我国有限合伙私募股权基金治理研究
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摘要
私募股权资本是指那些对非上市企业进行股权投资,并为被投资企业提供增值服务,获得价值增值后,通过上市或转让的方式出售股权退出,实现投资盈利的资本。私募股权资本以对被投资企业提供合理价值判断及经常性的增值服务为本质,具有投资的长期性、非流动性、信息的非对称性、管理服务性、投资的高风险性和预期收益较高的特点。私募股权资本市场是现代资本市场的重要子系统,它对促进储蓄向投资转化、促进经济增长和技术创新、提高劳动就业、促进产业重组和技术升级有重要作用,因此得到世界各国政府的大力支持,并在近年来呈现快速发展态势。美国是世界上私募股权资本市场最活跃、最发达的国家。美国私募股权的高度发展,除了得益于宏观层面上经济的持续发展和技术进步之外,微观层面上采用有限合伙制的组织形式也是重要原因。美国政府为有限合伙私募股权基金的发展创造了宽松的政策环境,这是有限合伙私募股权基金得以发展的重要保障,因此也成为世界各国学习、模仿和应用的典范。
近年来,我国私募股权资本市场在政府的政策支持下,规模不断扩大。在基金的组织形式上,《合伙企业法》修订之前,我国私募股权基金组织形式主要是公司制。修订后的《合伙企业法》颁布实施之后,有限合伙制成为我国私募股权基金的主要组织形式之一,但其治理机制中存在有限合伙人与普通合伙人职能模糊的问题,不利于充分发挥有限合伙制对基金管理人的激励和约束作用,压制了基金管理人对被投资企业的价值发现和价值创造能力,产生合作“租值消散”的问题①,从而在一定程度上制约了我国私募股权资本市场的发展。
本文针对上述我国私募股权资本市场发展过程中,我国有限合伙私募股权基金治理机制存在有限合伙人与普通合伙人职能模糊,造成合作“租值消散”的问题,以“我国有限合伙私募股权基金治理研究”为题,在深入分析私募股权基金特性的基础上,揭示人力资本在私募股权资本市场中的核心作用,以及私募股权基金不同组织形式和治理机制与基金投资人特性之间存在的内在联系,探寻有限合伙制在我国产生有限合伙人与普通合伙人职能模糊,造成合作“租值消散”问题的根源,并为我国有限合伙私募股权基金建立“三位一体”治理体系,达到促进我国私募股权资本市场发展的目的。
全文分六部分：第一部分为导言,进行理论假设,提出问题；第二部分即第一章,论述私募股权资本的性质和私募股权基金的理论基础；第三部分即第二章,在对企业治理基本理论进行综述,分析有限合伙私募股权基金治理机制的基础上,结合全球主要经济体私募股权资本市场及基金组织形式发展现状,论述美国有限合伙制私募股权基金的治理机制和政策支持并得出启示；第四部分即第三章,分析我国私募股权基金组织形式和治理机制现状,对我国有限合伙制的成长环境进行分析,提出强化我国有限合伙私募股权基金治理的途径与方法体系；第五部分包括第四、五、六章,分别从政府、社群和市场三个方面,对加强我国有限合伙私募股权基金治理的途径与方法体系进行论述；第六部分即第七章,对全文分析进行总结。
0章,导言。主要包括研究的背景与意义、国内外研究现状、研究工具和方法、基本思路、逻辑结构和本文的创新之处等,指出私募股权基金组织形式和治理机制在不同国家和地区的差异,结合有限合伙私募股权基金在我国的成长环境,提出本文的研究主题。
1章,私募股权资本的经济学分析。本章先对国内外关于私募股权资本和私募股权基金有关理论进行回顾,指出国内外关于私募股权资本和基金的研究局限,揭示研究我国有限合伙私募股权基金治理机制的重要性和必要性。本文认为,私募股权资本是专门投资于非上市企业,并为投资对象提供增值服务,待时机成熟时通过上市或并购的方式将股权出售获得投资收益的资本。私募股权资本具有投资期限长、流动性差、收益率高等特点,在促进经济增长、扩大劳动就业和促进技术进步方面有重要作用。国内外学者虽然对私募股权资本的性质、私募股权基金的组织形式及有限合伙私募股权基金的治理机制与治理效果进行了系统的论述,但是未能深刻揭示基金管理人在私募股权资本价值增值中的关键作用,未能揭示私募股权资本市场参与者要素禀赋与私募股权基金组织形式之间的内在联系,因此也就难以对在转轨时期我国有限合伙私募股权基金的治理体系进行系统的研究。事实上,私募股权资本的性质体现在融资方面,就是企业家根据所拥有项目的发展需要以及市场对项目的估值高低,决定让渡多大比例股份给外部投资者；体现在投资方面,就是投资者在收集和整理项目一般信息和意外信息的基础上,对项目进行估值,并从企业家手里获得部分股权,还对被投资项目提供持续的增值服务。资本要素拥有者为企业家拥有的项目提供资本要素；人力资本要素拥有者为企业家拥有的项目提供价值评估和增值服务的人力资本要素。市场参与者根据自己拥有的要素禀赋,决定采取何种方式进入私募股权资本市场。如果市场参与者同时拥有资本要素和人力资本要素,则它们采取积极的投资策略；拥有资本要素但缺乏人力资本管理要素的市场参与者提供资本要素,采取消极的投资策略；拥有人力资本要素但缺乏资本要素的市场参与者,则提供人力资本要素。在法律允许的情况下,同时拥有资本要素和人力资本要素的市场参与者倾向于采取公司制或合伙制的基金组织形式；而只拥有资本要素或人力资本要素的市场参与者,倾向于采取有限合伙的基金组织形式,前者是有限合伙人,后者是普通合伙人。
2章,有限合伙私募股权基金治理分析。企业治理是现代企业理论的核心,是企业投资人与企业经理人在信息不对称和利益不一致的情况下,投资人如何加强对经理人的激励和约束,从而减少和避免经理人的道德风险和逆向选择问题。企业治理的最主要途径有市场治理和内部契约治理。市场治理是通过股票市场和经理人市场加强对经理人的外部激励和约束；内部契约治理是解决市场治理所不能解决的问题,通过国家法律制度和企业内部投资人和经理人的约定来达到治理的目的。然而,企业内部契约治理也存在边界问题,社群组织对加强企业治理有重要作用。有限合伙企业的治理是投资人作为有限合伙人对经理人作为普通合伙人的监督和管理,有限合伙人以其出资对基金债务承担有限责任,普通合伙人拥有对企业的控制权和部分剩余索取权,对企业债务承担无限责任。有限合伙制以其对普通合伙人良好的激励和约束机制,成为私募股权基金重要的微观组织形式,在促进私募股权资本市场发展中发挥重要作用。在全球主要私募股权资本市场中,美国是私募股权资本的发源地,也是私募股权资本市场最发达的国家,有限合伙制组织形式是其私募股权基金的主要组织形式。成熟的市场经济体系、发达的私募股权资本市场、持续的有限合伙制制度创新、美国政府对机构投资者的准入制度、宽松的税收制度、优秀的基金管理人,以及美国私募股权基金行业的自律管理,是美国有限合伙私募股权基金得以顺利发展的主要原因。
