基于博弈论的流域水资源利用冲突及初始水权分配研究
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摘要
流域水资源利用冲突问题及流域初始水权分配问题的研究是当前国内外水利界、经济学界所关注的主要研究内容。为了保证和促进流域的可持续发展，对其进行研究和分析是必要的。为此，本文主要运用博弈论的方法对流域水资源的利用冲突问题、流域初始水权的分配问题、塔里木河流域下游断流和水质恶化问题以及塔里木河流域初始水权分配问题进行了研究。
(1)运用多人非合作博弈模型、重复博弈模型以及演化博弈模型对流域水资源水量利用冲突问题进行了研究，通过对上述博弈模型均衡结果的分析，提出了一些解决流域水资源水量利用冲突问题的方法和机制。
(2)运用非合作静态博弈模型、完全合作博弈模型、非合作动态博弈模型对流域水资源水量和水质双重利用冲突问题进行了研究。通过对模型均衡结果的分析，得出了结论：采用市场经济宏观调控措施能有效解决流域水资源水量和水质双重利用的冲突和矛盾，实现流域水资源水量和水质双重利用的良性循环，促进流域的可持续发展；运用非合作博弈模型对流域用水产节水社会资本的供给问题进行了分析研究，找出了影响流域用水产节水社会资本供给水平的关键因素。
(3)利用完全信息寡头博弈模型、不完全信息寡头博弈模型以及拍卖博弈模型，对流域初始水权分配问题进行了分析研究；在考虑到具有交易成本、回流水转移成本、回流水净化成本以及环境约束的情况下，建立了可交易的流域水权和污染权“准市场”的均衡模型，对模型的均衡结果进行了分析，得到了水权和污染权购买方的出价策略成为叫价博弈Nash均衡的充分必要条件。
(4)运用多目标非合作博弈理论对塔里木河流域下游断流以及水质恶化问题进行了研究；将流域初始水权分配的博弈模型运用到塔里木河流域初始水权分配研究，得到了塔里木河流域的初始水权分配方案；运用大系统分解协调原理，建立并求解了塔里木河下游输水的合作博弈模型，得到了分配给各子区的合理输水水量。
Currently, the study of water resource utilizing conflict problem and the study of initial water right allocation problem in a river basin are the main research contents which draw the attention of water conservancy circles and economics circles. In order to guarantee and promote the river basin sustainability development, it is necessary to analyze and study water resource utilizing conflict problem; therefore, in this paper, game theory method is applied to studying the water resource conflict problem of river basin, the initial water right allocation problem of river basin, the cut-off problem of the Lower Reaches of Tarim River, and the initial water right allocation problem of Tarim River.
(1) Non-cooperative game model with multi-players, repeated game model, and evolutionary game model were employed to study the water quantity utilizing conflict problem of water resource in a river basin. Analyzing and comparing the equilibrium results of the above non-cooperative game model lead to some methods and mechanisms, which can solve the water resource utilizing conflict problem in a river.
(2) Non-cooperative static game model, complete cooperative game model, and non-cooperative dynamic game model were used to study the water quantity and water quality double utilizing conflict problem of water resource of a river basin. By analyzing the equilibrium results of the above models, this paper obtains the conclusion that adopting macroscopical control measure of market economy can resolve the conflict and inconsistency of the water quantity and water quality double utilizing of water resource of a river basin effectively, realize the benign circulation of the water quantity and water quality double utilizing of water resource in a river basin, and then promote the river basin sustainability development. Non-cooperative game model was applied to analyzing and studying the supplying problem of water-saving social capital of the water resource users in a river basin. By analyzing and comparing the equilibrium result of the game model, this paper finds the key factors which control the supplying level of water-saving social capital of the water resource users in a river basin.
(3) Duopoly game models with complete information and incomplete information and the auction game model are applied to analyzing and studying the initial water right allocation problem in a rive basin. An equilibrium model for tradable water right and pollution right "quasi-market" is established under the condition that the transaction costs, the transferring costs and decontamination for return flows water, and the environment constraints are considered. The results of the equilibrium model are analyzed, and then a sufficient and necessary condition for a set of bidding strategies of water right and pollution right buyers being the Nash equilibrium of bidding game is given.
(4) Based on the theory of non-cooperative multi-objective game, the problem for the cut-off and water quality deterioration of the Lower Reaches of Tarim River is studied. On the basis of the initial water right allocation game model, the initial water right allocation schemes for Tarim River are obtained. Based on the decomposition-coordination principle of large-scale, a cooperative game model for the urgent water deliveries to the Lower Reaches of Tarim River is established and solved. The reasonable allocation results of water quantity for various sub-regions of the Lower Reaches of Tarim River are obtained.
