美国私募权益资本研究
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摘要
美国是全球私募权益资本发展最早、也是私募权益资本最发达的国家。在经济全球化背景下,美国已将私募权益资本投资到全球各大洲;与此同时,美国私募权益资本的管理模式,包括以有限合伙制为代表的基金组织形式、投资的操作流程和投资技巧等也迅速影响到其他国家。此外,随着美国私募权益资本管理资金规模的日益庞大,在资本市场中的份额逐渐增加,对企业和经济发展的作用也越来越大。为此,研究美国私募权益资本的主要特征和演进过程,私募权益资本市场与其他层次资本市场、实体经济和宏观经济的相互关系和相互作用,以及初具规模的中国私募权益资本的发展方向具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。
本文分为7章。第1章为绪论。本章阐述了论文的选题背景及选题的理论意义和现实意义;对国内外有关研究文献进行了综述;说明了本文的研究思路、研究方法及结构安排;指出了本文的创新及不足之处。
第2章为美国私募权益资本的特征。本章着重研究了美国私募权益资本自身的特点,从市场层面分析的角度考察了美国私募资本的市场主体、市场结构以及募资、投资、退出和绩效等各方面的主要特征。本章首先对私募权益资本进行了综述,明确了私募权益资本的定义、分类。美国的私募权益资本主要来源于高净值人士、金融机构和养老基金、保险基金、捐赠基金等机构投资者。私募权益基金作为专业的投资机构,按照一定的投资流程,通过对项目的筛选、尽职调查、设计投资方案、通过各种审批实施投资、投资后管理以及根据合适时机和路径进行投资退出,形成一个完整的项目投资流程。投资收益扣除相应的成本后由普通合伙人和有限合伙人根据有限合伙协议的规定进行分配。美国私募权益资本的整体投资收益率要优于股票市场和债券市场的收益率,但不同的私募权益基金之间绩效差异很大。风险、回报和现金流的相互作用决定了私募权益基金的绩效。美国私募权益资本的结构和收益的设计从尽可能避税的角度来安排。而美国的税法也鼓励长期投资,对资本利得的税收比较优惠。
第3章为美国私募权益资本的宏观经济效应。本章从市场层面分析的角度研究了美国私募权益资本对其他层次的资本市场、金融体系以及经济发展的影响。美国私募权益资本属于资本市场中的私募基金市场,它在资本市场中的主要功能是:第一,为资本市场开辟了新的投资领域;第二,弥补了资本市场的缝隙,完善了资本市场的功能;第三,积极投资的理念使资本市场更好地为实体经济服务。美国私募权益资本通过募资—投资—增值—退出—回报这一过程完成资本的循环增值。现金作为各类资本中流动性最强的价值表现形式,是整个私募权益资本循环运动的起点和终点。美国私募权益资本在运作过程中不仅为投资者提供了较高的投资回报率,而且还在客观上具备了价值创造功能,即提高了被投企业的销售收入、就业、劳动生产率和公司治理水平,提升了企业价值,从而对宏观经济产生了积极的影响。美国私募权益资本将资本、战略、管理模式和资源输入到被投企业,通过被投企业的盈利增长、成本削减、资产利用率提高、融资渠道拓宽、公司治理和员工激励改善及财务结构变化形成了价值创造的结果。逐利性所产生的驱动力是美国私募权益资本具备价值创造功能的根本原因。此外,目标企业的可成长性是价值创造的基础;私募权益基金的组织形式和盈利模式是价值创造的制度保证。企业价值提升会带动实体经济中就业增长、创新能力增强、劳动生产率提高和资源的有效配置;而实体经济的发展必然会促进资本回报率提高、金融市场基础扩大、资源有效配置及金融产品的创新与进步和金融市场的活跃;金融经济的发展又会给私募权益资本提供更为充足的资本和技术来源,从而形成美国私募权益资本的宏观经济效应。美国私募权益资本已经着眼于全球范围内的投资机会,也产生了积极和消极的影响。但总体来说,由于美国私募权益资本的低杠杆率、风险隔离措施以及长期投资性质,其自身并未带来系统性风险,而且力求对实体经济中最活跃的微观经济主体——企业带来价值提升。因此,在全球金融危机期间,美国私募权益资本对经济复苏起到了积极的作用。
第4章为美国私募权益资本的制度分析。本章从制度分析的视角考察了美国私募权益资本。私募权益资本投资者、私募权益投资机构和被投企业三个制度主体及其在私募权益资本投资过程中的主要功能和行为方式,共同构成了美国私募权益资本相关制度的基本结构。在促使美国私募权益资本在各环节流动的过程中,也形成了三个制度主体之间的双层委托—代理关系,即私募权益资本投资者与私募权益投资机构的委托—代理关系和私募权益投资机构与被投企业管理层之间的委托—代理关系;而前者又具体表现为私募权益基金中有限合伙人与普通合伙人之间的委托—代理关系。这两层委托—代理关系分别由有限合伙协议和私募权益资本投资协议这样的契约方式来规定,通过相关条款来较为成功地解决了由于信息不对称带来的道德风险、要挟问题和逆向选择这三个委托—代理问题。美国私募权益资本从产生到逐步发展的制度变迁过程中,每一次重要的减税政策、新的退出渠道的开辟或经济周期进入景气之时,都会迎来私募权益资本新一轮规模上的增长和形式上的多样化。影响美国私募权益资本发展的各种复杂的制度因素包括四个层级:第一,宏观经济和市场环境层级的宏观经济周期、法律、社会环境和文化因素的影响。第二,PE投资者层级的资本供求、流动性、风险性、收益性和金融工具等因素的影响。第三,PE投资机构层级的投资机构组织形式、机构和合伙人声誉、经验、资源依赖和竞争等因素的影响。第四,被投企业层级的行业、规模、成长阶段、绩效、管理水平和代理程度等因素的影响。不同层级的制度因素交互作用,共同影响了美国私募权益资本的制度形成、结构和制度变迁。