3章,我国有限合伙私募股权基金治理分析。我国私募股权资本市场近年来呈现快速发展态势。在组织形式上,我国的私募股权基金以公司制为主。尽管在我国《合伙企业法》通过修订并引入有限合伙制度之后,有限合伙制成为新设立的私募股权基金的重要组织形式,但有限合伙制基金中出现了治理机制有限合伙人与普通合伙人职能模糊,造成合作“租值消散”的现象,即基金投资人或多或少参与基金的投资决策,模糊了有限合伙人和普通合伙人的界限,压抑了普通合伙人的积极性和创造性,不利于充分发挥有限合伙制对普通合伙人的激励和约束机制。公司制仍然是我国私募股权基金重要组织形式,这与有限合伙私募股权基金在治理机制方面存在的有限合伙人与普通合伙人职能模糊,造成合作“租值消散”问题,转轨时期我国相关法律法规的不完善以及私募股权资本市场自身的发展不成熟有关。因此,从完善市场竞争机制、加强政府制度建设和发挥合伙人社群作用三个方面加强对我国有限合伙私募股权基金的治理,是促进我国私募股权资本市场发展的关键。
4章,有限合伙私募股权基金市场治理与基金管理人选择。企业的市场治理主要包括股票市场、并购市场和经理人市场。在私募股权资本市场中,由于私募股权资本的非流动性,通过股票市场和并购市场治理难以实现。经理人市场治理分事前的经理人市场治理和事后的经理人市场的流动治理。由于基金投资人和基金管理人之间的信息不对称以及资产的非流动性,事后解聘基金管理人会使投资人付出很高的成本。因此,事前治理成为基金治理的优先选择。发达国家和地区有限合伙人对普通合伙人的选择以普通合伙人创造的业绩记录为依据,而我国私募股权资本市场处于“新兴+转轨”发展阶段,普通合伙人缺乏经营记录,因此通过优秀普通合伙人应该具备的知识和经验指标来选择更为现实。本文通过对清科集团评选的2008年我国创业投资优秀机构高级管理人员拥有的知识和经验特征进行分析,发现我国优秀基金管理人具有学历高,从业经验丰富,社会关系网络丰富,拥有海外背景和上市经验等重要特征。
5章,有限合伙制基金政府治理与契约设计。强制性制度变迁是我国市场经济改革的重要特征,我国有限合伙私募股权基金的发展需要良好的制度保障。在《合伙企业法》修订之后,我国有限合伙私募股权基金制度建设应包括出台与《合伙企业法》配套的法律法规,允许保险资金和银行资金进入私募股权资本市场,鼓励个人资本进入私募股权资本市场等方面。同时,本文在分析我国转轨时期的经济和社会发展环境以及经典私募股权基金契约自身局限的基础上,认为从优化我国有限合伙私募股权基金契约结构、加强普通合伙人的激励机制、约束机制和监督机制等方面,建立适应我国特殊历史条件下有限合伙私募股权基金契约治理框架非常必要。
6章,有限合伙私募股权基金社群治理。社群治理是社群组织利用社群成员之间的交易密集和信息充分的特征,以及社群成员之间道德、情感、信任等因素,促进社群成员自我检查和相互监督,达到共同遵守社群规范的目的。由于私募股权资本市场存在严重的信息不对称问题,且基金投资人和基金管理人之间的交易不受政府监管,社群治理成为有限合伙私募股权基金治理的重要方式。我国有限合伙私募股权基金社群治理需要成立统一的合伙人社群组织、建立普通合伙人行为规范以及加强合伙人之间的相互监督等。同时,由于有限合伙制强化了私募股权资本市场的信息不对称问题,加强私募股权基金的信息披露是加强社群治理的重要方面。信息披露包括强制性信息披露和自觉性信息披露,前者以《国际会计准则》为指导,而后者则以欧洲或美国的《私募股权基金信息披露指引》为指导。国际主要私募股权资本市场通过强化私募股权基金信息披露加强对私募股权基金治理的成功经验,值得我国借鉴。
7章,结论。私募股权资本是资本要素和人力资本要素的结合体,人力资本要素是私募股权基金价值增值的源泉。有限合伙制是私募股权资本理想的组织形式,与公司制基金相比,它具有强化对基金管理人的激励和约束机制的优势。我国新设立的私募股权基金中,公司制为重要的组织形式,这与有限合伙制私募股权基金治理中产生合作“租值消散”的问题,以及与我国私募股权投资人结构和我国转轨时期制度和经济环境密切相关。在转轨时期,通过构建有限合伙制私募股权基金治理体系,即从加强对基金的市场治理和选择普通合伙人,加强政府制度治理,加强自律组织的群体治理和基金信息披露三个方面改善有限合伙制发展条件,是加强我国有限合伙制私募股权基金治理,促进我国私募股权资本市场发展的关键。
本文的创新与价值在于,通过对企业家股权融资性质的分析,揭示基金管理人拥有人力资本在私募股权资本中的核心作用,并得出市场参与者要素禀赋决定私募股权基金组织形式和治理机制的结论。同时,本文通过分析美国有限合伙私募股权基金治理的启示,对我国私募股权资本市场和微观组织形式发展历史与现状的考察,分析了我国私募股权基金所在的经济、制度及社会环境,提出从市场治理,政府制度治理和社群治理三个维度加强对有限合伙私募股权基金治理,这是我国有限合伙私募股权基金发展的关键,对政府部门、合伙人自律组织、基金投资人和基金管理人有一定的参考价值。本文的研究局限在于,因我国私募股权资本市场仍然处于发展初期,缺少相应的统计数据,难以对我国有限合伙私募股权基金管理人特征和基金治理机制进行定量分析,降低了本文分析过程与所得结论的严密性,也是下一步研究的重要方向。
Private equity capital refers the capital that to be invested into the unlisted companies to buy its equity, while the investors providing value added service to the invested companies for the purpose to realize profits by selling the equity according to listing or transfer. With the essence of providing reasonable value judgment and regularity value added service, private equity has characteristics of investing lasting, no fluidity, information dissymmetrical, service management, high venture and prospecting high profits. As the important subsystem of modern capital market, the private equity market plays an important role in accelerating the transfer of save to investment, promoting the development of economy and technology innovation, improving employment, expediting industry recombination and technology upgrade. Hence, private equity has gotten the great support from every government in the world and has the rapid development in recent years.
