我国土地收购储备的运行机制研究
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摘要
土地储备是城市土地收购储备中心通过征用、收购、置换、转制、收回等方式,从分散的土地使用者手中,把土地集中起来,并由土地收购储备中心组织进行职工和居民的安置、房屋拆迁、土地平整等一系列土地整理工作后,将土地储备起来,再根据城市规划和城市土地出让年度计划,有计划地将土地投入市场。2008年10月12日中国共产党第十七届中央委员会第三次全体会议通过了中共中央关于推进农村改革发展若干重大问题的决定中也强调指出合理进行土地流转,创新土地制度。这都说明了土地改革对整个国民经济的发展起到了举足轻重的作用。我国城市土地归国家所有,通过实行土地有偿有期限使用,形成土地市场。在这种土地制度框架下,国家是惟一的土地所有者,国有土地使用权出让和出租形成垄断性的城市土地一级市场:从国家取得的合法土地使用权在合同规定的范围内可以进入市场流通,进行转让和转租,形成竞争性的土地二级市场。土地储备制度的这一现象的出现不是偶然的,是我国经济体制改革、土地使用制度改革和土地管理改革深化的必然结果。
随着我国土地储备制度的推行和发展,我国土地市场的规范化建设取得了长足的进步,但由于我国建立土地储备制度的时间还不长,尚存在一些不够完善的地方。缺乏法律法规的支撑,没有明确的法律地位,在实践中出现了许多的问题。土地储备机构性质定位模糊,责任、权利不明确,土地储备政策难以有效实施,且缺乏有效的监督机制,土地储备制度的公平、公正性很难保证等等。这些问题影响到我国土地市场的长远健康发展。加强土地储备制度的系统建设,建立多渠道资金筹集,保障土地储备顺利进行,才能使土地储备更好的服务于我国的经济建设。本文通过对土地储备运行机制及目前的发展现状的剖析,指出了土地储备三个环节即土地收购、土地储备和土地供应运作过程中的问题,并针对每个环节出现的问题做出了科学的分析。在土地收购储备运行机制中,存在着明显的寻租现象。在土地收购环节中,一些地方政府片面追求“以地生财”,几乎一切征地项目都搭车公共利益,随意出让,批租国有土地。还有一些开发区“圈而不用”、“储而不用”,真正的工业企业又征不到地,影响了企业的再发展;在土地储备过程中,城市政府在土地资源配置和土地利益的分配问题上,有强烈的追求地方经济利益的趋向。当国家的利益与地方利益有所冲突时,地方政府必然要竭力维护地方利益,从而导致地方政府与中央政府之间的寻租活动的出现。土地供应过程中,这种寻租行为表现在政府与开发商的博弈,其焦点体现在对开发商的授权上。本文的一个创新点就在于土地收购储备中的博弈分析。这包括中央政府和地方政府的博弈分析,地方政府不同届之间的征地博弈分析,政府与开发商的博弈分析。
本文在深入分析土地收购储备运行机制各个程序的基础上提出了一个适合我国土地储备制度有效运行机制的基本框架,并对完善土地储备的管理措施进行了探讨。建立健全城市土地利用规划制度,科学客观评价储备土地实际价值,加强土地储备的管理,建立社会化的资金筹措机制,加强土地收购储备风险控制以及贷款的控制,确定合理的土地收购价格。加强城市土地收购储备中的法律法规。土地收购储备制度从表面上看,既是土地储备,也是资金储备,土地收购储备运作过程中需要大量资金,这成为土地收购储备制度顺利实施的关键所在。通过扩大筹资渠道、土地储备过程中开发项目方式多样化等手段,合理确定土地收购价格等从资金流入方向和资金流出方向的来构建资金内部良性循环体系。并提出要提高土地收购储备机构自有资金的比例才是保证土地收购储备过程中资金顺利流动的根本。土地收益分配体系也是土地收购储备财政保障制度必不可少的组成部分。正如十七届三中全会所提倡的,在土地制度改革中,必须探索一条满足工业化、城市化建设用地需要与保护耕地政策相协调的新途径。其出路在于:一是继续实行土地占补平衡政策,二是继续实行严格的节约用地制度,三是改革完善征地制度,规范政府和企业征地行为。由此可见,本文所研究的土地收购储备问题具有与时俱进的现实意义。
Land reserve is the land reserve centers in the city recover the land together from the land owners, by purchasing, exchanging, conversioning or some other ways. These lands reserved will be uesd by land reserve center for series land consolidation, for example, employees and residents’housings, house dismantlementin, land leveling and so on. Then put the land to the market, according to the urban planning and urban land remise of the annual plan. October 12th,2008, the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China(CPC)started its third plenary session and obtained consistency to promote the rural reform.And a number of major issues in the decision also emphasized that the reasonable flow of land and the land system innovation, which reflected that the land reform development in the national economy has played an increasingly important role. Our urban land owned by the State, through the introduction of the land there is a fee to use the period to form the land market. In such a system of land within the framework of the state is the only land owners, the state-owned land have rights to sell and rent which form the monopolistic urban land market level. And achieve the legal national land-use rights can access market circulation in terms of the contract, transfer and sublet to form a competitive land on the secondary market. Land reserve system, the emergence of its phenomenon is not an accident, which were an inevitable result of our country’s economic structural reform, land use reform and the deepening of land management system reform.
