商业银行公司治理与绩效研究
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摘要
20世纪80年代以来,奉行公司治理导向投资策略的机构投资者逐渐成为主流,对银行来说,财务数据仅仅代表了银行目前和历史的经营业绩,而稳健和良性治理结构则代表着银行未来的行为和价值。公司治理一般框架主要是由法律、监管、自律机制、主动承诺和业务实践等要素构成的,这些要素因各国环境、历史和传统不同会有所差异,银行的公司治理框架也不例外。对中国银行业来说,一方面由于银行公司治理区别于一般公司治理的特殊性,并没有在理论界得到完全的揭示,银行公司治理的系统性的框架仍未建立;另一方面由于现阶段国内商业银行的公司治理环境出现了较为重大的变化,特别是存在银行业改革往往领先于理论研究突破的情况,迄今为止,国内对商业银行公司治理研究的焦点也在不断的变化。其中,争论最为激烈的部分仍然是我国商业银行公司治理的模式与治理目标究竟该如何选择的问题。
为了系统地分析银行公司治理,本文对公司治理理论的发展以及银行公司的公司治理的相关理论进行了梳理和评论,对于银行公司的公司治理则集中于文献中对股东至上的公司治理模式及利益相关者共同治理模式两种不同治理模式的研究。通过文献回顾,我们看到,公司治理构成了建立在高度专业化分工基础上的现代公司制度运行的核心,作为一类特殊的公司,银行公司在诸多方面都显示出与工业化时代更为强调物质资产公司的不同,目前经济学家们已经认识到了与那些不受监管、非金融类的企业相比,银行公司治理结构的最优设计更为复杂并且更为重要。目前对银行公司治理结构的主要理论存在一个重要分歧,股东至上的单边治理和利益相关者之上的多边治理,许多研究者都强调银行公司应采取利益相关者共同治理的公司治理模式,但是随之而来的却是利益相关者的界定和利益相关者参与治理的机制涉及问题仍不明确。
理论上的“股东至上”与“利益相关者”两种模式,在国际商业银行实践中也能找到相应的对照。目前,国际上商业银行的公司治理结构主要有两种:美英法系下的单层制结构和大陆法系下的双层制结构,历史上理论界对两种治理模式优劣的争论从来就没有停止过。通过对两种治理模式的在治理机制的有效性比较可以看到,银行治理模式的选择是一个渐进的历史的过程,现实中两种治理模式随着治理环境的改变,也存在一个相互融合、学习的过程。
虽然诸多的研究者都强调了利益相关者共同治理原则否定的只是一味单纯强调股东利益的股东至上主义,并不否定股东在顾及其他利益相关者合法权益的基础上对自身利益最大化的追求,它所体现的就是各方追求各自利益而形成的一种合作均衡。但在实践中,这种治理模式却遇到了操作上的障碍,我们也很少能够发现符合利益相关者共同治理模式的安排,导致这一现象的原因有很多,而具体到银行公司来说,本文则认为信息问题以及组织行动的低效率是银行公司采用利益相关者共同治理模式最难逾越的障碍。
本文采用一个银行与小储蓄者之间的两阶段动态博弈模型考察银行公司管理层与银行公司小储蓄者之间存在策略互动情形时,共同治理模式对商业银行公司效率及经营绩效的影响。作为研究的铺垫,本文首先对银行公司的利益相关者进行了界定,将银行的小储蓄者作为参与共同治理的利益相关者,也即银行公司利益相关者共同治理模式的潜台词也即小储蓄者对银行公司治理过程的参与。在完全信息情形下,两阶段治理博弈的均衡为(存款人维持存款并取得利息收入;管理者选择低风险的项目并付出低的努力水平),而且在本文所假定的博弈环境下这是唯一能够维持的纳什均衡解。分析的结果显示,如果银行小储蓄者在银行公司治理安排中获取更大的权力的话,那么将导致商业银行公司的治理绩效以及银行公司竞争力的下降。本文认为银行公司治理绩效的下降来自两个方面,首先,储蓄者与银行公司管理层之间的策略互动本身将使最优的效率目标难以达到,这起源于银行储蓄者与银行管理层之间目标的冲突以及策略互动过程中的信任难以建立;其次,小储蓄者风险规避的特征以及现代商业银行风险管理过程参与成本的提高加大了小储蓄者与银行公司管理层之间信息交流的难度,导致了治理绩效的进一步恶化。
在考虑了存款人与银行公司管理者之间的信息不对称情形下,本文认为适当的信息不对称反而使银行公司的绩效有所提高,也就是说银行公司存款人难以获取更多的信息似乎导致了银行取得更好的治理效果,而这一点与银行公司共同治理模式所一直强调的观点出现了明显的分歧。造成这一有些出乎意料的结果的一个重要原因在于对银行来说利息回报与投资回报之间的差异,也即说存款人所承担的风险与所取得的回报之间的不对称,而这却也正是银行公司与一般公司之间相区别的重要一面。如果只有使存款人难以获取相应的信息才能够使银行公司取得更好的治理效果的话,那么对于银行公司来说也应采取倾向于股东治理的模式,而银行公司治理中的存款人利益的保护问题应由专门的机构来进行承担,例如存款保险机制,这样一种安排似乎能够顾及利益相关者各方的利益平衡。在这种情形下,我们可以认为共同治理模式中存款人的利益将最终体现为银行公司对风险进行管理的水平,而不同的机构,例如银行监管部门、存款保险公司等均可以由对风险的共同管理中获取相应的收益,同时也可以约束银行公司管理者过度冒险的行为。
