服务型政府的预算契约研究
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摘要
一、论文的主要内容及观点
政府预算是改革政府、实现政府善治的元工具。因此,要构建服务型政府,政府预算的改革和完善必然是先行的步骤和推动力。在这一视域下,一个好的政府预算应该是什么样的、要如何构建,对政府的改革来说,是一个关键的问题。本文将围绕上述议题展开分析和论述,主要的内容及观点如下：
1.构建服务型政府是当前政府改革的目标。政府起源于公意契约,现代民主国家的政府应当成为为了公共事务而存在的一套有组织的制度安排,以公意为本来实施公共治理,保障和促进公共利益,有效的履行公共受托责任,满足公民的公共需求。可以说,现代意义上的好政府是以为公共利益服务、为民服务为本的,构建以服务为导向的政府是当前整个世界范围内政府改革的主要目标。服务型的政府,首先是一个承担和履行公共受托责任的政府,还必须是一个高绩效的组织体系。服务意识、顾客导向、结果绩效导向、善治和高效的公共生产力是服务型政府的基本要件。
2.政府预算是政府改革的元工具。政府预算这一命题可以是一个政治问题,也可以是一个经济问题。之所以这样说,是因为政府预算不仅涉及政治程序对公共资源的配置,也最直观地涉及政府理财的一系列问题,包括政府理财的能力、财政支出的效率以及政府的经济活动对社会产生的影响。从政府预算的政治维度出发,政府预算是整个社会中各利益集团、不同的社会阶层之间以实现自身效用最大化为前提相互博弈、妥协所达成的利益均衡结果。他不仅是全体社会成员都能够接受的公共意志的宣示和表达,更是各利益主体间相互约束彼此行为的信约,目的是要实现和增进最广泛的公共利益。因此,政府作为民选的代理人和政府预算的执行者,他所掌握的由公民社会让渡的预算权和这些权力的行使必然要受到政治程序所达成的预算契约的控制和约束。而政府预算的执行从过程和内容上看等同于政府行政的全过程。所以说政府预算是整个公民社会及其利益代表控制政府的工具。从政府理财的角度来看,政府预算是整个政府所有活动的财务计划和蓝图,是政府做出的涉及政府收入、分配和公共财政资源使用的决策以及这些决策的执行过程,毫不夸张地说,政府预算决定了政府的能力,是政府实现善治的工具,因此,政府预算也被看作是政府运行的血脉,他以最强有力的方式反映着政府运作的全貌,实现着政策目标和公共受托责任的分解与落实,决定了政府的行为方式和效能,并将类似绩效考评与监督、合同外包、标杆管理以及平衡记分卡等多种先进的组织管理策略和推动政府改革的工具植入政府组织的管理过程,以“元工具”的姿态在政府组织内部构建起了以权力和义务的明确界定为基础的、对政府履职行为进行有效控制的契约式规制机制,成为了政府自我控制和实现高绩效的公共治理的有利工具。因此,政府预算是实现控制政府和政府控制的双刃剑。所谓“工欲善其事,必先利其器”。要实现政府职能的顺利转变,建立一个高绩效的服务型政府,政府预算的改革必然是先行的步骤。
3.基于控制政府层面的政府预算契约效率分析框架。政府预算的元工具地位体现在他所能实现的契约规制的有效性方面。从控制政府的层面来看,政府预算的立法控制建立在这样一种认知之上,人民应该通过最能代表其利益的代议机关来防止财政专制。因此,由政治代表组成的立法机构拥有宪法赋予的财政上的控制权。立法控制包括决策控制和执行控制两方面。决策控制必须保证只有全体人民所渴望的、在特定的时间内他们所支持的公共生产的项目、质量和数量,才能在政府预算契约中反映出来。在决策控制设立了法定的支出规模、资源配置结构、使用方式和拟实现的目标以后,预算执行的立法控制要保证主权意志在预算法定契约履行的微观过程中被切实地遵从,契约规制的效率体现在对预算执行自由裁量权的控制和降低预算执行的违约风险方面。然而,契约的不完全性是普遍存在的,在政府预算领域也不例外。不可预见性,语言表达的局限,不可观测或不可证实等因素导致了缔约与契约执行的不完全。因此,需要有司法部门作为无利益关切的第三方来执行对结果的控制,必要时以强制力保证契约的履行,司法控制的独立性是结果控制效率的决定因素。在司法控制的过程中,契约执行结果的不可观测或可观测不可证实制约着结果控制的有效性和可执行性。因此,公民的直接参与通过一种更广泛的民主控制机制强化着对政府预算进行控制的力度,这一控制机制发挥作用的前提是有效的公共偏好信息揭示的激励机制。