第5章为美国私募权益资本的案例研究。本章选取了三个典型案例来展现美国私募权益资本的运作、特点和发展,从历史的、动态的角度出发,在不同方面反映了美国私募权益资本逐利性、灵活性和收益性,也在不同程度上体现了美国私募权益资本与宏观经济和金融体系的密切联系。第一个案例“美国黑石集团的运作模式”描述了黑石集团作为行业领先者的业务模式和发展方向,及其在引起轰动的上市过程中,如何通过复杂的法律结构和巧妙的契约安排来保持私募权益资本的优势;第二个案例“耶鲁大学捐赠基金的私募权益资本投资”说明了美国机构投资者如何通过选择投资私募权益资本这种资产类型来优化资产配置,从而获得较好的投资回报;第三个案例“凯雷集团的发展及在华投资策略”则体现了美国私募权益资本是如何在逐利性的驱动下,随着投资环境的变化灵活地调整其投资策略的。
第6章为中国私募权益资本的发展方向。中国市场是国际私募权益资本进行战略布局的重点地区,而源自中国本土的私募权益资本也迅速崛起。国际私募权益资本有着资本规模和经验的优势,但在中国市场面临着适应国情,灵活运用投资策略的问题;而本土私募权益资本虽然能够灵活地适应政策、把握机会,但运作不成熟,人才匮乏。更重要的是,中国私募权益资本相关立法和政策远落后于行业的发展。而美国私募权益资本注重对被投企业的增值服务、私募权益资本投资机构的专业化发展以及灵活有效的投资模式值得中国借鉴。在制度安排上有限合伙制的广泛运用以及为鼓励长期投资而对私募权益资本相对宽松的税收和监管政策也是有借鉴意义的。如果能够发挥出私募权益资本对其他层次资本市场和对宏观经济的积极作用,则对中国构建多层次资本市场意义更为重大。未来,中国私募权益资本会有更充足的资本来源,外资及本土的民营资本会加大投资力度,而国内机构投资者是正待开发的沃土;从投资机会来看,中国经济增长的持续性、人口规模带来的消费能力和经济增长方式的转变是长期投资机会,而不同行业进行升级或整合的投资热点则构成了短期的投资机会;在退出渠道上将不限于目前的IPO路径,而向着并购和二级市场等多元化退出渠道发展;在法律政策环境方面,随着行业的发展和成熟,相关的政策法规也会不断地出台并加以完善。第7章为全文的主要结论。第一,美国私募权益资本以其灵活性和收益性已经成为资本市场中最活跃的力量之一。在逐利性的驱动下,美国私募权益资本除了自身的循环增值以外还存在着对宏观经济的循环促进效应。因此,发展私募权益资本市场可以在很大程度上促进实体经济和金融经济的发展;第二,美国私募权益资本在解决两个层次的委托—代理关系的问题上采取了有效的制度安排以解决由于信息不对称带来的道德风险、要挟问题和逆向选择等问题。影响美国私募权益资本发展的四个层级制度因素交互作用,共同决定了美国私募权益资本的制度形成、结构和变迁;第三,中国私募权益资本市场中海外资本尤其是美国资本已经开始发挥引导作用,而中国私募权益资本的发展过程中政府的作用应该在于建立有利于私募权益资本发展的税收和监管政策,营造有利于私募权益资本生存和发展的市场环境。
The United States of America(USA or U.S.)is the first country to develop private equity (PE) and the most developed country in private equity in the world. U.S. private equity funds invest their money to global market; at the same time, the management model of U.S. private equity, including the type of organization known as limited partnership, investment operating procedures and investment techniques have quickly spread to other countries. Moreover, as the increasingly amount and market share in capital market of USA, private equity makes more and more influence on the portfolio companies and economy development. Therefore, it has the important theoretical and realistic significance to research the major features and the change process of private equity of USA, the relationship between the PE market and other levels of capital market, and mutual influence among the capital market, entity economy and macro economy. So the research of U.S. private equity provides enlightenment to understand the development of private equity of China.
