农村信用担保机构运行效率研究
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摘要
在农村信贷市场上,担保约束造成了农村金融机构的农村信贷资产质量不高、农村信贷业务难以拓展和农村经济主体的融资难问题。为缓解这种困境,国际经验和我国部分地区的实践经验表明,构建以服务农民和农村经济发展为目的的信用担保体系,在参与金融交易的农村金融机构和农村经济主体之间引入一个传递信号的第三方担保,可以在一定程度上解决担保约束问题,从而缓解农户与农村中小企业融资难的问题。农村信用担保机构是农村信用担保体系运作的微观主体,也是社会信用体系的重要组成部分。农村信用担保机构持续健康的运行是农村信用担保体系能够发挥杠杆作用的前提和基础,也是社会信用体系完善的有力保障。因此,深入考察农村信贷融资的担保约束及当前农村信用担保机构的发展状况,特别是对已有的不同模式的农村信用担保机构的运行效率及其影响因素进行深入分析和研究,对构建适合农村经济及金融发展形势的农村信贷担保体系不仅有理论意义,更具现实意义。
本文主要以福建为研究对象,分析了农村正规的信贷融资受担保约束的状况,明确了我国和福建信用担保业的发展状况,利用调查数据深入地分析了福建农村信用担保机构的运行状况,介绍了四个中东欧转型经济体国家的农村信用担保计划的发展经验,指出了值得借鉴的成功经验。在对信用担保机构运行效率度量方法分析讨论的基础上,根据调查数据,运用数据包络分析法(DEA)对农村信用担保机构运行效率进行测算和判断分析,并运用Tobit回归模型分析影响农村信用担保机构运行效率的因素,随后提出提高农村信用担保机构运行效率的政策建议。
本文经系统研究而形成的主要结论有以下几个方面：
第一,在农村金融市场上,事前金融合约的达成既受客观自然风险的影响,还受借贷双方信息不对称所导致的信用风险的制约。为了防范违约风险,农村金融机构普遍采用担保贷款的形式向农村经济主体发放贷款。但是,担保贷款却受农村经济主体从事产业的弱质性、实际财产状况不佳及其产权不明晰、抵押担保品产权交易市场缺乏和抵押担保贷款交易成本高昂等因素的制约,从而造成了农村经济主体的贷款难问题。通过模型分析表明,建立农村信用担保机构能有效的解除担保的约束,从而在一定程度上缓解农村经济主体的融资难问题。
第二,通过对福建省农村信用担保机构运行状况的深入调查分析表明,农村信用担保机构的建立与快速发展,在一定程度上缓解了农村经济主体的资金压力。然而,由于农村信用担保机构建立的时间不长,目前尚处于发展初期,在其运行过程中还存在着诸如担保资金有限、规模小、信用面狭窄和难以满足众多农村经济主体的融资需求；担保放大倍数过小,信用扩张能力弱；担保机构与金融机构合作不畅,风险分散机制尚未建立；政府监管缺位,行业有待规范等许多问题。
第三,通过对福建省农村信用担保机构运行状况的深入调查分析还表明,农村信用担保机构的发展受地方政府的政策影响较大,并由于地方政府的重视程度不同,而使各地区的发展不平衡；有的地方还存在着商业性农村信用担保机构过多、过滥及不规范经营问题。同时,由于不同模式的农村信用担保机构的目标、对象、机构性质、社会定位,以及追求的利益目标不同,其运行结果也有所不同,其中互助性农村信用担保机构的总体运行状况良好,而商业性和政策性农村信用担保机构的总体运行状况较差。
第四,如何度量信用担保机构的运行效率,不同的学者从不同的角度提出了不同的方法,主要有财务比率分析法、成本收益法和投入产出法等,由于受基础数据的来源与准确性、替代问题及贡献模糊等因素的约束,导致对信用担保机构运行效率的度量远比对其内容和结构的分析判断要困难得多。
第五,通过运用DEA方法,评价了福建省农村信用担保机构2008年的运行效率,实证结果表明,福建省农村信用担保机构的总体运行效率偏低,而且个体之间的差异较大。同时,不同地区的农村信用担保机构,其运行效率也存在着较大的差异。实证研究结果还表明,不同模式的农村信用担保机构,其运行效率也存在着差异,其中互助性农村信用担保机构的运行效率明显高于商业性和政策性担保机构的运行效率,而且其差异主要体现在纯技术效率层面上,即对现有资源利用能力的差异上,也就是互助性农村信用担保机构在运用担保资金进行贷款担保的能力上有明显的优势。
第六,通过运用Tobit回归模型,对影响农村信用担保机构运行效率的因素进行实证分析,结果表明,担保机构的模式、保费收入占总收入的比例、担保机构成立的年数、担保费率、协议担保放大倍数、金融机构存贷比、工业产值占GDP的比例等因素对农村信用担保机构运行效率的影响是显著的。
第七,通过分析四个中东欧转型经济体国家在农村信用担保计划方面十几年的发展经验可知,其中有很多成功的经验值得我国借鉴,特别是在农村信用担保计划的定位明确、政府支持方式得当及其与金融机构的良好合作关系等方面,都有借鉴意义。
第八,通过调查分析和实证分析,本文提出应发展以互助性农村信用担保为主体,商业性和政策性农村信用担保为辅助的,能够有效地控制、分散和化解风险的多元化农村信用担保体系,同时应充分地发挥政府政策引导和监督作用,促进农村信用担保机构的良性发展,构建积极的农村信用担保机构与金融机构的合作关系。
In the rural credit guarantee market, there exist some problems such as the poor quality of credit property in rural financial organizations, the difficulty of developing credit services in rural area and collecting fund by rural economic subject, which are the result of the guarantee restraints. Constructing credit guarantee system and introducing the third party guarantee as a bridge between the rural financial institution and the rural economic subject will help to ease the difficulty of collecting fund for the farmers and small and medium-sized enterprises. As a microsubject in the rural credit guarantee system operation, the rural