信息不对称、资本预算与收益分享合约的选择
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摘要
净现值法则是企业进行资本预算的基本法则。净现值法则的运用需要决策者掌握现金流量和资本成本的相关信息。然而,随着企业规模的不断扩大,随着所有权和经营权的不断分离,作为具有资本优势的所有者通常难以获取关于投资项目的真实信息,这就限制了所有者运用净现值法则作出相应的投资决策。处于信息劣势的所有者应当如何作出自己的资本支出预算?传统的财务理论似乎没有给出答案。
另一方面,伴随着知识经济的到来,伴随着人力资本观念的不断深化,以人为本的人本管理思想已经成为一种新的管理理念,并逐渐深入人心。“以人为本”,从财务上来解释就是要以人为资本,就是要把经营者看成是人力资本所有者,就是要让经营者参与企业收益的分配。然而,由于人力资本属于无形资本的范畴,其在计量上具有很大的不确定性,人力资本有多大?应在多大程度上参与企业收益的分配?这在理论上似乎是一个难以解决的问题。本文试图站在所有者的角度,以企业理论为基本理论,以最大化所有者的预期效用为基本目标,并将资本预算与人力资本参与收益分配结合起来考察,以期设计出一套激励制度,从而解决所有者的资本预算问题和抑制经营者的道德风险。
一、本文的结构
本文共分为四个部分:
第一部分导论主要是介绍研究背景、目的、该选题的研究现状以及本文拟采用的研究方法和思路。该部分对国内外文献作了一个简单的回顾,并分析了其中的不足之处。从国外研究来看,主要存在的问题是没有把人力资本参与收益分配纳入他们的分析框架;从国内研究来看,主要存在的问题是没有意识到信息不对称在资本预算和收益分配中的重要性,从而导致了研究结论的片面性。
本文在研究内容上不仅包括所有者的资本预算问题,而且还包括所有者应如何与经营者签定收益分享合约的问题。本文以所有者分配给经营者的资本量和赋予经营者的收益分享比例为内生变量,通过最优化求解的方式进行研究。从研究方法上来看,这属于演绎法。
本文的研究思路是:所有者首先制订一个关于资本预算和收益分享的合约框架,而后,通过经营者所汇报的项目质量来决定资本分配量和收益分享比例。这种通过经营者的选择来获取关于项目质量信息的思想,是对经济学中显示性偏好原理的一种应用。
第二部分是理论基础部分。该部分首先介绍了企业理论的相关内容。企业之所以产生,是因为要素市场替代了产品市场,是因为要素的交易效率高于中间产品的交易效率。而在企业产生后,由于所有权和经营权的分离,也由于经营者工作的努力程度是难以考察的,从而常常引起经营者的出工不出力的现象,这种现象便是所谓的道德风险。道德风险的存在,使得最终的均衡结果与帕累托最优之间产生差异,形成内生交易费用,严重地阻碍了企业的发展。这就需要一个有效的制度安排,通过合理地界定企业各方的所有权,来降低这种内生交易费用的发生。
第三部分是本文的主体部分。在这一部分中,笔者通过模型最优化求解的方式,得出了关于资本预算和收益分享的结论。
在资本预算方面,本文认为,当总部不能免费获取项目的真实信息以及不能有效地考察分部经理的努力程度时,总部应制定一个高于资本成本的门槛利率,以此来作为项目投资的选择标准。该门槛利率首先应随着项目真实质量的提高而在边际上不断增大,当项目真实质量达到某一临界水平后,由于分部经理的利益通过一份收益分享合约与总部绑定起来,因而,随着项目真实质量的继续提高,该门槛利率随着这种提高而在边际上有所降低。
在收益分享合约方面,本文认为,当项目质量不高时,所有者仅仅应该支付给分部经理固定的工资性收益,而当项目质量高于某一临界水平后,则应该赋予分部经理分享企业剩余的权利,并且该权利随着项目真实质量的提高而增大。另一方面,当分部经理参与企业剩余的分享后,其工资性收益将随着项目真实质量的提高而减小,从而使得分部经理承担了更大的不确定性。事实上,这是一种关于收益分享和风险分摊的两难境地,而最终的合约选择则是这种两难境地的有效折中。
第四部分研究的是模型应用。该部分主要研究本文的模型在完善公司治理结构上的应用。本文认为,公司治理结构的本质是所有权安排的具体化,而在总部将资本分配给分部经理之后,如何进行经营管理的决策权就交托给了分部经理,因而,可以将这种分配资本的行为看作是企业控制权的转移行为。根据本文的模型,在项目质量不高时,分部经理只获取固定的工资性收益,并没有分享企业剩余的权力,此时的剩余索取权和控制权基本上是集中在总部手中的;而在项目质量很高时,总部分配一定量的资本给分部经理,赋予其一定的剩余索取权和控制权,企业内的所有权是分散并且对称分布于总部和分部经理之间的,这与古典主义关于治理结构效率的定义是吻合的。