The dissertation contains 7 chapters. The first chapter is introduction. In this chapter, background of the topic and theoretical and practical significance is elaborated, related literature is reviewed, the structure arrangement and research method is clarified, and the innovation and inadequacy of this research are given.
The second chapter is the features of U.S. private equity. In this chapter, the author researches into the panorama and major features of U.S. private equity with the market analysis method. It firstly reviews the definition and classification of private equity. U.S. private equity raises capital from high net worth individuals (HNWI), financial institutions and institutional investors such as pension funds, insurance funds and endowment funds. As professional investment institutions of U.S. private equity, the PE funds complete a capital circulation according to certain investment process including projects screening, due diligence, contract design, execute investment, post-investment management and exit. General partners (GP) and limited partners (LP) will share the investment profits according to the limited partnership agreement. In the United States, the overall yield of private equity is higher than that of stock market and bond market. However, the performance is quite different among individual PE funds. The performance of PE funds is determined by the interaction of the risk, return and cash flow. The organizational structure and income pattern of PE funds are designed considering tax avoidance, and U.S. legal principles also encourages long-term investments by applying lower tax rate on capital gains.
The third chapter is the macro economic effect of U.S. private equity. In this chapter, the author researches into the economic effect of U.S. private equity on other levels of capital market, financial system, and economy development with the market analysis method. U.S. private equity is a part of private fund market in capital market, and the main functions of PE contain opening up a new investment field, repairing the gap of capital market and perfecting the function of capital market, the notion of active investors supports the better service provision for the entity economy. U.S. private equity realizes the capital circular increment by the movement of Fundraising - Investment - Value-added Management - Exit - Return. U.S. private equity provides not only higher returns for investors, but also the function of value creation which increases the income, employment, labor productivity and corporate governance level of portfolio companies, and promotes the enterprise value, thus makes positive macro impact on the entity and financial economy. Driven by the factors such as the money-chasing, U.S. private equity invests not only capital, but also business strategy, management mode, and all kinds of resources to the portfolio companies, then realizes the value creation by the profit growth, cost cutting, asset rational utilization, financing channels expanding, corporate governance improvement, employees incentives, and financial structure changes of the portfolio companies. In the process of value creation of U.S. private equity, the driving force of money-chasing is the primary cause of value creation. Otherwise, the growth potentiality of portfolio companies is the foundation of value creation; the organizational structure and business model of PE funds are the institutional guarantee of value creation; the development of the entity economy will promote return on capital increase, financial markets expand, efficient allocation of financial resources, product innovation and improvement of financial market; and the development of finance economy will provide a more abundant capital and financial technology sources, thus form macro economic effects of U.S. private equity. U.S. private equity has been focusing on global scope of investment opportunities and produced the positive and negative effects. In general, the low leverage ratio, risk isolation measures and long-term investment properties of U.S. private equity did not bring systematic risk but value increment of enterprises which are the most active micro economic subject in the entity economy. Therefore, in the global financial crisis, U.S. private equity capital has positive effects for the economic recovery.
