纳税人权利保护研究
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摘要
随着世界经济发展的一体化进程的加速以及宪政制度的广泛确立,世界各国都意识到了纳税人权利保护的重要性,对纳税人权利保护的研究也成了学术界的一个理论热点,但现在的研究大多是定性研究,对纳税人权利的法经济学的定量分析相对薄弱。对纳税人权利进行法经济学的分析,从理论上说有利于丰富法经济学理论,从实践上来说可以为寻找到最优的纳税人权利保护提供方法。这种最优除了涵盖法律的正义价值以外,还包括了它的实现成本最小。博弈分析则为构成纳税人整体的各个利益集团提供了寻求利益均衡的方法,从而优化了各方的利益。通过研究的理论结论与纳税人权利保护的实际状况相比较,我们可以发现我国纳税人权利保护中的一些问题,并找到有益的对策。
从整体分析到局部研究,从问题分析到对策研究是本文的基本逻辑思路。全文共分8章,除第1章导论之外,论文可以分为三部分,第一部分即第2章、第3章,从整体上以法经济学的视角对纳税人权利的保护进行分析。第二部分即第4章、第5章、第6章,从立法、执法、司法三个环节对纳税人权利的保护作法经济学的分析。第三部分即第7章、第8章,对国际纳税人权利保护作了部分介绍,在此基础上提出了优化我国纳税人权利保护的对策。本文的基本内容和结构安排如下:
第1章,导论。包括相关概念和研究范围的界定、相关文献综述、研究主体、研究思路与方法以及逻辑结构安排等内容。
第2章,纳税人权利的本体论。对纳税人权利的保护进行分析首先要对纳税人权利有一个全面的理解和分析,即回答权利是什么、普遍的人权与纳税人权利有何关系、纳税人权利是什么、纳税人权利是如何起源的以及纳税人权利的法律本质和相关特征等等,这些都是纳税人权利保护分析的基础与对象,只有在此基础上才能对纳税人权利保护进行静态与动态的分析。本章的主要内容和观点是:
(1)人权的本质。人权是受特定历史文化条件所制约的,由道德和法律所支撑的人之所以为人的基本权利,在道德、法律和反抗意义上使用。人权是纳税人权利的权利来源,人权的保护状况直接影响到纳税人权利的保护状况,纳税人权利保护的状况也反作用于人权的保护。
(2)纳税人权利保护状况的影响因素。社会文明决定纳税人权利保护状况,纳税人权利是特定文明的产物,受到构成这一文明的历史、法律、政治、习俗等方面的影响。西方宪政推动了纳税人权利的保护。纳税人权利保护呈现国际化趋势,无论中国和西方的纳税人权利成长情况怎样,纳税人权利在全球化的今天越来越受到各国所重视。
(3)权利、人权、纳税人权利的关系。权利是主体享有的支配性自由,这种主体包括国家与公民。公权利与私权利共同构成了权利。人权的内容包括了公权利与私权利的部分内容。人权中,公民个人的权利属于私权利,国家与民族的一些权利包括国家与民族的自决权等属于公权利。纳税人权利是人权的重要内容,它是纳税人所享有的权利,因此也属于私权利。
(4)纳税人权利存在的理论依据。纳税人福利的改善要求社会生产效率提高,而社会生产效率的提高必须依靠社会资源的产权的有效配置来实现。国家与政府决定着产权的配置,而国家与政府是否公正廉明决定了产权配置的有效性,于是纳税人需要对国家与政府这样的公共机构进行选择,经过纳税人选择的公共机构才具备了真正意义上的合法性和合理性。公正的公共机构提供着包括法律这样的公共产品,法律对资源的合理配置反过来又促进了产权的优化配置,社会福利得到进一步提高。
第3章,纳税人权利保护的运行机理。对纳税人的权利本体有了基本的认识以后,才能运用法律的方法和经济的方法对纳税人权利的保护进行分析。法律的分析方法是静态的,经济分析方法是动态的,二者互相补充、互为优势,全面地涵盖了纳税人权利的保护。在对纳税人权利的保护进行一般分析后,具体的纳税人权利保护的立法、执法和司法环节才能够得到讨论。本章主要内容和观点是:
(1)作为公共品供给的纳税人权利保护。纳税人权利的享有是以纳税人自身为出发点的,而纳税人权利的保护却是从权利保护的供给和维护方即国家、政府、和征税机关为出发点的。在立法阶段和执法阶段,每个纳税人都平等的享有立法的参与权,通过自己的代表行使征税同意权等等,当纳税人以立法的形式享有纳税人权利时,每个纳税人都可以平等地受到法律的保护。从这个角度讲,国家对纳税人权利的供给与维护是无条件的。
(2)纳税人权利保护的动因。纳税人权利保护的动因包括经济动因、制度动因和社会秩序动因。纳税人权利保护的制度动因是指在纳税人权利保护制度的推进下,纳税人权利得到确认与保护的过程。纳税人权利保护制度可以分为内在纳税人权利保护制度与外在纳税人权利保护制度。社会秩序是由一系列制度所形成的有机体系,组成这一体系的各项制度相互影响,形成一个动态的体系。作为制度或者社会秩序的纳税人权利保护成长于制度自身,并在其中演进成长。
(3)纳税人权利保护的最优化。纳税人权利保护的最优化目标包括:充分的意思自治、权利应有尽有、各个环节充分保护、纳税人权利保护的社会成本最低。关于实现最优化的路径,本文就私人品和纳税人权利保护同时存在以及公共品和纳税人权利保护同时存在的两种情况进行了分别讨论。
(4)纳税人权利的博弈分析的均衡目标。分析纳税人利益集团在纳税人权利保护过程中的博弈行为和规律是为了导出博弈的均衡并以此来说明实际问题,从而为各方合理决策或者纳税人权利保护的政策和规则的制订提供依据。这种行为均衡分析比价格均衡的分析更加的全面和深入。
第4章,立法视角:纳税人权利保护的经济分析。纳税人权利保护的逻辑起点在于立法阶段的权利的保护,立法阶段没有对纳税人权利进行基本界定,则执法阶段、司法阶段都没有权利依据。各个国家对纳税人权利的具体规定和项目是有所不同的,但总的趋势在于对纳税人权利的规定越来越详尽和完备。对纳税人权利保护进行立法阶段的经济和博弈分析有利于我们对立法阶段的纳税人权利保护进行最优化处理。本章主要内容和观点是:
(1)征税同意权的产权理论解释。当征税同意权获得的交易成本过大时,征税同意权就该赋予那些最珍视它的人。这就是波斯纳定理在征税同意权配置上的解释。1这是一种决定财产让渡的权利,在纳税人一方称为征税同意权,在国家一方称为征税权。征税者希望获得征税权,因为他们的生活享乐都系于此,而纳税人更加珍视征税同意权,因为他们的生存和希望也全部系于此。因此,作为被动而艰辛的纳税人更加珍视征税同意权。所以,征税同意权应该配置给纳税人。
(2)税收立法参与权保护的边际成本与边际收益分析。税收立法参与权的保护成本受一定社会经济水平制约,不可能进行无节制的投入,其收益仍然受到边际收益的约束,只有税收立法参与权保护的边际成本等于其边际收益时,才实现了税收立法参与权保护的收益最大化。
(3)纳税人与国家之间的博弈。立法活动中,税收法律的制定与修改或者废除需要纳税人及其代表的积极参与,充分反映和体现纳税人的要求和利益。这是纳税人税收立法参与权的体现。从短期和微观来看,纳税人的利益和国家征税机关的利益是不一致的。具有自己部门利益的国家税收征管机关同样也希望自己的权力越大越好。纳税人权利此时与国家税收征管机关的权力同时体现在一部税收法律当中,不可避免会出现此消彼长,相互冲突和博弈。
(4)利益集团博弈的启示。我们在对纳税人权利进行保护时,要注重对纳税人的整体权利进行保护,也要将其内部成员的利益考虑进来,这样才能作出切实可行的制度安排。对纳税人权利保护进行制度设计时要主动关注不同纳税人利益集团的要求,使得制度设计能够公平合理,减少纳税人内部的对立与矛盾。
第5章,执法视角:纳税人权利保护的经济分析。对纳税人而言,除了立法阶段产生纳税人权利外,更多是税收行政机关与纳税人的相互关系。这就涉及到纳税人权利在执法环节的保护。通过本章的分析,可以得知对纳税人权利在执法阶段进行全面的保护不但符合纳税人的利益,也符合税收行政机关的利益。本章主要内容和观点是:
(1)税收筹划权保护的经济效应。纳税人税收筹划权的行使可以促进社会和谐目标的实现;减轻通货膨胀;产生企业的经济效应;税收筹划节约了个人的支出,体现了经济上的收入效应。
(2)纳税人受歧视待遇的分析。纳税人享有平等纳税,不受国家机关歧视的权利。不受歧视意味着无论纳税多少,都应当受到平等的对待。从法律角度讲,对纳税人的歧视违背了纳税人享有的受到平等对待的权利,从经济意义上分析,对纳税人歧视将造成征税效率损失。
(3)征税监督权的最优威慑水平。纳税人对税收机关行使征税权进行监督主要是为了预防和减少征税机关违法执法所造成的损失。一方面这是一种通过减少损失获得收益的行为,同时纳税人对征税机关违法执法的监督是需要付出成本的。如果付出的成本低于因监督而获得的收益,则这种付出是有效率的。如果付出的成本高于因监督而获得的收益,那么,这种付出就是缺乏效率的。
(4)遭遇税务侵权的控告、检举权的博弈分析。在税收执法中,执法机关存在税收侵权的可能,而纳税人则会选择控告或者检举的方式来保护自己作为纳税人的权利。从博弈分析可以看出,执法机关侵犯纳税人权利必然会遭到纳税人的控告,而执法机关不侵犯纳税人权利时,纳税人就不会检举和控告征税机关。这从理论上告诉我们,纳税人的权利是不容侵犯的,征税机关只有严格依照法定程序执法,才能履行好自己的职责。以违法或者侵权的方式执法,必将使自己的利益受损。
(5)依法纳税获得表彰权利的博弈分析。博弈的理论分析告诉我们,当执法机关消极对待纳税人受表彰的权利时,纳税人也会以消极纳税的形式来对应。纳税人以消极的方式纳税,必然导致税收遵从度的下降进而增加征税机关的征税成本,从而影响整体的征税效率。因此,税收执法机关应当积极对待纳税人受表彰的权利。