二、本文的主要结论
本文认为,随着企业规模的不断扩大,随着所有权和经营权的不断分离,信息不对称在所有者财务中的重要性将不断提高。由于所有者处于信息劣势,无法利用传统的资本预算法则来决定其资本支出,他们只能通过一个有效的制度安排来抑制经营者的道德风险。这种制度安排应包括资本支出和收益分享两个方面。
本文关于这种制度安排(或合约选择)的主要结论是:
本文认为,随着企业规模的不断扩大,随着所有权和经营权的不断分离,信息不对称在所有者财务中的重要性将不断提高。由于所有者处于信息劣势,无法利用传统的资本预算法则来决定其资本支出,他们只能通过一个有效的制度安排来抑制经营者的道德风险。这种制度安排应包括资本支出和收益分享两个方面。
本文关于这种制度安排(或合约选择)的主要结论是:(1)当分部经理(经营者的代表)报告的项目质量很低时,总部(所有者的代表)不分配资本给分部,并且只赋予分部经理固定的工资性收益;(2)当分部经理报告的项目质量处于中等水平时,总部分配给分部少量资本,但分部经理仍然没有参与企业收益分享的权利,因为对于总部来说,此时赋予分部经理一定份额的分享比例的代价仍然大于其收益;(3)当分部经理报告的项目质量很高时,总部将分配更多的资本给分部,同时提供给分部经理参与企业收益分享的机会,并且其分享比例随着报告质量的提高而增大,但工资性收益却不断减少;
(4)在考虑到分部经理“自立门户”的可能性后,总部为了挽留住分部经理就有可能需要额外地支付一笔费用,这种支付是一种或有支付,类似于期权激励。
三、本文的创新点
本文的主要创新点如下:(1)本文的模型引入了信息不对称因素,并将所有者的资本分配额和赋予经营者的收益分享比例内生在模型中;(2)本文的模型解释了现实生活中为什么会同时存在固定的工资性收益,或有的分享利润性收益以及期权收益;(3)按照本文的模型,站在所有者的角度,并非所有的分部经理都能视为人力资本所有者,这主要取决于项目质量的好坏;(4)根据本文的扩展部分,可以得出,期权收益仅仅是总部为了挽留住分部经理而承担的一笔或有费用,它是一种有效地激励分部经理努力工作的办法,但期权收益本身并非属于人力资本参与收益分配的部分;(5)将本文的模型加以引申,便得出了关于公司治理结构的相关结论。本文认为,在项目质量不高时,分部经理只获取固定的工资性收益,并没有分享企业剩余的权力,此时的剩余索取权和控制权基本上是集中在总部手中的;而在项目质量很高时,总部分配一定量的资本给分部经理,赋予其一定的剩余索取权和控制权,企业内的所有权是分散并且对称地分布于总部和分部经理之间的。
NPV rule is a basic capital budgeting rule. The application of NPV rule needs decision-makers to master the information related to cash flow and capital costs. However, with the continuous expansion of business scale, with the ownership and the right to operate continuously separating, the owner of capital advantage is often difficult to acquire the true information of investment projects, which limits the use of NPV rule when owners make investment decisions accordingly. How the owners of information disadvantage should make its own capital budgeting? Conventional financial theory seems to be no answer given.
