网络型产业动态竞争理论研究
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摘要
分工、信息分工与网络效应已经成为社会和产业研究的热点,基于新的社会分工的信息分工,以及以网络效应为特点的新兴网络产业将对今后社会和经济发展起着长远影响,因而研究网络产业的内在本质,促进网络产业竞争和动态发展具有重要的现实意义。本文以网络型产业为研究对象,着重结合网络型产业的新现象和新特点进行研究,针对网络型产业的规制和竞争进行深入剖析。
网络外部性,也称网络效应,随着网络产业的迅猛发展而受到广泛关注,网络外部性将对产业的结构和发展起着深刻的影响。本文从网络外部性的本源进行深层探索,逐步揭示网络外部性的价值、价值分配,从其对需求、供给和均衡的影响,对规制和竞争价格和均衡的影响,对数量竞争均衡的影响,对非完全信息的激励、动态定价等方面的影响,以及在我国电信领域的竞争影响等角度来全面分析和研究网络型产业规制和动态竞争的规律,提出了科学合理的理论分析架构。主要研究成果包括以下几个方面:
1.扩充了网络外部性和网络效应的外延和内涵。网络效应在产业中极其广泛地存在着,或多或少,或直接或间接地影响着微观个体和宏观产业的存在和发展。网络效应起源于社会的分工,随着分工经济的发展而不断增强。网络效应有利于进一步推动社会分工,有利于降低交易费用,反过来交易费用的降低对网络效应和分工经济起着促进作用。网络效应将推动社会组织的多样性,既有利于主流组织的膨胀,同时也扶植弱小社会组织的存在和快速发展。
2.网络效应的价值决定于网络结构和网络规模,价值分配也因此而异。网络结构可以分为多种,网络的价值可分别以算术级数、几何级数和指数等形式递增。网络价值在个体间的分配也会因网络结构不同而不同,网络产品的消费者和生产者的价值分配形式多样。网络总价值和个体价值具有相关性,这种相关关系有多种可能形式。
3.网络效应对网络产品的需求和供给的影响势必影响供需均衡。正的网络外部性提高需求,降低和节省边际成本,因而有利于提高产出和增加社会福利。网络产品的需求曲线受到消费者的预期的影响,在预期准确实现时达到实现预期均衡。
4.存在网络外部性的规制和竞争动态理论。产品和服务具有网络外部性的网络型公共事业的规制并不同于一般的公共事业。引入时序等动态因素,分析和对比了受规制的竞争、不受规制的竞争、不受规制的垄断性竞争、不受规制的补贴性竞争等情形的Ramsey-Boiteux规制定价。
5.提出和论证存在网络外部性的古诺竞争均衡理论。将网络外部性引入古诺数量竞争模型,分别就预期值和预期函数等形式的网络外部性在完全兼容、互不兼容和不完全兼容等情形的均衡数量、价格、利润等全面深入分析和对比。
6.研究和分析不完全信息的网络动态竞争理论。将消费者偏好的非完全信息引入模型,把网络外部性、激励和动态定价结合起来,分析消费者、在位者和竞争者三者间的动态博弈和均衡。研究了消费者与垄断者相互作用对定价的影响,以及在位者与进入者在不同策略的情形下单期和两期的动态均衡定价。
论文的内容和章节安排如下:第一章为绪论,主要说明论文的研究背景和意义,以及网络外部性的概念和产业组织理论、外部性理论和网络外部性理论等相关文献的综述。第二章主要研究网络效应和网络价值及其相互关系,深入探讨网络价值的构成和分配。第三章论述网络外部性对网络型产业的需求和供给以及均衡的影响。第四章研究存在外部性的规制和竞争理论。第五章研究存在网络外部性的古诺竞争均衡理论。第六章研究不完全信息的网络动态竞争理论。分析消费者、在位者和竞争者三者间的动态博弈和均衡。第七章研究中国电信行业的规制和竞争改革进程,指出其发展方向。第八章对论文进行了总结,并对进一步的研究方向作出归纳。
While division of labour, division of information and network effect are hot spots of the social and industrial study, division of information based on new division of labour and newly network industries characterized by network effect may impact on the development of society and economy in the future, so it is realistically meaningful to research on internal essence and advance competition and dynamic evolution of network industries. This paper, network industry as object of analysis, aims at deep dissecting the regulation and competition in network industry by combining with new phenomena and new characteristics.
