政治联系对企业价值的影响研究
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摘要
政治联系是关乎企业生存发展的一种重要经济行为，给企业价值带来巨大影响。然而，目前我国上市公司企业价值的考量多以财务因素作为判断依据，对政治联系因素考虑较少。鉴于此，本文对我国上市公司政治联系与企业价值的关系进行研究，理论分析政治联系影响企业价值，并揭示政治联系影响企业价值的机理，以丰富政治联系与企业价值的相关研究，有效指导投资者的投资实践。主要内容包括：
理论分析政治联系对上市公司企业价值的影响。以资源基础理论、委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、寻租理论以及生命周期理论为基础，运用文献分析法和规范分析法，分析政治联系对上市公司企业价值的影响。在理论分析中，以上市公司管理层人员的政治背景为考察政治联系的替代变量，对政治联系各相关变量进行研究，并最终确定从内在分析上市公司政治联系动因及传导过程，从外在分别以不同行业、不同所有制、不同生命周期阶段三个角度进行实证研究，以此作为全文研究的理论基础。
通过政治联系对企业价值影响的内在机理研究，本文揭示了基于企业价值提升的上市公司政治联系的动因、方式和内在交互作用。以委托代理理论为基础，研究发现政治联系的动机是提升工作成绩获取经济利益，旨在进行权利、利益的寻租；在政治联系方式选择研究中，发现上市公司更倾向于选择聘用制的形式建立政治联系；多元回归分析还证实了政治联系强度、政治联系深度以及政治联系增长度之间的交互作用。
通过对不同行业政治联系对企业价值的影响研究，发现政治联系综合能力强的行业，其政治联系对企业价值具有积极影响；而政治联系综合能力较弱的的行业，其政治联系对企业价值具有消极影响。自然垄断行业的政治联系强度对企业价值具有积极影响，而竞争较为充分的行业其政治联系强度对企业价值的影响具有消极作用。受地方保护主义影响较大的行业，其政治联系深度越大，对该行业上市公司的企业价值越不利。政治联系增长快的行业，其企业价值并未得到相应的提升；而政治联系发展平稳缓慢的行业，反而有利于所在行业企业价值的提升。
通过对不同所有制上市公司政治联系对企业价值的影响研究，揭示因所有制结构的不同，而导致政治联系对上市公司企业价值影响的差异性。结果表明，政治联系对上市公司企业价值的影响，无论在国有企业或是非国有企业总体上均对企业价值具有积极影响，其中，非国有上市公司的政治联系综合能力略大于国有企业。
通过对不同生命周期阶段的上市公司政治联系对企业价值的影响研究，发现在上市公司的初创期和成熟期，政治联系综合能力指标对企业价值具有显著消极影响，扮演了“掠夺之手”的角色；而在成长期和衰退期，政治联系综合能力指标对企业价值具有显著积极影响，扮演了“扶持之手”的角色。政治联系综合能力指标下的各子指标对企业价值也具有不同程度的直接影响或间接影响。
国内外学者在进行政治联系与企业价值的关系研究时大都基于单一视角，本文基于政治联系指标的综合分析构建。从理论上看，本研究可以为政治联系与企业价值的进一步研究提供理论依据；有助于丰富和完善政治联系的理论内涵，丰富企业价值理论；有助于揭示政治联系对企业价值的影响机理和影响效应。从实践上看，本研究有助于上市公司完善管理经济行为，合理披露政治联系的相关信息，提升公司市场价值；有助于投资者重视政治联系因素并依此对企业价值进行判断，做出科学的投资决策；有助于政府及中介各方明确各自的责任与作用，促进资本市场的健康稳定发展。
As an important economic behavior, political connection is related to survival and development of the enterprises. It will bring the tremendous influence to the enterprise value. However, at present, the listing corporation enterprise value considerations to financial factors as the basis of judgment, the political connection was less considered. In view of this, this paper researched the relation between political connections and firm value, and theoretical analysis of political connections affect the firm value. This research reveal the political connections affect the enterprise value, the related study will rich the theory of political connections and the value of the enterprise, and guide the investors investment practice more effectively. The main contents contain:
The study analyses the influence between the political connection and firm value on the listing corporation of china. This research based on the resource theory, the principal-agent theory, the asymmetric information theory, the rent-seeking theory and the life-cycle theory as the basis, it using literature analysis and normative analysis, analysis the influence of political connection on enterprise value. The political background of senior executives as an alternative variable, and ultimately determine the process from the motivation and conduction of listing corporation political relationship, the empirical research from the three angles of the external respectively to different industries, different ownership, different life cycle stage, as the theoretical basis of this thesis.