Meanwhile, with the advent of a knowledge-based economy and the continuous deepening of the human capital concept, human-centered management thinking has become a new management philosophy, and gradually enjoys popular support. As human capital belongs to intangible capital, in the measurement of a great deal of uncertainty, to what extent human capital should participate in the distribution of enterprises income? This seems to be a difficult problem in theory. This paper attempts to stand in owner’s perspective, which is based on firm theory and for the purpose to maximize the expected utility of owners, combine the capital budgeting with income sharing to design a set of incentive mechanism, which can solve the capital budgeting problem and prevent operators’moral hazard.
The logical organizations are as follows:
The first chapter is introductory remarks. This part mainly elaborates the background about the theme, the goal, the significance, the frame as well as the research technique and so on. From research abroad, the main problem is that the human capital is not taken into their analytical framework of income sharing; from domestic research, the main question is that it is not aware of the importance of information asymmetry in the income sharing and capital budgeting, which led to the incomplete conclusion.
The content of this paper includes not only capital budgeting of owners, but also owners and operators on how to sign income sharing contract. This paper makes the number of capital allocated to the operators by owners and the operator's income sharing ratio endogenous variable, using the most optimizing method.
The second chapter is elementary theory analysis. This part starts with the firm theory. Enterprises are produced, because factor market takes the place of product market. Because of the separating of ownership and the right to operate, and because the efforts of the operators are difficult to be observed, the operators make less efforts, which is the so-called moral hazard. The existence of moral hazard leads to the difference between the final outcome and Pareto-Optimum , which seriously impedes the growth of enterprises. This requires an effective institutional arrangement, by reasonably defining the ownership of enterprises.
The third chapter is the core of this paper. In this part, I gain the conclusions of income-sharing and capital budgeting through the optimization model. In the capital budgeting, when headquarters can not get access to the true project information as well as effectively investigate the division manager’s efforts, headquarters should make a hurdle rate higher than the cost of capital in order to evaluate a project. In the income-sharing contracts, this paper believes that when the quality is not high, the owners should only pay the division managers with the fixed wages. However, when the quality of project is above a certain threshold level , division managers should be given the rights of income-sharing, which become greater as the true quality of the project becomes better.
The fourth chapter analyzes the application of the model mainly in the corporation governance structure. This paper argues that the essence of corporation governance structure is the specific arrangements. When capital has been allocated to the division Managers from the headquarters, the powers to conduct operations have also been entrusted to the division managers. Therefore, we can view capital allocating acts as the transfer of control rights of the enterprise.
The innovations of this paper mainly are: (1) This paper introduces information asymmetry factors into the model, and makes capital allocation of owners and the operator's income-sharing ratio in the endogenous model; (2) In this paper, the model explained why in real life there are the fixed wages, income sharing and options receipts at the same time; (3) In accordance with this model, from the perspective of the owners, not all the division managers can be regarded as human capital, which depends largely on the quality of the project; (4) According to the extension of this paper, the option income is only a contingent expenses in order to retain division managers. It is an effective incentive for division managers to work harder, but option income itself is not a type of human capital to participate in the income sharing; (5) Extending the model, I come to an conclusion about the corporation governance structure. This paper holds that when the quality is not high, the owners should only pay the division managers with the fixed wages. The division managers do not have the power of income sharing. While the quality of project is high, headquarters should allocate a certain amount of capital to the division managers. That is to say, the control rights of enterprise is dispersed and symmetrically distributed between headquarters and the division managers.