America is the country with the most active and developed private equity market. Besides the sustainable development of macro-economy and improvement of technology, one of the most important reasons in microcosmic area of the development of America private equity market is limited partnership. The America government created loose policy condition for private equity market to ensure the development of limited partnership, which is studied, modeled and utilized by the other governments all over the world.
In recent years, with the support of the government, China's private equity market has been developing rapidly. Before the revision of the LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, the main organizational form of private equity fund is corporation, and after the revision of the LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, limited partnership becomes one of the most important organizational forms. But on the governance mechanism of new funded limited partnership private equity funds, the function between the Limited partners and General partners becomes dark, which goes against for limited partnership plays roles in inspiring and binding the General partners, so that to suppress the General partners ability of value discovering and value creation, and make the problem of rent dissipation. So the development of the private equity market is restricted in a certain extent.
With the title of The Research on China's Limited Partnership Private Equity Fund Governance and on the basis of analysis the characteristic of private equity capital and the key role of human capital in private equity capital market, this paper aims at the problem of the function darkness between Limited partners and General partners in the governance mechanism of private equity fund of limited partnership which caused "rent dissipation", in order to dispose o the inter-connection between the different organizational form and different investors and explores the germ of function darkness between Limited partners and General partners which made the rent dissipation, and for the purpose to establish the scientific governance system for China's limited partnership private equity to reach the aim of promoting the development of China's private equity market.
The whole paper can be divided into six parts. The first part is the introduction, which put up the theoretic hypothesis and brought forward the issue. The second part is the first chapter, which discussed the characteristics of private equity capital and the theory foundation of the fund. The third part is the second chapter, with summarizing the theories of company governance and analyzing the governance mechanism of limited partnership, the chapter discussed the revelation of America limited partnership private equity funds governance mechanism and policy supporting. The forth part is the third chapter. According to the organizations of China's private equity funds and governance mechanism, This chapter analyzed the development environment of limited partnership in China, and brought forward the approach and methods system of intensifying the governance China's limited partnership private equity funds. The fifth part includes chapter forth, fifth and sixth, which dissertated the approaches and methods system of intensify the govrenance of private equity of limited partnership fund in market, government and consortium. The sixth part is the seventh chapter, which concluded the whole paper.
Chapter 0 is the introduction, which includes the background and signification, the inside and outside actuality, the instruments and methods of research, and the basic thought and logic structure and the innovations of the private equity.
Chapter 1 is related to the economics analysis on private equity capital. Firstly, this chapter includes the review of the relative theory of private equity capital and private equity fund in China domestic and abroad, points out the research limitation, and opens out the importance and necessity of researching the administration of China's limited partnership private equity funds. The authors considers that private equity capital refers the capital that to be invested to the unlisted companies with equity while the investors providing value added service to the invested objects, aims at to realize profits by selling the equity according to listing or transfer. Private equity capital has characteristics of investing lasting, no fluidity, information dissymmetrical, service management, high venture and prospecting high profits. Private equity market plays an important role in accelerating save is transferred to investment, promoting the development of economy and technologic innovation, improving employment, expediting industry recombination and technologic upgrade. The domestic and foreign scholars have systematively discussed the characters of private equity capital, the organizational form and the governance mechanism, and e affect of the governance on the private equity fund, but they can't open out the key function of the fund managers in the value increment of the private equity capital deeply, and can't find out the inhesion connection between the factors of the participators and the organizational form of the fund, and of course it's hard for them to reseach systematively on the governance system of China limit partnership private equity funds. On the aspect of finance, the character of private equity capital refers the proportion that the entrepreneurs decide to release to outside investors according to the financial scales needed for the project development and the value of the project appraised by the market. On the aspect of investment, private equity refers that the investor, on the basis of collecting and clearing up the general and serendipitous information, estimate the project and get share equity from the entrepreneur, and provide increment services to the projects. On the basis of factor gifts, the market factors decided to take part in the market through any suitable approach. The capital factor owners provide capital to the project and the human capital owners provide value evaluation and increment services. If the market factors own both capital and human capital, they will take active investment strategy, and the factors which own capital but are short of human capital, they will take the passive investment strategy. The factors with human capital but being short of capital will provide management factors. With the permission of the law, the market factors with capital and human capital will be fit for the organizational form as corporation or partnership, and the factors with capital or human capital is apt to the organization of limited partnership, and the former is limited partners and the later is general partners.