credit guarantee organization is also an important part of social credit system.Thus, its consistent operation provides the foundation for the leverage of the rural credit guarantee system and ensures the improvement of social credit system. Therefore, the systemic survey on the rural credit restraints and the analysis on the operation efficiency of the existing rural credit guarantee organizations will provide the theoretical basis and practical experience to construct the proper rural credit guarantee system.
With Fujian Province as the study subject, the thesis starts with the analysis of the guarantee restraints on standard fund collecting to have a clear picture of the present situation of credit guarantee industry in China and Fujian Province. Then taking advantage of the experience of transitional economic countries in Central and Eastern Europe for reference, the thesis makes the analysis and estimation on the operation efficiency of the rural credit guarantee organizations in the method of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The thesis also employs Tobit regression model to find the elements affecting the operation efficiency of rural credit guarantee organizations. After that, the policy proposals to improve the operation efficiency of rural credit guarantee organizations are put forward in the thesis.
The main conclusions in the thesis are as follow:
First, the financial contract is restrained by the natural risk and credit risk caused by the asymmetric information of both parties in rural financial market. Usually the rural financial organizations grant the loans to rural economic subjects in the manner of guarantee loan to decrease the risk of default. However, some elements such as the rural industry vulnerability, poor property state and unclearly-indentified property right, no trade fair for collaterals, and high trading cost, etc. make it difficult to ask for a loan for the rural economic subjects. The analysis of model shows that the construction of the rural guarantee organizations will relieve the guarantee restraints and reduce the difficulty of collecting fund for the rural economic subjects.
Second, the complete survey on the operation of the rural credit guarantee organizations in Fujian Province displays that the construction and rapid development of the rural credit guarantee organizations help to relieve the funds shortage for the rural economic subjects in some extend. Meanwhile, there exists some problems in the process of operation. The problems are:for the rural economic subjects, limited guarantee capitals and small scale of credit coverage can't meet their needs; Security magnification is too small, weak expansion of credit; there is no risk dispersed mechanism; it is lacking in government regulation and industry standards, so on and so forth.
