我国央地财政分权的宪法学研究
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摘要
财政乃庶政之母,财政权如何配置与规范是中央与地方关系的核心,也是一个国家宪政体制中极为重要的内容。它不仅关涉到保证中央权威与维护地方自治、保证国家统一与激发地方活力的最佳平衡,而且关系到经济的发展、社会的福祉、人权的保障等一系列重大问题。
在中央与地方的财政权配置问题上,存在两种基本对立的主张：一种是财政集权主义,一种是财政分权主义。在当今社会,不论是联邦制国家,还是单一制国家,都存在着程度不等的地方分权,完全意义上的财政集权体制事实上已不复存在。尽管各国财政分权的模式和程度因其具体国情的不同而特色各异,但大体上还是表现出以下基本特征：事权划分的规范性、中央财政的主导性、地方财政的独立性以及财政分权的立宪性。
我国从上个世纪五十年代的统收统支,到六十年代的“共灶吃饭”,再到八十年代的“分灶吃饭”,以及九十年代的分税制改革等,财税体制不断进行着集权与分权的试错。特别是1994年的分税制改革,开启了央地关系向宪政主义方向迈进的坚实步伐。分税制改革顺应市场经济发展的要求,对政府间的事权、财权做出了较为合理的分配,显著推动了规范而稳定的央地关系的建构,又一次对“两个积极性”的宪法原则进行了有益的摸索贯彻。尽管分税制改革使得我国的央地关系发生了巨大变化,但是这距离宪政意义上的财政分权还有一定的距离。由于具体历史条件的限制,分税制财政体制缺乏宪政层面的理论根基和宏观制度安排,致使中央与地方财政分权的基础既不明确,也不牢固,加上具体制度设计的不合理及其运行过程中的偏差,使得政府间事权划分不清、财权配置不整、转移支付的制度功能难以有效发挥,从而造成我国财政的公共性缺失。
因此,完善我国分税制财政体制,要从财政立宪主义的视角出发,加强财政领域的民主化与法治化建设,将财政分权的结构和内容纳入宪政体制的基本框架。具体来说,一是要转变政府职能,科学界定政府间事权；二是要根据责、权、利相统一的原则,合理配置各级政府的财权,赋予地方政府一定的税收立法权；三是在合理划分政府间事权财权的基础之上,规范财政转移支付制度,以进一步理顺央地财政关系。而当务之急在于完善财税法律体系,提高分税制财政体制的法制化水平,使得财政分权体制的运作建立在坚实的宪法和法律基础之上。
How to distribute the state financial power between the central and local governments is very important in the constitutional structure of a country. It is not only related to how to achieve the best balance between the central authority and local autonomy, and how to stimulate local innovation while ensuring national unity, but also related to the economic development, social well-being, protection of human rights and other important issues.
There are two basic opposing ideas in the allocation of the state financial power: one is the doctrine of fiscal centralization, the other is the doctrine of fiscal decentralization. In modern society, there are varying degrees of decentralization in whether a federal state or a unitary state, the absolute centralization of fiscal system has actually ceased to exist. Although the patterns and extents of fiscal decentralization systems vary in different countries due to the specific national conditions, the following basic features are common:normative allocation of powers, the dominance of central finance, the independence of local finance and constitutionalism of fiscal decentralization.
The fiscal system has experienced numerous attempts of centralization and decentralization since new China. The tax-sharing reform in 1994 pushed forward the relationship between the central and local governments in the direction of constitutionalism. The reform, which was well-organized and implemented in line with the socialist market economy, has played significant role in reasonablely allocating intergovernmental powers and building normative and stable relationship between the central and local. The tax-sharing reform was a useful exploration in implementing the constitutional principle of "two initiatives". Although the relationship between the central and local governments has undergone tremendous changes after the reform, there was still quite a long distance from constitutional decentralization. Due to the specific historical conditions, the tax-sharing fiscal system lacks theoretical foundation and macroscopic institutional arrangements on the constitutional basis, leading that the fiscal decentralization system is neither clear nor firm. What's more, there are irrationalities in the design and operation of the specific system. The problems above resulted in deletion of public character of the public finances.
In a conclusion, we must improve our tax-sharing fiscal system in the perspective of fiscal constitutionalism. Enhance the democratization and institutionalization in the fiscal area, bring the structure and content of fiscal decentralization into the basic framework of the constitutional system. Firstly, it is necessary to transform the functions of governments and distribute governmental functions scientifically; Secondly, allocate intergovernmental financial powers according to the principle of the unification of responsibilities, powers and interests, authorize local governments certain legislative power of tax; Thirdly, standardize fiscal transfer payment system to further rationalize the fiscal relationship between the central and local. The priority is to improve the legal system of tax-sharing system, laying a solid constitutional and legal foundation for the operation of fiscal decentralization system.