Chapter 2 is related to the analysis on the limited partnership private equity fund. Company governance is the core of modern company theories, and on the condition of information asymmetry and benefit inconsistent between investors and managers, the investors how to enhance the prompting and bounding the manager in order to reduce or avoid their moral risk and converse choice. The most important approaches of company governance are market governance and inside contract governance. The market governance refers to reinforce outside prompting and restrain the manager by stock markets and human capital markets, and the inside contract governance can solve the problem which can't be solved by market governance, which are used to reach the aim to control company according national law and insider contracts. Nevertheless, there is boundary problem related to the inside contract governance, and community organization play an important role in enhance the company governance. The governance of limited partnership refers that the investors as limited partners supervise and manage the general partners. In limited partnerships, the limited partners take the limited liability with the limited contribution, and the general partners have the right of controlling the company and partly come down on remnant with taking the infinitude liability to the debt. With the good mechanism of prompting and restriction to the general partners, the limited partnership becomes the most important macrocosmic organization and plays an important role in private equity market. In the world private equity market, America is the cradle of private equity capital and the most developed country. Limited partnership is the main organization of private equity fund in America. The main reasons which cause private equity funds development include the mature market economic system, developed private equity capital market, sustaining institution innovation of limited partnership, the admittance to institution investors, loose revenue institution, excellent fund managers and the self-discipline management in private equity industry, etc.
Chapter 3 is to analyze the governance of China's limited partnership private equity fund. China's private equity capital market has been developing rapidly in recent years. In the organizational forms, although the PARTNERSHIP LAW has been revised and introduced limited partnership institution,after that limited partnership private equity fund becomes main organizational form in China, but the problem of the function between Limited partners and General partners is becoming dark in the governance mechanism of limited partnership private equity fund which causes rent dissipation arises, which suppresses the general partners enthusiasm and creativity, and make against full use of the limited partnership's prompting and restriction to the general partners. The reasons for corporation form is abroadly used and the function darkness between general partners and limited partners are connected to the faultiness of China's law and the development of private equity capital market. So, there are the key points to enhance the China's limited partnership private equity fund by perfecting market competing system, strengthening institution construction and making good use the partners community.
Chapter 4 is related to the market governance on limited partnership private equity fund and the choice on fund managers. The market governance for company comprises stock market, M & A market and manager market. In private equity capital market, because the non-liquidity, it is very hard to govern the fund by stock market and M & A market. The manager market governance can be divided as beforehand governance and postmortem governance. Because the information asymmetry between the investors and managers and the non-liquidity, the investors must pay highly for firing fund managers, and the beforehand governance becomes the preference. Limited partners in developed countries regard the outstanding achievement track record as criterion for choosing the general partners. Because China's is getting along with the seedtime of newness and transition, and the general being lack of track records, it is a realism to regard knowledge and experience of excellent managers as criterion of choosing fund manager. By analyzing knowledge and experience of senior managers in excellent venture capital investment institutions choosed by Zero2ipo Group in 2008, the paper found the excellent managers in China have the feature of high degree, abundance experience, abroad social network, background of abroad and experience of listing, etc.
Chapter 5 is related to the government governance and contract design of limited partnership private equity fund. The institution variance with compulsion is an important feature of China's market economy reform, and the development of limited partnership private equity fund needs favorable system to guarantee. After the LAW OF PARTNERSHIP has been revised, the construction of limited partnership private equity fund should consist law and rule matched with LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, permitting insurance and bank capital entering into private equity capital market, and encourage individual capital ingress to private equity capital market, etc. At the same time, on the basis of analysis on the situation of economy and society in transition period of China and the limitation of classic private equity fund contracts, the paper reckons that it is very important to optimize the contract construe of China's limited partnership private equity fund, and to reinforce the prompting, restriction and supervision mechanism to general, and to construct the limited partnership private equity fund contracts adapting to the special historical situation of China.
Chapter 6 is related to the community govrenance of private equity of limited partnership fund. Community governance means community organization takes good use of the character of exchange denseness and information abundance among the members of community, and the factors of morality, sensibility and trust of the members, so that to promote the members self-check and supervise one another and achieve the aim to abide the community criterion together. Because information asymmetry exists in private equity capital market seriously and the deal between investors and managers is not supervised by government, community governance becomes an important method to enhance the govrenance of private equity of limited partnership fund. The community governance in China of limited partnership private equity fund needs to found united partners organization, establish behavior criterion for general managers and reinforce mutual supervise, etc. At the same time, because limited partnership consolidating the problem of information asymmetry, it is an important aspect of enhancing the community governance to strengthen information disclosure. Information Disclosure consists of obliging information disclosure and conscious information disclosure, and the former is guided by INTERNATION ACCOUNTANT RULE and the latter is guided by private equity fund information disclosure issued by Europe or America. The successful experience of strengthening limited partnership private equity fund governance by enhancing information disclosure in international private equity market is deserved to be studied in China.
Chapter 7 is conclusion part. Private equity capital is a combination of capital and human capital and the latter is the headspring of private equity value investment. Comparing to corporation form, limited partnership has the advantage of enhancing prompting and restricting managers and can be perfect organization method of private equity fund. Of the newly founded private equity fund, the reason of corporation form being important and the problem of rent scatter arising is connected to the investor structure and conditions of China's system and economy. In the transition period, it is the key to reinforce China's limited partnership private equity fund by constructing governance system, including market governance of choosing general partners, government system governance and self-discipline community governance and information disclosure.
The innovations and worthiness of this paper are follows, analyzed scientifically the characteristics of equity finance of entrepreneurs, opened out the key role of human capital of fund managers in private equity capital, and got the conclusion that the actors'gift is the key factors which decides the organizational forms and governing systems of private equity funds. At the same time, The paper analyzed the revelation of America's limited partnership private equity fund and reviewed China's the history and actuality of private equity capital and its microcosmic organizational forms, and also analyzed the economic, institution and social situations of China's private equity funds, and put forward the policy advice of enhancing the governance of China's limited partnership private equity funds in three aspects of the governance of market, government institution, and community, which has the consulting value for the government, the partners self-discipline, investors and managers. The limitation of the paper is that because China's private equity market is still in its initial stages and the statistics data is very absent, it is very hard to analyze the features of China's limited partnership private equity fund managers and governance system of the fund in quantitatively, which reduced the strictness of the analysis procedure and conclusion, and should be the research fields in the future.