The forth chapter is the institutional analysis of U.S. private equity. In this chapter, the author works over U.S. private equity with the institutional analysis method. Investors, investment institutions and portfolio companies are the three subjects of U.S. private equity. The three subjects and their main functions and behaviors in the process of capital circulation constitute the basic institutional structure of U.S. private equity. There are double levels of principal-agent relationship in the circular increment of capital flow, the principal-agent relationship between investors and investment institutions, and the principal-agent relationship between investment institutions and portfolio companies. The former relationship is materialized by the contract being known as limited partnership agreement signed by general partners and limited partners; and the latter relationship is materialized by the investment agreement. The articles of the two agreements solve the principal-agent problems of moral hazard, holdup, and adverse selection caused by information asymmetry. The institutional structure of U.S. private equity changes from the slow growth stage of 1946 to late 1970s, to the fast growth stage of late 1970s to late 1980s, the diversification development stage of 1990s, and the globalization development stage of the 21st century. In the institution changes process, each import tax-cutting policy enacted, new exit channel opened up or the economic cycle come into prosperity resulted in the industry growth and the diversification of investment pattern. There are four levels of institutional factors which effect the development of U.S. private equity: Firstly, the macroeconomic level factors, including economic cycle, legal system, social environment and culture; Secondly, the PE investors level factors, including demand and supply of capital, asset liquidity, risk, returns and financial instruments; Thirdly, the PE institutions level factors, including reputation, experience, and resources of institution and partners, resource dependence and competition, etc.; Fourthly, the portfolio companies level factors, which are industry traits, scale, growth stage, performance, management and principle-agent level, etc. The interaction and influence of different level factors determine the form, structure and changes of the institution of U.S. private equity.
The fifth chapter is the case study of U.S. private equity. Three typical cases were selected to show the operation, characteristics and development of U.S. private equity. From a historical and dynamic perspective, these cases reflect in different aspects the money-chasing, flexible and profitable features of U.S. private equity; and also in different extent, embody the close relationships among U.S. private equity capital, macro economy and financial system. The first case,“the business model of the Blackstone Group”, describes the business model and development of the Blackstone Group. As a leading company in PE industry, the Blackstone Group completed the first major IPO of a private equity firm in June 2007, but to keep the advantages of private company by designing complex legal structure and artful contract arrangement; The second case,“the private equity investment of the Yale Endowment”, reveals how the institution investors optimize the assets allocation and get a good investment return by choosing to invest in private equity; The third case,“the development of the Carlyle Group and their investment strategies in China”, explains the situation that driven by the money-chasing notion, how U.S. private equity changes their investment strategies according to the changes of investment environment.
The sixth chapter is the development of private equity of China. China is the important strategic area of international private equity. At the same time, local private equity of China is rising fast. International private equity has the advantages of capital scale and investment experience, but in China, it faces the problem of localization and flexible investment strategies. The local private equity can be to the situation and seize the opportunities, but lacks management experiences and PE professionals. Moreover, related legislation and policies are far behind the development of PE industry in China. The merits of value-added services, professional development, and flexible and effective investment mode of U.S. private equity are valuable for reference to Chinese PE industry. Considering the institutional arrangement, the limited partnership, the relatively loose tax and regulatory policies also have important implications to China to construct multi-level capital market. In the future, foreign and local private investors will invest more capital in private equity in China, and the local institutional investors are the potential important PE investors. China's economic growth of sustainability, population size of consumption ability and the transformation of economic growth mode is a long-term investment opportunities. Different industries upgraded or integrated investment constitute a short-term investment opportunities. The exit routes of China will not be limited to IPO, the merger and acquisition exit and secondary exit etc. will become more and more important. In the perspective of legal environment, the relative policies and legislation of private equity will be improved by the development of private equity of China.
The seventh chapter is the conclusions of this dissertation. Firstly, driven by the money-chasing notion, U.S. private equity form macro economic effects besides its capital circular increment. Thus, it has largely promoted the development of entity and financial economy. Secondly, there are double levels of principal-agent relationship in the circular increment of capital flow, and the institutional arrangement of U.S. private equity solved the principal-agent problems of moral hazard, holdup, and adverse selection caused by information asymmetry. The interaction and influence of different level factors determine the form, structure and changes of the institution of U.S. private equity. Thirdly, international private equity, especially U.S. private equity has begun to play a leading role in the private equity market of China. The role of Chinese government is to make tax policies which are conducive to the development of private equity, and build the favorable market environment.