在中央与地方的财政权配置问题上,存在两种基本对立的主张：一种是财政集权主义,一种是财政分权主义。在当今社会,不论是联邦制国家,还是单一制国家,都存在着程度不等的地方分权,完全意义上的财政集权体制事实上已不复存在。尽管各国财政分权的模式和程度因其具体国情的不同而特色各异,但大体上还是表现出以下基本特征：事权划分的规范性、中央财政的主导性、地方财政的独立性以及财政分权的立宪性。
我国从上个世纪五十年代的统收统支,到六十年代的“共灶吃饭”,再到八十年代的“分灶吃饭”,以及九十年代的分税制改革等,财税体制不断进行着集权与分权的试错。特别是1994年的分税制改革,开启了央地关系向宪政主义方向迈进的坚实步伐。分税制改革顺应市场经济发展的要求,对政府间的事权、财权做出了较为合理的分配,显著推动了规范而稳定的央地关系的建构,又一次对“两个积极性”的宪法原则进行了有益的摸索贯彻。尽管分税制改革使得我国的央地关系发生了巨大变化,但是这距离宪政意义上的财政分权还有一定的距离。由于具体历史条件的限制,分税制财政体制缺乏宪政层面的理论根基和宏观制度安排,致使中央与地方财政分权的基础既不明确,也不牢固,加上具体制度设计的不合理及其运行过程中的偏差,使得政府间事权划分不清、财权配置不整、转移支付的制度功能难以有效发挥,从而造成我国财政的公共性缺失。
因此,完善我国分税制财政体制,要从财政立宪主义的视角出发,加强财政领域的民主化与法治化建设,将财政分权的结构和内容纳入宪政体制的基本框架。具体来说,一是要转变政府职能,科学界定政府间事权；二是要根据责、权、利相统一的原则,合理配置各级政府的财权,赋予地方政府一定的税收立法权；三是在合理划分政府间事权财权的基础之上,规范财政转移支付制度,以进一步理顺央地财政关系。而当务之急在于完善财税法律体系,提高分税制财政体制的法制化水平,使得财政分权体制的运作建立在坚实的宪法和法律基础之上。
How to distribute the state financial power between the central and local governments is very important in the constitutional structure of a country. It is not only related to how to achieve the best balance between the central authority and local autonomy, and how to stimulate local innovation while ensuring national unity, but also related to the economic development, social well-being, protection of human rights and other important issues.
There are two basic opposing ideas in the allocation of the state financial power: one is the doctrine of fiscal centralization, the other is the doctrine of fiscal decentralization. In modern society, there are varying degrees of decentralization in whether a federal state or a unitary state, the absolute centralization of fiscal system has actually ceased to exist. Although the patterns and extents of fiscal decentralization systems vary in different countries due to the specific national conditions, the following basic features are common:normative allocation of powers, the dominance of central finance, the independence of local finance and constitutionalism of fiscal decentralization.
The fiscal system has experienced numerous attempts of centralization and decentralization since new China. The tax-sharing reform in 1994 pushed forward the relationship between the central and local governments in the direction of constitutionalism. The reform, which was well-organized and implemented in line with the socialist market economy, has played significant role in reasonablely allocating intergovernmental powers and building normative and stable relationship between the central and local. The tax-sharing reform was a useful exploration in implementing the constitutional principle of "two initiatives". Although the relationship between the central and local governments has undergone tremendous changes after the reform, there was still quite a long distance from constitutional decentralization. Due to the specific historical conditions, the tax-sharing fiscal system lacks theoretical foundation and macroscopic institutional arrangements on the constitutional basis, leading that the fiscal decentralization system is neither clear nor firm. What's more, there are irrationalities in the design and operation of the specific system. The problems above resulted in deletion of public character of the public finances.
In a conclusion, we must improve our tax-sharing fiscal system in the perspective of fiscal constitutionalism. Enhance the democratization and institutionalization in the fiscal area, bring the structure and content of fiscal decentralization into the basic framework of the constitutional system. Firstly, it is necessary to transform the functions of governments and distribute governmental functions scientifically; Secondly, allocate intergovernmental financial powers according to the principle of the unification of responsibilities, powers and interests, authorize local governments certain legislative power of tax; Thirdly, standardize fiscal transfer payment system to further rationalize the fiscal relationship between the central and local. The priority is to improve the legal system of tax-sharing system, laying a solid constitutional and legal foundation for the operation of fiscal decentralization system.