近年来,我国私募股权资本市场在政府的政策支持下,规模不断扩大。在基金的组织形式上,《合伙企业法》修订之前,我国私募股权基金组织形式主要是公司制。修订后的《合伙企业法》颁布实施之后,有限合伙制成为我国私募股权基金的主要组织形式之一,但其治理机制中存在有限合伙人与普通合伙人职能模糊的问题,不利于充分发挥有限合伙制对基金管理人的激励和约束作用,压制了基金管理人对被投资企业的价值发现和价值创造能力,产生合作“租值消散”的问题①,从而在一定程度上制约了我国私募股权资本市场的发展。
本文针对上述我国私募股权资本市场发展过程中,我国有限合伙私募股权基金治理机制存在有限合伙人与普通合伙人职能模糊,造成合作“租值消散”的问题,以“我国有限合伙私募股权基金治理研究”为题,在深入分析私募股权基金特性的基础上,揭示人力资本在私募股权资本市场中的核心作用,以及私募股权基金不同组织形式和治理机制与基金投资人特性之间存在的内在联系,探寻有限合伙制在我国产生有限合伙人与普通合伙人职能模糊,造成合作“租值消散”问题的根源,并为我国有限合伙私募股权基金建立“三位一体”治理体系,达到促进我国私募股权资本市场发展的目的。
全文分六部分：第一部分为导言,进行理论假设,提出问题；第二部分即第一章,论述私募股权资本的性质和私募股权基金的理论基础；第三部分即第二章,在对企业治理基本理论进行综述,分析有限合伙私募股权基金治理机制的基础上,结合全球主要经济体私募股权资本市场及基金组织形式发展现状,论述美国有限合伙制私募股权基金的治理机制和政策支持并得出启示；第四部分即第三章,分析我国私募股权基金组织形式和治理机制现状,对我国有限合伙制的成长环境进行分析,提出强化我国有限合伙私募股权基金治理的途径与方法体系；第五部分包括第四、五、六章,分别从政府、社群和市场三个方面,对加强我国有限合伙私募股权基金治理的途径与方法体系进行论述；第六部分即第七章,对全文分析进行总结。
0章,导言。主要包括研究的背景与意义、国内外研究现状、研究工具和方法、基本思路、逻辑结构和本文的创新之处等,指出私募股权基金组织形式和治理机制在不同国家和地区的差异,结合有限合伙私募股权基金在我国的成长环境,提出本文的研究主题。
1章,私募股权资本的经济学分析。本章先对国内外关于私募股权资本和私募股权基金有关理论进行回顾,指出国内外关于私募股权资本和基金的研究局限,揭示研究我国有限合伙私募股权基金治理机制的重要性和必要性。本文认为,私募股权资本是专门投资于非上市企业,并为投资对象提供增值服务,待时机成熟时通过上市或并购的方式将股权出售获得投资收益的资本。私募股权资本具有投资期限长、流动性差、收益率高等特点,在促进经济增长、扩大劳动就业和促进技术进步方面有重要作用。国内外学者虽然对私募股权资本的性质、私募股权基金的组织形式及有限合伙私募股权基金的治理机制与治理效果进行了系统的论述,但是未能深刻揭示基金管理人在私募股权资本价值增值中的关键作用,未能揭示私募股权资本市场参与者要素禀赋与私募股权基金组织形式之间的内在联系,因此也就难以对在转轨时期我国有限合伙私募股权基金的治理体系进行系统的研究。事实上,私募股权资本的性质体现在融资方面,就是企业家根据所拥有项目的发展需要以及市场对项目的估值高低,决定让渡多大比例股份给外部投资者；体现在投资方面,就是投资者在收集和整理项目一般信息和意外信息的基础上,对项目进行估值,并从企业家手里获得部分股权,还对被投资项目提供持续的增值服务。资本要素拥有者为企业家拥有的项目提供资本要素；人力资本要素拥有者为企业家拥有的项目提供价值评估和增值服务的人力资本要素。市场参与者根据自己拥有的要素禀赋,决定采取何种方式进入私募股权资本市场。如果市场参与者同时拥有资本要素和人力资本要素,则它们采取积极的投资策略；拥有资本要素但缺乏人力资本管理要素的市场参与者提供资本要素,采取消极的投资策略；拥有人力资本要素但缺乏资本要素的市场参与者,则提供人力资本要素。在法律允许的情况下,同时拥有资本要素和人力资本要素的市场参与者倾向于采取公司制或合伙制的基金组织形式；而只拥有资本要素或人力资本要素的市场参与者,倾向于采取有限合伙的基金组织形式,前者是有限合伙人,后者是普通合伙人。
2章,有限合伙私募股权基金治理分析。企业治理是现代企业理论的核心,是企业投资人与企业经理人在信息不对称和利益不一致的情况下,投资人如何加强对经理人的激励和约束,从而减少和避免经理人的道德风险和逆向选择问题。企业治理的最主要途径有市场治理和内部契约治理。市场治理是通过股票市场和经理人市场加强对经理人的外部激励和约束；内部契约治理是解决市场治理所不能解决的问题,通过国家法律制度和企业内部投资人和经理人的约定来达到治理的目的。然而,企业内部契约治理也存在边界问题,社群组织对加强企业治理有重要作用。有限合伙企业的治理是投资人作为有限合伙人对经理人作为普通合伙人的监督和管理,有限合伙人以其出资对基金债务承担有限责任,普通合伙人拥有对企业的控制权和部分剩余索取权,对企业债务承担无限责任。有限合伙制以其对普通合伙人良好的激励和约束机制,成为私募股权基金重要的微观组织形式,在促进私募股权资本市场发展中发挥重要作用。在全球主要私募股权资本市场中,美国是私募股权资本的发源地,也是私募股权资本市场最发达的国家,有限合伙制组织形式是其私募股权基金的主要组织形式。成熟的市场经济体系、发达的私募股权资本市场、持续的有限合伙制制度创新、美国政府对机构投资者的准入制度、宽松的税收制度、优秀的基金管理人,以及美国私募股权基金行业的自律管理,是美国有限合伙私募股权基金得以顺利发展的主要原因。
3章,我国有限合伙私募股权基金治理分析。我国私募股权资本市场近年来呈现快速发展态势。在组织形式上,我国的私募股权基金以公司制为主。尽管在我国《合伙企业法》通过修订并引入有限合伙制度之后,有限合伙制成为新设立的私募股权基金的重要组织形式,但有限合伙制基金中出现了治理机制有限合伙人与普通合伙人职能模糊,造成合作“租值消散”的现象,即基金投资人或多或少参与基金的投资决策,模糊了有限合伙人和普通合伙人的界限,压抑了普通合伙人的积极性和创造性,不利于充分发挥有限合伙制对普通合伙人的激励和约束机制。公司制仍然是我国私募股权基金重要组织形式,这与有限合伙私募股权基金在治理机制方面存在的有限合伙人与普通合伙人职能模糊,造成合作“租值消散”问题,转轨时期我国相关法律法规的不完善以及私募股权资本市场自身的发展不成熟有关。因此,从完善市场竞争机制、加强政府制度建设和发挥合伙人社群作用三个方面加强对我国有限合伙私募股权基金的治理,是促进我国私募股权资本市场发展的关键。