4.基于政府控制层面的政府预算契约效率分析框架。在政府控制层面,政府预算的元工具作用由一系列的契约组合所实现的契约规制来体现。整个政府预算契约体系的构成包括政府组织内部不同层级之间的预算契约、决策部门与支出执行部门之间的预算契约、针对政府部门人力资源管理的预算契约和政府部门与私营部门之间为合作而缔结的政府预算契约。当政府预算契约本身成为契约参与者间相互合作、竞争、妥协的博弈均衡解时,契约就成为了各方彼此牵制、彼此约束的规制力量,政府内部的行政管理和控制机制也就随之形成,而契约的效率则体现在它所能实现的控制力上。不同层级政府间契约的效率取决于这种契约的规制力量能够在多大程度上清晰地界定和明确各方的权利和义务,以达到以责任控制行为的目的。决策部门与支出执行部门间契约的效率体现于这种契约规制力量是生产性竞争的激励因素,还是分配性竞争的激励因素。针对人力资源管理的预算契约的效率体现在其规制作用能否为政府组织构建一套有效的人力资源管理手段方面,激励理性人的行为与政府预算契约确定的公共利益和公共目标保持一致。涉及政府部门与私营部门合作的预算契约,其效率体现在他能够在多大程度上实现私营企业的利润最大化诉求和政府项目公共性之间的整合上。
5.政府预算契约规制的建立。契约规制的建立是以契约的效率为导向的,以期最大限度地实现政府预算契约对参与各方行为的规制。从控制政府的层面来看,契约式的立法控制是最为有效、也是最根本的控制政府预算和政府行为的手段,非连续性、全面性、一致性和严格性是这一控制机制所要遵循的基本原则,目的是从政府预算契约的缔约阶段开始,就将公意、公共受托责任以订立事前承诺的方式植入政府部门,使得政府预算契约切实地成为公民及其政治代表控制政府的工具。在预算执行的立法控制方面,契约规制将通过合理的自由裁量权授予结构和恰当的契约关系来约束权力的行使,并通过独立的行政司法程序和有效的参与式预算策略来强化对政府及其行为的控制,形成以立法控制为主,多元力量共同参与的对政府预算的联合控制体系。以政府预算为工具,改善政府组织对自身的控制和管理能力是政府预算推动政府改革的最直观表现。通常,预算契约能够通过预算权的配置来实现权利、责任和义务的明确划分,目的在于以责任规范和引导行为。由于政府部门内部交易的双边垄断特征,以权利和责任对等为基础的控制权激励是政府层级和政府组织间的预算契约规制手段,它通过控制权收益和成本负担的内部化来实现对政府履职的激励与约束,同时,财政权力配置的固有原则也要求控制权的配置必须实现他与事权配置在横向和纵向上的对称,保证公共领域内公平正义目标的实现。组织结构的设置是影响政府预算契约效率的又一个重要因素。在企业中,扁平化组织被认为是一种高效率的组织结构安排,这一结论在政府预算领域的运用体现为财政层级的扁平化,他通过精简组织层级、拓展管理跨度、压缩管理指挥链,使得契约规制的运行更经济、更直接,也使得权职的界定更完整,有利于构建一个高效能的政府组织。在政府预算拨款的契约规制构建当中,标杆管理作为一种能够有效激励生产性努力并使得政府财政为绩效买单的手段被引入到政府预算支出管理的过程中来。而以平衡记分卡为规制手段的绩效合同和编制中长期政府滚动预算则有利于改善政府组织的人力资源管理机制。文章还从不完全契约的研究视角出发,通过“事前事后都不可缔约的事前事后效率问题模型”、“部分可缔约的效率问题模型”和“契约的自我履约”等理论在政府预算契约规制研究中的运用,为一些现实问题的解决提供了理论性的方案。