Network externality, also called as network effect, is concerned abroad with the swift growth of network industry and will deep influence the structure and development of the industry. We explore the fountain of network externality and unveil the value of network externality and its allocation step by step, analyze the law of regulation and competition in network industry from its impact on demand, supply and their equilibrium, on regulation and competitive price and equilibrium, on the quantity competition equilibrium, on incentive with incomplete information and dynamic pricing, on the competition of telecommunication industry in China, and propose the scientific framework of theory study. Main result of research includes:
1. The extension and meaning of network externality or network effect are expanded. Being numerous in industry, network effect works on the development of micro individual and macro industry more or less, directly or indirectly. Network effect comes of division of labour and increases with the development of division economy. It promotes division of labour more, and reduces transaction charge, in reverse, lower charge improve network effect and division economy. Network effect impulse the variety of social organization, both expands mainstream and props up the puniness.
2. The value of network effect and its allocation depend on the structure and size of network. While there are several network structures, the value of network increases arithmetically, geometrically or exponentially with its size. Its allocation depends on the structure, while the allocation formation is different between consumers and firms. The gross network value and individual value are relative by several ways.
3. Network effect influenceing the demand and supply of network goods certainly impacts the equilibrium. Positive network externality enhances demand, and reduces or saves marginal cost, so it can advance production and social welfare. The demand curve of network goods come under expectation of consumer, while equilibrium is realized if the expectation equals to actual size.
4. This paper puts forward and demonstrates regulation and dynamic competition theory with network externality. Network utility with network goods is different from traditional public utility. By introducing time order this paper analyzes and contrasts Ramsey-Boiteux pricing while the competition in or out of regulation, monopolistic and subsidy competition out of regulation.
5. It propounds and demonstrates Cournot competition equilibrium with network externality. Introducing network externality into Cournot competition model, studies and contrasts the equilibrium quantity, price and profit with the form of expectation value and expectation function while the goods are complete compatible, incompatible or incomplete compatible.
6. Research on the network dynamic competition theory under incomplete information. Introducing incomplete information about preference of consumer into model, combining with network externality, incentive and dynamic pricing, it analyzes dynamic game and equilibrium among consumer, incumbent and entrant and studies the interaction of consumer and monopolist and the dynamic equilibrium pricing of incumbent and entrant with different strategies.
The dissertation includes eight parts: At first it introduces the background, the purpose of this paper and the research status at present, the following is the introduction of the theory basis, the notion of network externality and the review of the research, including industry organization theory, externality theory and network externality theory. Chapter 2 analyzes the relation between network effect and its value; deep explores the structure and allocation of network value. Chapter 3 discusses Network effect influencing demand and supply of network goods and their equilibrium. Chapter 4 Brings forward and demonstrates regulation and dynamic competition theory with network externality. Chapter 5 discusses Cournot competition equilibrium theory with network externality. Chapter 6 Researches the network dynamic competition theory under incomplete information. Chapter 7 analyzes the regulation and competition reform course and proposes the development trend. The last chapter makes a conclusion of paper and states several topics in future research.