4章,有限合伙私募股权基金市场治理与基金管理人选择。企业的市场治理主要包括股票市场、并购市场和经理人市场。在私募股权资本市场中,由于私募股权资本的非流动性,通过股票市场和并购市场治理难以实现。经理人市场治理分事前的经理人市场治理和事后的经理人市场的流动治理。由于基金投资人和基金管理人之间的信息不对称以及资产的非流动性,事后解聘基金管理人会使投资人付出很高的成本。因此,事前治理成为基金治理的优先选择。发达国家和地区有限合伙人对普通合伙人的选择以普通合伙人创造的业绩记录为依据,而我国私募股权资本市场处于“新兴+转轨”发展阶段,普通合伙人缺乏经营记录,因此通过优秀普通合伙人应该具备的知识和经验指标来选择更为现实。本文通过对清科集团评选的2008年我国创业投资优秀机构高级管理人员拥有的知识和经验特征进行分析,发现我国优秀基金管理人具有学历高,从业经验丰富,社会关系网络丰富,拥有海外背景和上市经验等重要特征。
5章,有限合伙制基金政府治理与契约设计。强制性制度变迁是我国市场经济改革的重要特征,我国有限合伙私募股权基金的发展需要良好的制度保障。在《合伙企业法》修订之后,我国有限合伙私募股权基金制度建设应包括出台与《合伙企业法》配套的法律法规,允许保险资金和银行资金进入私募股权资本市场,鼓励个人资本进入私募股权资本市场等方面。同时,本文在分析我国转轨时期的经济和社会发展环境以及经典私募股权基金契约自身局限的基础上,认为从优化我国有限合伙私募股权基金契约结构、加强普通合伙人的激励机制、约束机制和监督机制等方面,建立适应我国特殊历史条件下有限合伙私募股权基金契约治理框架非常必要。
6章,有限合伙私募股权基金社群治理。社群治理是社群组织利用社群成员之间的交易密集和信息充分的特征,以及社群成员之间道德、情感、信任等因素,促进社群成员自我检查和相互监督,达到共同遵守社群规范的目的。由于私募股权资本市场存在严重的信息不对称问题,且基金投资人和基金管理人之间的交易不受政府监管,社群治理成为有限合伙私募股权基金治理的重要方式。我国有限合伙私募股权基金社群治理需要成立统一的合伙人社群组织、建立普通合伙人行为规范以及加强合伙人之间的相互监督等。同时,由于有限合伙制强化了私募股权资本市场的信息不对称问题,加强私募股权基金的信息披露是加强社群治理的重要方面。信息披露包括强制性信息披露和自觉性信息披露,前者以《国际会计准则》为指导,而后者则以欧洲或美国的《私募股权基金信息披露指引》为指导。国际主要私募股权资本市场通过强化私募股权基金信息披露加强对私募股权基金治理的成功经验,值得我国借鉴。
7章,结论。私募股权资本是资本要素和人力资本要素的结合体,人力资本要素是私募股权基金价值增值的源泉。有限合伙制是私募股权资本理想的组织形式,与公司制基金相比,它具有强化对基金管理人的激励和约束机制的优势。我国新设立的私募股权基金中,公司制为重要的组织形式,这与有限合伙制私募股权基金治理中产生合作“租值消散”的问题,以及与我国私募股权投资人结构和我国转轨时期制度和经济环境密切相关。在转轨时期,通过构建有限合伙制私募股权基金治理体系,即从加强对基金的市场治理和选择普通合伙人,加强政府制度治理,加强自律组织的群体治理和基金信息披露三个方面改善有限合伙制发展条件,是加强我国有限合伙制私募股权基金治理,促进我国私募股权资本市场发展的关键。
本文的创新与价值在于,通过对企业家股权融资性质的分析,揭示基金管理人拥有人力资本在私募股权资本中的核心作用,并得出市场参与者要素禀赋决定私募股权基金组织形式和治理机制的结论。同时,本文通过分析美国有限合伙私募股权基金治理的启示,对我国私募股权资本市场和微观组织形式发展历史与现状的考察,分析了我国私募股权基金所在的经济、制度及社会环境,提出从市场治理,政府制度治理和社群治理三个维度加强对有限合伙私募股权基金治理,这是我国有限合伙私募股权基金发展的关键,对政府部门、合伙人自律组织、基金投资人和基金管理人有一定的参考价值。本文的研究局限在于,因我国私募股权资本市场仍然处于发展初期,缺少相应的统计数据,难以对我国有限合伙私募股权基金管理人特征和基金治理机制进行定量分析,降低了本文分析过程与所得结论的严密性,也是下一步研究的重要方向。
Private equity capital refers the capital that to be invested into the unlisted companies to buy its equity, while the investors providing value added service to the invested companies for the purpose to realize profits by selling the equity according to listing or transfer. With the essence of providing reasonable value judgment and regularity value added service, private equity has characteristics of investing lasting, no fluidity, information dissymmetrical, service management, high venture and prospecting high profits. As the important subsystem of modern capital market, the private equity market plays an important role in accelerating the transfer of save to investment, promoting the development of economy and technology innovation, improving employment, expediting industry recombination and technology upgrade. Hence, private equity has gotten the great support from every government in the world and has the rapid development in recent years.