6.在中国,政府预算改革同样是促进政府职能转变和建设服务型政府的重要手段,但政府预算的改革要分阶段、有规划地进行。从建国至今,中国政府预算制度的变迁体现了财政管理体制和政府职能转变的轨迹。对于新时期政府改革的目标来说,政府预算的改革是突破口。但政府预算的改革也并非一蹴而就。本文认为,作为现阶段中国政府改革的一个核心部分,政府预算的改革,其近期的、可实现的目标是建立包括立法、司法控制,民主参与控制和政府组织内部有效严格的控制机制为内容的,内在统一、一致和控制严格的政府预算。在此基础之上,建立以绩效问责机制为基础的政府预算的契约规制体系才有可能实现。同时,在具备条件的地区或部门对民主参与、基于绩效的契约规制等政府预算的策略进行尝试,为改革的深入推进积累和总结经验也是必不可少的。
二、论文的主要贡献
本文在大量文献研读的基础之上,针对服务型政府这一具体的政府构建模式来讨论与之相适应的政府预算制度应该是怎么样的,以及怎样建立和完善。在建设服务型政府的过程中,本文主张通过政府预算这一实现控制政府和政府控制的双刃剑来建立一套系统性和具有适应性的契约规制机制,从立法、司法控制,民主参与协商等方面加强对政府预算和政府行为的控制；而在政府组织内部,则强调运用预算契约的规制作用明确政府预算权职的划分、优化组织结构、引入私营企业领域内的相关创新性管理策略,以实现政府的自我完善、提升政府组织的绩效和效能,从而构建一个能够引导和推动服务型政府建设的政府预算契约体系。文章在论述和研究的过程中,引入了公共行政管理理论、完全和不完全契约理论、企业管理理论、组织理论等的相关理论基础和包括交易费用范式、博弈分析在内的研究方法,拓展了政府预算问题的研究视域,在政府预算问题的跨学科研究方面作了一次尝试。同时,多学科理论的综合分析为政府预算机制的效率研究构建了一个基本的理论分析框架,明确指出了政府预算体系的运行效率体现在不同预算参与者间的预算契约规制的控制力上,好的政府预算制度的构建必须围绕控制力的加强来展开。在控制政府层面,除了巩固和落实立法及司法控制外,更有必要引入民主参与力量来增强对政府预算、进而对政府行为的控制。在政府自我管理和自我完善的过程中,财政层级的优化和层级间网络的建立、支出管理、政府部门人力资源管理制度的革新、以结果为导向的规制机制等都是改进政府预算制度、实现政府善治的有效手段。在上述分析和探讨的基础之上,文章对政府预算契约规制的建立提供了理论和实践的参考,并结合中国的实际加以运用。
Government budgeting is on the top of governmental tools list, so, it's the driving force of establishing a service-oriented government. Well, according to what mentioned above, how to construct an appropriate governmental budgeting system, for the reform of government, is a basic stage. These are the topics covered by this dissertation, and the summary reviews are as following.
1. Service-oriented government must be the aim of the present governmental reforming. Government was created by sovereignty, so, it should responsible for the public issues by improving an efficient mechanism of public accountability. Senses of service, client orientation, aim management and multi-level governance are aims and values for service-oriented government.