本文分为7章。第1章为绪论。本章阐述了论文的选题背景及选题的理论意义和现实意义;对国内外有关研究文献进行了综述;说明了本文的研究思路、研究方法及结构安排;指出了本文的创新及不足之处。
第2章为美国私募权益资本的特征。本章着重研究了美国私募权益资本自身的特点,从市场层面分析的角度考察了美国私募资本的市场主体、市场结构以及募资、投资、退出和绩效等各方面的主要特征。本章首先对私募权益资本进行了综述,明确了私募权益资本的定义、分类。美国的私募权益资本主要来源于高净值人士、金融机构和养老基金、保险基金、捐赠基金等机构投资者。私募权益基金作为专业的投资机构,按照一定的投资流程,通过对项目的筛选、尽职调查、设计投资方案、通过各种审批实施投资、投资后管理以及根据合适时机和路径进行投资退出,形成一个完整的项目投资流程。投资收益扣除相应的成本后由普通合伙人和有限合伙人根据有限合伙协议的规定进行分配。美国私募权益资本的整体投资收益率要优于股票市场和债券市场的收益率,但不同的私募权益基金之间绩效差异很大。风险、回报和现金流的相互作用决定了私募权益基金的绩效。美国私募权益资本的结构和收益的设计从尽可能避税的角度来安排。而美国的税法也鼓励长期投资,对资本利得的税收比较优惠。
第3章为美国私募权益资本的宏观经济效应。本章从市场层面分析的角度研究了美国私募权益资本对其他层次的资本市场、金融体系以及经济发展的影响。美国私募权益资本属于资本市场中的私募基金市场,它在资本市场中的主要功能是:第一,为资本市场开辟了新的投资领域;第二,弥补了资本市场的缝隙,完善了资本市场的功能;第三,积极投资的理念使资本市场更好地为实体经济服务。美国私募权益资本通过募资—投资—增值—退出—回报这一过程完成资本的循环增值。现金作为各类资本中流动性最强的价值表现形式,是整个私募权益资本循环运动的起点和终点。美国私募权益资本在运作过程中不仅为投资者提供了较高的投资回报率,而且还在客观上具备了价值创造功能,即提高了被投企业的销售收入、就业、劳动生产率和公司治理水平,提升了企业价值,从而对宏观经济产生了积极的影响。美国私募权益资本将资本、战略、管理模式和资源输入到被投企业,通过被投企业的盈利增长、成本削减、资产利用率提高、融资渠道拓宽、公司治理和员工激励改善及财务结构变化形成了价值创造的结果。逐利性所产生的驱动力是美国私募权益资本具备价值创造功能的根本原因。此外,目标企业的可成长性是价值创造的基础;私募权益基金的组织形式和盈利模式是价值创造的制度保证。企业价值提升会带动实体经济中就业增长、创新能力增强、劳动生产率提高和资源的有效配置;而实体经济的发展必然会促进资本回报率提高、金融市场基础扩大、资源有效配置及金融产品的创新与进步和金融市场的活跃;金融经济的发展又会给私募权益资本提供更为充足的资本和技术来源,从而形成美国私募权益资本的宏观经济效应。美国私募权益资本已经着眼于全球范围内的投资机会,也产生了积极和消极的影响。但总体来说,由于美国私募权益资本的低杠杆率、风险隔离措施以及长期投资性质,其自身并未带来系统性风险,而且力求对实体经济中最活跃的微观经济主体——企业带来价值提升。因此,在全球金融危机期间,美国私募权益资本对经济复苏起到了积极的作用。
第4章为美国私募权益资本的制度分析。本章从制度分析的视角考察了美国私募权益资本。私募权益资本投资者、私募权益投资机构和被投企业三个制度主体及其在私募权益资本投资过程中的主要功能和行为方式,共同构成了美国私募权益资本相关制度的基本结构。在促使美国私募权益资本在各环节流动的过程中,也形成了三个制度主体之间的双层委托—代理关系,即私募权益资本投资者与私募权益投资机构的委托—代理关系和私募权益投资机构与被投企业管理层之间的委托—代理关系;而前者又具体表现为私募权益基金中有限合伙人与普通合伙人之间的委托—代理关系。这两层委托—代理关系分别由有限合伙协议和私募权益资本投资协议这样的契约方式来规定,通过相关条款来较为成功地解决了由于信息不对称带来的道德风险、要挟问题和逆向选择这三个委托—代理问题。美国私募权益资本从产生到逐步发展的制度变迁过程中,每一次重要的减税政策、新的退出渠道的开辟或经济周期进入景气之时,都会迎来私募权益资本新一轮规模上的增长和形式上的多样化。影响美国私募权益资本发展的各种复杂的制度因素包括四个层级:第一,宏观经济和市场环境层级的宏观经济周期、法律、社会环境和文化因素的影响。第二,PE投资者层级的资本供求、流动性、风险性、收益性和金融工具等因素的影响。第三,PE投资机构层级的投资机构组织形式、机构和合伙人声誉、经验、资源依赖和竞争等因素的影响。第四,被投企业层级的行业、规模、成长阶段、绩效、管理水平和代理程度等因素的影响。不同层级的制度因素交互作用,共同影响了美国私募权益资本的制度形成、结构和制度变迁。
第5章为美国私募权益资本的案例研究。本章选取了三个典型案例来展现美国私募权益资本的运作、特点和发展,从历史的、动态的角度出发,在不同方面反映了美国私募权益资本逐利性、灵活性和收益性,也在不同程度上体现了美国私募权益资本与宏观经济和金融体系的密切联系。第一个案例“美国黑石集团的运作模式”描述了黑石集团作为行业领先者的业务模式和发展方向,及其在引起轰动的上市过程中,如何通过复杂的法律结构和巧妙的契约安排来保持私募权益资本的优势;第二个案例“耶鲁大学捐赠基金的私募权益资本投资”说明了美国机构投资者如何通过选择投资私募权益资本这种资产类型来优化资产配置,从而获得较好的投资回报;第三个案例“凯雷集团的发展及在华投资策略”则体现了美国私募权益资本是如何在逐利性的驱动下,随着投资环境的变化灵活地调整其投资策略的。