引文
[1].任进.地方制度基本范畴比较[C].见：江平,编.比较法在中国(2004年上).北京：法律出版社,2004.410
[2].苗连营,王圭宇.地方“人格化”、财政分权与央地关系[J].河南社会科学,2009,(2)：69
[3].王征,彭青秀.论构建共赢的中央与地方财政关系[C].见：刘龙亨,编.中国法学会财税法学研究会2007年会暨第五届全国财税法学学术研讨会论文集.北京：中国税务出版社,2008.114
[4].周中胜.国外财政分权理论研究的进展与启示[J].国外社会科学,2011,(2)：76-78
[5].张澍.财政联邦主义理论的新发展[J].财政科学,2004,(5)：104
[6].任剑涛.宪政分权视野中的央地关系[J].学海,2007,(1)：55-66
[7].郑磊.中国财政分权的特点及其影响[J].地方财政研究,2011,(1)：37
[8]. James M. Buchanan. Federalism and Fiscal[J]. American Economics Review, September 1950
[9]. R.A.Musgrave. the Theory of Public Finance[M]. New York:McGraw-Hill,1959
[10]. Wallance E. Oates. Fiscal Federalism[M]. New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,Inc., 1972.35
[11].平新乔.财政原理与比较财政制度[M].上海：三联出版社,1995.313
[12].朱丘祥.分税与宪政——中央与地方财政分权的价值与逻辑[M].北京：知识产权出版社,2008.38
[13].孙群力.中国地方政府规模影响因素的实证研究[J].财政研究,2010,(1)：38
[14].孙群力.财政分权与政府规模：中国的经验分析[J].经济纵横,2006,(12)：96-98
[15].季卫东.宪政新论[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2002.134
[16].葛克昌.税法基本问题——财政宪法篇[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2004.171
[17].熊运儿,王峰.国外分税制的比较与评析[J].经济师,2001,(9)：80
[18].熊运儿,王峰.国外分税制的比较与评析[J].经济师,2001,(9)：80
[19].曹小奇,郭焦锋等.德国财政平衡制度及其对我国的借鉴[R].调查研究报告,2007,(202)：8
[20].王乔,席卫群.比较税制[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2004.255
[21].财政部财政制度国际比较课题组.日本财政制度[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,1998.108
[22].熊运儿,王峰.国外分税制的比较与评析[J].经济师,2001,(9)：81
[23].金人庆.中国当代税收要论[M].北京：人民出版社2002.45
[24].秦晓燕.关于完善我国财政体制的研究[D].[硕士学位论文].苏州：苏州大学,2005
[25].郑永年,王旭.论中央地方关系中的集权和民主问题[J].战略与管理,2001,(3)：61-70
[26].爱伦·鲁宾.公共预算中的政治：收入与支出,借贷与平衡[M].马骏译.北京：中国人 民大学出版社2001.143
[27].郭庆旺,赵志耘.财政理论与政策[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2002.43
[28].张馨.建构公共财政体制框架问题研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2004.143
[29].赵云旗.完善中央与地方税收划分的思考[J].经济研究参考,2005,(66)
[30].崔克亮.中央与地方公共服务事权财权划分的走向[N].中国经济时报,2004.12.7
[31].李婉.中国式财政分权与地方政府预算外收入膨胀研究[J].财经论丛,2010,(3)：24-30
[32].苗连营,程雪阳.分税制、地方公债与央地财政关系的深化改革——基于立宪主义的视角[J].河南省政法管理干部学院学报,2009,(4)：29
[33].葛克昌.国家学说与国家法——社会国、租税国与法治国理念[M].台湾：月旦出版社股份有限公司,1996.67
[34].季卫东.宪政新论[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2002.257
[35].郑永年,吴国光.论中央地方关系——中国制度转型中的一个轴心问题[J].当代中国研究,1994,(6)
[36].胡洪曙.构建以财产税为主体的地方税体系研究[J].当代财经,2011,(2)：34
[37].李凤荣.我国税权划分存在的问题及改进措施[J].财经月刊,2006,(1)：25
[38].贾康,白景明.县乡财政解困与财政体制创新[N].中国财经报,2004.2.5
[39].R.J.Reede, J.W.Swain. Public Finance Administation[M]. New York:Prentine Hall,Inc.,1990.转引自朱丘祥.分税与宪政——中央与地方财政分权的价值与逻辑[M].北京：知识产权出版社,2008.260
[40].刘剑文,熊伟.财政税收法(第四版)[M].北京：法律出版社,2007.101
[41].杜牧.政府间财政转移支付制度理论与实践[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2001.149