第6章,司法视角:纳税人权利保护的经济分析。立法阶段对纳税人权利的保护可以使纳税人权利更加完备,而执法阶段纳税人权利的保护则使这些完备的权利有了现实的土壤,当然,这种现实也意味着征税机关同纳税人之间在保护纳税人权利问题上可能出现一定的冲突。司法途径成了解决这种冲突的最基本办法,因此必须赋予和优化纳税人在司法阶段的权利保护。本章主要内容和观点是:
(1)纳税人权利保护的诉讼“成本—收益”分析。涉税行政诉讼中纳税人的诉讼成本的由裁判费用、其他费用、律师费、时间成本、精神成本构成。纳税人权利保护的诉讼收益包括参与、公平、及时、裁决。
(2)不负举证责任的权利的经济分析。在税务侵权的诉讼中,由征税机关在行政执法的同时,一同利用国家提供的证据搜集工具来保留证据,比起纳税人举证来说,成本要小许多。由征税机关就其行政行为的合法性提出证据会最大限度节约举证成本。
(3)律师代理博弈。律师代理博弈的结论告诉我们,当事人委托律师、律师努力工作将是双方利益最优的选择。在纳税人权利保护的诉讼中,委托人应当积极委托律师,而律师也应当努力地工作。
(4)法院救济博弈。法院救济的博弈存在两对纳什均衡,即纳税人不起诉、法院不救济和纳税人起诉、法院救济。而且纳税人起诉、法院救济是最优的策略,这说明法院作为裁决机关积极主动地救济纳税人权利,不但是法律规定的职责而且也是法院利益所在。因此,纳税人应当积极利用法律来维护自己的权利,法院也必须积极主动地对纳税人的权利保护进行救济。
第7章,国际视野下的纳税人权利保护。纳税人权利保护是现代文明的重要标志,东西方社会都极其重视纳税人权利的保护。由于世界各国的法律传统和法律渊源不一样,对纳税人权利保护的具体法律规定也不一样。从两大法系来看,英美法系和大陆法系的纳税人权利保护由于二者的法律依据、审判方式、审判程序上的差异而有所不同。但从总的趋势来看,两大法系的国家和地区都加大了对纳税人权利保护的力度,这些对于中国纳税人权利保护体系的建立而言具有积极的意义。
第8章,优化我国纳税人权利保护体系的对策研究。国外纳税人权利的保护给了我们许多启示。一些国家,尤其是西方发达国家之所以能够对纳税人权利进行全面保护,关键就在于提高纳税人权利的法律地位,支持不同利益的纳税人进行合法的博弈、最优化纳税人权利、以宪法的形式加以保障。建立健全相关的法律制度、代理制度和司法保护制度,从而全面长效地保护纳税人权利。我国只有从这些方面入手,结合中国国情,以宪法、法律完善为契机,加强代理制度、诉讼保护制度的建立。本章主要通过对中国纳税人权利保护的现状进行研究,提出了优化我国纳税人权利保护的思路与对策。本章主要内容和观点是:
(1)优化我国纳税人权利保护体系的原则。优化我国纳税人权利保护体系的原则包括坚持社会主义原则、坚持宪政原则、坚持税收法定原则、坚持行政效率原则。
(2)优化我国纳税人权利保护体系的对策。优化我国纳税人权利保护体系的对策包括在立法阶段推动纳税人权利保护的立法规划、提高纳税人权利在宪法中的地位、鼓励纳税人的参与积极性等。在执法阶段要转变征收主体的执法观念、严格税务行政执法的程序、健全税务信息化服务系统、强化税收行政效益原则、建立税务机关和社会中介组织相结合的纳税服务系统等。在司法阶段要全面保障司法独立、建立税收法院、建立纳税人公益诉讼制度、坚决执行审判结果等。
本文在继承现有研究成果的基础上,进行了以下创新性探索:
1.研究视角的融合性
以往的纳税人权利研究多从历史的、制度的、法律的层面来研究,本文以法律和经济学相融合的独特视角来分析纳税人权利,注重纳税人权利保障的成本—收益关系和相关主体的博弈关系,更能揭示纳税人权利保护的动态机制,从而使纳税人权利的保护更具有可行性。以经济视角审视纳税人权利保护问题,扩展了传统的分析视角。
2.研究方法的拓展性
从目前来看,国内外关于纳税人权利的研究多注重法律分析,少经济分析;多价值判断、少实证分析。现有的法经济学著作虽有许多对权利的经济分析,但是分析内容、分析方法上比较缺乏严密的逻辑性,在结构上也相对松散,对纳税人权利实现的约束条件以及如何在约束条件之下寻求纳税人权利保护最优化研究尤为不足。法经济学研究方法的引入,一方面可以寻找到最优化纳税人权利保护的方法,另一方面也为建立纳税人利益集团合理的博弈机制提供理论指导。同时,经济分析的方法还为积极保障纳税人权利策略作出经济学上的解释。本文运用法律研究的方法对纳税人权利进行基本的界定,在此基础上运用经济学的“成本—收益”方法寻求纳税人权利保护最优的途径,并运用博弈方法揭示多方利益的动态最优。
3.理论观点的创新
(1)本文认为纳税人权利保护的成本是可以计量的。从立法阶段来看,动用专家成本和调研成本是可以确定的,确立了多少项权利也是可以确定的,则每项权利在立法阶段的成本是可以确定的。在执法阶段,税务行政机关为保护纳税人权利所配备的人力和物力是可以确定的,服务了多少人次的纳税人以及纳税人的多少项权利是可以确定的,则每人每项权利保护的平均成本是可以计算出来的。在司法阶段,为保护纳税人权利,每人每项权利保护的平均价格也是像上面一样可以计算出来的。而确定的纳税人权利的保护价格就可以让我们计算出纳税人权利保护的成本。
(2)本文提出了最优化纳税人权利的四个标准。最优化的纳税人权利保护包括以下几方面:①纳税人的权利应有尽有;②各个环节充分保护;③社会成本最低;④社会收益最大。纳税人愿意接受的保护其权利的成本越高,立法、行政、司法等国家机构越能够提供优质的纳税人权利保护。同时,这些国家机构也越有动力来提供优质的纳税人权利保护,因为这样,纳税人才能接受更高的纳税人权利保护的成本,国家机构才有可能获得更多的税款来实现自己的多重利益。
(3)本文提出纳税人权利保护最优化的两种路径。私人品与纳税人权利保护同时存在时,纳税人购买的私人品对购买纳税人权利的边际替代率之和等于购买私人品对购买纳税人权利的边际转换率时,实现了纳税人权利保护同私人品之间的最优配置。在只存在公共品的条件下,保护纳税人权利的单位成本带来的对纳税人权利保护的边际效用等于纳税人购买其他公共品的单位成本对购买其他公共产品带来的边际效用时,纳税人权利保护达到最优;通过对纳税人受歧视待遇的分析得到征税机关对纳税人歧视将会导致征税机关受到更大损失的结论。
(4)以产权理论解释了征税同意权的配置问题。征税同意权是纳税人享有的基本权利,从历史经验来看是纳税人长期斗争的结果,但从产权理论来分析,征税同意权配置于纳税人是一种富于效率的选择。
(5)本文通过博弈模型得到系列博弈均衡。本文通过建立纳税人与征税机关博弈的模型,得到纳税人与国家征税机关都会选择尽可能扩大自己权利这一均衡结论;通过博弈模型证明了纳税人利益集团间博弈的合理性;利用博弈模型证明了征税机关保障纳税人权利的必要性。
(6)拓展了“汉德公式”的运用范围。“汉德公式”首先适用于对过失责任的确定,但“汉德公式”还可以进一步的推广运用。在举证责任的界定中同样适用汉德公式。税务机关在税务行政行为中占有主动性,如果税务机关在行政执法时,利用国家提供的搜集证据的便利条件保留证据,这比起纳税人自己搜集证据来说,成本要小许多。所以,应当由税务机关就其行政行为的合法性提出证据。“汉德公式”对举证责任有着强大解释力。
With the acceleration of economic integration process of the world and extensive establishment of constitution system, the countries all over the world have realized the importance of taxpayer’s right protection, have become a academic focus on the research of taxpayer’s right protection, but present research is mostly qualitative research, the quantitative analysis of law and economics on taxpayer’s right is relatively weak. Carrying on the analysis of law and economics to taxpayer’s right, which is favorable to enrich law and economics theory, can offer the optimum method of taxpayer’s right protection in practice. Besides the justice value of the law, the optimum includes the minimum realization cost. Game analysis offers the method of benefit equilibrium for each interest group of the taxpayers and thus optimizes the various interests. Compared with the theory conclusion of the research and the real state of taxpayer’s right protection, we can find some questions and discover the beneficial countermeasure on taxpayer’s right protection.