2. Government budgeting is the primary important governmental tools. Refers to the issues of government budgeting, it is sensible to take both sides of them, a political problem as well as a public financial problem. Viewed in political, the whole process of government budgeting is totally the game between interest groups. The game equilibrium is binding upon all parties, or it also could be nexus of contracts, by a series of political processes. Then, the popularly elected government, as the agent, his budgeting rights and execute behavior must be control by legislative body. While, the governmental budget is just the tool of this controlling. On the other hand, governmental budget is financial plans of administration as well. It gives an overview of government operations, makes the public accountability be divided and acknowledged. By government budgeting, some new management strategy, such as performance management, outsourcing contract and Benchmarking Management, etc, can be introduced into the public sector. So, budgeting plays the role of means to gain administration and governmental self-manage.
3. Analysis on the efficiency of budgetary contract, viewed in political. Controlling the government budgeting based on such cognition:the council's voting procedures is the most efficient way to shelter sovereignty from the tyranny in the field of public finance. So, the whole process of government budgeting should be controlled by legislative and judicial procedure. Besides, by introducing the participatory budgeting, it could push extensive democracy to reinforce the external budgetary control.
4. Analysis on the efficiency of budgetary contract, viewed in public financial. The nexus of budgetary contracts refers to the behavior strategy between different governmental organizations and coordinating mechanism between the policies. So, these contracts can be the power of mutually control to regulate the behavior of various budgetary departments and administrative official. Reinforce the power of contractual regulation is the key to improve the efficiency of budgetary institution.
5. Establishing contractual regulations of government budgeting. For the constructing of external control system, some Basic principles must be abided, including non-continuity, comprehensiveness, unity and specification. Efficient legislative controlling on the process of budgetary execution is attributed to the reasonable regulation of discretionary power. Independent administrative judicature is the key point for the result control of the budgetary execution. While, participatory budgeting can be a valuable tactics to compensate for the indirect democracy. The reformation of the government budgeting that is the primary governmental tool, the purpose of which is add value to and improve the operative efficiency of governmental organization. In these processes, an incitement of authority or control, the optimal design of organizational structure and some innovation administration innovation, such as flat structure, benchmarking management, etc, could be beneficial. Otherwise, the self-enforcing mechanism provides successfully solution to avoid the ineffectiveness of incomplete contracting.
6. Government budgeting issues in china. Building a service-oriented government is the main goal of governmental reform and development in China. As a breakthrough of this reformation, governmental budgeting is emphasis, which cannot be done at one go. The standpoint of this thesis, the short-term goals of budgetary innovation is finishing a control-oriented system of contractual regulation. Specific measures including:complete the system of legislative control, make sure the independence of administrative justice and take effective measures to push the attempt at participatory budgeting. Based on these approaches, performance-oriented budgetary contractual regulation is the long-range goals for Chinese reformation that refers to the government and budgetary institution.
The dissertation, based on the corresponding research and a variety of reference refers to the governmental budgeting, presents a full summary to'the ways of constructing an appropriate service-oriented governmental budgeting system. Considering the government budgeting is the primary important governmental tools, so the final purpose of the present study is to achieve the goal of governmental reform. The key o f reforming the governmental budgeting is how to develop a positive control institution, which consists two parts:external and inside control. By controlled by legislative, judicial procedure and democratic participation, an efficient external control system can be achieved. At the same time, contractual regulations of budget, optimization of organizational structure and the introduction of the marketization tools offer some new approaches for the establishment of right inside control. This dissertation develops and deepens the study about the governmental budgeting by the blend of public administrative theory, complete and incomplete contract theory, organizational theory, transaction costs paradigm, game theory, etc. At the end of this dissertation, provides the theoretical and practical reference for the Chinese reforming of governmental budgeting and public governance.