为了能够对理论模型所刻画的结果进行验证,本文分别通过实证分析以及案例分析进行了相应的研究。本文利用因子分析法来确定公司治理各种影响因素在评价体系中所占的比重,以此来探索究竟可以从哪些方面来评价商业银行的公司治理的水平,并在此基础上利用主成分回归来分析公司治理对商业银行绩效的影响。对公司治理的影响因素及公司治理和企业绩效间的关系实证分析表明,商业银行的公司治理包括内部治理和外部治理这两个方面,但内部治理比外部治理更为有效,而外部治理中由监管机构代表小储蓄者参与公司治理实际上有助于公司治理优化及商业银行盈利能力提高。
此外,本文按照制度经济学的方法,沿着历史的脉络,对国际上两种主要的治理模式的特点作了比较,论证了其公司治理机制发挥作用的不同特点,指出两种模式均是治理有效的模式,并不存在优劣之分,但是这两种治理模式由于均存在内在的不足,随着国际经济一体化和金融一体化进程加快,两种模式之间开始互相吸收对方的优点,以进一步提高治理的有效性。本文回顾了我国商业银行的改革历程,论证了我国商业银行的改革一直是围绕公司治理问题为核心的改革,这种改革具有历史的惯性——路径依赖性,并不属于任何一种模式,这种特点最直接的表现使我国公司治理法源上的复合性。分析的结果认为加强内部治理机制建设会对我国商业银行的绩效有更大的促进作用,而现实中我国商业银行公司治理改革的主要做法,实质上是公司治理制度中的各种内部治理制度,强调内部治理制度的作用恰恰是“股东至上”治理模式中的主要做法。这种情况,再次验证了我国商业银公司治理改革的阶段性。
本文的主要结论可以概括为以下几点:(1)银行的利益相关者与利益相关者参与银行公司治理的具体机制仍然是难以明确界定的问题;(2)理论模型显示,利益相关者参与银行公司治理不是最优的博弈均衡:(3)内部治理机制能够较多的解释目前我国商业银行的公司治理内涵,同时内部治理机制对银行绩效的解释力更强;(4)在商业银行公司治理改革中,目前银行公司治理改革更应注意如何发挥内部治理机制问题。
Since the 1980s, pursued corporate governance-oriented investment strategy gradually become mainstream institutional investors .To banks, financial data only on behalf of the bank's current and historical operating performance, sound and healthy governance structure of the bank on behalf of the future behavior and values. General framework of corporate governance is by law, regulation, self-discipline mechanism, the initiative promises and business practices, and other factors posed by these elements because of environment, history and traditions of different makes a difference, the banks corporate governance framework is no exception. China's banking sector, corporate governance on the one hand because banks generally different from the special nature of corporate governance, and not in theoretical circles are fully revealed, the banks corporate governance systematic framework yet to be established; on the other hand because at this stage domestic commercial banks corporate governance environment of the more significant changes, in particular the existence of banking sector reforms often lead to a breakthrough in theoretical research, to date, the domestic commercial banks on corporate governance is the focus of constant change. The most controversial part of China's commercial banks is still the mode of corporate governance and management of the goal is the question of how to choose.