From global analysis to partial research, from problem analysis to countermeasure research, which is basic logic thinking of the text. The full text divides into 8 chapters. Besides introduction of chapter 1, the thesis can be divided into three parts. The first part includes chapter 2 and chapter 3, which carries on the analysis of law and economics to taxpayer’s right protection on the whole. The second part includes chapter 4, chapter 5 and chapter 6, which carries on the analysis of law and economics to taxpayer’s right protection from three links of legislation, law enforcement and justice. The third part includes chapter 7 and chapter 8, which introduces partly the international taxpayer’s right protection, and put forward the countermeasure of optimizing the taxpayer’s right protection in our country. The basic content and structure of the text are arranged as follows:
Chapter 1 as introduction includes the definition of relevant concept and research scope, literature review, research subject, research thinking and method and logical structure arrangement etc.
Chapter 2 is the ontology of taxpayer’s right. Before we carry on the analysis of the taxpayer’s right protection, we should have an overall understanding and analysis on taxpayer’s right primarily. That is to say, what is the right, what is the relation between general human rights and taxpayer’s right, what is taxpayer’s right, the origin of taxpayer’s right, the law essence and characteristics of taxpayer’s right etc. All these are the foundation and target analyzed on taxpayer’s right protection, we can carry on static and dynamic analysis to the taxpayer’s right protection on this basis only. The main content and view of the chapter are:
(1) The essence of human rights. Human rights are restricted by the specific history and culture condition. Fundamental human rights supported by moral and law is used in the meaning of morals, law and resistance. Human rights is a right source of taxpayer’s right, the protection condition of human rights influences the protection condition of taxpayer’s right directly, the condition of taxpayer’s right protection is interactive with the protection of human rights.
(2) The influencing factors of the condition of taxpayer’s right protection. The social civilization determines the condition of taxpayer’s right protection; the taxpayer’s right is the product of the specific civilization, influenced by some factors such as history, law, politics, custom etc. The western constitution system promotes the protection of taxpayer’s right. Taxpayer’s right protection presents the international trend, no matter how Chinese and Western taxpayer’s right situation develop, the taxpayer’s right is being paid attention in globalization age increasingly.
(3) Relation between right, human rights and taxpayer’s right. The right is the domination free that the subject enjoys, the subject includes country and citizen. Common right and private right form the right together. The content of human rights includes some contents of the common right and private right. According to the definition of human rights, citizen’s personal rights belong to private right, some national rights including the national self-determination right belong to the common right. Taxpayer’s right is an important content of the human rights, it is a right that taxpayer enjoys, so it is the private right too.
(4) The theoretical foundation that taxpayer’s right exists. The improvement of taxpayer’s welfare requires the improvement of social production efficiency, the improvement of social production efficiency must rely on the effective disposition of the property right of social resources. The country and government decide the disposition of the property right, whether the country and government is incorruptible decide the validity of the disposition of the property right, thus the taxpayer needs to choose public organizations such as the country and government, the public organization which the taxpayer chose posses the real legitimacy and rationality. The just public organization offers public products such as law, law to the rational disposition of the resource promotes optimal allocation of the property right reversely, the social welfare get improvement further.
Chapter 3 is the operation mechanism of taxpayer’s right protection. Only when we have basic understanding on taxpayer’s right noumenon can we use the legal and economic method to analyze the protection of taxpayer’s right. The law analytical method is static, the economic analytical method is dynamic, they complement and manifest the advantage each other, comprehensively contain the protection of taxpayer’s right. After the protection of the taxpayer’s right is generally analyzed, the concrete taxpayer’s right protection can be discussed at three links of legislation, Law enforcement and justice. The main contents and view of the chapter are:
(1) The taxpayer’s right protection as public goods. The enjoyment of the taxpayer’s rights is based on taxpayer oneself as the starting point. The protection of taxpayer’s right is based on the supply and maintenance organization of right protection as starting point, namely country, government and levy organ. At the legislation and law enforcement stage, each taxpayer has the right to participate in legislating equally and exercise taxation consent right through one’s own representatives etc. When the taxpayer enjoys the taxpayer’s right in the form of legislation, every taxpayer can receive legal protection equally. From this perspective, country is unconditional to the supply and maintenance of taxpayer’s right.
(2) The reason on taxpayer’s right protection. The reason of taxpayer’s right protection includes economic reason, civil order reason and institution reason. The institution reason on taxpayer’s right protection refers to the course in which taxpayer’s right get confirmation and protection under the promotion of taxpayer’s right protection institution. Taxpayer’s right protection institution can be divided into the inherent taxpayer’s right protection institution and external taxpayer’s right protection institution. The civil order is an organic system formed by a series of institutions, every institution which makes up of this system influences each other and forms a dynamic system. The taxpayer’s right protection as institution and civil order grows up in the institution oneself and gets evolvement among them.
(3) The optimization of the taxpayer’s right protection. The optimization goal of taxpayer’s right protection include sufficient autonomy of will, all kinds of rights, full protection in each link and minimum social cost. About the optimal realization route, the text discusses two kind situations as follows respectively. One is the coexistence of private products and taxpayer’s right protection, the other is the coexistence of public products and taxpayer’s right protection.
(4) The equilibrium goal of game analysis of the taxpayer’s right. The analysis of game behavior and rule of taxpayer interest group in the course of taxpayer’s right protection is to deduce game equilibrium and solve practical problems, which can provide basis for rational decision of all parties or the establishment of the policy and rule of taxpayer’s right protection. The behavior equilibrium analysis is more comprehensive and in-depth than the equilibrium price analysis.
Chapter 4 is the economic analysis of taxpayer’s right protection from legislative visual angle. The logic starting point of taxpayer’s right protection lies in the right protection at legislation stage, the stage of law enforcement and justice would lack right basis if the taxpayer’s right at legislation stage lacks basic definition. The concrete regulation and project of taxpayer’s right each country is different to some extent, generally speaking, it is more and more exhaustive and complete than before. The economics and game analysis to taxpayer’s right protection helps us to optimize the taxpayer’s right protection at legislation stage. The main contents and view of the text are:
(1) The theory explanation of property right about the levy consent right. When the transaction cost about the levy consent right is too big, it should be disposed to the people who cherish its value mostly. This is the explanation of Posner Theorem about the levy consent right. This is a right which can decide property decidability; it is called the levy consent right in one party of the taxpayer and the levy right in the national party. The persons who levy taxes hope to obtain it because their life and enjoyment depend on the right of taxation, at the same time, taxpayers more prize the levy consent right because their existence and hope also depend on it. Hence, the passive and hard taxpayers more prize the levy consent right. In this sense, the levy consent right should be disposed to taxpayers.
(2) Marginal cost and marginal benefit analysis of participation right protection on revenue legislation. The protection cost of participation right on revenue legislation is restricted with specific social and economic competence, it is impossible of immoderate input, its income still receives the restraint of the marginal benefit, when marginal cost of participation right protection on revenue legislation is equal to its marginal benefit, the income of participation right protection on revenue legislation can realize the maximization.
(3) The game between the taxpayer and country. In the legislative activity, the formulation, modification and abolishing of the revenue law need taxpayer and representative to participate actively, which reflects the requirement and interests of taxpayer fully. This can embody the participation right of tax legislation of the taxpayer. But the taxpayer’s interests are always inconsistent with the interests of the national levy organ in short term. The national levy organ with one’s own department’s interests also hopes one’s own power is the bigger, the better. The right of taxpayer and national levy organ is embodied in a revenue law, which is unavoidable to increase with the decrease, conflict each other and game.
(4) Enlightenment on the game of interest group. We should pay attention to the protection of taxpayer’s whole right and consider the interests of its inside member while protecting taxpayer’s right, which could make the feasible system arrangement in this way. The system design of taxpayer right protection need pay attention to the requirement of different interest groups, make system design fair and reasonable and reduce the antithesis and contradiction within taxpayers.
Chapter 5 is the economic analysis of taxpayer’s right protection from law enforcement visual angle. As to taxpayer, besides the taxpayer’s right which produces at legislative stage, it reflects the interrelation between the levy organ and taxpayer to a great extent. This involves taxpayer’s right protection at law enforcement link. We can know taxpayer’s right protection at law enforcement link accord with not only the interests of the taxpayer, but also the interests of the levy organ through analysis. The main contents and view of the text are:
(1) The economic effect of tax planning right protection. The enforcement of tax planning right can promote the realization of social harmonious goal; lighten the inflation; produce the economic effects of enterprises; economize the personal expenditure and reflect the income effect economically.
(2) The analysis of the discrimination treatments of the taxpayer. Taxpayer enjoys the taxable rights equally, which is not discriminated against by the state organ. It means no matter how much does taxpayer pay taxes, they should be treated equally. From the point of law, the discrimination treatments have violated the equal treatment right that taxpayer enjoys, which will cause efficiency losses of the taxation considering the analysis of economic meaning.
(3) The optimum deterrent level of levy supervisory authority. The exertion of levy supervisory authority of the taxpayer can prevent and reduce the losses which levy organ cause due to illegal law enforcement mainly. On the one hand, this is a kind of behavior of obtaining the income through reducing losses, but on the other hand, the taxpayer demands cost to the supervision of the levy organ due to its illegal law enforcement. If the cost paid is lower than the income obtained because of supervising, then it is efficient. If the cost paid is higher than the income obtained because of supervising, then it is lack of efficiency.