第6章为中国私募权益资本的发展方向。中国市场是国际私募权益资本进行战略布局的重点地区,而源自中国本土的私募权益资本也迅速崛起。国际私募权益资本有着资本规模和经验的优势,但在中国市场面临着适应国情,灵活运用投资策略的问题;而本土私募权益资本虽然能够灵活地适应政策、把握机会,但运作不成熟,人才匮乏。更重要的是,中国私募权益资本相关立法和政策远落后于行业的发展。而美国私募权益资本注重对被投企业的增值服务、私募权益资本投资机构的专业化发展以及灵活有效的投资模式值得中国借鉴。在制度安排上有限合伙制的广泛运用以及为鼓励长期投资而对私募权益资本相对宽松的税收和监管政策也是有借鉴意义的。如果能够发挥出私募权益资本对其他层次资本市场和对宏观经济的积极作用,则对中国构建多层次资本市场意义更为重大。未来,中国私募权益资本会有更充足的资本来源,外资及本土的民营资本会加大投资力度,而国内机构投资者是正待开发的沃土;从投资机会来看,中国经济增长的持续性、人口规模带来的消费能力和经济增长方式的转变是长期投资机会,而不同行业进行升级或整合的投资热点则构成了短期的投资机会;在退出渠道上将不限于目前的IPO路径,而向着并购和二级市场等多元化退出渠道发展;在法律政策环境方面,随着行业的发展和成熟,相关的政策法规也会不断地出台并加以完善。第7章为全文的主要结论。第一,美国私募权益资本以其灵活性和收益性已经成为资本市场中最活跃的力量之一。在逐利性的驱动下,美国私募权益资本除了自身的循环增值以外还存在着对宏观经济的循环促进效应。因此,发展私募权益资本市场可以在很大程度上促进实体经济和金融经济的发展;第二,美国私募权益资本在解决两个层次的委托—代理关系的问题上采取了有效的制度安排以解决由于信息不对称带来的道德风险、要挟问题和逆向选择等问题。影响美国私募权益资本发展的四个层级制度因素交互作用,共同决定了美国私募权益资本的制度形成、结构和变迁;第三,中国私募权益资本市场中海外资本尤其是美国资本已经开始发挥引导作用,而中国私募权益资本的发展过程中政府的作用应该在于建立有利于私募权益资本发展的税收和监管政策,营造有利于私募权益资本生存和发展的市场环境。
The United States of America(USA or U.S.)is the first country to develop private equity (PE) and the most developed country in private equity in the world. U.S. private equity funds invest their money to global market; at the same time, the management model of U.S. private equity, including the type of organization known as limited partnership, investment operating procedures and investment techniques have quickly spread to other countries. Moreover, as the increasingly amount and market share in capital market of USA, private equity makes more and more influence on the portfolio companies and economy development. Therefore, it has the important theoretical and realistic significance to research the major features and the change process of private equity of USA, the relationship between the PE market and other levels of capital market, and mutual influence among the capital market, entity economy and macro economy. So the research of U.S. private equity provides enlightenment to understand the development of private equity of China.
The dissertation contains 7 chapters. The first chapter is introduction. In this chapter, background of the topic and theoretical and practical significance is elaborated, related literature is reviewed, the structure arrangement and research method is clarified, and the innovation and inadequacy of this research are given.