In order to analyze the banking system of corporate governance, the paper on corporate governance and the development of the theory of banking companies to the theory of corporate governance and comments reviewed and sorted out, the bank will focus on corporate governance in the literature on the primacy of shareholders and the interests of corporate governance model related to corporate governance model two different models of governance. Through literature review, we see that the establishment of a corporate governance in a highly specialized division of labor on the basis of the modern corporate system running the core, as a special category of companies, banks in many areas have shown that the era of industrialization and more emphasis on material assets of different companies, economists have come to realize with those who are not regulated, non-financial enterprises compared to the banks of the corporate governance structure optimal design more complex and more important. At present governance structure of the banking company's main theories are an important differences, and the supremacy of unilateral management shareholders and stakeholders on the multilateral governance, and many researchers have emphasized bank companies should take stakeholders to jointly deal with the corporate governance model, but the attendant is the definition of stakeholders and stakeholder participation in governance issues involved in the mechanism remains unclear.
Theoretically shareholder supremacy and stakeholders in two modes, in the practice of international commercial banks can be found in the corresponding control. At present, international commercial banks on the corporate governance structure, there are two: the United States and Britain under the law of the monolayer structure and the civil law system under the two-tier system structure, the history of the theoretical circle on the merits of the two modes of governance has never been controversy never stopped. Through two models of governance in the administration compared the effectiveness of the mechanisms can be seen, the choice of bank governance model is a gradual historical process, the reality of two governance model with environmental management change, there is also a mutual integration, learning process.
Although many researchers have highlighted the stakeholders governance principles only blindly simply deny that the interests of shareholders and the shareholders of supremacy, does not deny shareholders to take into account other legitimate rights and interests of stakeholders on the basis of maximizing the pursuit of their own interests, it is embodied in the pursuit of their own interests and the parties formed a cooperative balanced. In practice, however, this governance model, but the operation encountered obstacles, we can seldom found with stakeholders mode of governance arrangements, leading to the causes of this phenomenon are many, and specifically to the banks to companies, the paper think that the problem as well as the organization of information to the low efficiency of the banking companies stakeholders to jointly deal with the most difficult mode insurmountable obstacles.
In this paper, using a small savings banks and between the two-stage model of Dynamic Game inspection bank management and banking companies small savers interaction between strategy circumstances, the common mode of governance of commercial banks operating company efficiency and performance impact. As a research and paving the way, the paper's first bank stakeholders were defined, a small savings bank, as participation in the common management of stakeholders, namely banking companies stakeholders governance model that is the unspoken words of small savers on the banks involved in the process of corporate governance. In the case of complete information, the two-stage treatment Game balanced (deposits of depositors and maintain the interest income; managers choose low-risk projects and the efforts of a low level), but in this paper under the assumption that this Game is the only way to maintain the Nash equilibrium solution. The results of the analysis showed that, if the banks were small savings in the bank corporate governance arrangements in greater access to the power, then it will lead to commercial banks and the company's management performance of the banking company's competitiveness decline. This article holds that the corporate governance performance of the banks dropped from two aspects, first of all, savings banks and the company's management strategy for interaction between itself will enable optimal efficiency goals difficult to achieve, which originated in the bank's savings deposit and the bank's management of and the conflict between the objectives of the strategy in the process of interaction hard to establish trust; Secondly, the savings to the characteristics of risk aversion, as well as modern commercial banks to participate in the risk management process increase the cost of raising a small savings bank management and the exchange of information between difficult, leading to a further deterioration of the performance of management.
In considering the depositors and the banking company managers asymmetry of information between the circumstances, we think it appropriate to the information asymmetry bank's performance has improved, that is difficult to bank depositors company for more information seems to be led to the bank better governance results, which companies to jointly deal with the banking model has been emphasized in view of the obvious differences. This caused some unexpected results is a major reason for the interest return to the banks and the difference between the return on investment, but also said that the depositors and risks borne by the returns achieved by the asymmetry between, and this it also is banking companies and the general distinguish between the important aspect. If only so that the depositors were difficult to access the corresponding information will allow banking companies to achieve better control effect, then the banking company should also take the mode of governance tend to shareholders, and corporate governance in the banking deposit protection of the interests of people issue should be specialized agencies to carry out commitments, such as deposit insurance, such an arrangement seems to take into account the interests of stakeholders balance the interests of all parties. In such circumstances, we can consider that the common mode of governance in the interests of depositors, the banks will ultimately reflect the company's risk management level, and different agencies, such as banking supervision department, FDIC, etc. can be risk common access to the management of the corresponding income, but can also bound banking firm managers over risky behavior.