(4) The game analysis of the right of accusation and impeachment encountering tax infringement. In the course of revenue law enforcement, the law enforcement agency can cause revenue infringement, but the taxpayer may choose to charge or inform against to protect one’s own right. We can see from the game analysis, the law enforcement agency that infringes the taxpayer’s right will receive the accusation of taxpayer inevitably, and vice versa. This tells us theoretically the taxpayer’s right can’t be infringed. Only the levy organ enforces the law according to legal procedure strictly can it fulfill one’s own duty well. Enforcing the law by way of breaking the law or infringing will make one’s own interests damaged.
(5) The game analysis of the commended right received because of legal tax payment. The game analysis tells us, while the law enforcement agency treats the commended right of the taxpayer passively, the taxpayer will pay tax passively too. The taxpayer pays taxes in a passive way, which will cause the decline of tax compliance and further increase the levy cost of the levy organ, thus influence the taxation efficiency of the whole. Hence, the law enforcement agency of revenue should treat the commended right of the taxpayer actively.
Chapter 6 is the economic analysis of taxpayer’s right protection from justice visual angle. The taxpayer right protection at the legislative stage can make taxpayer’s right more complete, the taxpayer right protection at the law enforcement stage makes these complete rights have realistic soil. Of course, the reality means certain conflict possibly exist in the levy organ and taxpayer on the problem of taxpayer’s right protection. The judicial way has become the most basic method of solving the conflict, so it is essential to endow and optimize the taxpayer’s right protection at justice stage. The main contents and view of the text are:
(1) The“cost and income”analysis of the lawsuit of taxpayer’s right protection. The taxpayer’s lawsuit cost is composed of judgment expenses, other expenses, attorney fee, time cost, spiritual cost while involving in tax administrative litigation. The lawsuit income of taxpayer’s right protection is composed of participation, dispassion, prescription and arbitrament.
(2) The economic analysis of the right without the burden of proof. In the lawsuit of tax infringement, the levy organ makes use of evidences collection tool that country offers to keep the evidence together while enforcing the law, the cost is much smaller compared with the taxpayer’s proof citation. The levy organ put forward evidence in regard to the legitimacy of its administrative behavior, which can economize the cost of proof citation furthest.
(3) The game of lawyer’s agency service. The conclusion of the game of lawyer’s agency service tells us, the party entrusts the lawyer and the lawyer works hard, which will be the optimum interest choice on both sides. In the lawsuit of taxpayer’s right protection, the client should entrust lawyer actively, and the lawyer should be diligent in work.
(4) The game analysis of the court relief. The two Nash equilibriums exist in the game of the court relief, namely the court relieve if the taxpayer prosecute, and vice versa. And the court relieves when the taxpayer is sued, which is the optimum tactics, this proves the court as the arbitrament organ should relieves taxpayer’s right positively, not only the duty of the legal provisions but also court’s interests. Therefore, the taxpayer should make use of law to safeguard one’s own right actively, the court must administer relief to the taxpayer’s right protection actively too.
Chapter 7 is the taxpayer’s right protection under international vision. The taxpayer’s right protection is important sign of the modern civilization, so the society between east and west all pay attention to the protection of taxpayer’s right particularly. Because the legal tradition and origin of countries all over the world is different, the concrete legal provisions of the taxpayer’s right protection are different too. Compared with Anglo-American law system and continental law system, the taxpayer’s right protection is dissimilar owing to the difference of legal basis, trial mode, the judicial procedure to some extent. But seen from the total trend, the two legal systems all enhance the taxpayer’s right protection, which have a positive meaning to the foundation of taxpayer’s right protection system in china.
Chapter 8 is the countermeasure research of optimizing taxpayer’s right protection system. The protection of the foreign taxpayer’s right has given us a lot of enlightenment. Some countries, especially the western developed country can carry on overall protection to taxpayer’s right, the key lies in improving the legal status of taxpayer’s right, supporting the taxpayers of different interests to carry on the legal game, optimizing and ensuring taxpayer’s right in the form of constitution. In order to establish the overall and everlasting taxpayer’s right protection, we should establish and improve the system of relevant laws, agency and judicial protection. Our country should consider the China’s actual conditions and take the perfection of constitution and law as turning point at the same time to embark on the foundation of the agency system and lawsuit protection system. This chapter carries on research to the current situation of taxpayer’s right protection in china mainly, and puts forward the thinking and countermeasure of optimizing the taxpayer’s right protection in china. This main contents and view of the text are:
(1) The principles of optimizing the taxpayer’s right protection system in china. The principles of optimizing the taxpayer’s right protection system include the socialist principle, constitutional principle, legal revenue principle and administrative efficiency principle.
(2) The countermeasures of optimizing the taxpayer’s right protection system in china. The countermeasures of optimizing the taxpayer’s right protection system in china involve in promoting the legislation programming of taxpayer’s right protection at legislative stage, increasing the position of taxpayer’s right in the constitution, and encouraging taxpayer’s participation enthusiasm etc. At the law enforcement stage, we should change the law enforcement idea of levy subject, rigorously enforce the procedure of tax law enforcement, perfect the system of tax information service, strengthen the administrative benefit principle of revenue and set up the taxation service system between the levy organ and social intermediary organization etc. At the justice stage, we should ensure the judicial independence, set up the tax court, set up the taxpayer’s public interest litigation system and implement the trial result firmly etc.
This text has carried on the following innovative exploration on the basis of inheriting existing research results:
1. The integration of research perspective
The literature of taxpayer’s right protection in the past carries on the research from the aspects of history, the system and law. The text analyses taxpayer’s right merging the law and economics with the unique visual angle, pay attention to the“cost and income”relation and the game relation of relevant subjects on taxpayer’s right ensuring, which can announce the dynamic essence of taxpayer’s right protection, thus make the protection of taxpayer’s right feasible even more. Examining taxpayer’s right protection question closely with economic visual angle has expanded the traditional analysis visual angle.
2. The expansion of research approach
Seen from the present, the research on taxpayer’s right home and abroad pays more attention to law analysis and value judgment, make light of the economical and empirical analysis. Although the existing law and economics work has a lot of economic analysis on rights, the content and method of analysis is short of rigorous logic and firm structure. Especially, the research is insufficient to the constraint terms of taxpayer’s right realization and how to seek the optimization of taxpayer’s right under the constraint terms. With the introduction of research approach of law and economics, on one hand, it can find the optimum methods on taxpayer’s right protection; on the other hand, it offers the theoretical direction for the rational game mechanism of taxpayer’s interest group. Meanwhile, the economic analysis methods make the economical explanation in order to ensure taxpayer’s right tactics actively. The text uses law method to carry on the basic definition to taxpayer’s right, seeks the optimum way of taxpayer’s right protection using the“cost and income”method of economics on the basis, and announce the dynamic optimization of the extensive interests using the game method.
3. The innovation of theory view
(1) The text thinks the cost of taxpayer’s right protection is quantifiable. At the legislative stage, the expert cost used and study cost can be confirmed, how many rights does it establish also can be confirmed, then the price of each right at legislation stage can be confirmed. At the law enforcement stage, the manpower and material resources equipped for the taxpayer’s right protection can be confirmed to the levy organ, how much taxpayer does it serve and how many rights does it establish can be confirmed, then the per capita price of each right protection can be counted. At the justice stage, in order to protect taxpayer’s right, the per capita price of each right protection can be counted as mentioned above too. And the confirmed price of taxpayer’s right protection can let us calculate the cost of taxpayer’s right protection.
(2) This text puts forward four standards of optimizing the taxpayer’s right. The optimum protection of taxpayer’s right include the following aspects: the taxpayer’s right has everything that one expects to find; each link can get sufficient protection; the social cost is the lowest; the social income is the largest. The higher the cost of right protection which the taxpayer would like to accept, the better the taxpayer’s right protection which such state organs as legislation, administration and justice can provide. Meanwhile, there is motive force to offer high-quality taxpayer’s right protection in these state organs too, in this way, the taxpayer can accept the higher cost of taxpayer’s right protection, and the state organs may obtain more taxes to realize one’s own multiple interests.
(3) This text brings forward two kinds of routes of optimizing the taxpayer’s right protection. If the private product and taxpayer’s right protection present at the same time, the taxpayer need buy the private product and taxpayer’s right, only when the marginal rate of transformation equals the marginal rate of substitution can we realize the optimum disposition between the private product and taxpayer’s right protection. If there is the public product only, when the marginal utility which the unit cost to the taxpayer’s right protection brings equals the marginal utility which the unit cost of buying other public product brings, we realize the optimization of taxpayer’s right protection. Through the analysis of discrimination treatments on taxpayer, we can know the levy organ will lead to great loss if they discriminate against the taxpayer’s right.
(4) The text explains the disposition questions of taxation consent right with property right theory. The taxation consent right is the fundamental right that taxpayer enjoys, which is a result of taxpayer’s long-term struggle according to the historical experience, seen from the analysis of property right theory, the taxation consent right disposed to the taxpayer is a kind of choice filled with efficiency.
(5) The text gets a series of game equilibrium with the game model. Through setting up the game model between taxpayer and levy organ, the text gets the equilibrium conclusion that taxpayer and levy organ enlarge one’s own right as much as possible; proves the rationality of the game among taxpayer’s interest group; points out the necessity that the levy organ ensures the taxpayer’s right.