(1)运用多人非合作博弈模型、重复博弈模型以及演化博弈模型对流域水资源水量利用冲突问题进行了研究，通过对上述博弈模型均衡结果的分析，提出了一些解决流域水资源水量利用冲突问题的方法和机制。
(2)运用非合作静态博弈模型、完全合作博弈模型、非合作动态博弈模型对流域水资源水量和水质双重利用冲突问题进行了研究。通过对模型均衡结果的分析，得出了结论：采用市场经济宏观调控措施能有效解决流域水资源水量和水质双重利用的冲突和矛盾，实现流域水资源水量和水质双重利用的良性循环，促进流域的可持续发展；运用非合作博弈模型对流域用水产节水社会资本的供给问题进行了分析研究，找出了影响流域用水产节水社会资本供给水平的关键因素。
(3)利用完全信息寡头博弈模型、不完全信息寡头博弈模型以及拍卖博弈模型，对流域初始水权分配问题进行了分析研究；在考虑到具有交易成本、回流水转移成本、回流水净化成本以及环境约束的情况下，建立了可交易的流域水权和污染权“准市场”的均衡模型，对模型的均衡结果进行了分析，得到了水权和污染权购买方的出价策略成为叫价博弈Nash均衡的充分必要条件。
(4)运用多目标非合作博弈理论对塔里木河流域下游断流以及水质恶化问题进行了研究；将流域初始水权分配的博弈模型运用到塔里木河流域初始水权分配研究，得到了塔里木河流域的初始水权分配方案；运用大系统分解协调原理，建立并求解了塔里木河下游输水的合作博弈模型，得到了分配给各子区的合理输水水量。
Currently, the study of water resource utilizing conflict problem and the study of initial water right allocation problem in a river basin are the main research contents which draw the attention of water conservancy circles and economics circles. In order to guarantee and promote the river basin sustainability development, it is necessary to analyze and study water resource utilizing conflict problem; therefore, in this paper, game theory method is applied to studying the water resource conflict problem of river basin, the initial water right allocation problem of river basin, the cut-off problem of the Lower Reaches of Tarim River, and the initial water right allocation problem of Tarim River.
(1) Non-cooperative game model with multi-players, repeated game model, and evolutionary game model were employed to study the water quantity utilizing conflict problem of water resource in a river basin. Analyzing and comparing the equilibrium results of the above non-cooperative game model lead to some methods and mechanisms, which can solve the water resource utilizing conflict problem in a river.
(2) Non-cooperative static game model, complete cooperative game model, and non-cooperative dynamic game model were used to study the water quantity and water quality double utilizing conflict problem of water resource of a river basin. By analyzing the equilibrium results of the above models, this paper obtains the conclusion that adopting macroscopical control measure of market economy can resolve the conflict and inconsistency of the water quantity and water quality double utilizing of water resource of a river basin effectively, realize the benign circulation of the water quantity and water quality double utilizing of water resource in a river basin, and then promote the river basin sustainability development. Non-cooperative game model was applied to analyzing and studying the supplying problem of water-saving social capital of the water resource users in a river basin. By analyzing and comparing the equilibrium result of the game model, this paper finds the key factors which control the supplying level of water-saving social capital of the water resource users in a river basin.
(3) Duopoly game models with complete information and incomplete information and the auction game model are applied to analyzing and studying the initial water right allocation problem in a rive basin. An equilibrium model for tradable water right and pollution right "quasi-market" is established under the condition that the transaction costs, the transferring costs and decontamination for return flows water, and the environment constraints are considered. The results of the equilibrium model are analyzed, and then a sufficient and necessary condition for a set of bidding strategies of water right and pollution right buyers being the Nash equilibrium of bidding game is given.
(4) Based on the theory of non-cooperative multi-objective game, the problem for the cut-off and water quality deterioration of the Lower Reaches of Tarim River is studied. On the basis of the initial water right allocation game model, the initial water right allocation schemes for Tarim River are obtained. Based on the decomposition-coordination principle of large-scale, a cooperative game model for the urgent water deliveries to the Lower Reaches of Tarim River is established and solved. The reasonable allocation results of water quantity for various sub-regions of the Lower Reaches of Tarim River are obtained.
引文
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