In order to describe the theoretical model validation of the results, the paper through empirical analysis and case analysis of the corresponding study. By using factor analysis to determine the various factors affecting the corporate governance system in the evaluation of the proportion of this is to explore what could be from commercial banks to evaluate the level of corporate governance, and based on this, using principal component regression Analysis of corporate governance on the performance of commercial banks. On corporate governance factors and the impact of corporate governance and the relationship between corporate performance Empirical analysis shows that commercial banks corporate governance, including internal governance and external governance in these two areas, but internal control is more effective than external management, and external governance in the regulatory agencies on behalf of small savers to participate in corporate governance actually helps the company optimize the management of commercial banks and enhance profitability.
In addition, according to this system of economics, history along the threads of the two main international governance model in comparison, demonstrating its corporate governance mechanism to play its role of the different characteristics of the two modes is that governance effective model, there is no division into superior and inferior, but because these two governance model there are inherent limitations, as the international economic integration and accelerating the process of financial integration, began between the two modes of mutual absorption each other's advantages, to further enhance the effectiveness of governance. This paper reviews the reform of China's commercial banks course, the proof of China's commercial banks has been on the reform of corporate governance issues at the core of the reform, such reform is the history of inertia - Path dependence, and does not belong to any one model, which Characteristics of the most direct kind of performance to our corporate governance sources of the compound. The results of the analysis to strengthen internal control mechanism that the building would be the performance of China's commercial banks have greater role in promoting, and the reality of China's commercial banks of the major corporate governance reform, the system of corporate governance is essentially the various internal control system, internal control system that it is precisely the role of shareholders first governance model in the main practice. This situation once again proved China's Commercial Bank of corporate governance reform stage.
The main conclusions can be summarized as follows: (1) Bank of stakeholders and stakeholder participation in the Bank's Corporate Governance specific mechanism is still not clearly defined; (2) theoretical model shows that stakeholders in the banking company Game management is not optimal balance (3) internal control mechanism to explain the larger commercial banks in China connotation of corporate governance, internal control mechanisms to explain the performance of the banks stronger and (4) Corporate Governance of Commercial Banks reform of the current banking reform and corporate governance should pay attention to how the internal governance mechanism.
为了系统地分析银行公司治理,本文对公司治理理论的发展以及银行公司的公司治理的相关理论进行了梳理和评论,对于银行公司的公司治理则集中于文献中对股东至上的公司治理模式及利益相关者共同治理模式两种不同治理模式的研究。通过文献回顾,我们看到,公司治理构成了建立在高度专业化分工基础上的现代公司制度运行的核心,作为一类特殊的公司,银行公司在诸多方面都显示出与工业化时代更为强调物质资产公司的不同,目前经济学家们已经认识到了与那些不受监管、非金融类的企业相比,银行公司治理结构的最优设计更为复杂并且更为重要。目前对银行公司治理结构的主要理论存在一个重要分歧,股东至上的单边治理和利益相关者之上的多边治理,许多研究者都强调银行公司应采取利益相关者共同治理的公司治理模式,但是随之而来的却是利益相关者的界定和利益相关者参与治理的机制涉及问题仍不明确。
