煤炭资源产权与开发外部性关系及我国资源产权改革研究
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摘要
煤炭资源开发外部性问题包括三个方面:资源耗竭外部性、生态环境破坏外部性和生产安全外部性。外部性问题的存在使资源配置偏离帕累托最优,影响了资源的可持续性开发利用,造成了生态环境、财产和生命的重大损失。煤炭资源产权包括所有权和矿业权,而矿业权又是由占有权、使用权、收益权等基本权能构成。煤炭资源产权对资源开发的外部性问题具有非常重要的影响。
论文首先分析了煤炭资源开发外部性问题产生的原因,重点分析了煤炭资源的所有权、使用权和收益权,以及产权明晰对外部性问题的影响及其作用机理。通过分析认为,煤炭资源的国家所有、垄断开发、形成以马克思矿租理论为指导思想的资源开发合理的收益分配格局,以及建立完善、明晰的产权关系和产权制度,有利于优化资源开发规模和节约资源,促进资源可持续性利用;与生态环境产权主体趋于一致,便于协调资源开发收益和生态环境利益之间的关系,促进生态环境成本内部化;消除煤炭资源开发超产的利益诱发因素,减少在煤矿生产安全监管上的博弈,提高煤矿生产安全投资预期收益,增加生产安全投入。其次,建立资源开发规模影响模型,得出资本和劳动力投入越多、开发利润越高和国有产权比重越小,资源开发的规模越大的结论;建立生产安全影响模型,得到煤炭单位产量资本投入越大、资本利润率越高、国有资本率越高、单个煤矿资本规模越大和单位产量劳动力投入越少,生产安全水平越高的结论;以我国煤炭资源开发的历史数据进一步验证了产权对外部效应的影响及其作用机理。最后,提出了综合运用庇古方法和科斯方法解决我国煤炭资源开发外部性问题的思路,并提出产权改革的建议:实施“国家统筹管理,分级所有”的产权制度;逐步组建大型的国有煤矿,改革乡镇煤矿的产权结构和经营模式;以马克思的矿租理论为收益权分配指导思想,形成合理的资源开发收益分配格局;建立完善、明晰的矿业权关系和产权制度。
The externality problems in coal resource exploitation included the coal resource exhaust externality, the environment destruction externality and the security incident externality. The externality problems made the allocation of resource lost the efficiency of the Pareto Optimal Allocation, affected the sustainable utilization of the coal resource, and resulted to the heavy losses in the ecological environment, the lives and the properties. The property right of the coal resource was composed by the ownership and the mining right that included the occupancy right, the usage right, the usufruct right, and so on. The property right affected heavily the externality problems in coal resource exploitation.
Firstly, the article analyzed what caused the externality problems in coal resource exploitation, and studied the mechanism that the ownership, the usage right, the usufruct right and the right perspicuity of the coal resource acted on the externality problems. By studying, this article thought, that the coal resource was owned and monopoly exploited by state, that the reasonable relationships of the income distribution were formed according to the Mine Rent Theory of Marxism and that the clear relationships and insititutions of the property right were constructed, were contributive to optimization of the exploitation scale and save of the coal resource, to the sustainable usage of the coal resources; were convenient in adjusting the benefit relationships between the eco-environment and the coal resource exploitation and in interlizing the cost of the eco-environmental treatment because of the consistency with the owner of the eco-environmental property right; could decrease the games in security supervision by eliminating factors of the benefits that induced to overfulfill and make the coal mine increase the safety inputs by promoting the expected return. Secondly, this article constructed the exploitation scale impacted model, and concluded that the more capital and labor inputs, the more profits of the exploitation investment, and the smaller proportion of the state-owned capital, led to the greater exploitation scale. This article also constructed the security impacted model, and concluded that the more capital per unit of coal production, the more profit of the exploitation investment, the greater proportion of the state-owned capital, and the less labors per unit of coal production, led to the higher level of the security in the coal resources exploitation. At the same time, this article validated the theory that the property right of the coal resource affects the externality with the historical data of the coal resource exploitation in our courty. Lastly, this article advanced to solve the externality problems in coal resource exploitation in our country with the way integrated the Pigou’s Way and the Coase’s Way, and suggested for the property right reformation of the coal resource that, the coal resource should be owned by the governments at all levels and be managed by state in unity, state should gradually set up the large-scale coal mines owned by state and reform the property right and the operation mode of the town-owned coal mines, the reasonable relationships of the income distribution should be formed according to the Mine Rent Theory of Marxism, and the clear mining relationship and the property right system should be set up.