网络外部性,也称网络效应,随着网络产业的迅猛发展而受到广泛关注,网络外部性将对产业的结构和发展起着深刻的影响。本文从网络外部性的本源进行深层探索,逐步揭示网络外部性的价值、价值分配,从其对需求、供给和均衡的影响,对规制和竞争价格和均衡的影响,对数量竞争均衡的影响,对非完全信息的激励、动态定价等方面的影响,以及在我国电信领域的竞争影响等角度来全面分析和研究网络型产业规制和动态竞争的规律,提出了科学合理的理论分析架构。主要研究成果包括以下几个方面:
1.扩充了网络外部性和网络效应的外延和内涵。网络效应在产业中极其广泛地存在着,或多或少,或直接或间接地影响着微观个体和宏观产业的存在和发展。网络效应起源于社会的分工,随着分工经济的发展而不断增强。网络效应有利于进一步推动社会分工,有利于降低交易费用,反过来交易费用的降低对网络效应和分工经济起着促进作用。网络效应将推动社会组织的多样性,既有利于主流组织的膨胀,同时也扶植弱小社会组织的存在和快速发展。
2.网络效应的价值决定于网络结构和网络规模,价值分配也因此而异。网络结构可以分为多种,网络的价值可分别以算术级数、几何级数和指数等形式递增。网络价值在个体间的分配也会因网络结构不同而不同,网络产品的消费者和生产者的价值分配形式多样。网络总价值和个体价值具有相关性,这种相关关系有多种可能形式。
3.网络效应对网络产品的需求和供给的影响势必影响供需均衡。正的网络外部性提高需求,降低和节省边际成本,因而有利于提高产出和增加社会福利。网络产品的需求曲线受到消费者的预期的影响,在预期准确实现时达到实现预期均衡。
4.存在网络外部性的规制和竞争动态理论。产品和服务具有网络外部性的网络型公共事业的规制并不同于一般的公共事业。引入时序等动态因素,分析和对比了受规制的竞争、不受规制的竞争、不受规制的垄断性竞争、不受规制的补贴性竞争等情形的Ramsey-Boiteux规制定价。
5.提出和论证存在网络外部性的古诺竞争均衡理论。将网络外部性引入古诺数量竞争模型,分别就预期值和预期函数等形式的网络外部性在完全兼容、互不兼容和不完全兼容等情形的均衡数量、价格、利润等全面深入分析和对比。
6.研究和分析不完全信息的网络动态竞争理论。将消费者偏好的非完全信息引入模型,把网络外部性、激励和动态定价结合起来,分析消费者、在位者和竞争者三者间的动态博弈和均衡。研究了消费者与垄断者相互作用对定价的影响,以及在位者与进入者在不同策略的情形下单期和两期的动态均衡定价。
论文的内容和章节安排如下:第一章为绪论,主要说明论文的研究背景和意义,以及网络外部性的概念和产业组织理论、外部性理论和网络外部性理论等相关文献的综述。第二章主要研究网络效应和网络价值及其相互关系,深入探讨网络价值的构成和分配。第三章论述网络外部性对网络型产业的需求和供给以及均衡的影响。第四章研究存在外部性的规制和竞争理论。第五章研究存在网络外部性的古诺竞争均衡理论。第六章研究不完全信息的网络动态竞争理论。分析消费者、在位者和竞争者三者间的动态博弈和均衡。第七章研究中国电信行业的规制和竞争改革进程,指出其发展方向。第八章对论文进行了总结,并对进一步的研究方向作出归纳。
While division of labour, division of information and network effect are hot spots of the social and industrial study, division of information based on new division of labour and newly network industries characterized by network effect may impact on the development of society and economy in the future, so it is realistically meaningful to research on internal essence and advance competition and dynamic evolution of network industries. This paper, network industry as object of analysis, aims at deep dissecting the regulation and competition in network industry by combining with new phenomena and new characteristics.
Network externality, also called as network effect, is concerned abroad with the swift growth of network industry and will deep influence the structure and development of the industry. We explore the fountain of network externality and unveil the value of network externality and its allocation step by step, analyze the law of regulation and competition in network industry from its impact on demand, supply and their equilibrium, on regulation and competitive price and equilibrium, on the quantity competition equilibrium, on incentive with incomplete information and dynamic pricing, on the competition of telecommunication industry in China, and propose the scientific framework of theory study. Main result of research includes:
1. The extension and meaning of network externality or network effect are expanded. Being numerous in industry, network effect works on the development of micro individual and macro industry more or less, directly or indirectly. Network effect comes of division of labour and increases with the development of division economy. It promotes division of labour more, and reduces transaction charge, in reverse, lower charge improve network effect and division economy. Network effect impulse the variety of social organization, both expands mainstream and props up the puniness.
2. The value of network effect and its allocation depend on the structure and size of network. While there are several network structures, the value of network increases arithmetically, geometrically or exponentially with its size. Its allocation depends on the structure, while the allocation formation is different between consumers and firms. The gross network value and individual value are relative by several ways.
3. Network effect influenceing the demand and supply of network goods certainly impacts the equilibrium. Positive network externality enhances demand, and reduces or saves marginal cost, so it can advance production and social welfare. The demand curve of network goods come under expectation of consumer, while equilibrium is realized if the expectation equals to actual size.
4. This paper puts forward and demonstrates regulation and dynamic competition theory with network externality. Network utility with network goods is different from traditional public utility. By introducing time order this paper analyzes and contrasts Ramsey-Boiteux pricing while the competition in or out of regulation, monopolistic and subsidy competition out of regulation.