理论上的“股东至上”与“利益相关者”两种模式,在国际商业银行实践中也能找到相应的对照。目前,国际上商业银行的公司治理结构主要有两种:美英法系下的单层制结构和大陆法系下的双层制结构,历史上理论界对两种治理模式优劣的争论从来就没有停止过。通过对两种治理模式的在治理机制的有效性比较可以看到,银行治理模式的选择是一个渐进的历史的过程,现实中两种治理模式随着治理环境的改变,也存在一个相互融合、学习的过程。
虽然诸多的研究者都强调了利益相关者共同治理原则否定的只是一味单纯强调股东利益的股东至上主义,并不否定股东在顾及其他利益相关者合法权益的基础上对自身利益最大化的追求,它所体现的就是各方追求各自利益而形成的一种合作均衡。但在实践中,这种治理模式却遇到了操作上的障碍,我们也很少能够发现符合利益相关者共同治理模式的安排,导致这一现象的原因有很多,而具体到银行公司来说,本文则认为信息问题以及组织行动的低效率是银行公司采用利益相关者共同治理模式最难逾越的障碍。
本文采用一个银行与小储蓄者之间的两阶段动态博弈模型考察银行公司管理层与银行公司小储蓄者之间存在策略互动情形时,共同治理模式对商业银行公司效率及经营绩效的影响。作为研究的铺垫,本文首先对银行公司的利益相关者进行了界定,将银行的小储蓄者作为参与共同治理的利益相关者,也即银行公司利益相关者共同治理模式的潜台词也即小储蓄者对银行公司治理过程的参与。在完全信息情形下,两阶段治理博弈的均衡为(存款人维持存款并取得利息收入;管理者选择低风险的项目并付出低的努力水平),而且在本文所假定的博弈环境下这是唯一能够维持的纳什均衡解。分析的结果显示,如果银行小储蓄者在银行公司治理安排中获取更大的权力的话,那么将导致商业银行公司的治理绩效以及银行公司竞争力的下降。本文认为银行公司治理绩效的下降来自两个方面,首先,储蓄者与银行公司管理层之间的策略互动本身将使最优的效率目标难以达到,这起源于银行储蓄者与银行管理层之间目标的冲突以及策略互动过程中的信任难以建立;其次,小储蓄者风险规避的特征以及现代商业银行风险管理过程参与成本的提高加大了小储蓄者与银行公司管理层之间信息交流的难度,导致了治理绩效的进一步恶化。
在考虑了存款人与银行公司管理者之间的信息不对称情形下,本文认为适当的信息不对称反而使银行公司的绩效有所提高,也就是说银行公司存款人难以获取更多的信息似乎导致了银行取得更好的治理效果,而这一点与银行公司共同治理模式所一直强调的观点出现了明显的分歧。造成这一有些出乎意料的结果的一个重要原因在于对银行来说利息回报与投资回报之间的差异,也即说存款人所承担的风险与所取得的回报之间的不对称,而这却也正是银行公司与一般公司之间相区别的重要一面。如果只有使存款人难以获取相应的信息才能够使银行公司取得更好的治理效果的话,那么对于银行公司来说也应采取倾向于股东治理的模式,而银行公司治理中的存款人利益的保护问题应由专门的机构来进行承担,例如存款保险机制,这样一种安排似乎能够顾及利益相关者各方的利益平衡。在这种情形下,我们可以认为共同治理模式中存款人的利益将最终体现为银行公司对风险进行管理的水平,而不同的机构,例如银行监管部门、存款保险公司等均可以由对风险的共同管理中获取相应的收益,同时也可以约束银行公司管理者过度冒险的行为。
为了能够对理论模型所刻画的结果进行验证,本文分别通过实证分析以及案例分析进行了相应的研究。本文利用因子分析法来确定公司治理各种影响因素在评价体系中所占的比重,以此来探索究竟可以从哪些方面来评价商业银行的公司治理的水平,并在此基础上利用主成分回归来分析公司治理对商业银行绩效的影响。对公司治理的影响因素及公司治理和企业绩效间的关系实证分析表明,商业银行的公司治理包括内部治理和外部治理这两个方面,但内部治理比外部治理更为有效,而外部治理中由监管机构代表小储蓄者参与公司治理实际上有助于公司治理优化及商业银行盈利能力提高。
此外,本文按照制度经济学的方法,沿着历史的脉络,对国际上两种主要的治理模式的特点作了比较,论证了其公司治理机制发挥作用的不同特点,指出两种模式均是治理有效的模式,并不存在优劣之分,但是这两种治理模式由于均存在内在的不足,随着国际经济一体化和金融一体化进程加快,两种模式之间开始互相吸收对方的优点,以进一步提高治理的有效性。本文回顾了我国商业银行的改革历程,论证了我国商业银行的改革一直是围绕公司治理问题为核心的改革,这种改革具有历史的惯性——路径依赖性,并不属于任何一种模式,这种特点最直接的表现使我国公司治理法源上的复合性。分析的结果认为加强内部治理机制建设会对我国商业银行的绩效有更大的促进作用,而现实中我国商业银行公司治理改革的主要做法,实质上是公司治理制度中的各种内部治理制度,强调内部治理制度的作用恰恰是“股东至上”治理模式中的主要做法。这种情况,再次验证了我国商业银公司治理改革的阶段性。
本文的主要结论可以概括为以下几点:(1)银行的利益相关者与利益相关者参与银行公司治理的具体机制仍然是难以明确界定的问题;(2)理论模型显示,利益相关者参与银行公司治理不是最优的博弈均衡:(3)内部治理机制能够较多的解释目前我国商业银行的公司治理内涵,同时内部治理机制对银行绩效的解释力更强;(4)在商业银行公司治理改革中,目前银行公司治理改革更应注意如何发挥内部治理机制问题。
Since the 1980s, pursued corporate governance-oriented investment strategy gradually become mainstream institutional investors .To banks, financial data only on behalf of the bank's current and historical operating performance, sound and healthy governance structure of the bank on behalf of the future behavior and values. General framework of corporate governance is by law, regulation, self-discipline mechanism, the initiative promises and business practices, and other factors posed by these elements because of environment, history and traditions of different makes a difference, the banks corporate governance framework is no exception. China's banking sector, corporate governance on the one hand because banks generally different from the special nature of corporate governance, and not in theoretical circles are fully revealed, the banks corporate governance systematic framework yet to be established; on the other hand because at this stage domestic commercial banks corporate governance environment of the more significant changes, in particular the existence of banking sector reforms often lead to a breakthrough in theoretical research, to date, the domestic commercial banks on corporate governance is the focus of constant change. The most controversial part of China's commercial banks is still the mode of corporate governance and management of the goal is the question of how to choose.