政府预算是改革政府、实现政府善治的元工具。因此,要构建服务型政府,政府预算的改革和完善必然是先行的步骤和推动力。在这一视域下,一个好的政府预算应该是什么样的、要如何构建,对政府的改革来说,是一个关键的问题。本文将围绕上述议题展开分析和论述,主要的内容及观点如下：
1.构建服务型政府是当前政府改革的目标。政府起源于公意契约,现代民主国家的政府应当成为为了公共事务而存在的一套有组织的制度安排,以公意为本来实施公共治理,保障和促进公共利益,有效的履行公共受托责任,满足公民的公共需求。可以说,现代意义上的好政府是以为公共利益服务、为民服务为本的,构建以服务为导向的政府是当前整个世界范围内政府改革的主要目标。服务型的政府,首先是一个承担和履行公共受托责任的政府,还必须是一个高绩效的组织体系。服务意识、顾客导向、结果绩效导向、善治和高效的公共生产力是服务型政府的基本要件。
2.政府预算是政府改革的元工具。政府预算这一命题可以是一个政治问题,也可以是一个经济问题。之所以这样说,是因为政府预算不仅涉及政治程序对公共资源的配置,也最直观地涉及政府理财的一系列问题,包括政府理财的能力、财政支出的效率以及政府的经济活动对社会产生的影响。从政府预算的政治维度出发,政府预算是整个社会中各利益集团、不同的社会阶层之间以实现自身效用最大化为前提相互博弈、妥协所达成的利益均衡结果。他不仅是全体社会成员都能够接受的公共意志的宣示和表达,更是各利益主体间相互约束彼此行为的信约,目的是要实现和增进最广泛的公共利益。因此,政府作为民选的代理人和政府预算的执行者,他所掌握的由公民社会让渡的预算权和这些权力的行使必然要受到政治程序所达成的预算契约的控制和约束。而政府预算的执行从过程和内容上看等同于政府行政的全过程。所以说政府预算是整个公民社会及其利益代表控制政府的工具。从政府理财的角度来看,政府预算是整个政府所有活动的财务计划和蓝图,是政府做出的涉及政府收入、分配和公共财政资源使用的决策以及这些决策的执行过程,毫不夸张地说,政府预算决定了政府的能力,是政府实现善治的工具,因此,政府预算也被看作是政府运行的血脉,他以最强有力的方式反映着政府运作的全貌,实现着政策目标和公共受托责任的分解与落实,决定了政府的行为方式和效能,并将类似绩效考评与监督、合同外包、标杆管理以及平衡记分卡等多种先进的组织管理策略和推动政府改革的工具植入政府组织的管理过程,以“元工具”的姿态在政府组织内部构建起了以权力和义务的明确界定为基础的、对政府履职行为进行有效控制的契约式规制机制,成为了政府自我控制和实现高绩效的公共治理的有利工具。因此,政府预算是实现控制政府和政府控制的双刃剑。所谓“工欲善其事,必先利其器”。要实现政府职能的顺利转变,建立一个高绩效的服务型政府,政府预算的改革必然是先行的步骤。
3.基于控制政府层面的政府预算契约效率分析框架。政府预算的元工具地位体现在他所能实现的契约规制的有效性方面。从控制政府的层面来看,政府预算的立法控制建立在这样一种认知之上,人民应该通过最能代表其利益的代议机关来防止财政专制。因此,由政治代表组成的立法机构拥有宪法赋予的财政上的控制权。立法控制包括决策控制和执行控制两方面。决策控制必须保证只有全体人民所渴望的、在特定的时间内他们所支持的公共生产的项目、质量和数量,才能在政府预算契约中反映出来。在决策控制设立了法定的支出规模、资源配置结构、使用方式和拟实现的目标以后,预算执行的立法控制要保证主权意志在预算法定契约履行的微观过程中被切实地遵从,契约规制的效率体现在对预算执行自由裁量权的控制和降低预算执行的违约风险方面。然而,契约的不完全性是普遍存在的,在政府预算领域也不例外。不可预见性,语言表达的局限,不可观测或不可证实等因素导致了缔约与契约执行的不完全。因此,需要有司法部门作为无利益关切的第三方来执行对结果的控制,必要时以强制力保证契约的履行,司法控制的独立性是结果控制效率的决定因素。在司法控制的过程中,契约执行结果的不可观测或可观测不可证实制约着结果控制的有效性和可执行性。因此,公民的直接参与通过一种更广泛的民主控制机制强化着对政府预算进行控制的力度,这一控制机制发挥作用的前提是有效的公共偏好信息揭示的激励机制。