(6) The text develops the application range of“Hand Formula”.“Hand Formula”is suitable for the sureness of fault liability at first, but it can still get the further popularization. It is also suitable for the definition of burden of proof. The tax authority occupies the initiative in the administrative behavior of taxation, if the tax authority uses the convenient conditions of evidences collection that the country offers to keep the evidence in the course of the administrative law enforcement, then its cost should be much smaller compared with the evidence collected by taxpayer. Therefore, the tax authority should put forward evidence on the legitimacy of the administrative behavior.“Hand Formula”has strong explanation strength to the burden of proof.
从整体分析到局部研究,从问题分析到对策研究是本文的基本逻辑思路。全文共分8章,除第1章导论之外,论文可以分为三部分,第一部分即第2章、第3章,从整体上以法经济学的视角对纳税人权利的保护进行分析。第二部分即第4章、第5章、第6章,从立法、执法、司法三个环节对纳税人权利的保护作法经济学的分析。第三部分即第7章、第8章,对国际纳税人权利保护作了部分介绍,在此基础上提出了优化我国纳税人权利保护的对策。本文的基本内容和结构安排如下:
第1章,导论。包括相关概念和研究范围的界定、相关文献综述、研究主体、研究思路与方法以及逻辑结构安排等内容。
第2章,纳税人权利的本体论。对纳税人权利的保护进行分析首先要对纳税人权利有一个全面的理解和分析,即回答权利是什么、普遍的人权与纳税人权利有何关系、纳税人权利是什么、纳税人权利是如何起源的以及纳税人权利的法律本质和相关特征等等,这些都是纳税人权利保护分析的基础与对象,只有在此基础上才能对纳税人权利保护进行静态与动态的分析。本章的主要内容和观点是:
(1)人权的本质。人权是受特定历史文化条件所制约的,由道德和法律所支撑的人之所以为人的基本权利,在道德、法律和反抗意义上使用。人权是纳税人权利的权利来源,人权的保护状况直接影响到纳税人权利的保护状况,纳税人权利保护的状况也反作用于人权的保护。
(2)纳税人权利保护状况的影响因素。社会文明决定纳税人权利保护状况,纳税人权利是特定文明的产物,受到构成这一文明的历史、法律、政治、习俗等方面的影响。西方宪政推动了纳税人权利的保护。纳税人权利保护呈现国际化趋势,无论中国和西方的纳税人权利成长情况怎样,纳税人权利在全球化的今天越来越受到各国所重视。
(3)权利、人权、纳税人权利的关系。权利是主体享有的支配性自由,这种主体包括国家与公民。公权利与私权利共同构成了权利。人权的内容包括了公权利与私权利的部分内容。人权中,公民个人的权利属于私权利,国家与民族的一些权利包括国家与民族的自决权等属于公权利。纳税人权利是人权的重要内容,它是纳税人所享有的权利,因此也属于私权利。
(4)纳税人权利存在的理论依据。纳税人福利的改善要求社会生产效率提高,而社会生产效率的提高必须依靠社会资源的产权的有效配置来实现。国家与政府决定着产权的配置,而国家与政府是否公正廉明决定了产权配置的有效性,于是纳税人需要对国家与政府这样的公共机构进行选择,经过纳税人选择的公共机构才具备了真正意义上的合法性和合理性。公正的公共机构提供着包括法律这样的公共产品,法律对资源的合理配置反过来又促进了产权的优化配置,社会福利得到进一步提高。
第3章,纳税人权利保护的运行机理。对纳税人的权利本体有了基本的认识以后,才能运用法律的方法和经济的方法对纳税人权利的保护进行分析。法律的分析方法是静态的,经济分析方法是动态的,二者互相补充、互为优势,全面地涵盖了纳税人权利的保护。在对纳税人权利的保护进行一般分析后,具体的纳税人权利保护的立法、执法和司法环节才能够得到讨论。本章主要内容和观点是:
(1)作为公共品供给的纳税人权利保护。纳税人权利的享有是以纳税人自身为出发点的,而纳税人权利的保护却是从权利保护的供给和维护方即国家、政府、和征税机关为出发点的。在立法阶段和执法阶段,每个纳税人都平等的享有立法的参与权,通过自己的代表行使征税同意权等等,当纳税人以立法的形式享有纳税人权利时,每个纳税人都可以平等地受到法律的保护。从这个角度讲,国家对纳税人权利的供给与维护是无条件的。
(2)纳税人权利保护的动因。纳税人权利保护的动因包括经济动因、制度动因和社会秩序动因。纳税人权利保护的制度动因是指在纳税人权利保护制度的推进下,纳税人权利得到确认与保护的过程。纳税人权利保护制度可以分为内在纳税人权利保护制度与外在纳税人权利保护制度。社会秩序是由一系列制度所形成的有机体系,组成这一体系的各项制度相互影响,形成一个动态的体系。作为制度或者社会秩序的纳税人权利保护成长于制度自身,并在其中演进成长。
(3)纳税人权利保护的最优化。纳税人权利保护的最优化目标包括:充分的意思自治、权利应有尽有、各个环节充分保护、纳税人权利保护的社会成本最低。关于实现最优化的路径,本文就私人品和纳税人权利保护同时存在以及公共品和纳税人权利保护同时存在的两种情况进行了分别讨论。
(4)纳税人权利的博弈分析的均衡目标。分析纳税人利益集团在纳税人权利保护过程中的博弈行为和规律是为了导出博弈的均衡并以此来说明实际问题,从而为各方合理决策或者纳税人权利保护的政策和规则的制订提供依据。这种行为均衡分析比价格均衡的分析更加的全面和深入。
第4章,立法视角:纳税人权利保护的经济分析。纳税人权利保护的逻辑起点在于立法阶段的权利的保护,立法阶段没有对纳税人权利进行基本界定,则执法阶段、司法阶段都没有权利依据。各个国家对纳税人权利的具体规定和项目是有所不同的,但总的趋势在于对纳税人权利的规定越来越详尽和完备。对纳税人权利保护进行立法阶段的经济和博弈分析有利于我们对立法阶段的纳税人权利保护进行最优化处理。本章主要内容和观点是:
(1)征税同意权的产权理论解释。当征税同意权获得的交易成本过大时,征税同意权就该赋予那些最珍视它的人。这就是波斯纳定理在征税同意权配置上的解释。1这是一种决定财产让渡的权利,在纳税人一方称为征税同意权,在国家一方称为征税权。征税者希望获得征税权,因为他们的生活享乐都系于此,而纳税人更加珍视征税同意权,因为他们的生存和希望也全部系于此。因此,作为被动而艰辛的纳税人更加珍视征税同意权。所以,征税同意权应该配置给纳税人。
(2)税收立法参与权保护的边际成本与边际收益分析。税收立法参与权的保护成本受一定社会经济水平制约,不可能进行无节制的投入,其收益仍然受到边际收益的约束,只有税收立法参与权保护的边际成本等于其边际收益时,才实现了税收立法参与权保护的收益最大化。
(3)纳税人与国家之间的博弈。立法活动中,税收法律的制定与修改或者废除需要纳税人及其代表的积极参与,充分反映和体现纳税人的要求和利益。这是纳税人税收立法参与权的体现。从短期和微观来看,纳税人的利益和国家征税机关的利益是不一致的。具有自己部门利益的国家税收征管机关同样也希望自己的权力越大越好。纳税人权利此时与国家税收征管机关的权力同时体现在一部税收法律当中,不可避免会出现此消彼长,相互冲突和博弈。
(4)利益集团博弈的启示。我们在对纳税人权利进行保护时,要注重对纳税人的整体权利进行保护,也要将其内部成员的利益考虑进来,这样才能作出切实可行的制度安排。对纳税人权利保护进行制度设计时要主动关注不同纳税人利益集团的要求,使得制度设计能够公平合理,减少纳税人内部的对立与矛盾。
第5章,执法视角:纳税人权利保护的经济分析。对纳税人而言,除了立法阶段产生纳税人权利外,更多是税收行政机关与纳税人的相互关系。这就涉及到纳税人权利在执法环节的保护。通过本章的分析,可以得知对纳税人权利在执法阶段进行全面的保护不但符合纳税人的利益,也符合税收行政机关的利益。本章主要内容和观点是:
(1)税收筹划权保护的经济效应。纳税人税收筹划权的行使可以促进社会和谐目标的实现;减轻通货膨胀;产生企业的经济效应;税收筹划节约了个人的支出,体现了经济上的收入效应。
(2)纳税人受歧视待遇的分析。纳税人享有平等纳税,不受国家机关歧视的权利。不受歧视意味着无论纳税多少,都应当受到平等的对待。从法律角度讲,对纳税人的歧视违背了纳税人享有的受到平等对待的权利,从经济意义上分析,对纳税人歧视将造成征税效率损失。
(3)征税监督权的最优威慑水平。纳税人对税收机关行使征税权进行监督主要是为了预防和减少征税机关违法执法所造成的损失。一方面这是一种通过减少损失获得收益的行为,同时纳税人对征税机关违法执法的监督是需要付出成本的。如果付出的成本低于因监督而获得的收益,则这种付出是有效率的。如果付出的成本高于因监督而获得的收益,那么,这种付出就是缺乏效率的。
(4)遭遇税务侵权的控告、检举权的博弈分析。在税收执法中,执法机关存在税收侵权的可能,而纳税人则会选择控告或者检举的方式来保护自己作为纳税人的权利。从博弈分析可以看出,执法机关侵犯纳税人权利必然会遭到纳税人的控告,而执法机关不侵犯纳税人权利时,纳税人就不会检举和控告征税机关。这从理论上告诉我们,纳税人的权利是不容侵犯的,征税机关只有严格依照法定程序执法,才能履行好自己的职责。以违法或者侵权的方式执法,必将使自己的利益受损。