The study research on the influence between the political connection and firm value base on internal mechanism, it reveals the promotion drivers of enterprise value. The internal interaction way of political connections Based on the principal-agent theory, it found that political connections enhance to the achievement motivation of obtaining economic benefits, seeking to rights, interests. It found that the listing companies are more likely to choose employment form of political connection in the choice of political connections. Multiple regression analysis also confirmed the interaction between the strength of political connections, the depth of political connections and the growth degree of political connections.
The study reveals the influence of political connections on firm value under different industries. It found that an industry who has strong comprehensive degree of political connection, it will has a positive impact on firm value, and if one industry keeps a low Debtel of the comprehensive degree of political connections, it will has a negative impact on firm value. Natural monopoly industry political relation intensity has a positive impact on the enterprise value, while the effect of competition is full of industry the strength of political connections to the firm value has negative effect. The industry of local protectionism has greater depth political connection influence on firm value. The industry that has the rapid growth Debtel of political connection, the enterprise value has not been improved.
The study reveals the influence of political connections on firm value under different ownership. The results show that, the influence of political connection on the listing corporation of enterprise value, whether in the state owned enterprise or non state-owned enterprise generally has a positive impact on the enterprise value,the comprehensive degree of political connection, non state owned listing Corporation is slightly larger than the state-owned enterprises.
The study reveals the influence of political connections on firm value under different stages of the life cycle of listing Corporation. The research indicated grow stage and mature stage, political connection capacity indexes have significant negative impact on enterprise value,played the "grabbing hand" role; and in start-up and a recession stage,political connection capacity indexes have significant positive impact on enterprise value, played the role of "the hand of support". The sub index of political connection ability index also has direct influence on different degree or indirect impact on enterprise value.
Domestic and foreign scholars in the study of relationship between political ties and enterprise value are based on single view.However, based on the comprehensive analysis of political connection indicator from the theoretical perspective, it will provide theoretical basis for further study of this study can into a political connections and firm value; it will enrich and improve the theoretical connotation of political connections, enrich the theory of enterprise value, reveal the political connections to enterprise value influence mechanism and effect. From a practical point of view, this study is helpful to improve the management of economic behavior of listing Corporation, the disclosure related information of political connections, enhance the market value of the company; help investors pay attention to political connections and to judge the value of the enterprise, make the scientific investment decision. It also will help the government and intermediary parties clear responsibilities and roles, promote the healthy and stable development of the capital market.
理论分析政治联系对上市公司企业价值的影响。以资源基础理论、委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、寻租理论以及生命周期理论为基础，运用文献分析法和规范分析法，分析政治联系对上市公司企业价值的影响。在理论分析中，以上市公司管理层人员的政治背景为考察政治联系的替代变量，对政治联系各相关变量进行研究，并最终确定从内在分析上市公司政治联系动因及传导过程，从外在分别以不同行业、不同所有制、不同生命周期阶段三个角度进行实证研究，以此作为全文研究的理论基础。
通过政治联系对企业价值影响的内在机理研究，本文揭示了基于企业价值提升的上市公司政治联系的动因、方式和内在交互作用。以委托代理理论为基础，研究发现政治联系的动机是提升工作成绩获取经济利益，旨在进行权利、利益的寻租；在政治联系方式选择研究中，发现上市公司更倾向于选择聘用制的形式建立政治联系；多元回归分析还证实了政治联系强度、政治联系深度以及政治联系增长度之间的交互作用。
通过对不同行业政治联系对企业价值的影响研究，发现政治联系综合能力强的行业，其政治联系对企业价值具有积极影响；而政治联系综合能力较弱的的行业，其政治联系对企业价值具有消极影响。自然垄断行业的政治联系强度对企业价值具有积极影响，而竞争较为充分的行业其政治联系强度对企业价值的影响具有消极作用。受地方保护主义影响较大的行业，其政治联系深度越大，对该行业上市公司的企业价值越不利。政治联系增长快的行业，其企业价值并未得到相应的提升；而政治联系发展平稳缓慢的行业，反而有利于所在行业企业价值的提升。
通过对不同所有制上市公司政治联系对企业价值的影响研究，揭示因所有制结构的不同，而导致政治联系对上市公司企业价值影响的差异性。结果表明，政治联系对上市公司企业价值的影响，无论在国有企业或是非国有企业总体上均对企业价值具有积极影响，其中，非国有上市公司的政治联系综合能力略大于国有企业。
通过对不同生命周期阶段的上市公司政治联系对企业价值的影响研究，发现在上市公司的初创期和成熟期，政治联系综合能力指标对企业价值具有显著消极影响，扮演了“掠夺之手”的角色；而在成长期和衰退期，政治联系综合能力指标对企业价值具有显著积极影响，扮演了“扶持之手”的角色。政治联系综合能力指标下的各子指标对企业价值也具有不同程度的直接影响或间接影响。
国内外学者在进行政治联系与企业价值的关系研究时大都基于单一视角，本文基于政治联系指标的综合分析构建。从理论上看，本研究可以为政治联系与企业价值的进一步研究提供理论依据；有助于丰富和完善政治联系的理论内涵，丰富企业价值理论；有助于揭示政治联系对企业价值的影响机理和影响效应。从实践上看，本研究有助于上市公司完善管理经济行为，合理披露政治联系的相关信息，提升公司市场价值；有助于投资者重视政治联系因素并依此对企业价值进行判断，做出科学的投资决策；有助于政府及中介各方明确各自的责任与作用，促进资本市场的健康稳定发展。