In order to analyze the banking system of corporate governance, the paper on corporate governance and the development of the theory of banking companies to the theory of corporate governance and comments reviewed and sorted out, the bank will focus on corporate governance in the literature on the primacy of shareholders and the interests of corporate governance model related to corporate governance model two different models of governance. Through literature review, we see that the establishment of a corporate governance in a highly specialized division of labor on the basis of the modern corporate system running the core, as a special category of companies, banks in many areas have shown that the era of industrialization and more emphasis on material assets of different companies, economists have come to realize with those who are not regulated, non-financial enterprises compared to the banks of the corporate governance structure optimal design more complex and more important. At present governance structure of the banking company's main theories are an important differences, and the supremacy of unilateral management shareholders and stakeholders on the multilateral governance, and many researchers have emphasized bank companies should take stakeholders to jointly deal with the corporate governance model, but the attendant is the definition of stakeholders and stakeholder participation in governance issues involved in the mechanism remains unclear.
Theoretically shareholder supremacy and stakeholders in two modes, in the practice of international commercial banks can be found in the corresponding control. At present, international commercial banks on the corporate governance structure, there are two: the United States and Britain under the law of the monolayer structure and the civil law system under the two-tier system structure, the history of the theoretical circle on the merits of the two modes of governance has never been controversy never stopped. Through two models of governance in the administration compared the effectiveness of the mechanisms can be seen, the choice of bank governance model is a gradual historical process, the reality of two governance model with environmental management change, there is also a mutual integration, learning process.
Although many researchers have highlighted the stakeholders governance principles only blindly simply deny that the interests of shareholders and the shareholders of supremacy, does not deny shareholders to take into account other legitimate rights and interests of stakeholders on the basis of maximizing the pursuit of their own interests, it is embodied in the pursuit of their own interests and the parties formed a cooperative balanced. In practice, however, this governance model, but the operation encountered obstacles, we can seldom found with stakeholders mode of governance arrangements, leading to the causes of this phenomenon are many, and specifically to the banks to companies, the paper think that the problem as well as the organization of information to the low efficiency of the banking companies stakeholders to jointly deal with the most difficult mode insurmountable obstacles.