(5)依法纳税获得表彰权利的博弈分析。博弈的理论分析告诉我们,当执法机关消极对待纳税人受表彰的权利时,纳税人也会以消极纳税的形式来对应。纳税人以消极的方式纳税,必然导致税收遵从度的下降进而增加征税机关的征税成本,从而影响整体的征税效率。因此,税收执法机关应当积极对待纳税人受表彰的权利。
第6章,司法视角:纳税人权利保护的经济分析。立法阶段对纳税人权利的保护可以使纳税人权利更加完备,而执法阶段纳税人权利的保护则使这些完备的权利有了现实的土壤,当然,这种现实也意味着征税机关同纳税人之间在保护纳税人权利问题上可能出现一定的冲突。司法途径成了解决这种冲突的最基本办法,因此必须赋予和优化纳税人在司法阶段的权利保护。本章主要内容和观点是:
(1)纳税人权利保护的诉讼“成本—收益”分析。涉税行政诉讼中纳税人的诉讼成本的由裁判费用、其他费用、律师费、时间成本、精神成本构成。纳税人权利保护的诉讼收益包括参与、公平、及时、裁决。
(2)不负举证责任的权利的经济分析。在税务侵权的诉讼中,由征税机关在行政执法的同时,一同利用国家提供的证据搜集工具来保留证据,比起纳税人举证来说,成本要小许多。由征税机关就其行政行为的合法性提出证据会最大限度节约举证成本。
(3)律师代理博弈。律师代理博弈的结论告诉我们,当事人委托律师、律师努力工作将是双方利益最优的选择。在纳税人权利保护的诉讼中,委托人应当积极委托律师,而律师也应当努力地工作。
(4)法院救济博弈。法院救济的博弈存在两对纳什均衡,即纳税人不起诉、法院不救济和纳税人起诉、法院救济。而且纳税人起诉、法院救济是最优的策略,这说明法院作为裁决机关积极主动地救济纳税人权利,不但是法律规定的职责而且也是法院利益所在。因此,纳税人应当积极利用法律来维护自己的权利,法院也必须积极主动地对纳税人的权利保护进行救济。
第7章,国际视野下的纳税人权利保护。纳税人权利保护是现代文明的重要标志,东西方社会都极其重视纳税人权利的保护。由于世界各国的法律传统和法律渊源不一样,对纳税人权利保护的具体法律规定也不一样。从两大法系来看,英美法系和大陆法系的纳税人权利保护由于二者的法律依据、审判方式、审判程序上的差异而有所不同。但从总的趋势来看,两大法系的国家和地区都加大了对纳税人权利保护的力度,这些对于中国纳税人权利保护体系的建立而言具有积极的意义。
第8章,优化我国纳税人权利保护体系的对策研究。国外纳税人权利的保护给了我们许多启示。一些国家,尤其是西方发达国家之所以能够对纳税人权利进行全面保护,关键就在于提高纳税人权利的法律地位,支持不同利益的纳税人进行合法的博弈、最优化纳税人权利、以宪法的形式加以保障。建立健全相关的法律制度、代理制度和司法保护制度,从而全面长效地保护纳税人权利。我国只有从这些方面入手,结合中国国情,以宪法、法律完善为契机,加强代理制度、诉讼保护制度的建立。本章主要通过对中国纳税人权利保护的现状进行研究,提出了优化我国纳税人权利保护的思路与对策。本章主要内容和观点是:
(1)优化我国纳税人权利保护体系的原则。优化我国纳税人权利保护体系的原则包括坚持社会主义原则、坚持宪政原则、坚持税收法定原则、坚持行政效率原则。
(2)优化我国纳税人权利保护体系的对策。优化我国纳税人权利保护体系的对策包括在立法阶段推动纳税人权利保护的立法规划、提高纳税人权利在宪法中的地位、鼓励纳税人的参与积极性等。在执法阶段要转变征收主体的执法观念、严格税务行政执法的程序、健全税务信息化服务系统、强化税收行政效益原则、建立税务机关和社会中介组织相结合的纳税服务系统等。在司法阶段要全面保障司法独立、建立税收法院、建立纳税人公益诉讼制度、坚决执行审判结果等。
本文在继承现有研究成果的基础上,进行了以下创新性探索:
1.研究视角的融合性
以往的纳税人权利研究多从历史的、制度的、法律的层面来研究,本文以法律和经济学相融合的独特视角来分析纳税人权利,注重纳税人权利保障的成本—收益关系和相关主体的博弈关系,更能揭示纳税人权利保护的动态机制,从而使纳税人权利的保护更具有可行性。以经济视角审视纳税人权利保护问题,扩展了传统的分析视角。
2.研究方法的拓展性
从目前来看,国内外关于纳税人权利的研究多注重法律分析,少经济分析;多价值判断、少实证分析。现有的法经济学著作虽有许多对权利的经济分析,但是分析内容、分析方法上比较缺乏严密的逻辑性,在结构上也相对松散,对纳税人权利实现的约束条件以及如何在约束条件之下寻求纳税人权利保护最优化研究尤为不足。法经济学研究方法的引入,一方面可以寻找到最优化纳税人权利保护的方法,另一方面也为建立纳税人利益集团合理的博弈机制提供理论指导。同时,经济分析的方法还为积极保障纳税人权利策略作出经济学上的解释。本文运用法律研究的方法对纳税人权利进行基本的界定,在此基础上运用经济学的“成本—收益”方法寻求纳税人权利保护最优的途径,并运用博弈方法揭示多方利益的动态最优。
3.理论观点的创新
(1)本文认为纳税人权利保护的成本是可以计量的。从立法阶段来看,动用专家成本和调研成本是可以确定的,确立了多少项权利也是可以确定的,则每项权利在立法阶段的成本是可以确定的。在执法阶段,税务行政机关为保护纳税人权利所配备的人力和物力是可以确定的,服务了多少人次的纳税人以及纳税人的多少项权利是可以确定的,则每人每项权利保护的平均成本是可以计算出来的。在司法阶段,为保护纳税人权利,每人每项权利保护的平均价格也是像上面一样可以计算出来的。而确定的纳税人权利的保护价格就可以让我们计算出纳税人权利保护的成本。
(2)本文提出了最优化纳税人权利的四个标准。最优化的纳税人权利保护包括以下几方面:①纳税人的权利应有尽有;②各个环节充分保护;③社会成本最低;④社会收益最大。纳税人愿意接受的保护其权利的成本越高,立法、行政、司法等国家机构越能够提供优质的纳税人权利保护。同时,这些国家机构也越有动力来提供优质的纳税人权利保护,因为这样,纳税人才能接受更高的纳税人权利保护的成本,国家机构才有可能获得更多的税款来实现自己的多重利益。
(3)本文提出纳税人权利保护最优化的两种路径。私人品与纳税人权利保护同时存在时,纳税人购买的私人品对购买纳税人权利的边际替代率之和等于购买私人品对购买纳税人权利的边际转换率时,实现了纳税人权利保护同私人品之间的最优配置。在只存在公共品的条件下,保护纳税人权利的单位成本带来的对纳税人权利保护的边际效用等于纳税人购买其他公共品的单位成本对购买其他公共产品带来的边际效用时,纳税人权利保护达到最优;通过对纳税人受歧视待遇的分析得到征税机关对纳税人歧视将会导致征税机关受到更大损失的结论。
(4)以产权理论解释了征税同意权的配置问题。征税同意权是纳税人享有的基本权利,从历史经验来看是纳税人长期斗争的结果,但从产权理论来分析,征税同意权配置于纳税人是一种富于效率的选择。
(5)本文通过博弈模型得到系列博弈均衡。本文通过建立纳税人与征税机关博弈的模型,得到纳税人与国家征税机关都会选择尽可能扩大自己权利这一均衡结论;通过博弈模型证明了纳税人利益集团间博弈的合理性;利用博弈模型证明了征税机关保障纳税人权利的必要性。
(6)拓展了“汉德公式”的运用范围。“汉德公式”首先适用于对过失责任的确定,但“汉德公式”还可以进一步的推广运用。在举证责任的界定中同样适用汉德公式。税务机关在税务行政行为中占有主动性,如果税务机关在行政执法时,利用国家提供的搜集证据的便利条件保留证据,这比起纳税人自己搜集证据来说,成本要小许多。所以,应当由税务机关就其行政行为的合法性提出证据。“汉德公式”对举证责任有着强大解释力。
With the acceleration of economic integration process of the world and extensive establishment of constitution system, the countries all over the world have realized the importance of taxpayer’s right protection, have become a academic focus on the research of taxpayer’s right protection, but present research is mostly qualitative research, the quantitative analysis of law and economics on taxpayer’s right is relatively weak. Carrying on the analysis of law and economics to taxpayer’s right, which is favorable to enrich law and economics theory, can offer the optimum method of taxpayer’s right protection in practice. Besides the justice value of the law, the optimum includes the minimum realization cost. Game analysis offers the method of benefit equilibrium for each interest group of the taxpayers and thus optimizes the various interests. Compared with the theory conclusion of the research and the real state of taxpayer’s right protection, we can find some questions and discover the beneficial countermeasure on taxpayer’s right protection.