另一方面,伴随着知识经济的到来,伴随着人力资本观念的不断深化,以人为本的人本管理思想已经成为一种新的管理理念,并逐渐深入人心。“以人为本”,从财务上来解释就是要以人为资本,就是要把经营者看成是人力资本所有者,就是要让经营者参与企业收益的分配。然而,由于人力资本属于无形资本的范畴,其在计量上具有很大的不确定性,人力资本有多大?应在多大程度上参与企业收益的分配?这在理论上似乎是一个难以解决的问题。本文试图站在所有者的角度,以企业理论为基本理论,以最大化所有者的预期效用为基本目标,并将资本预算与人力资本参与收益分配结合起来考察,以期设计出一套激励制度,从而解决所有者的资本预算问题和抑制经营者的道德风险。
一、本文的结构
本文共分为四个部分:
第一部分导论主要是介绍研究背景、目的、该选题的研究现状以及本文拟采用的研究方法和思路。该部分对国内外文献作了一个简单的回顾,并分析了其中的不足之处。从国外研究来看,主要存在的问题是没有把人力资本参与收益分配纳入他们的分析框架;从国内研究来看,主要存在的问题是没有意识到信息不对称在资本预算和收益分配中的重要性,从而导致了研究结论的片面性。
本文在研究内容上不仅包括所有者的资本预算问题,而且还包括所有者应如何与经营者签定收益分享合约的问题。本文以所有者分配给经营者的资本量和赋予经营者的收益分享比例为内生变量,通过最优化求解的方式进行研究。从研究方法上来看,这属于演绎法。
本文的研究思路是:所有者首先制订一个关于资本预算和收益分享的合约框架,而后,通过经营者所汇报的项目质量来决定资本分配量和收益分享比例。这种通过经营者的选择来获取关于项目质量信息的思想,是对经济学中显示性偏好原理的一种应用。
第二部分是理论基础部分。该部分首先介绍了企业理论的相关内容。企业之所以产生,是因为要素市场替代了产品市场,是因为要素的交易效率高于中间产品的交易效率。而在企业产生后,由于所有权和经营权的分离,也由于经营者工作的努力程度是难以考察的,从而常常引起经营者的出工不出力的现象,这种现象便是所谓的道德风险。道德风险的存在,使得最终的均衡结果与帕累托最优之间产生差异,形成内生交易费用,严重地阻碍了企业的发展。这就需要一个有效的制度安排,通过合理地界定企业各方的所有权,来降低这种内生交易费用的发生。
第三部分是本文的主体部分。在这一部分中,笔者通过模型最优化求解的方式,得出了关于资本预算和收益分享的结论。
在资本预算方面,本文认为,当总部不能免费获取项目的真实信息以及不能有效地考察分部经理的努力程度时,总部应制定一个高于资本成本的门槛利率,以此来作为项目投资的选择标准。该门槛利率首先应随着项目真实质量的提高而在边际上不断增大,当项目真实质量达到某一临界水平后,由于分部经理的利益通过一份收益分享合约与总部绑定起来,因而,随着项目真实质量的继续提高,该门槛利率随着这种提高而在边际上有所降低。
在收益分享合约方面,本文认为,当项目质量不高时,所有者仅仅应该支付给分部经理固定的工资性收益,而当项目质量高于某一临界水平后,则应该赋予分部经理分享企业剩余的权利,并且该权利随着项目真实质量的提高而增大。另一方面,当分部经理参与企业剩余的分享后,其工资性收益将随着项目真实质量的提高而减小,从而使得分部经理承担了更大的不确定性。事实上,这是一种关于收益分享和风险分摊的两难境地,而最终的合约选择则是这种两难境地的有效折中。
第四部分研究的是模型应用。该部分主要研究本文的模型在完善公司治理结构上的应用。本文认为,公司治理结构的本质是所有权安排的具体化,而在总部将资本分配给分部经理之后,如何进行经营管理的决策权就交托给了分部经理,因而,可以将这种分配资本的行为看作是企业控制权的转移行为。根据本文的模型,在项目质量不高时,分部经理只获取固定的工资性收益,并没有分享企业剩余的权力,此时的剩余索取权和控制权基本上是集中在总部手中的;而在项目质量很高时,总部分配一定量的资本给分部经理,赋予其一定的剩余索取权和控制权,企业内的所有权是分散并且对称分布于总部和分部经理之间的,这与古典主义关于治理结构效率的定义是吻合的。
二、本文的主要结论
本文认为,随着企业规模的不断扩大,随着所有权和经营权的不断分离,信息不对称在所有者财务中的重要性将不断提高。由于所有者处于信息劣势,无法利用传统的资本预算法则来决定其资本支出,他们只能通过一个有效的制度安排来抑制经营者的道德风险。这种制度安排应包括资本支出和收益分享两个方面。
本文关于这种制度安排(或合约选择)的主要结论是:
本文认为,随着企业规模的不断扩大,随着所有权和经营权的不断分离,信息不对称在所有者财务中的重要性将不断提高。由于所有者处于信息劣势,无法利用传统的资本预算法则来决定其资本支出,他们只能通过一个有效的制度安排来抑制经营者的道德风险。这种制度安排应包括资本支出和收益分享两个方面。