America is the country with the most active and developed private equity market. Besides the sustainable development of macro-economy and improvement of technology, one of the most important reasons in microcosmic area of the development of America private equity market is limited partnership. The America government created loose policy condition for private equity market to ensure the development of limited partnership, which is studied, modeled and utilized by the other governments all over the world.
In recent years, with the support of the government, China's private equity market has been developing rapidly. Before the revision of the LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, the main organizational form of private equity fund is corporation, and after the revision of the LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, limited partnership becomes one of the most important organizational forms. But on the governance mechanism of new funded limited partnership private equity funds, the function between the Limited partners and General partners becomes dark, which goes against for limited partnership plays roles in inspiring and binding the General partners, so that to suppress the General partners ability of value discovering and value creation, and make the problem of rent dissipation. So the development of the private equity market is restricted in a certain extent.
With the title of The Research on China's Limited Partnership Private Equity Fund Governance and on the basis of analysis the characteristic of private equity capital and the key role of human capital in private equity capital market, this paper aims at the problem of the function darkness between Limited partners and General partners in the governance mechanism of private equity fund of limited partnership which caused "rent dissipation", in order to dispose o the inter-connection between the different organizational form and different investors and explores the germ of function darkness between Limited partners and General partners which made the rent dissipation, and for the purpose to establish the scientific governance system for China's limited partnership private equity to reach the aim of promoting the development of China's private equity market.
The whole paper can be divided into six parts. The first part is the introduction, which put up the theoretic hypothesis and brought forward the issue. The second part is the first chapter, which discussed the characteristics of private equity capital and the theory foundation of the fund. The third part is the second chapter, with summarizing the theories of company governance and analyzing the governance mechanism of limited partnership, the chapter discussed the revelation of America limited partnership private equity funds governance mechanism and policy supporting. The forth part is the third chapter. According to the organizations of China's private equity funds and governance mechanism, This chapter analyzed the development environment of limited partnership in China, and brought forward the approach and methods system of intensifying the governance China's limited partnership private equity funds. The fifth part includes chapter forth, fifth and sixth, which dissertated the approaches and methods system of intensify the govrenance of private equity of limited partnership fund in market, government and consortium. The sixth part is the seventh chapter, which concluded the whole paper.
Chapter 0 is the introduction, which includes the background and signification, the inside and outside actuality, the instruments and methods of research, and the basic thought and logic structure and the innovations of the private equity.
Chapter 1 is related to the economics analysis on private equity capital. Firstly, this chapter includes the review of the relative theory of private equity capital and private equity fund in China domestic and abroad, points out the research limitation, and opens out the importance and necessity of researching the administration of China's limited partnership private equity funds. The authors considers that private equity capital refers the capital that to be invested to the unlisted companies with equity while the investors providing value added service to the invested objects, aims at to realize profits by selling the equity according to listing or transfer. Private equity capital has characteristics of investing lasting, no fluidity, information dissymmetrical, service management, high venture and prospecting high profits. Private equity market plays an important role in accelerating save is transferred to investment, promoting the development of economy and technologic innovation, improving employment, expediting industry recombination and technologic upgrade. The domestic and foreign scholars have systematively discussed the characters of private equity capital, the organizational form and the governance mechanism, and e affect of the governance on the private equity fund, but they can't open out the key function of the fund managers in the value increment of the private equity capital deeply, and can't find out the inhesion connection between the factors of the participators and the organizational form of the fund, and of course it's hard for them to reseach systematively on the governance system of China limit partnership private equity funds. On the aspect of finance, the character of private equity capital refers the proportion that the entrepreneurs decide to release to outside investors according to the financial scales needed for the project development and the value of the project appraised by the market. On the aspect of investment, private equity refers that the investor, on the basis of collecting and clearing up the general and serendipitous information, estimate the project and get share equity from the entrepreneur, and provide increment services to the projects. On the basis of factor gifts, the market factors decided to take part in the market through any suitable approach. The capital factor owners provide capital to the project and the human capital owners provide value evaluation and increment services. If the market factors own both capital and human capital, they will take active investment strategy, and the factors which own capital but are short of human capital, they will take the passive investment strategy. The factors with human capital but being short of capital will provide management factors. With the permission of the law, the market factors with capital and human capital will be fit for the organizational form as corporation or partnership, and the factors with capital or human capital is apt to the organization of limited partnership, and the former is limited partners and the later is general partners.
Chapter 2 is related to the analysis on the limited partnership private equity fund. Company governance is the core of modern company theories, and on the condition of information asymmetry and benefit inconsistent between investors and managers, the investors how to enhance the prompting and bounding the manager in order to reduce or avoid their moral risk and converse choice. The most important approaches of company governance are market governance and inside contract governance. The market governance refers to reinforce outside prompting and restrain the manager by stock markets and human capital markets, and the inside contract governance can solve the problem which can't be solved by market governance, which are used to reach the aim to control company according national law and insider contracts. Nevertheless, there is boundary problem related to the inside contract governance, and community organization play an important role in enhance the company governance. The governance of limited partnership refers that the investors as limited partners supervise and manage the general partners. In limited partnerships, the limited partners take the limited liability with the limited contribution, and the general partners have the right of controlling the company and partly come down on remnant with taking the infinitude liability to the debt. With the good mechanism of prompting and restriction to the general partners, the limited partnership becomes the most important macrocosmic organization and plays an important role in private equity market. In the world private equity market, America is the cradle of private equity capital and the most developed country. Limited partnership is the main organization of private equity fund in America. The main reasons which cause private equity funds development include the mature market economic system, developed private equity capital market, sustaining institution innovation of limited partnership, the admittance to institution investors, loose revenue institution, excellent fund managers and the self-discipline management in private equity industry, etc.