Third, the complete survey on the operation of the rural credit guarantee organizations in Fujian Province also displays that the local government policies have great impact on the development of the rural credit guarantee organizations, resulting on the difference among the districts. In some districts, there are excessive amount of the rural commercial credit guarantee organizations, some of which offer irregular operations. In the meantime, the rural credit guarantee organizations in different models vary in their target, organization nature, social position and benefits pursued. As a result, mutually-owned organizations are in good operation, but commercial and policy ones are not.
Fourth, various researchers put forward a lot of methods, like financial ratio analysis, return value assessment and input output method to measure the operation efficiency of the credit guarantee organizations. However, the sources of data and the inaccuracy of the figures, substitution problems and fuzzy contribution make it much harder to measure the operation efficiency than to analyze their content and structure.
Fifth, the thesis makes an assessment on the operation efficiency of the rural credit guarantee organizations in Fujian Province in2008in the method of DEA and finds that the operation efficiency are generally poor and there are great difference among the organizations. And that is the case with the organizations in different models. The mutually-owned organizations are more efficient than the commercial and policy ones, especially when making full use of the available resources. Thus, the mutually-owned organizations possess the dominant position in the credit capital operation.
Sixth, the thesis applies Tobit regression model to the positive analysis on the influential elements on the operation efficiency of the rural credit guarantee organizations. It is found that the organization model, the ratio of premiums revenue in gross revenue, the age history of the organization, guarantee rate, the scale up by guarantee agreement, the loan-deposit ratio in financial institutions, and the percentage of industrial output value in GDP have great impact on the operation efficiency of the rural credit guarantee organizations.
Seventh, the analytical study on the rural credit guarantee schemes of four transitional economic countries in Central and Eastern Europe provides much valuable experience for China in many aspects such as the clear position of Rural Credit Guarantee Schemes, the proper government support system and good cooperation among the financial institutions.
Eighth, Based on the survey and positive analysis, the thesis put forwards a proposal that the rural credit guarantee system should be mutual guarantee-centred with the auxiliary of the commercial and policy credit guarantees. The diversified system will help to guard against and reduce the risks. Meanwhile, the government policy guidance and supervision should be fully played to ensure the sound development of the rural credit guarantee organizations, and to construct a positive cooperation between the rural credit guarantee organizations and the financial institutions.
本文主要以福建为研究对象,分析了农村正规的信贷融资受担保约束的状况,明确了我国和福建信用担保业的发展状况,利用调查数据深入地分析了福建农村信用担保机构的运行状况,介绍了四个中东欧转型经济体国家的农村信用担保计划的发展经验,指出了值得借鉴的成功经验。在对信用担保机构运行效率度量方法分析讨论的基础上,根据调查数据,运用数据包络分析法(DEA)对农村信用担保机构运行效率进行测算和判断分析,并运用Tobit回归模型分析影响农村信用担保机构运行效率的因素,随后提出提高农村信用担保机构运行效率的政策建议。
本文经系统研究而形成的主要结论有以下几个方面：