本文关于这种制度安排(或合约选择)的主要结论是:(1)当分部经理(经营者的代表)报告的项目质量很低时,总部(所有者的代表)不分配资本给分部,并且只赋予分部经理固定的工资性收益;(2)当分部经理报告的项目质量处于中等水平时,总部分配给分部少量资本,但分部经理仍然没有参与企业收益分享的权利,因为对于总部来说,此时赋予分部经理一定份额的分享比例的代价仍然大于其收益;(3)当分部经理报告的项目质量很高时,总部将分配更多的资本给分部,同时提供给分部经理参与企业收益分享的机会,并且其分享比例随着报告质量的提高而增大,但工资性收益却不断减少;
(4)在考虑到分部经理“自立门户”的可能性后,总部为了挽留住分部经理就有可能需要额外地支付一笔费用,这种支付是一种或有支付,类似于期权激励。
三、本文的创新点
本文的主要创新点如下:(1)本文的模型引入了信息不对称因素,并将所有者的资本分配额和赋予经营者的收益分享比例内生在模型中;(2)本文的模型解释了现实生活中为什么会同时存在固定的工资性收益,或有的分享利润性收益以及期权收益;(3)按照本文的模型,站在所有者的角度,并非所有的分部经理都能视为人力资本所有者,这主要取决于项目质量的好坏;(4)根据本文的扩展部分,可以得出,期权收益仅仅是总部为了挽留住分部经理而承担的一笔或有费用,它是一种有效地激励分部经理努力工作的办法,但期权收益本身并非属于人力资本参与收益分配的部分;(5)将本文的模型加以引申,便得出了关于公司治理结构的相关结论。本文认为,在项目质量不高时,分部经理只获取固定的工资性收益,并没有分享企业剩余的权力,此时的剩余索取权和控制权基本上是集中在总部手中的;而在项目质量很高时,总部分配一定量的资本给分部经理,赋予其一定的剩余索取权和控制权,企业内的所有权是分散并且对称地分布于总部和分部经理之间的。
NPV rule is a basic capital budgeting rule. The application of NPV rule needs decision-makers to master the information related to cash flow and capital costs. However, with the continuous expansion of business scale, with the ownership and the right to operate continuously separating, the owner of capital advantage is often difficult to acquire the true information of investment projects, which limits the use of NPV rule when owners make investment decisions accordingly. How the owners of information disadvantage should make its own capital budgeting? Conventional financial theory seems to be no answer given.
Meanwhile, with the advent of a knowledge-based economy and the continuous deepening of the human capital concept, human-centered management thinking has become a new management philosophy, and gradually enjoys popular support. As human capital belongs to intangible capital, in the measurement of a great deal of uncertainty, to what extent human capital should participate in the distribution of enterprises income? This seems to be a difficult problem in theory. This paper attempts to stand in owner’s perspective, which is based on firm theory and for the purpose to maximize the expected utility of owners, combine the capital budgeting with income sharing to design a set of incentive mechanism, which can solve the capital budgeting problem and prevent operators’moral hazard.