The second chapter is the features of U.S. private equity. In this chapter, the author researches into the panorama and major features of U.S. private equity with the market analysis method. It firstly reviews the definition and classification of private equity. U.S. private equity raises capital from high net worth individuals (HNWI), financial institutions and institutional investors such as pension funds, insurance funds and endowment funds. As professional investment institutions of U.S. private equity, the PE funds complete a capital circulation according to certain investment process including projects screening, due diligence, contract design, execute investment, post-investment management and exit. General partners (GP) and limited partners (LP) will share the investment profits according to the limited partnership agreement. In the United States, the overall yield of private equity is higher than that of stock market and bond market. However, the performance is quite different among individual PE funds. The performance of PE funds is determined by the interaction of the risk, return and cash flow. The organizational structure and income pattern of PE funds are designed considering tax avoidance, and U.S. legal principles also encourages long-term investments by applying lower tax rate on capital gains.
The third chapter is the macro economic effect of U.S. private equity. In this chapter, the author researches into the economic effect of U.S. private equity on other levels of capital market, financial system, and economy development with the market analysis method. U.S. private equity is a part of private fund market in capital market, and the main functions of PE contain opening up a new investment field, repairing the gap of capital market and perfecting the function of capital market, the notion of active investors supports the better service provision for the entity economy. U.S. private equity realizes the capital circular increment by the movement of Fundraising - Investment - Value-added Management - Exit - Return. U.S. private equity provides not only higher returns for investors, but also the function of value creation which increases the income, employment, labor productivity and corporate governance level of portfolio companies, and promotes the enterprise value, thus makes positive macro impact on the entity and financial economy. Driven by the factors such as the money-chasing, U.S. private equity invests not only capital, but also business strategy, management mode, and all kinds of resources to the portfolio companies, then realizes the value creation by the profit growth, cost cutting, asset rational utilization, financing channels expanding, corporate governance improvement, employees incentives, and financial structure changes of the portfolio companies. In the process of value creation of U.S. private equity, the driving force of money-chasing is the primary cause of value creation. Otherwise, the growth potentiality of portfolio companies is the foundation of value creation; the organizational structure and business model of PE funds are the institutional guarantee of value creation; the development of the entity economy will promote return on capital increase, financial markets expand, efficient allocation of financial resources, product innovation and improvement of financial market; and the development of finance economy will provide a more abundant capital and financial technology sources, thus form macro economic effects of U.S. private equity. U.S. private equity has been focusing on global scope of investment opportunities and produced the positive and negative effects. In general, the low leverage ratio, risk isolation measures and long-term investment properties of U.S. private equity did not bring systematic risk but value increment of enterprises which are the most active micro economic subject in the entity economy. Therefore, in the global financial crisis, U.S. private equity capital has positive effects for the economic recovery.
The forth chapter is the institutional analysis of U.S. private equity. In this chapter, the author works over U.S. private equity with the institutional analysis method. Investors, investment institutions and portfolio companies are the three subjects of U.S. private equity. The three subjects and their main functions and behaviors in the process of capital circulation constitute the basic institutional structure of U.S. private equity. There are double levels of principal-agent relationship in the circular increment of capital flow, the principal-agent relationship between investors and investment institutions, and the principal-agent relationship between investment institutions and portfolio companies. The former relationship is materialized by the contract being known as limited partnership agreement signed by general partners and limited partners; and the latter relationship is materialized by the investment agreement. The articles of the two agreements solve the principal-agent problems of moral hazard, holdup, and adverse selection caused by information asymmetry. The institutional structure of U.S. private equity changes from the slow growth stage of 1946 to late 1970s, to the fast growth stage of late 1970s to late 1980s, the diversification development stage of 1990s, and the globalization development stage of the 21st century. In the institution changes process, each import tax-cutting policy enacted, new exit channel opened up or the economic cycle come into prosperity resulted in the industry growth and the diversification of investment pattern. There are four levels of institutional factors which effect the development of U.S. private equity: Firstly, the macroeconomic level factors, including economic cycle, legal system, social environment and culture; Secondly, the PE investors level factors, including demand and supply of capital, asset liquidity, risk, returns and financial instruments; Thirdly, the PE institutions level factors, including reputation, experience, and resources of institution and partners, resource dependence and competition, etc.; Fourthly, the portfolio companies level factors, which are industry traits, scale, growth stage, performance, management and principle-agent level, etc. The interaction and influence of different level factors determine the form, structure and changes of the institution of U.S. private equity.