From global analysis to partial research, from problem analysis to countermeasure research, which is basic logic thinking of the text. The full text divides into 8 chapters. Besides introduction of chapter 1, the thesis can be divided into three parts. The first part includes chapter 2 and chapter 3, which carries on the analysis of law and economics to taxpayer’s right protection on the whole. The second part includes chapter 4, chapter 5 and chapter 6, which carries on the analysis of law and economics to taxpayer’s right protection from three links of legislation, law enforcement and justice. The third part includes chapter 7 and chapter 8, which introduces partly the international taxpayer’s right protection, and put forward the countermeasure of optimizing the taxpayer’s right protection in our country. The basic content and structure of the text are arranged as follows:
Chapter 1 as introduction includes the definition of relevant concept and research scope, literature review, research subject, research thinking and method and logical structure arrangement etc.
Chapter 2 is the ontology of taxpayer’s right. Before we carry on the analysis of the taxpayer’s right protection, we should have an overall understanding and analysis on taxpayer’s right primarily. That is to say, what is the right, what is the relation between general human rights and taxpayer’s right, what is taxpayer’s right, the origin of taxpayer’s right, the law essence and characteristics of taxpayer’s right etc. All these are the foundation and target analyzed on taxpayer’s right protection, we can carry on static and dynamic analysis to the taxpayer’s right protection on this basis only. The main content and view of the chapter are:
(1) The essence of human rights. Human rights are restricted by the specific history and culture condition. Fundamental human rights supported by moral and law is used in the meaning of morals, law and resistance. Human rights is a right source of taxpayer’s right, the protection condition of human rights influences the protection condition of taxpayer’s right directly, the condition of taxpayer’s right protection is interactive with the protection of human rights.
(2) The influencing factors of the condition of taxpayer’s right protection. The social civilization determines the condition of taxpayer’s right protection; the taxpayer’s right is the product of the specific civilization, influenced by some factors such as history, law, politics, custom etc. The western constitution system promotes the protection of taxpayer’s right. Taxpayer’s right protection presents the international trend, no matter how Chinese and Western taxpayer’s right situation develop, the taxpayer’s right is being paid attention in globalization age increasingly.
(3) Relation between right, human rights and taxpayer’s right. The right is the domination free that the subject enjoys, the subject includes country and citizen. Common right and private right form the right together. The content of human rights includes some contents of the common right and private right. According to the definition of human rights, citizen’s personal rights belong to private right, some national rights including the national self-determination right belong to the common right. Taxpayer’s right is an important content of the human rights, it is a right that taxpayer enjoys, so it is the private right too.
(4) The theoretical foundation that taxpayer’s right exists. The improvement of taxpayer’s welfare requires the improvement of social production efficiency, the improvement of social production efficiency must rely on the effective disposition of the property right of social resources. The country and government decide the disposition of the property right, whether the country and government is incorruptible decide the validity of the disposition of the property right, thus the taxpayer needs to choose public organizations such as the country and government, the public organization which the taxpayer chose posses the real legitimacy and rationality. The just public organization offers public products such as law, law to the rational disposition of the resource promotes optimal allocation of the property right reversely, the social welfare get improvement further.
Chapter 3 is the operation mechanism of taxpayer’s right protection. Only when we have basic understanding on taxpayer’s right noumenon can we use the legal and economic method to analyze the protection of taxpayer’s right. The law analytical method is static, the economic analytical method is dynamic, they complement and manifest the advantage each other, comprehensively contain the protection of taxpayer’s right. After the protection of the taxpayer’s right is generally analyzed, the concrete taxpayer’s right protection can be discussed at three links of legislation, Law enforcement and justice. The main contents and view of the chapter are:
(1) The taxpayer’s right protection as public goods. The enjoyment of the taxpayer’s rights is based on taxpayer oneself as the starting point. The protection of taxpayer’s right is based on the supply and maintenance organization of right protection as starting point, namely country, government and levy organ. At the legislation and law enforcement stage, each taxpayer has the right to participate in legislating equally and exercise taxation consent right through one’s own representatives etc. When the taxpayer enjoys the taxpayer’s right in the form of legislation, every taxpayer can receive legal protection equally. From this perspective, country is unconditional to the supply and maintenance of taxpayer’s right.
(2) The reason on taxpayer’s right protection. The reason of taxpayer’s right protection includes economic reason, civil order reason and institution reason. The institution reason on taxpayer’s right protection refers to the course in which taxpayer’s right get confirmation and protection under the promotion of taxpayer’s right protection institution. Taxpayer’s right protection institution can be divided into the inherent taxpayer’s right protection institution and external taxpayer’s right protection institution. The civil order is an organic system formed by a series of institutions, every institution which makes up of this system influences each other and forms a dynamic system. The taxpayer’s right protection as institution and civil order grows up in the institution oneself and gets evolvement among them.
(3) The optimization of the taxpayer’s right protection. The optimization goal of taxpayer’s right protection include sufficient autonomy of will, all kinds of rights, full protection in each link and minimum social cost. About the optimal realization route, the text discusses two kind situations as follows respectively. One is the coexistence of private products and taxpayer’s right protection, the other is the coexistence of public products and taxpayer’s right protection.
(4) The equilibrium goal of game analysis of the taxpayer’s right. The analysis of game behavior and rule of taxpayer interest group in the course of taxpayer’s right protection is to deduce game equilibrium and solve practical problems, which can provide basis for rational decision of all parties or the establishment of the policy and rule of taxpayer’s right protection. The behavior equilibrium analysis is more comprehensive and in-depth than the equilibrium price analysis.
Chapter 4 is the economic analysis of taxpayer’s right protection from legislative visual angle. The logic starting point of taxpayer’s right protection lies in the right protection at legislation stage, the stage of law enforcement and justice would lack right basis if the taxpayer’s right at legislation stage lacks basic definition. The concrete regulation and project of taxpayer’s right each country is different to some extent, generally speaking, it is more and more exhaustive and complete than before. The economics and game analysis to taxpayer’s right protection helps us to optimize the taxpayer’s right protection at legislation stage. The main contents and view of the text are:
(1) The theory explanation of property right about the levy consent right. When the transaction cost about the levy consent right is too big, it should be disposed to the people who cherish its value mostly. This is the explanation of Posner Theorem about the levy consent right. This is a right which can decide property decidability; it is called the levy consent right in one party of the taxpayer and the levy right in the national party. The persons who levy taxes hope to obtain it because their life and enjoyment depend on the right of taxation, at the same time, taxpayers more prize the levy consent right because their existence and hope also depend on it. Hence, the passive and hard taxpayers more prize the levy consent right. In this sense, the levy consent right should be disposed to taxpayers.
(2) Marginal cost and marginal benefit analysis of participation right protection on revenue legislation. The protection cost of participation right on revenue legislation is restricted with specific social and economic competence, it is impossible of immoderate input, its income still receives the restraint of the marginal benefit, when marginal cost of participation right protection on revenue legislation is equal to its marginal benefit, the income of participation right protection on revenue legislation can realize the maximization.
(3) The game between the taxpayer and country. In the legislative activity, the formulation, modification and abolishing of the revenue law need taxpayer and representative to participate actively, which reflects the requirement and interests of taxpayer fully. This can embody the participation right of tax legislation of the taxpayer. But the taxpayer’s interests are always inconsistent with the interests of the national levy organ in short term. The national levy organ with one’s own department’s interests also hopes one’s own power is the bigger, the better. The right of taxpayer and national levy organ is embodied in a revenue law, which is unavoidable to increase with the decrease, conflict each other and game.
(4) Enlightenment on the game of interest group. We should pay attention to the protection of taxpayer’s whole right and consider the interests of its inside member while protecting taxpayer’s right, which could make the feasible system arrangement in this way. The system design of taxpayer right protection need pay attention to the requirement of different interest groups, make system design fair and reasonable and reduce the antithesis and contradiction within taxpayers.
Chapter 5 is the economic analysis of taxpayer’s right protection from law enforcement visual angle. As to taxpayer, besides the taxpayer’s right which produces at legislative stage, it reflects the interrelation between the levy organ and taxpayer to a great extent. This involves taxpayer’s right protection at law enforcement link. We can know taxpayer’s right protection at law enforcement link accord with not only the interests of the taxpayer, but also the interests of the levy organ through analysis. The main contents and view of the text are:
(1) The economic effect of tax planning right protection. The enforcement of tax planning right can promote the realization of social harmonious goal; lighten the inflation; produce the economic effects of enterprises; economize the personal expenditure and reflect the income effect economically.
(2) The analysis of the discrimination treatments of the taxpayer. Taxpayer enjoys the taxable rights equally, which is not discriminated against by the state organ. It means no matter how much does taxpayer pay taxes, they should be treated equally. From the point of law, the discrimination treatments have violated the equal treatment right that taxpayer enjoys, which will cause efficiency losses of the taxation considering the analysis of economic meaning.
(3) The optimum deterrent level of levy supervisory authority. The exertion of levy supervisory authority of the taxpayer can prevent and reduce the losses which levy organ cause due to illegal law enforcement mainly. On the one hand, this is a kind of behavior of obtaining the income through reducing losses, but on the other hand, the taxpayer demands cost to the supervision of the levy organ due to its illegal law enforcement. If the cost paid is lower than the income obtained because of supervising, then it is efficient. If the cost paid is higher than the income obtained because of supervising, then it is lack of efficiency.
(4) The game analysis of the right of accusation and impeachment encountering tax infringement. In the course of revenue law enforcement, the law enforcement agency can cause revenue infringement, but the taxpayer may choose to charge or inform against to protect one’s own right. We can see from the game analysis, the law enforcement agency that infringes the taxpayer’s right will receive the accusation of taxpayer inevitably, and vice versa. This tells us theoretically the taxpayer’s right can’t be infringed. Only the levy organ enforces the law according to legal procedure strictly can it fulfill one’s own duty well. Enforcing the law by way of breaking the law or infringing will make one’s own interests damaged.