4.基于政府控制层面的政府预算契约效率分析框架。在政府控制层面,政府预算的元工具作用由一系列的契约组合所实现的契约规制来体现。整个政府预算契约体系的构成包括政府组织内部不同层级之间的预算契约、决策部门与支出执行部门之间的预算契约、针对政府部门人力资源管理的预算契约和政府部门与私营部门之间为合作而缔结的政府预算契约。当政府预算契约本身成为契约参与者间相互合作、竞争、妥协的博弈均衡解时,契约就成为了各方彼此牵制、彼此约束的规制力量,政府内部的行政管理和控制机制也就随之形成,而契约的效率则体现在它所能实现的控制力上。不同层级政府间契约的效率取决于这种契约的规制力量能够在多大程度上清晰地界定和明确各方的权利和义务,以达到以责任控制行为的目的。决策部门与支出执行部门间契约的效率体现于这种契约规制力量是生产性竞争的激励因素,还是分配性竞争的激励因素。针对人力资源管理的预算契约的效率体现在其规制作用能否为政府组织构建一套有效的人力资源管理手段方面,激励理性人的行为与政府预算契约确定的公共利益和公共目标保持一致。涉及政府部门与私营部门合作的预算契约,其效率体现在他能够在多大程度上实现私营企业的利润最大化诉求和政府项目公共性之间的整合上。
5.政府预算契约规制的建立。契约规制的建立是以契约的效率为导向的,以期最大限度地实现政府预算契约对参与各方行为的规制。从控制政府的层面来看,契约式的立法控制是最为有效、也是最根本的控制政府预算和政府行为的手段,非连续性、全面性、一致性和严格性是这一控制机制所要遵循的基本原则,目的是从政府预算契约的缔约阶段开始,就将公意、公共受托责任以订立事前承诺的方式植入政府部门,使得政府预算契约切实地成为公民及其政治代表控制政府的工具。在预算执行的立法控制方面,契约规制将通过合理的自由裁量权授予结构和恰当的契约关系来约束权力的行使,并通过独立的行政司法程序和有效的参与式预算策略来强化对政府及其行为的控制,形成以立法控制为主,多元力量共同参与的对政府预算的联合控制体系。以政府预算为工具,改善政府组织对自身的控制和管理能力是政府预算推动政府改革的最直观表现。通常,预算契约能够通过预算权的配置来实现权利、责任和义务的明确划分,目的在于以责任规范和引导行为。由于政府部门内部交易的双边垄断特征,以权利和责任对等为基础的控制权激励是政府层级和政府组织间的预算契约规制手段,它通过控制权收益和成本负担的内部化来实现对政府履职的激励与约束,同时,财政权力配置的固有原则也要求控制权的配置必须实现他与事权配置在横向和纵向上的对称,保证公共领域内公平正义目标的实现。组织结构的设置是影响政府预算契约效率的又一个重要因素。在企业中,扁平化组织被认为是一种高效率的组织结构安排,这一结论在政府预算领域的运用体现为财政层级的扁平化,他通过精简组织层级、拓展管理跨度、压缩管理指挥链,使得契约规制的运行更经济、更直接,也使得权职的界定更完整,有利于构建一个高效能的政府组织。在政府预算拨款的契约规制构建当中,标杆管理作为一种能够有效激励生产性努力并使得政府财政为绩效买单的手段被引入到政府预算支出管理的过程中来。而以平衡记分卡为规制手段的绩效合同和编制中长期政府滚动预算则有利于改善政府组织的人力资源管理机制。文章还从不完全契约的研究视角出发,通过“事前事后都不可缔约的事前事后效率问题模型”、“部分可缔约的效率问题模型”和“契约的自我履约”等理论在政府预算契约规制研究中的运用,为一些现实问题的解决提供了理论性的方案。
