, the importance of agency problem between stockholders and managers has been replaced by the agency problem between the controlling shareholders and minority stockholders. The agency problem caused by the controlling shareholders becomes the principal contradiction, and the controlling shareholders governance risk also becomes the important source of the modern corporate governance risk. Therefore, it is very important to avoid the controlling shareholder governance risk, and construct the benign government environment orientated by the long-term performance and the value increment of the company, and realize the positive interaction between the controlling shareholders and other stakeholders in the current world and the East Asia market including China.
The deficiency of the related studies is that there is no systematic study on the integrating of the controlling shareholders governance risk into the corporate governance risk system, and there is less study on the controlling shareholders' governance behavior and function in the different ownership structure, and the behavior mechanism as well as the corresponding risk level measure caused by the controlling shareholders governance risk.
Based on the above thoughts, taking the early warning of the controlling shareholders governance risk of Chinese listed companies as the research topic, and by empirically analyzing the controlling shareholders governance risk of Chinese violated companies, this paper systematically studies the characteristics of the controlling shareholders' governance risk in the different ownership structure, and finds the dominant factors that influence the controlling shareholders' governance risk. On this basis, according to the characteristics of the Chinese capital market corporate governance, the early warning index system of the controlling shareholders' governance risk and the model of the risk warning are constructed.
Based on the review of the literature, this paper analyzes the controlling shareholders governance mechanism by using mixed gamble, and on this basis studies the cause of internal and external corporate governance mechanism to the controlling shareholders governance risk. The results show that when the controlling shareholders choose the governance risk behavior, it needs to make a balance to the available excess amount of private income of controlling right, when the expected excess return surpasses a certain level threshold, the controlling shareholders governance risk will be produced. The factors that influence the expected excess return threshold level include: the risk loss cost (violation penalties), risk-control mechanism due to internal and external governance mechanism (the probability of violation that may be found, the probability of small and medium-sized shareholders and other stakeholders to monitor), the controlling shareholders' risk preference (the probability of controlling shareholder to choose risk behaviors),ownership structure(controlling factors). Increasing the expected return of controlling shareholder risk management threshold levels can reduce the risk of shareholder governance. The interaction of various factors can reduce the risk of controlling shareholder governance, but the function of all factors is related to the ownership structure. In the different ownership structure, the mechanism of the function of all factors is different. From the company's long-term and sustainable development perspective, controlling shareholders and medium or small shareholders and other stakeholders should establish a cooperation, win-win situation, harmonious corporate governance mechanisms. If we want to keep sustainable development, we should increase the future level of the remaining proceeds and the ratio of direct holdings, and optimize the ownership structure.
Based on the theory analysis, using the data of Chinese violated listed companies from 2001 to 2007, utilizing the multiple statistical analysis methods, such as the intelligent neural network calculating method, variance analysis, the controlling shareholders governance risk factors of violated listed companies are empirically analyzed and data-mined, also the dominance factors that influence the controlling shareholders governance risk are determined, and on this basis, its warning model is instructed, and also the validity of the warning model is examined by using the quality of corporate governance reflected by The Special Self-Report of Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2007, and using the model warning results, the Chinese listed companies governance risk is empirically analyzed the results , the conclusions of theoretical analysis are confirmed by the empirical results .
Base on the above research work, the following conclusions are drawn:
Firstly, under the uncertain internal and external circumstances of governance, the governance risk of the controlling shareholders is come into being by the governance risk, governance preference and risk restriction. Under the current corporate governance system, the factors such as the control intensity of the controlling shareholders, the corporation ownership structure, the board of shareholders mechanism, the board of directors mechanism, the board of supervisors mechanism, the companies ownership circulating status, the deviation degree of the controlling shareholders' voting rights and cash flow rights, the capital size, the debt lever, the companies investment value, the actual controller type, the level of regional credit, the legal environment are important factors that influence the controlling shareholders governance risk cost, risk preference, the risk chance and the risk income. In the different ownership structure, these influencing factors in the different forming mechanism influence the controlling shareholders governance risk cost, risk preference, the risk chance and the risk income, and then decide the level of the controlling shareholders governance risk.
Secondly, the characteristics of the controlling shareholders' governance risk are not the same in the different ownership structure. Relatively, the ownership absolute concentration companies: such as the internal mechanism of the board of supervisors, the external legal environment and market environment, as well as the regional credit environment have the important effects to the forming and inhibiting of external governance mechanism; the ownership relative concentration companies: the factors such as the balancing mechanism among shareholders, the insiders ownership status, the board of shareholders mechanism, the external market environment and the credit mechanism have the important effects to the forming and inhibiting of the risk. The ownership relative concentration companies: the factors such as the balancing mechanism among shareholders, the insider ownership status, the board of shareholders mechanism, the external market environment and the credit mechanism have the important effects to the forming and inhibiting of the risk. The ownership relative dispersion companies: the factors such as the deviation degree of corporate control right and the cash flow right, the board of shareholders mechanism, the board of supervisors, as well as the type of controlling shareholders have the prominent function to the controlling shareholders' governance risk, and external governance mechanism has no significant inhibitory effect to the controlling shareholders' governance risk.
Thirdly, in China, external mechanisms such as credit mechanisms, product market competition mechanisms are important complementary law governance mechanisms, which have a significant inhibitory effect on risk management of the controlling shareholders. The strengthening of external mechanisms such as our credit system, market mechanisms product market mechanisms will help reduce the risk of controlling shareholder governance. Different types of controlling shareholder have different risk capacity. Relatively speaking, controlling shareholder of state-owned enterprises have better transparent information disclosure, and due to the existence of state-owned asset management sector and the corresponding role in the regulatory impact of state control, the risk of state-owned shareholder governance is relatively weak .Therefore, strengthening the controlling shareholder's information disclosure will help curb the risk of controlling shareholder governance.
引文
[1]参见:甘培忠.公司控制权的正当行使[M].北京:法律出版社,2006,9
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[2]程序法:股东会的召集合举行要合乎公司法和公司章程的规定,董事会讨论决策公司的重大问题应当制作完备的纪录,存在关联交易时利益相关者应当回避表决,及时、准确、完整、没有误导和重大遗漏并清晰易懂地批露信息等。实体法:控制性股东不能占用公司资产,董事不能收受贿赂等。
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