第一,在农村金融市场上,事前金融合约的达成既受客观自然风险的影响,还受借贷双方信息不对称所导致的信用风险的制约。为了防范违约风险,农村金融机构普遍采用担保贷款的形式向农村经济主体发放贷款。但是,担保贷款却受农村经济主体从事产业的弱质性、实际财产状况不佳及其产权不明晰、抵押担保品产权交易市场缺乏和抵押担保贷款交易成本高昂等因素的制约,从而造成了农村经济主体的贷款难问题。通过模型分析表明,建立农村信用担保机构能有效的解除担保的约束,从而在一定程度上缓解农村经济主体的融资难问题。
第二,通过对福建省农村信用担保机构运行状况的深入调查分析表明,农村信用担保机构的建立与快速发展,在一定程度上缓解了农村经济主体的资金压力。然而,由于农村信用担保机构建立的时间不长,目前尚处于发展初期,在其运行过程中还存在着诸如担保资金有限、规模小、信用面狭窄和难以满足众多农村经济主体的融资需求；担保放大倍数过小,信用扩张能力弱；担保机构与金融机构合作不畅,风险分散机制尚未建立；政府监管缺位,行业有待规范等许多问题。
第三,通过对福建省农村信用担保机构运行状况的深入调查分析还表明,农村信用担保机构的发展受地方政府的政策影响较大,并由于地方政府的重视程度不同,而使各地区的发展不平衡；有的地方还存在着商业性农村信用担保机构过多、过滥及不规范经营问题。同时,由于不同模式的农村信用担保机构的目标、对象、机构性质、社会定位,以及追求的利益目标不同,其运行结果也有所不同,其中互助性农村信用担保机构的总体运行状况良好,而商业性和政策性农村信用担保机构的总体运行状况较差。
第四,如何度量信用担保机构的运行效率,不同的学者从不同的角度提出了不同的方法,主要有财务比率分析法、成本收益法和投入产出法等,由于受基础数据的来源与准确性、替代问题及贡献模糊等因素的约束,导致对信用担保机构运行效率的度量远比对其内容和结构的分析判断要困难得多。
第五,通过运用DEA方法,评价了福建省农村信用担保机构2008年的运行效率,实证结果表明,福建省农村信用担保机构的总体运行效率偏低,而且个体之间的差异较大。同时,不同地区的农村信用担保机构,其运行效率也存在着较大的差异。实证研究结果还表明,不同模式的农村信用担保机构,其运行效率也存在着差异,其中互助性农村信用担保机构的运行效率明显高于商业性和政策性担保机构的运行效率,而且其差异主要体现在纯技术效率层面上,即对现有资源利用能力的差异上,也就是互助性农村信用担保机构在运用担保资金进行贷款担保的能力上有明显的优势。
第六,通过运用Tobit回归模型,对影响农村信用担保机构运行效率的因素进行实证分析,结果表明,担保机构的模式、保费收入占总收入的比例、担保机构成立的年数、担保费率、协议担保放大倍数、金融机构存贷比、工业产值占GDP的比例等因素对农村信用担保机构运行效率的影响是显著的。
第七,通过分析四个中东欧转型经济体国家在农村信用担保计划方面十几年的发展经验可知,其中有很多成功的经验值得我国借鉴,特别是在农村信用担保计划的定位明确、政府支持方式得当及其与金融机构的良好合作关系等方面,都有借鉴意义。
第八,通过调查分析和实证分析,本文提出应发展以互助性农村信用担保为主体,商业性和政策性农村信用担保为辅助的,能够有效地控制、分散和化解风险的多元化农村信用担保体系,同时应充分地发挥政府政策引导和监督作用,促进农村信用担保机构的良性发展,构建积极的农村信用担保机构与金融机构的合作关系。
In the rural credit guarantee market, there exist some problems such as the poor quality of credit property in rural financial organizations, the difficulty of developing credit services in rural area and collecting fund by rural economic subject, which are the result of the guarantee restraints. Constructing credit guarantee system and introducing the third party guarantee as a bridge between the rural financial institution and the rural economic subject will help to ease the difficulty of collecting fund for the farmers and small and medium-sized enterprises. As a microsubject in the rural credit guarantee system operation, the rural credit guarantee organization is also an important part of social credit system.Thus, its consistent operation provides the foundation for the leverage of the rural credit guarantee system and ensures the improvement of social credit system. Therefore, the systemic survey on the rural credit restraints and the analysis on the operation efficiency of the existing rural credit guarantee organizations will provide the theoretical basis and practical experience to construct the proper rural credit guarantee system.
With Fujian Province as the study subject, the thesis starts with the analysis of the guarantee restraints on standard fund collecting to have a clear picture of the present situation of credit guarantee industry in China and Fujian Province. Then taking advantage of the experience of transitional economic countries in Central and Eastern Europe for reference, the thesis makes the analysis and estimation on the operation efficiency of the rural credit guarantee organizations in the method of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The thesis also employs Tobit regression model to find the elements affecting the operation efficiency of rural credit guarantee organizations. After that, the policy proposals to improve the operation efficiency of rural credit guarantee organizations are put forward in the thesis.