[42].詹姆斯·布坎南.民主财政论[M].穆怀朋译.北京：商务印书馆,2002.56
[2].苗连营,王圭宇.地方“人格化”、财政分权与央地关系[J].河南社会科学,2009,(2)：69
[3].王征,彭青秀.论构建共赢的中央与地方财政关系[C].见：刘龙亨,编.中国法学会财税法学研究会2007年会暨第五届全国财税法学学术研讨会论文集.北京：中国税务出版社,2008.114
[4].周中胜.国外财政分权理论研究的进展与启示[J].国外社会科学,2011,(2)：76-78
[5].张澍.财政联邦主义理论的新发展[J].财政科学,2004,(5)：104
[6].任剑涛.宪政分权视野中的央地关系[J].学海,2007,(1)：55-66
[7].郑磊.中国财政分权的特点及其影响[J].地方财政研究,2011,(1)：37
[8]. James M. Buchanan. Federalism and Fiscal[J]. American Economics Review, September 1950
[9]. R.A.Musgrave. the Theory of Public Finance[M]. New York:McGraw-Hill,1959
[10]. Wallance E. Oates. Fiscal Federalism[M]. New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,Inc., 1972.35
[11].平新乔.财政原理与比较财政制度[M].上海：三联出版社,1995.313
[12].朱丘祥.分税与宪政——中央与地方财政分权的价值与逻辑[M].北京：知识产权出版社,2008.38
[13].孙群力.中国地方政府规模影响因素的实证研究[J].财政研究,2010,(1)：38
[14].孙群力.财政分权与政府规模：中国的经验分析[J].经济纵横,2006,(12)：96-98
[15].季卫东.宪政新论[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2002.134
[16].葛克昌.税法基本问题——财政宪法篇[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2004.171
[17].熊运儿,王峰.国外分税制的比较与评析[J].经济师,2001,(9)：80
[18].熊运儿,王峰.国外分税制的比较与评析[J].经济师,2001,(9)：80
[19].曹小奇,郭焦锋等.德国财政平衡制度及其对我国的借鉴[R].调查研究报告,2007,(202)：8
[20].王乔,席卫群.比较税制[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2004.255
[21].财政部财政制度国际比较课题组.日本财政制度[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,1998.108
[22].熊运儿,王峰.国外分税制的比较与评析[J].经济师,2001,(9)：81
[23].金人庆.中国当代税收要论[M].北京：人民出版社2002.45
[24].秦晓燕.关于完善我国财政体制的研究[D].[硕士学位论文].苏州：苏州大学,2005
[25].郑永年,王旭.论中央地方关系中的集权和民主问题[J].战略与管理,2001,(3)：61-70
[26].爱伦·鲁宾.公共预算中的政治：收入与支出,借贷与平衡[M].马骏译.北京：中国人 民大学出版社2001.143
[27].郭庆旺,赵志耘.财政理论与政策[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2002.43
[28].张馨.建构公共财政体制框架问题研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2004.143
[29].赵云旗.完善中央与地方税收划分的思考[J].经济研究参考,2005,(66)
[30].崔克亮.中央与地方公共服务事权财权划分的走向[N].中国经济时报,2004.12.7
[31].李婉.中国式财政分权与地方政府预算外收入膨胀研究[J].财经论丛,2010,(3)：24-30
[32].苗连营,程雪阳.分税制、地方公债与央地财政关系的深化改革——基于立宪主义的视角[J].河南省政法管理干部学院学报,2009,(4)：29
[33].葛克昌.国家学说与国家法——社会国、租税国与法治国理念[M].台湾：月旦出版社股份有限公司,1996.67
[34].季卫东.宪政新论[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2002.257
[35].郑永年,吴国光.论中央地方关系——中国制度转型中的一个轴心问题[J].当代中国研究,1994,(6)
[36].胡洪曙.构建以财产税为主体的地方税体系研究[J].当代财经,2011,(2)：34
[37].李凤荣.我国税权划分存在的问题及改进措施[J].财经月刊,2006,(1)：25
[38].贾康,白景明.县乡财政解困与财政体制创新[N].中国财经报,2004.2.5
[39].R.J.Reede, J.W.Swain. Public Finance Administation[M]. New York:Prentine Hall,Inc.,1990.转引自朱丘祥.分税与宪政——中央与地方财政分权的价值与逻辑[M].北京：知识产权出版社,2008.260
[40].刘剑文,熊伟.财政税收法(第四版)[M].北京：法律出版社,2007.101
[41].杜牧.政府间财政转移支付制度理论与实践[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2001.149
[42].詹姆斯·布坎南.民主财政论[M].穆怀朋译.北京：商务印书馆,2002.56