5. It propounds and demonstrates Cournot competition equilibrium with network externality. Introducing network externality into Cournot competition model, studies and contrasts the equilibrium quantity, price and profit with the form of expectation value and expectation function while the goods are complete compatible, incompatible or incomplete compatible.
6. Research on the network dynamic competition theory under incomplete information. Introducing incomplete information about preference of consumer into model, combining with network externality, incentive and dynamic pricing, it analyzes dynamic game and equilibrium among consumer, incumbent and entrant and studies the interaction of consumer and monopolist and the dynamic equilibrium pricing of incumbent and entrant with different strategies.
The dissertation includes eight parts: At first it introduces the background, the purpose of this paper and the research status at present, the following is the introduction of the theory basis, the notion of network externality and the review of the research, including industry organization theory, externality theory and network externality theory. Chapter 2 analyzes the relation between network effect and its value; deep explores the structure and allocation of network value. Chapter 3 discusses Network effect influencing demand and supply of network goods and their equilibrium. Chapter 4 Brings forward and demonstrates regulation and dynamic competition theory with network externality. Chapter 5 discusses Cournot competition equilibrium theory with network externality. Chapter 6 Researches the network dynamic competition theory under incomplete information. Chapter 7 analyzes the regulation and competition reform course and proposes the development trend. The last chapter makes a conclusion of paper and states several topics in future research.
引文
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Mandy, D. 1992. Nonuniform Bertrand Competition. Econometrica Vol. 60, pp. 1293-1330.
Maskin, E., and J. Riley. 1984. Monopoly with Incomplete Information, RAND Journal of Economics, 15,171-196.
Mckean, R., and M. Jacquelene. 1975. Browning 'Externalities from Government and Non-profit Sectors. Canadian Journal of Economics, 8 (4): 574-590.
Mendelson, H. 1985. Pricing Computer Services: Queuing Effects. Communications of the ACM Vol. 28, pp. 312-321.
Mendelson, H., and Whang, S. 1990. Optimal Incentive-Compatible Priority Pricing for the M/M/1 queue. Operations Research Vol. 38, pp. 870-883.
Methe, D., R. Toyama, J. Miyabe. 1997. Product Development Strategy and Organizational Learning: A Tale of Two PC Makers. The Journal of Product Innovation Management, September.
Methe, D., W. Mitchell, J. Miyabe and R. Toyama. 1998. Overcoming a Standard Bearer: Challenges to NEC's Personal Computer in Japan RIEB Working Paper, Kobe Univeristy, Kobe Japan.
Mirlees, J. 1995. Private Risk and Public Action: The Economics of The Welfare State, European Economic Review (39), 383-397.
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Liebowitz, S. J., and S. E. Margolis. 1994. Network Externality: A Common Tragedy, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8,133-150.
Linda Harris Dobkins. 1996. Location, Innovation and Trade: The Role of Localization and Nation-based Externalities . Re-gional Science and Urban Economics, 26: 591-612.
Lindahl, E. 1919, Just Taxation - A Positive Solution. Classics in the Public Finance. London: Macmillan, 1958.
Mandy, D. 1992. Nonuniform Bertrand Competition. Econometrica Vol. 60, pp. 1293-1330.
Maskin, E., and J. Riley. 1984. Monopoly with Incomplete Information, RAND Journal of Economics, 15,171-196.
Mckean, R., and M. Jacquelene. 1975. Browning 'Externalities from Government and Non-profit Sectors. Canadian Journal of Economics, 8 (4): 574-590.
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Mirlees, J. 1995. Private Risk and Public Action: The Economics of The Welfare State, European Economic Review (39), 383-397.
Nelson R., R. Sidney and G Winter. 2002. Evolutionary Theorizing in Economics . Journal of Economic Perspectives Volume, 16: 25-46.
Pigou, A. C. 1928. A Study in Public Finance. London: Macmillan
Pigou, A. C. 1960. The Economics of Welfare, Fourth edition . Macmillan, London, 1960: 170-192.
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Rochet, J., and J. Tirole. 2002. Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, IDEI working paper, Toulouse.
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Rochet, J., and P. Chone. 1998. Ironing, Sweeping and Multidimensional Screening. Econometrica Vol. 66, pp. 783-826.
Rohlfs, J. 1974. A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communication Service. Bell Journal of Economics Vol. 10, pp. 16-37.
Salani'e, B. 1997. The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Salop, S. C. 1979. Strategic Entry Deterrence, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 69, pp. 335-358.