The logical organizations are as follows:
The first chapter is introductory remarks. This part mainly elaborates the background about the theme, the goal, the significance, the frame as well as the research technique and so on. From research abroad, the main problem is that the human capital is not taken into their analytical framework of income sharing; from domestic research, the main question is that it is not aware of the importance of information asymmetry in the income sharing and capital budgeting, which led to the incomplete conclusion.
The content of this paper includes not only capital budgeting of owners, but also owners and operators on how to sign income sharing contract. This paper makes the number of capital allocated to the operators by owners and the operator's income sharing ratio endogenous variable, using the most optimizing method.
The second chapter is elementary theory analysis. This part starts with the firm theory. Enterprises are produced, because factor market takes the place of product market. Because of the separating of ownership and the right to operate, and because the efforts of the operators are difficult to be observed, the operators make less efforts, which is the so-called moral hazard. The existence of moral hazard leads to the difference between the final outcome and Pareto-Optimum , which seriously impedes the growth of enterprises. This requires an effective institutional arrangement, by reasonably defining the ownership of enterprises.
The third chapter is the core of this paper. In this part, I gain the conclusions of income-sharing and capital budgeting through the optimization model. In the capital budgeting, when headquarters can not get access to the true project information as well as effectively investigate the division manager’s efforts, headquarters should make a hurdle rate higher than the cost of capital in order to evaluate a project. In the income-sharing contracts, this paper believes that when the quality is not high, the owners should only pay the division managers with the fixed wages. However, when the quality of project is above a certain threshold level , division managers should be given the rights of income-sharing, which become greater as the true quality of the project becomes better.
The fourth chapter analyzes the application of the model mainly in the corporation governance structure. This paper argues that the essence of corporation governance structure is the specific arrangements. When capital has been allocated to the division Managers from the headquarters, the powers to conduct operations have also been entrusted to the division managers. Therefore, we can view capital allocating acts as the transfer of control rights of the enterprise.
The innovations of this paper mainly are: (1) This paper introduces information asymmetry factors into the model, and makes capital allocation of owners and the operator's income-sharing ratio in the endogenous model; (2) In this paper, the model explained why in real life there are the fixed wages, income sharing and options receipts at the same time; (3) In accordance with this model, from the perspective of the owners, not all the division managers can be regarded as human capital, which depends largely on the quality of the project; (4) According to the extension of this paper, the option income is only a contingent expenses in order to retain division managers. It is an effective incentive for division managers to work harder, but option income itself is not a type of human capital to participate in the income sharing; (5) Extending the model, I come to an conclusion about the corporation governance structure. This paper holds that when the quality is not high, the owners should only pay the division managers with the fixed wages. The division managers do not have the power of income sharing. While the quality of project is high, headquarters should allocate a certain amount of capital to the division managers. That is to say, the control rights of enterprise is dispersed and symmetrically distributed between headquarters and the division managers.