The fifth chapter is the case study of U.S. private equity. Three typical cases were selected to show the operation, characteristics and development of U.S. private equity. From a historical and dynamic perspective, these cases reflect in different aspects the money-chasing, flexible and profitable features of U.S. private equity; and also in different extent, embody the close relationships among U.S. private equity capital, macro economy and financial system. The first case,“the business model of the Blackstone Group”, describes the business model and development of the Blackstone Group. As a leading company in PE industry, the Blackstone Group completed the first major IPO of a private equity firm in June 2007, but to keep the advantages of private company by designing complex legal structure and artful contract arrangement; The second case,“the private equity investment of the Yale Endowment”, reveals how the institution investors optimize the assets allocation and get a good investment return by choosing to invest in private equity; The third case,“the development of the Carlyle Group and their investment strategies in China”, explains the situation that driven by the money-chasing notion, how U.S. private equity changes their investment strategies according to the changes of investment environment.
The sixth chapter is the development of private equity of China. China is the important strategic area of international private equity. At the same time, local private equity of China is rising fast. International private equity has the advantages of capital scale and investment experience, but in China, it faces the problem of localization and flexible investment strategies. The local private equity can be to the situation and seize the opportunities, but lacks management experiences and PE professionals. Moreover, related legislation and policies are far behind the development of PE industry in China. The merits of value-added services, professional development, and flexible and effective investment mode of U.S. private equity are valuable for reference to Chinese PE industry. Considering the institutional arrangement, the limited partnership, the relatively loose tax and regulatory policies also have important implications to China to construct multi-level capital market. In the future, foreign and local private investors will invest more capital in private equity in China, and the local institutional investors are the potential important PE investors. China's economic growth of sustainability, population size of consumption ability and the transformation of economic growth mode is a long-term investment opportunities. Different industries upgraded or integrated investment constitute a short-term investment opportunities. The exit routes of China will not be limited to IPO, the merger and acquisition exit and secondary exit etc. will become more and more important. In the perspective of legal environment, the relative policies and legislation of private equity will be improved by the development of private equity of China.
The seventh chapter is the conclusions of this dissertation. Firstly, driven by the money-chasing notion, U.S. private equity form macro economic effects besides its capital circular increment. Thus, it has largely promoted the development of entity and financial economy. Secondly, there are double levels of principal-agent relationship in the circular increment of capital flow, and the institutional arrangement of U.S. private equity solved the principal-agent problems of moral hazard, holdup, and adverse selection caused by information asymmetry. The interaction and influence of different level factors determine the form, structure and changes of the institution of U.S. private equity. Thirdly, international private equity, especially U.S. private equity has begun to play a leading role in the private equity market of China. The role of Chinese government is to make tax policies which are conducive to the development of private equity, and build the favorable market environment.
引文
①参见World Economic Forum. Globalization of Alternative Investments Working Papers Volume I, the Global Economic Impact of Private Equity Report 2008[R], Preface iii.
②参见周炜.解读私募股权基金[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2008,p3-12.
③资料来源:Dealogic, Thomson Financial, Literature Research,转引自周炜(2008), p6-7.
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美国劳工部劳动统计局网站http://www.bls.gov
美国众议院网站http://www.house.gov
黑石集团网站hppt://www.blackstone.com
凯雷集团网站hppt://www.carlyle.com
美国全国高等学校经营者协会http://www.nacubo.org
美国风险投资协会网站http://www.nvca.org
亚洲私募权益资本评论网站http://www.adiape.com
国家发改委财政金融司网站http://www.cjs.ndrc.gov.cn
中国证监会网站http://www. csrc.gov.cn
清科集团网站http://www.zero2ipo.com.cn
海富产业投资基金管理有限公司网站http://www.hffund.com.cn
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美国私募权益资本理事会网站http://www.privateequitycouncil.org
美国劳工部劳动统计局网站http://www.bls.gov
美国众议院网站http://www.house.gov
黑石集团网站hppt://www.blackstone.com
凯雷集团网站hppt://www.carlyle.com
美国全国高等学校经营者协会http://www.nacubo.org
美国风险投资协会网站http://www.nvca.org
亚洲私募权益资本评论网站http://www.adiape.com
国家发改委财政金融司网站http://www.cjs.ndrc.gov.cn
中国证监会网站http://www. csrc.gov.cn
清科集团网站http://www.zero2ipo.com.cn
海富产业投资基金管理有限公司网站http://www.hffund.com.cn