(5) The game analysis of the commended right received because of legal tax payment. The game analysis tells us, while the law enforcement agency treats the commended right of the taxpayer passively, the taxpayer will pay tax passively too. The taxpayer pays taxes in a passive way, which will cause the decline of tax compliance and further increase the levy cost of the levy organ, thus influence the taxation efficiency of the whole. Hence, the law enforcement agency of revenue should treat the commended right of the taxpayer actively.
Chapter 6 is the economic analysis of taxpayer’s right protection from justice visual angle. The taxpayer right protection at the legislative stage can make taxpayer’s right more complete, the taxpayer right protection at the law enforcement stage makes these complete rights have realistic soil. Of course, the reality means certain conflict possibly exist in the levy organ and taxpayer on the problem of taxpayer’s right protection. The judicial way has become the most basic method of solving the conflict, so it is essential to endow and optimize the taxpayer’s right protection at justice stage. The main contents and view of the text are:
(1) The“cost and income”analysis of the lawsuit of taxpayer’s right protection. The taxpayer’s lawsuit cost is composed of judgment expenses, other expenses, attorney fee, time cost, spiritual cost while involving in tax administrative litigation. The lawsuit income of taxpayer’s right protection is composed of participation, dispassion, prescription and arbitrament.
(2) The economic analysis of the right without the burden of proof. In the lawsuit of tax infringement, the levy organ makes use of evidences collection tool that country offers to keep the evidence together while enforcing the law, the cost is much smaller compared with the taxpayer’s proof citation. The levy organ put forward evidence in regard to the legitimacy of its administrative behavior, which can economize the cost of proof citation furthest.
(3) The game of lawyer’s agency service. The conclusion of the game of lawyer’s agency service tells us, the party entrusts the lawyer and the lawyer works hard, which will be the optimum interest choice on both sides. In the lawsuit of taxpayer’s right protection, the client should entrust lawyer actively, and the lawyer should be diligent in work.
(4) The game analysis of the court relief. The two Nash equilibriums exist in the game of the court relief, namely the court relieve if the taxpayer prosecute, and vice versa. And the court relieves when the taxpayer is sued, which is the optimum tactics, this proves the court as the arbitrament organ should relieves taxpayer’s right positively, not only the duty of the legal provisions but also court’s interests. Therefore, the taxpayer should make use of law to safeguard one’s own right actively, the court must administer relief to the taxpayer’s right protection actively too.
Chapter 7 is the taxpayer’s right protection under international vision. The taxpayer’s right protection is important sign of the modern civilization, so the society between east and west all pay attention to the protection of taxpayer’s right particularly. Because the legal tradition and origin of countries all over the world is different, the concrete legal provisions of the taxpayer’s right protection are different too. Compared with Anglo-American law system and continental law system, the taxpayer’s right protection is dissimilar owing to the difference of legal basis, trial mode, the judicial procedure to some extent. But seen from the total trend, the two legal systems all enhance the taxpayer’s right protection, which have a positive meaning to the foundation of taxpayer’s right protection system in china.
Chapter 8 is the countermeasure research of optimizing taxpayer’s right protection system. The protection of the foreign taxpayer’s right has given us a lot of enlightenment. Some countries, especially the western developed country can carry on overall protection to taxpayer’s right, the key lies in improving the legal status of taxpayer’s right, supporting the taxpayers of different interests to carry on the legal game, optimizing and ensuring taxpayer’s right in the form of constitution. In order to establish the overall and everlasting taxpayer’s right protection, we should establish and improve the system of relevant laws, agency and judicial protection. Our country should consider the China’s actual conditions and take the perfection of constitution and law as turning point at the same time to embark on the foundation of the agency system and lawsuit protection system. This chapter carries on research to the current situation of taxpayer’s right protection in china mainly, and puts forward the thinking and countermeasure of optimizing the taxpayer’s right protection in china. This main contents and view of the text are:
(1) The principles of optimizing the taxpayer’s right protection system in china. The principles of optimizing the taxpayer’s right protection system include the socialist principle, constitutional principle, legal revenue principle and administrative efficiency principle.
(2) The countermeasures of optimizing the taxpayer’s right protection system in china. The countermeasures of optimizing the taxpayer’s right protection system in china involve in promoting the legislation programming of taxpayer’s right protection at legislative stage, increasing the position of taxpayer’s right in the constitution, and encouraging taxpayer’s participation enthusiasm etc. At the law enforcement stage, we should change the law enforcement idea of levy subject, rigorously enforce the procedure of tax law enforcement, perfect the system of tax information service, strengthen the administrative benefit principle of revenue and set up the taxation service system between the levy organ and social intermediary organization etc. At the justice stage, we should ensure the judicial independence, set up the tax court, set up the taxpayer’s public interest litigation system and implement the trial result firmly etc.
This text has carried on the following innovative exploration on the basis of inheriting existing research results:
1. The integration of research perspective
The literature of taxpayer’s right protection in the past carries on the research from the aspects of history, the system and law. The text analyses taxpayer’s right merging the law and economics with the unique visual angle, pay attention to the“cost and income”relation and the game relation of relevant subjects on taxpayer’s right ensuring, which can announce the dynamic essence of taxpayer’s right protection, thus make the protection of taxpayer’s right feasible even more. Examining taxpayer’s right protection question closely with economic visual angle has expanded the traditional analysis visual angle.
2. The expansion of research approach
Seen from the present, the research on taxpayer’s right home and abroad pays more attention to law analysis and value judgment, make light of the economical and empirical analysis. Although the existing law and economics work has a lot of economic analysis on rights, the content and method of analysis is short of rigorous logic and firm structure. Especially, the research is insufficient to the constraint terms of taxpayer’s right realization and how to seek the optimization of taxpayer’s right under the constraint terms. With the introduction of research approach of law and economics, on one hand, it can find the optimum methods on taxpayer’s right protection; on the other hand, it offers the theoretical direction for the rational game mechanism of taxpayer’s interest group. Meanwhile, the economic analysis methods make the economical explanation in order to ensure taxpayer’s right tactics actively. The text uses law method to carry on the basic definition to taxpayer’s right, seeks the optimum way of taxpayer’s right protection using the“cost and income”method of economics on the basis, and announce the dynamic optimization of the extensive interests using the game method.
3. The innovation of theory view
(1) The text thinks the cost of taxpayer’s right protection is quantifiable. At the legislative stage, the expert cost used and study cost can be confirmed, how many rights does it establish also can be confirmed, then the price of each right at legislation stage can be confirmed. At the law enforcement stage, the manpower and material resources equipped for the taxpayer’s right protection can be confirmed to the levy organ, how much taxpayer does it serve and how many rights does it establish can be confirmed, then the per capita price of each right protection can be counted. At the justice stage, in order to protect taxpayer’s right, the per capita price of each right protection can be counted as mentioned above too. And the confirmed price of taxpayer’s right protection can let us calculate the cost of taxpayer’s right protection.
(2) This text puts forward four standards of optimizing the taxpayer’s right. The optimum protection of taxpayer’s right include the following aspects: the taxpayer’s right has everything that one expects to find; each link can get sufficient protection; the social cost is the lowest; the social income is the largest. The higher the cost of right protection which the taxpayer would like to accept, the better the taxpayer’s right protection which such state organs as legislation, administration and justice can provide. Meanwhile, there is motive force to offer high-quality taxpayer’s right protection in these state organs too, in this way, the taxpayer can accept the higher cost of taxpayer’s right protection, and the state organs may obtain more taxes to realize one’s own multiple interests.
(3) This text brings forward two kinds of routes of optimizing the taxpayer’s right protection. If the private product and taxpayer’s right protection present at the same time, the taxpayer need buy the private product and taxpayer’s right, only when the marginal rate of transformation equals the marginal rate of substitution can we realize the optimum disposition between the private product and taxpayer’s right protection. If there is the public product only, when the marginal utility which the unit cost to the taxpayer’s right protection brings equals the marginal utility which the unit cost of buying other public product brings, we realize the optimization of taxpayer’s right protection. Through the analysis of discrimination treatments on taxpayer, we can know the levy organ will lead to great loss if they discriminate against the taxpayer’s right.
(4) The text explains the disposition questions of taxation consent right with property right theory. The taxation consent right is the fundamental right that taxpayer enjoys, which is a result of taxpayer’s long-term struggle according to the historical experience, seen from the analysis of property right theory, the taxation consent right disposed to the taxpayer is a kind of choice filled with efficiency.
(5) The text gets a series of game equilibrium with the game model. Through setting up the game model between taxpayer and levy organ, the text gets the equilibrium conclusion that taxpayer and levy organ enlarge one’s own right as much as possible; proves the rationality of the game among taxpayer’s interest group; points out the necessity that the levy organ ensures the taxpayer’s right.
(6) The text develops the application range of“Hand Formula”.“Hand Formula”is suitable for the sureness of fault liability at first, but it can still get the further popularization. It is also suitable for the definition of burden of proof. The tax authority occupies the initiative in the administrative behavior of taxation, if the tax authority uses the convenient conditions of evidences collection that the country offers to keep the evidence in the course of the administrative law enforcement, then its cost should be much smaller compared with the evidence collected by taxpayer. Therefore, the tax authority should put forward evidence on the legitimacy of the administrative behavior.“Hand Formula”has strong explanation strength to the burden of proof.
引文
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38.《孟子·腾文公上》
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40.《史记·殷本纪》
41.《商君书·算地》
42.《汉书·食货志》
43.《商君书·壹言第八》
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