The main conclusions in the thesis are as follow:
First, the financial contract is restrained by the natural risk and credit risk caused by the asymmetric information of both parties in rural financial market. Usually the rural financial organizations grant the loans to rural economic subjects in the manner of guarantee loan to decrease the risk of default. However, some elements such as the rural industry vulnerability, poor property state and unclearly-indentified property right, no trade fair for collaterals, and high trading cost, etc. make it difficult to ask for a loan for the rural economic subjects. The analysis of model shows that the construction of the rural guarantee organizations will relieve the guarantee restraints and reduce the difficulty of collecting fund for the rural economic subjects.
Second, the complete survey on the operation of the rural credit guarantee organizations in Fujian Province displays that the construction and rapid development of the rural credit guarantee organizations help to relieve the funds shortage for the rural economic subjects in some extend. Meanwhile, there exists some problems in the process of operation. The problems are:for the rural economic subjects, limited guarantee capitals and small scale of credit coverage can't meet their needs; Security magnification is too small, weak expansion of credit; there is no risk dispersed mechanism; it is lacking in government regulation and industry standards, so on and so forth.
Third, the complete survey on the operation of the rural credit guarantee organizations in Fujian Province also displays that the local government policies have great impact on the development of the rural credit guarantee organizations, resulting on the difference among the districts. In some districts, there are excessive amount of the rural commercial credit guarantee organizations, some of which offer irregular operations. In the meantime, the rural credit guarantee organizations in different models vary in their target, organization nature, social position and benefits pursued. As a result, mutually-owned organizations are in good operation, but commercial and policy ones are not.
Fourth, various researchers put forward a lot of methods, like financial ratio analysis, return value assessment and input output method to measure the operation efficiency of the credit guarantee organizations. However, the sources of data and the inaccuracy of the figures, substitution problems and fuzzy contribution make it much harder to measure the operation efficiency than to analyze their content and structure.
Fifth, the thesis makes an assessment on the operation efficiency of the rural credit guarantee organizations in Fujian Province in2008in the method of DEA and finds that the operation efficiency are generally poor and there are great difference among the organizations. And that is the case with the organizations in different models. The mutually-owned organizations are more efficient than the commercial and policy ones, especially when making full use of the available resources. Thus, the mutually-owned organizations possess the dominant position in the credit capital operation.
Sixth, the thesis applies Tobit regression model to the positive analysis on the influential elements on the operation efficiency of the rural credit guarantee organizations. It is found that the organization model, the ratio of premiums revenue in gross revenue, the age history of the organization, guarantee rate, the scale up by guarantee agreement, the loan-deposit ratio in financial institutions, and the percentage of industrial output value in GDP have great impact on the operation efficiency of the rural credit guarantee organizations.
Seventh, the analytical study on the rural credit guarantee schemes of four transitional economic countries in Central and Eastern Europe provides much valuable experience for China in many aspects such as the clear position of Rural Credit Guarantee Schemes, the proper government support system and good cooperation among the financial institutions.
Eighth, Based on the survey and positive analysis, the thesis put forwards a proposal that the rural credit guarantee system should be mutual guarantee-centred with the auxiliary of the commercial and policy credit guarantees. The diversified system will help to guard against and reduce the risks. Meanwhile, the government policy guidance and supervision should be fully played to ensure the sound development of the rural credit guarantee organizations, and to construct a positive cooperation between the rural credit guarantee organizations and the financial institutions.
引文
1农业部软科学委员会办公室编.增加农业投入与改善农村金融服务.中国农业出版社,2005
1马克思、恩格斯：《马克思恩格斯全集》第25卷,第390页
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1农业部软科学委员会办公室编.增加农业投入与改善农村金融服务.中国农业出版社,2005
1数据来源：中国人民银行研究局、日本国际协力机构《我国中小企业金融制度报告》,中信出版社2004年。
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1马克思、恩格斯：《马克思恩格斯全集》第25卷,第390页
1马亚军.西方融资担保理论综述[J].经济社会体制比较,2005(1)p135-141
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