6.在中国,政府预算改革同样是促进政府职能转变和建设服务型政府的重要手段,但政府预算的改革要分阶段、有规划地进行。从建国至今,中国政府预算制度的变迁体现了财政管理体制和政府职能转变的轨迹。对于新时期政府改革的目标来说,政府预算的改革是突破口。但政府预算的改革也并非一蹴而就。本文认为,作为现阶段中国政府改革的一个核心部分,政府预算的改革,其近期的、可实现的目标是建立包括立法、司法控制,民主参与控制和政府组织内部有效严格的控制机制为内容的,内在统一、一致和控制严格的政府预算。在此基础之上,建立以绩效问责机制为基础的政府预算的契约规制体系才有可能实现。同时,在具备条件的地区或部门对民主参与、基于绩效的契约规制等政府预算的策略进行尝试,为改革的深入推进积累和总结经验也是必不可少的。
二、论文的主要贡献
本文在大量文献研读的基础之上,针对服务型政府这一具体的政府构建模式来讨论与之相适应的政府预算制度应该是怎么样的,以及怎样建立和完善。在建设服务型政府的过程中,本文主张通过政府预算这一实现控制政府和政府控制的双刃剑来建立一套系统性和具有适应性的契约规制机制,从立法、司法控制,民主参与协商等方面加强对政府预算和政府行为的控制；而在政府组织内部,则强调运用预算契约的规制作用明确政府预算权职的划分、优化组织结构、引入私营企业领域内的相关创新性管理策略,以实现政府的自我完善、提升政府组织的绩效和效能,从而构建一个能够引导和推动服务型政府建设的政府预算契约体系。文章在论述和研究的过程中,引入了公共行政管理理论、完全和不完全契约理论、企业管理理论、组织理论等的相关理论基础和包括交易费用范式、博弈分析在内的研究方法,拓展了政府预算问题的研究视域,在政府预算问题的跨学科研究方面作了一次尝试。同时,多学科理论的综合分析为政府预算机制的效率研究构建了一个基本的理论分析框架,明确指出了政府预算体系的运行效率体现在不同预算参与者间的预算契约规制的控制力上,好的政府预算制度的构建必须围绕控制力的加强来展开。在控制政府层面,除了巩固和落实立法及司法控制外,更有必要引入民主参与力量来增强对政府预算、进而对政府行为的控制。在政府自我管理和自我完善的过程中,财政层级的优化和层级间网络的建立、支出管理、政府部门人力资源管理制度的革新、以结果为导向的规制机制等都是改进政府预算制度、实现政府善治的有效手段。在上述分析和探讨的基础之上,文章对政府预算契约规制的建立提供了理论和实践的参考,并结合中国的实际加以运用。
Government budgeting is on the top of governmental tools list, so, it's the driving force of establishing a service-oriented government. Well, according to what mentioned above, how to construct an appropriate governmental budgeting system, for the reform of government, is a basic stage. These are the topics covered by this dissertation, and the summary reviews are as following.
1. Service-oriented government must be the aim of the present governmental reforming. Government was created by sovereignty, so, it should responsible for the public issues by improving an efficient mechanism of public accountability. Senses of service, client orientation, aim management and multi-level governance are aims and values for service-oriented government.