论文首先分析了煤炭资源开发外部性问题产生的原因,重点分析了煤炭资源的所有权、使用权和收益权,以及产权明晰对外部性问题的影响及其作用机理。通过分析认为,煤炭资源的国家所有、垄断开发、形成以马克思矿租理论为指导思想的资源开发合理的收益分配格局,以及建立完善、明晰的产权关系和产权制度,有利于优化资源开发规模和节约资源,促进资源可持续性利用;与生态环境产权主体趋于一致,便于协调资源开发收益和生态环境利益之间的关系,促进生态环境成本内部化;消除煤炭资源开发超产的利益诱发因素,减少在煤矿生产安全监管上的博弈,提高煤矿生产安全投资预期收益,增加生产安全投入。其次,建立资源开发规模影响模型,得出资本和劳动力投入越多、开发利润越高和国有产权比重越小,资源开发的规模越大的结论;建立生产安全影响模型,得到煤炭单位产量资本投入越大、资本利润率越高、国有资本率越高、单个煤矿资本规模越大和单位产量劳动力投入越少,生产安全水平越高的结论;以我国煤炭资源开发的历史数据进一步验证了产权对外部效应的影响及其作用机理。最后,提出了综合运用庇古方法和科斯方法解决我国煤炭资源开发外部性问题的思路,并提出产权改革的建议:实施“国家统筹管理,分级所有”的产权制度;逐步组建大型的国有煤矿,改革乡镇煤矿的产权结构和经营模式;以马克思的矿租理论为收益权分配指导思想,形成合理的资源开发收益分配格局;建立完善、明晰的矿业权关系和产权制度。
The externality problems in coal resource exploitation included the coal resource exhaust externality, the environment destruction externality and the security incident externality. The externality problems made the allocation of resource lost the efficiency of the Pareto Optimal Allocation, affected the sustainable utilization of the coal resource, and resulted to the heavy losses in the ecological environment, the lives and the properties. The property right of the coal resource was composed by the ownership and the mining right that included the occupancy right, the usage right, the usufruct right, and so on. The property right affected heavily the externality problems in coal resource exploitation.
Firstly, the article analyzed what caused the externality problems in coal resource exploitation, and studied the mechanism that the ownership, the usage right, the usufruct right and the right perspicuity of the coal resource acted on the externality problems. By studying, this article thought, that the coal resource was owned and monopoly exploited by state, that the reasonable relationships of the income distribution were formed according to the Mine Rent Theory of Marxism and that the clear relationships and insititutions of the property right were constructed, were contributive to optimization of the exploitation scale and save of the coal resource, to the sustainable usage of the coal resources; were convenient in adjusting the benefit relationships between the eco-environment and the coal resource exploitation and in interlizing the cost of the eco-environmental treatment because of the consistency with the owner of the eco-environmental property right; could decrease the games in security supervision by eliminating factors of the benefits that induced to overfulfill and make the coal mine increase the safety inputs by promoting the expected return. Secondly, this article constructed the exploitation scale impacted model, and concluded that the more capital and labor inputs, the more profits of the exploitation investment, and the smaller proportion of the state-owned capital, led to the greater exploitation scale. This article also constructed the security impacted model, and concluded that the more capital per unit of coal production, the more profit of the exploitation investment, the greater proportion of the state-owned capital, and the less labors per unit of coal production, led to the higher level of the security in the coal resources exploitation. At the same time, this article validated the theory that the property right of the coal resource affects the externality with the historical data of the coal resource exploitation in our courty. Lastly, this article advanced to solve the externality problems in coal resource exploitation in our country with the way integrated the Pigou’s Way and the Coase’s Way, and suggested for the property right reformation of the coal resource that, the coal resource should be owned by the governments at all levels and be managed by state in unity, state should gradually set up the large-scale coal mines owned by state and reform the property right and the operation mode of the town-owned coal mines, the reasonable relationships of the income distribution should be formed according to the Mine Rent Theory of Marxism, and the clear mining relationship and the property right system should be set up.
引文
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46参见王敏.小煤矿事故多发原因分析及对策研究.煤炭经济研究,2007(1):64~66.
47参见国家煤矿安全监察局行管司.乡镇煤矿安全生产资料汇编,2007年7月.
48王金洲.矿产资源产权的分析与研究.江汉石油学院学报(社科版),2002,4(1):35-37.
49方虹.我国资源产权及制度安排思考.北京市计划劳动管理干部学院学报,2006(1):48-51.
50漆佳.论矿产资源的产权制度安排.湖北行政学院学报,2008(3):26-29.
51蒲志仲.资源产权制度:作用、绩效、问题与改革.西安石油大学学报(社会科学版),17(3):5-11.
52郭国荣,方虹.我国资源产权制度安排的缺陷与优化.产权导刊,2006(4):25-27.
53谢地.论我国自然资源产权制度改革.河南社会科学,2006(5):1-7.
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