Samuelson, P. A. 1954. The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, Review of Economics and Statistics (36), 387-389.
Scherer, F. M. 1988. The Economics of Market Dominance, Basil Blackwell: Oxford, in International Journal of Industrial Organization, 6, pp. 517-518.
Schmalensee, R. 1988. Industrial Economics: An Overview, Economic Journal, 98, pp.675-676.
Schmalensee, R. 1999. Written testimony, Civil Action No. 98-1232 United States versus Microsoft,. Available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/schmal/ schmal. asp. 34
Scttovsky, T. 1954. Two Concepts of External Economies. Journal of Political Economy, 62: 143-151.
Segal, I. 1999. Contracting with Externalities, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114,337-388.
Segal, I. 2002. Coordination and Discrimination in Contracting with Externalities: Divide and Conquer? Forthcoming Journal of Economic Theory.
Segal, I., and M. Whinston. 2001. Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities. Working Paper #0027, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization, Northwestern University.
Segaller, S. 1998. Nerds: A Brief History of the Internet, NY: TV Books. Sen, A. 1996. Introduction to Industrial Organization, 1st ed. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Shapiro, C., and H. Varian. 1999. Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Sibley, D., and P. Sriganesh. 1997. Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing with Multiple Taste Characteristics. Rand Journal of Economics Vol. 28, pp. 684-707.
Spence, A. M. 1977. Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing. Bell Journal of Economics Vol. 8, pp. 534-547.
Stigler, G. J. 1968. The Organization of Industry, Illinois: Irvin Press.
Stole, L. 1995. Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy Vol. 4, pp. 529-562.
Sundararajan, A. 2002. Nonlinear Pricing of Information Goods. Working Paper #IS-02-01, Center for Digital Economy Research, New York University.
Sundararajan, A. 2003. Nonlinear Pricing with Network Effects, working paper, New York University.
Swann, G. M. P. 2002. The Function Form of Network Effects Information Economics and Policy 14, pp. 417-429
Tassey, G. 1995. The Role of Standards as Technology Infrastructure, in Standards, Innovation and Competitiveness: The Politics and Economics of Standards in Natural and Technical Environments, edited by R. Hawkins, R. Mansell, J. Skea, Aldershot, UK and Brookfield, US: Edward Elgar.
Tirole, J. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 1-10.
Tullock, G. 1998. Externalities and Government. Public Choice, 96: pp. 411-415.
Varian, H. 1992. Microeconomic Analysis (Third Edition), W. W. Norton & Company,Inc.
Varian, H. 1994. A Solution to The Problem of Externalities When Agents are Well-informed, American Economic Review (84), 1278-1293.
Varian, H. 1995. Coase, Competition, and Compensation, Japan and the world economy(7),13-27.
Varian,H.,and C.Shapiro.1998.Information Rules.Cambridge:Harvard Business School Press.
Vatn A.,and D.W.Bromley.1994.Choices without prices without apologies.Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,26:129-148.
Vickrey,W.1955.Some Implication of Marginal Cost Pricing for Public Utilities,American Economic Review,45(2),pp.605-620
Vivex,X.1990.Nash Equilibrium with Strategic Complementarities,Journal of Mathematical Economics,19(3),305-321.
WAP Forum.2001.Status of WAP,Presentation at WAP Australia,May 2001,http://www.wapforum.org/new/index.htm.
West,J.,and J.Dedrick.2000.Innovation and Control in Standards Architectures:The Rise and Fall of Japans PC-98,Information Systems Research,11,2(June),197-216.
Westland,C.1992.Congestion and Network Externalities in the Short-Run Pricing of Information Systems Services.Management Science Vol.38,pp.992-1009.
Williamson O.E.1985.The Economic Institutions of Capitalism,New York:Free Press.
Williamson O.E.1989.Transaction Cost Economics,in Schmalensee,R.,and Willig,R.D.eds.) Handbook of Industrial Organization,Amsterdam,NorthHolland:Elsevier Science Publishers.
Wilson,R.1993.Nonlinear Pricing.New York:Oxford University Press.
Windrum,P.,and G.M.P.Swann.1999.Networks,Noise and Navigation:Sustaining Metcalf's Law through Technology,MERIT Research Memorandum 99-009,University of Maastricht.
杨小凯,1998,经济学原理,北京,中国社会科学出版社。