2. Government budgeting is the primary important governmental tools. Refers to the issues of government budgeting, it is sensible to take both sides of them, a political problem as well as a public financial problem. Viewed in political, the whole process of government budgeting is totally the game between interest groups. The game equilibrium is binding upon all parties, or it also could be nexus of contracts, by a series of political processes. Then, the popularly elected government, as the agent, his budgeting rights and execute behavior must be control by legislative body. While, the governmental budget is just the tool of this controlling. On the other hand, governmental budget is financial plans of administration as well. It gives an overview of government operations, makes the public accountability be divided and acknowledged. By government budgeting, some new management strategy, such as performance management, outsourcing contract and Benchmarking Management, etc, can be introduced into the public sector. So, budgeting plays the role of means to gain administration and governmental self-manage.
3. Analysis on the efficiency of budgetary contract, viewed in political. Controlling the government budgeting based on such cognition:the council's voting procedures is the most efficient way to shelter sovereignty from the tyranny in the field of public finance. So, the whole process of government budgeting should be controlled by legislative and judicial procedure. Besides, by introducing the participatory budgeting, it could push extensive democracy to reinforce the external budgetary control.
4. Analysis on the efficiency of budgetary contract, viewed in public financial. The nexus of budgetary contracts refers to the behavior strategy between different governmental organizations and coordinating mechanism between the policies. So, these contracts can be the power of mutually control to regulate the behavior of various budgetary departments and administrative official. Reinforce the power of contractual regulation is the key to improve the efficiency of budgetary institution.
5. Establishing contractual regulations of government budgeting. For the constructing of external control system, some Basic principles must be abided, including non-continuity, comprehensiveness, unity and specification. Efficient legislative controlling on the process of budgetary execution is attributed to the reasonable regulation of discretionary power. Independent administrative judicature is the key point for the result control of the budgetary execution. While, participatory budgeting can be a valuable tactics to compensate for the indirect democracy. The reformation of the government budgeting that is the primary governmental tool, the purpose of which is add value to and improve the operative efficiency of governmental organization. In these processes, an incitement of authority or control, the optimal design of organizational structure and some innovation administration innovation, such as flat structure, benchmarking management, etc, could be beneficial. Otherwise, the self-enforcing mechanism provides successfully solution to avoid the ineffectiveness of incomplete contracting.
6. Government budgeting issues in china. Building a service-oriented government is the main goal of governmental reform and development in China. As a breakthrough of this reformation, governmental budgeting is emphasis, which cannot be done at one go. The standpoint of this thesis, the short-term goals of budgetary innovation is finishing a control-oriented system of contractual regulation. Specific measures including:complete the system of legislative control, make sure the independence of administrative justice and take effective measures to push the attempt at participatory budgeting. Based on these approaches, performance-oriented budgetary contractual regulation is the long-range goals for Chinese reformation that refers to the government and budgetary institution.
The dissertation, based on the corresponding research and a variety of reference refers to the governmental budgeting, presents a full summary to'the ways of constructing an appropriate service-oriented governmental budgeting system. Considering the government budgeting is the primary important governmental tools, so the final purpose of the present study is to achieve the goal of governmental reform. The key o f reforming the governmental budgeting is how to develop a positive control institution, which consists two parts:external and inside control. By controlled by legislative, judicial procedure and democratic participation, an efficient external control system can be achieved. At the same time, contractual regulations of budget, optimization of organizational structure and the introduction of the marketization tools offer some new approaches for the establishment of right inside control. This dissertation develops and deepens the study about the governmental budgeting by the blend of public administrative theory, complete and incomplete contract theory, organizational theory, transaction costs paradigm, game theory, etc. At the end of this dissertation, provides the theoretical and practical reference for the Chinese reforming of governmental budgeting and public governance.
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②所谓“组织失灵”是指,组织成本越来越高、组织效率日益低下、官僚化阻碍创新、程式化降低士气、滥用职权而导致腐败(罗仲伟,罗美娟,2001年)等等
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