引文
14详见《经济解释》一书中的55页,商务印书馆,2001。
17事实上,这种情况往往难以发生,而仅仅是理论上的一种可能性。
[1]Harris M, Kriebel CH, Raviv A. Asymmetric Information, Incentives, and Intrafirm Resource Allocation[J]. Management of Science, 1982,(28):604-620;
[2]Harris M, Raviv A. The Capital Budgeting Process: Incentives and Information[J]. Journal of Finance,1996,(4):1139-1174;
[3]Harris M, Raviv A. Capital Budgeting and Delegation[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1998,(50):259-289;
[4]HirshleiferJ.Investment, Interest and Capital[M].PrenticeHall,Englewood, Cliffs,NJ,1970;
[5]Antel R,Eppen G.Capital Rationing and Organizational Slack in Capital Budgeting[J].Management Science,1985,(31):163-174;
[6]Stein Jeremy C: internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources, journal of finance vol.52. 1997
[7]Rogerson W. Intertemporal cost allocation and managerial investment incentives: A theory explaining the use of economic value added as a performance measure [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1997, 105(4): 770-795;
[8]Dutta S. Capital budgeting and managerial compensation: incentive and retention effects [J]. The Accounting Review, 2003, 78(1): 71-93;
[9]Antle R, Fellingham J. Models of capital investments with private information and incentives: a selective review [J]. Journal of Business & Accounting, 1997, 24(7) ,(8): 887-908;
[10]Jensen M C, Meckling W H. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure [J]. Journal of Financial economics, 1976, 3: 305-360;
[11]干胜道.所有者财务——一个全新的领域[J].会计研究,1995(6);
[12]方竹兰.人力资本所有者拥有企业所有权是一个趋势[J].经济研究, 1996(5);
[13]张维迎.所有制、治理结构及委托——代理关系[J].经济研究,1996(9);
[14]周其仁.市场里的企业:一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约[J].经济研究,1996 (6);
[15]李旦,孙凯.企业家激励机制对分配性行为的治理分析[J].管理科学学报,2000(3);
[16]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(3);
[17]任永开,刘星和杨亦民.论公司资本预算限额的项目选择[J].贵州财经学院学报,2003(5);
[18]黄群慧.控制权作为企业家的激励约束因素:理论分析及现实解释意义[J].经济研究, 2000(1);
[19]黄群慧.业绩评价与国有企业经营者报酬的激励性[J].中国工业经济,2002(6);
[20]伍中信,何献忠.基于企业发展战略目标的资本预算方法改进[J].时代财会,2002(5);
[21]刘兵,张世英.企业激励机制设计与代理成本分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2000(6);
[22]刘斌,刘星,李世新,何顺文.CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,2003(3);
[23]张维迎.产权安排与企业内部的权利斗争[J].经济研究,2000(6);
[24]田国强.经济机制理论:信息效率与激励机制设计[J].经济学季刊,2003(2);
[25]王斌,竺素娥.论资本预算管理体系的构建[J].会计研究,2005(5);
[26]陈君宁,许月丽.基于代理问题的资本预算探讨[J].华中科技大学学报,2006(2);
[27]叶陈刚,王辉.知识型企业激励、代理成本与人力资源绩效[J].会计研究,2006(4);
[28]冯子标,焦斌龙.人力资本参与企业收益分配:一个分析框架及其实现条件[J].管理世界,2004(3);
[29]杨沙米.资本预算及投资决策的财务分析[J].南方金融, 2004(1);
[30]张维迎:《企业的企业家一契约理论》,上海人民出版社,1995年;
[31]张五常:《佃农理论—应用于亚洲的农业和台湾的土地改革》,商务印书馆,2000年;
[32]焦斌龙:《中国企业家人力资本:形成、定价与配置》,经济科学出版社,2000年;
[33]让·雅克·拉丰,邹恒甫主编:《激励理论》,北京大学出版社,2001年;
[34]王玛:《企业经理角色转换中的激励制度研究》,广东人民出版社,2002年;
[35]谢德仁:《企业剩余索取权:分享安排与剩余计量》,上海人民出版社,2001年;
[36]杨瑞龙:《企业共同治理的经济学分析》,经济科学出版社,2001年;
[37]科斯,哈特,斯蒂格利茨等:《契约经济学》,经济科学出版社,1999年
[38]段文斌,董林辉:《代理问题与作为治理机制的激励合同:一个理论检讨》,南开大学出版社,2003年。
[39]张五常:《经济解释——张五常经济论文选》,商务印书馆,2001年。