As an important economic behavior, political connection is related to survival and development of the enterprises. It will bring the tremendous influence to the enterprise value. However, at present, the listing corporation enterprise value considerations to financial factors as the basis of judgment, the political connection was less considered. In view of this, this paper researched the relation between political connections and firm value, and theoretical analysis of political connections affect the firm value. This research reveal the political connections affect the enterprise value, the related study will rich the theory of political connections and the value of the enterprise, and guide the investors investment practice more effectively. The main contents contain:
The study analyses the influence between the political connection and firm value on the listing corporation of china. This research based on the resource theory, the principal-agent theory, the asymmetric information theory, the rent-seeking theory and the life-cycle theory as the basis, it using literature analysis and normative analysis, analysis the influence of political connection on enterprise value. The political background of senior executives as an alternative variable, and ultimately determine the process from the motivation and conduction of listing corporation political relationship, the empirical research from the three angles of the external respectively to different industries, different ownership, different life cycle stage, as the theoretical basis of this thesis.
The study research on the influence between the political connection and firm value base on internal mechanism, it reveals the promotion drivers of enterprise value. The internal interaction way of political connections Based on the principal-agent theory, it found that political connections enhance to the achievement motivation of obtaining economic benefits, seeking to rights, interests. It found that the listing companies are more likely to choose employment form of political connection in the choice of political connections. Multiple regression analysis also confirmed the interaction between the strength of political connections, the depth of political connections and the growth degree of political connections.
The study reveals the influence of political connections on firm value under different industries. It found that an industry who has strong comprehensive degree of political connection, it will has a positive impact on firm value, and if one industry keeps a low Debtel of the comprehensive degree of political connections, it will has a negative impact on firm value. Natural monopoly industry political relation intensity has a positive impact on the enterprise value, while the effect of competition is full of industry the strength of political connections to the firm value has negative effect. The industry of local protectionism has greater depth political connection influence on firm value. The industry that has the rapid growth Debtel of political connection, the enterprise value has not been improved.
The study reveals the influence of political connections on firm value under different ownership. The results show that, the influence of political connection on the listing corporation of enterprise value, whether in the state owned enterprise or non state-owned enterprise generally has a positive impact on the enterprise value,the comprehensive degree of political connection, non state owned listing Corporation is slightly larger than the state-owned enterprises.
The study reveals the influence of political connections on firm value under different stages of the life cycle of listing Corporation. The research indicated grow stage and mature stage, political connection capacity indexes have significant negative impact on enterprise value,played the "grabbing hand" role; and in start-up and a recession stage,political connection capacity indexes have significant positive impact on enterprise value, played the role of "the hand of support". The sub index of political connection ability index also has direct influence on different degree or indirect impact on enterprise value.
Domestic and foreign scholars in the study of relationship between political ties and enterprise value are based on single view.However, based on the comprehensive analysis of political connection indicator from the theoretical perspective, it will provide theoretical basis for further study of this study can into a political connections and firm value; it will enrich and improve the theoretical connotation of political connections, enrich the theory of enterprise value, reveal the political connections to enterprise value influence mechanism and effect. From a practical point of view, this study is helpful to improve the management of economic behavior of listing Corporation, the disclosure related information of political connections, enhance the market value of the company; help investors pay attention to political connections and to judge the value of the enterprise, make the scientific investment decision. It also will help the government and intermediary parties clear responsibilities and roles, promote the healthy and stable development of the capital market.
引文
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