In this paper, using a small savings banks and between the two-stage model of Dynamic Game inspection bank management and banking companies small savers interaction between strategy circumstances, the common mode of governance of commercial banks operating company efficiency and performance impact. As a research and paving the way, the paper's first bank stakeholders were defined, a small savings bank, as participation in the common management of stakeholders, namely banking companies stakeholders governance model that is the unspoken words of small savers on the banks involved in the process of corporate governance. In the case of complete information, the two-stage treatment Game balanced (deposits of depositors and maintain the interest income; managers choose low-risk projects and the efforts of a low level), but in this paper under the assumption that this Game is the only way to maintain the Nash equilibrium solution. The results of the analysis showed that, if the banks were small savings in the bank corporate governance arrangements in greater access to the power, then it will lead to commercial banks and the company's management performance of the banking company's competitiveness decline. This article holds that the corporate governance performance of the banks dropped from two aspects, first of all, savings banks and the company's management strategy for interaction between itself will enable optimal efficiency goals difficult to achieve, which originated in the bank's savings deposit and the bank's management of and the conflict between the objectives of the strategy in the process of interaction hard to establish trust; Secondly, the savings to the characteristics of risk aversion, as well as modern commercial banks to participate in the risk management process increase the cost of raising a small savings bank management and the exchange of information between difficult, leading to a further deterioration of the performance of management.
In considering the depositors and the banking company managers asymmetry of information between the circumstances, we think it appropriate to the information asymmetry bank's performance has improved, that is difficult to bank depositors company for more information seems to be led to the bank better governance results, which companies to jointly deal with the banking model has been emphasized in view of the obvious differences. This caused some unexpected results is a major reason for the interest return to the banks and the difference between the return on investment, but also said that the depositors and risks borne by the returns achieved by the asymmetry between, and this it also is banking companies and the general distinguish between the important aspect. If only so that the depositors were difficult to access the corresponding information will allow banking companies to achieve better control effect, then the banking company should also take the mode of governance tend to shareholders, and corporate governance in the banking deposit protection of the interests of people issue should be specialized agencies to carry out commitments, such as deposit insurance, such an arrangement seems to take into account the interests of stakeholders balance the interests of all parties. In such circumstances, we can consider that the common mode of governance in the interests of depositors, the banks will ultimately reflect the company's risk management level, and different agencies, such as banking supervision department, FDIC, etc. can be risk common access to the management of the corresponding income, but can also bound banking firm managers over risky behavior.
In order to describe the theoretical model validation of the results, the paper through empirical analysis and case analysis of the corresponding study. By using factor analysis to determine the various factors affecting the corporate governance system in the evaluation of the proportion of this is to explore what could be from commercial banks to evaluate the level of corporate governance, and based on this, using principal component regression Analysis of corporate governance on the performance of commercial banks. On corporate governance factors and the impact of corporate governance and the relationship between corporate performance Empirical analysis shows that commercial banks corporate governance, including internal governance and external governance in these two areas, but internal control is more effective than external management, and external governance in the regulatory agencies on behalf of small savers to participate in corporate governance actually helps the company optimize the management of commercial banks and enhance profitability.
In addition, according to this system of economics, history along the threads of the two main international governance model in comparison, demonstrating its corporate governance mechanism to play its role of the different characteristics of the two modes is that governance effective model, there is no division into superior and inferior, but because these two governance model there are inherent limitations, as the international economic integration and accelerating the process of financial integration, began between the two modes of mutual absorption each other's advantages, to further enhance the effectiveness of governance. This paper reviews the reform of China's commercial banks course, the proof of China's commercial banks has been on the reform of corporate governance issues at the core of the reform, such reform is the history of inertia - Path dependence, and does not belong to any one model, which Characteristics of the most direct kind of performance to our corporate governance sources of the compound. The results of the analysis to strengthen internal control mechanism that the building would be the performance of China's commercial banks have greater role in promoting, and the reality of China's commercial banks of the major corporate governance reform, the system of corporate governance is essentially the various internal control system, internal control system that it is precisely the role of shareholders first governance model in the main practice. This situation once again proved China's Commercial Bank of corporate governance reform stage.
The main conclusions can be summarized as follows: (1) Bank of stakeholders and stakeholder participation in the Bank's Corporate Governance specific mechanism is still not clearly defined; (2) theoretical model shows that stakeholders in the banking company Game management is not optimal balance (3) internal control mechanism to explain the larger commercial banks in China connotation of corporate governance, internal control mechanisms to explain the performance of the banks stronger and (4) Corporate Governance of Commercial Banks reform of the current banking reform and corporate governance should pay attention to how the internal governance mechanism.
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