Chapter 3 is to analyze the governance of China's limited partnership private equity fund. China's private equity capital market has been developing rapidly in recent years. In the organizational forms, although the PARTNERSHIP LAW has been revised and introduced limited partnership institution,after that limited partnership private equity fund becomes main organizational form in China, but the problem of the function between Limited partners and General partners is becoming dark in the governance mechanism of limited partnership private equity fund which causes rent dissipation arises, which suppresses the general partners enthusiasm and creativity, and make against full use of the limited partnership's prompting and restriction to the general partners. The reasons for corporation form is abroadly used and the function darkness between general partners and limited partners are connected to the faultiness of China's law and the development of private equity capital market. So, there are the key points to enhance the China's limited partnership private equity fund by perfecting market competing system, strengthening institution construction and making good use the partners community.
Chapter 4 is related to the market governance on limited partnership private equity fund and the choice on fund managers. The market governance for company comprises stock market, M & A market and manager market. In private equity capital market, because the non-liquidity, it is very hard to govern the fund by stock market and M & A market. The manager market governance can be divided as beforehand governance and postmortem governance. Because the information asymmetry between the investors and managers and the non-liquidity, the investors must pay highly for firing fund managers, and the beforehand governance becomes the preference. Limited partners in developed countries regard the outstanding achievement track record as criterion for choosing the general partners. Because China's is getting along with the seedtime of newness and transition, and the general being lack of track records, it is a realism to regard knowledge and experience of excellent managers as criterion of choosing fund manager. By analyzing knowledge and experience of senior managers in excellent venture capital investment institutions choosed by Zero2ipo Group in 2008, the paper found the excellent managers in China have the feature of high degree, abundance experience, abroad social network, background of abroad and experience of listing, etc.
Chapter 5 is related to the government governance and contract design of limited partnership private equity fund. The institution variance with compulsion is an important feature of China's market economy reform, and the development of limited partnership private equity fund needs favorable system to guarantee. After the LAW OF PARTNERSHIP has been revised, the construction of limited partnership private equity fund should consist law and rule matched with LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, permitting insurance and bank capital entering into private equity capital market, and encourage individual capital ingress to private equity capital market, etc. At the same time, on the basis of analysis on the situation of economy and society in transition period of China and the limitation of classic private equity fund contracts, the paper reckons that it is very important to optimize the contract construe of China's limited partnership private equity fund, and to reinforce the prompting, restriction and supervision mechanism to general, and to construct the limited partnership private equity fund contracts adapting to the special historical situation of China.
Chapter 6 is related to the community govrenance of private equity of limited partnership fund. Community governance means community organization takes good use of the character of exchange denseness and information abundance among the members of community, and the factors of morality, sensibility and trust of the members, so that to promote the members self-check and supervise one another and achieve the aim to abide the community criterion together. Because information asymmetry exists in private equity capital market seriously and the deal between investors and managers is not supervised by government, community governance becomes an important method to enhance the govrenance of private equity of limited partnership fund. The community governance in China of limited partnership private equity fund needs to found united partners organization, establish behavior criterion for general managers and reinforce mutual supervise, etc. At the same time, because limited partnership consolidating the problem of information asymmetry, it is an important aspect of enhancing the community governance to strengthen information disclosure. Information Disclosure consists of obliging information disclosure and conscious information disclosure, and the former is guided by INTERNATION ACCOUNTANT RULE and the latter is guided by private equity fund information disclosure issued by Europe or America. The successful experience of strengthening limited partnership private equity fund governance by enhancing information disclosure in international private equity market is deserved to be studied in China.
Chapter 7 is conclusion part. Private equity capital is a combination of capital and human capital and the latter is the headspring of private equity value investment. Comparing to corporation form, limited partnership has the advantage of enhancing prompting and restricting managers and can be perfect organization method of private equity fund. Of the newly founded private equity fund, the reason of corporation form being important and the problem of rent scatter arising is connected to the investor structure and conditions of China's system and economy. In the transition period, it is the key to reinforce China's limited partnership private equity fund by constructing governance system, including market governance of choosing general partners, government system governance and self-discipline community governance and information disclosure.
The innovations and worthiness of this paper are follows, analyzed scientifically the characteristics of equity finance of entrepreneurs, opened out the key role of human capital of fund managers in private equity capital, and got the conclusion that the actors'gift is the key factors which decides the organizational forms and governing systems of private equity funds. At the same time, The paper analyzed the revelation of America's limited partnership private equity fund and reviewed China's the history and actuality of private equity capital and its microcosmic organizational forms, and also analyzed the economic, institution and social situations of China's private equity funds, and put forward the policy advice of enhancing the governance of China's limited partnership private equity funds in three aspects of the governance of market, government institution, and community, which has the consulting value for the government, the partners self-discipline, investors and managers. The limitation of the paper is that because China's private equity market is still in its initial stages and the statistics data is very absent, it is very hard to analyze the features of China's limited partnership private equity fund managers and governance system of the fund in quantitatively, which reduced the strictness of the analysis procedure and conclusion, and should be the research fields in the future.
引文
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③同注释①
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②事实上,很多的有限合伙人对市场上具有良好声誉的有限合伙人的推荐非常相信。
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①美国最大的公共养老金CalFERS被要求披露他们对私募股权投资的经营成果,他们披露的内容引起社会对基金的广泛关注,对美国私募股权行业有导向作用。
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③同注释①
④韦倩,增强惩罚能力的若干社会机制与群体合作秩序的维持,《经济研究》,2009年第10期。
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②事实上,很多的有限合伙人对市场上具有良好声誉的有限合伙人的推荐非常相信。
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①美国最大的公共养老金CalFERS被要求披露他们对私募股权投资的经营成果,他们披露的内容引起社会对基金的广泛关注,对美国私募股权行业有导向作用。
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