17事实上,这种情况往往难以发生,而仅仅是理论上的一种可能性。
[1]Harris M, Kriebel CH, Raviv A. Asymmetric Information, Incentives, and Intrafirm Resource Allocation[J]. Management of Science, 1982,(28):604-620;
[2]Harris M, Raviv A. The Capital Budgeting Process: Incentives and Information[J]. Journal of Finance,1996,(4):1139-1174;
[3]Harris M, Raviv A. Capital Budgeting and Delegation[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1998,(50):259-289;
[4]HirshleiferJ.Investment, Interest and Capital[M].PrenticeHall,Englewood, Cliffs,NJ,1970;
[5]Antel R,Eppen G.Capital Rationing and Organizational Slack in Capital Budgeting[J].Management Science,1985,(31):163-174;
[6]Stein Jeremy C: internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources, journal of finance vol.52. 1997
[7]Rogerson W. Intertemporal cost allocation and managerial investment incentives: A theory explaining the use of economic value added as a performance measure [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1997, 105(4): 770-795;
[8]Dutta S. Capital budgeting and managerial compensation: incentive and retention effects [J]. The Accounting Review, 2003, 78(1): 71-93;
[9]Antle R, Fellingham J. Models of capital investments with private information and incentives: a selective review [J]. Journal of Business & Accounting, 1997, 24(7) ,(8): 887-908;
[10]Jensen M C, Meckling W H. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure [J]. Journal of Financial economics, 1976, 3: 305-360;
[11]干胜道.所有者财务——一个全新的领域[J].会计研究,1995(6);
[12]方竹兰.人力资本所有者拥有企业所有权是一个趋势[J].经济研究, 1996(5);
[13]张维迎.所有制、治理结构及委托——代理关系[J].经济研究,1996(9);
[14]周其仁.市场里的企业:一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约[J].经济研究,1996 (6);
[15]李旦,孙凯.企业家激励机制对分配性行为的治理分析[J].管理科学学报,2000(3);
[16]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(3);
[17]任永开,刘星和杨亦民.论公司资本预算限额的项目选择[J].贵州财经学院学报,2003(5);
[18]黄群慧.控制权作为企业家的激励约束因素:理论分析及现实解释意义[J].经济研究, 2000(1);
[19]黄群慧.业绩评价与国有企业经营者报酬的激励性[J].中国工业经济,2002(6);
[20]伍中信,何献忠.基于企业发展战略目标的资本预算方法改进[J].时代财会,2002(5);
[21]刘兵,张世英.企业激励机制设计与代理成本分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2000(6);
[22]刘斌,刘星,李世新,何顺文.CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,2003(3);
[23]张维迎.产权安排与企业内部的权利斗争[J].经济研究,2000(6);
[24]田国强.经济机制理论:信息效率与激励机制设计[J].经济学季刊,2003(2);
[25]王斌,竺素娥.论资本预算管理体系的构建[J].会计研究,2005(5);
[26]陈君宁,许月丽.基于代理问题的资本预算探讨[J].华中科技大学学报,2006(2);
[27]叶陈刚,王辉.知识型企业激励、代理成本与人力资源绩效[J].会计研究,2006(4);
[28]冯子标,焦斌龙.人力资本参与企业收益分配:一个分析框架及其实现条件[J].管理世界,2004(3);
[29]杨沙米.资本预算及投资决策的财务分析[J].南方金融, 2004(1);
[30]张维迎:《企业的企业家一契约理论》,上海人民出版社,1995年;
[31]张五常:《佃农理论—应用于亚洲的农业和台湾的土地改革》,商务印书馆,2000年;
[32]焦斌龙:《中国企业家人力资本:形成、定价与配置》,经济科学出版社,2000年;
[33]让·雅克·拉丰,邹恒甫主编:《激励理论》,北京大学出版社,2001年;
[34]王玛:《企业经理角色转换中的激励制度研究》,广东人民出版社,2002年;
[35]谢德仁:《企业剩余索取权:分享安排与剩余计量》,上海人民出版社,2001年;
[36]杨瑞龙:《企业共同治理的经济学分析》,经济科学出版社,2001年;
[37]科斯,哈特,斯蒂格利茨等:《契约经济学》,经济科学出版社,1999年
[38]段文斌,董林辉:《代理问题与作为治理机制的激励合同:一个理论检讨》,南开大学出版社,2003年。
[39]张五常:《经济解释——张五常经济论文选》,商务印书馆,2001年。