As the land reserve system being implemented and developed, China's land market standardization has made considerable progresses. As the establishment of land reserve system has not a long time, there still not be perfect. Because of the lack of supporting laws, regulations and not clear legal status, there have been many problems in practice. A land bank agency fuzzy nature of the position, responsibilities, rights are not clear, the land reserve policy for the effective implementation difficult, and a lack of effective supervision mechanism, the land reserve system of fairness, impartiality, so it is difficult to ensure.These problems affect the land market healthy development in a long term. To make a better service to our country's economic construction,we should strengthen the land reserve system and establish more channels to raise funds to protect the smooth progress of a land bank.Through a land bank of the operating mechanism and its development in current status, this paper points out the three steps in a land bank, the acquisition of land, land reserves and land supply, had some problems in the operation. And made scientific analysis for every aspect of the se problems. In the land purchase and reserve mechanism, there is a phenomenon of rent-seeking. The acquisition of land in the session, a number of local governments to pursue money one-sided and almost all land acquisition projects have a ride in the public interest, free to sell, lease state-owned land. There are a number of development zones have been circled but without reserve, while the real industrial enterprises also can not sign, which impact the enterprise’s further development. In a land bank, the city government had interests on the allocation of land resources and land distribution issues, the pursuit of a strong local economic interests had been a trend. When the interests of the country's conflict with local interests, local governments must safeguard their best interests, which leads to the emergence of the rent-seeking activities between central government and local governments. In the process of land supply, the rent-seeking behavior happened between government and the developers, the focus of which is the authorization of developers. The innovation in this article is using the game analysis to analyse land acquisition reserves. This includes the central and local governments in the game, the local government’s land between the different sessions in the game and the government and the developers in the game.
This paper made a deep analysis of the land purchase and reserve mechanism on the basis of all the procedures, proposed the basic frame work for a land reserve system to run effectively, and improve the management of the land bank discussed. Establish and improve the urban land-use planning system, make an objective and scientific evaluation to the real value of the land reserves, strengthen the management of the social fund-raising mechanisms in the land bank, enhance the acquisition of land reserve loans, as well as risk management control, fix a reasonable price of land and strengthen the laws and regulations. The acquisition of land reserve system is not only a land bank but also reserve funds.Land reserves in the course of the operation need a lot of money, which has become the key to the land purchase and reserve system’s smooth implementation. By expanding financing channels for a land bank in the process of development projects, such as ways to diversify the means to determine a reasonable price of land from the direction of capital flows and financial direction of the outflow of funds to build a virtuous circle in-house system. And the way to improve the land purchase and reserve funds of its own institutions is to ensure that the ratio of land reserves in the capital flow is smooth.Finally, this paper presents reasonable proposals for the land reserves. Establish and improve the urban land-use planning system, use an objective and scientific evaluation to evalue land reserves, strengthen the management of land reserves, establish a social fund-raising mechanisms, enhance land reserve loans as well as risk management control, determine a reasonable price of land. Strengthen the laws and regulations. As the Central Committee decision, in the reform of the land system, it must be found a new way to meet the purposes of industrialization and urbanization of land for construction and the need to protect arable land policy. Its way out: First, continue to implement the balance of land policy. Second, continue to implement a strict system of land conservation and the third is reforming the land requisition system to improve and standardize government and enterprises behavior. As we can see, this article, studied the land reserves, has a time significance.
随着我国土地储备制度的推行和发展,我国土地市场的规范化建设取得了长足的进步,但由于我国建立土地储备制度的时间还不长,尚存在一些不够完善的地方。缺乏法律法规的支撑,没有明确的法律地位,在实践中出现了许多的问题。土地储备机构性质定位模糊,责任、权利不明确,土地储备政策难以有效实施,且缺乏有效的监督机制,土地储备制度的公平、公正性很难保证等等。这些问题影响到我国土地市场的长远健康发展。加强土地储备制度的系统建设,建立多渠道资金筹集,保障土地储备顺利进行,才能使土地储备更好的服务于我国的经济建设。本文通过对土地储备运行机制及目前的发展现状的剖析,指出了土地储备三个环节即土地收购、土地储备和土地供应运作过程中的问题,并针对每个环节出现的问题做出了科学的分析。在土地收购储备运行机制中,存在着明显的寻租现象。在土地收购环节中,一些地方政府片面追求“以地生财”,几乎一切征地项目都搭车公共利益,随意出让,批租国有土地。还有一些开发区“圈而不用”、“储而不用”,真正的工业企业又征不到地,影响了企业的再发展;在土地储备过程中,城市政府在土地资源配置和土地利益的分配问题上,有强烈的追求地方经济利益的趋向。当国家的利益与地方利益有所冲突时,地方政府必然要竭力维护地方利益,从而导致地方政府与中央政府之间的寻租活动的出现。土地供应过程中,这种寻租行为表现在政府与开发商的博弈,其焦点体现在对开发商的授权上。本文的一个创新点就在于土地收购储备中的博弈分析。这包括中央政府和地方政府的博弈分析,地方政府不同届之间的征地博弈分析,政府与开发商的博弈分析。
本文在深入分析土地收购储备运行机制各个程序的基础上提出了一个适合我国土地储备制度有效运行机制的基本框架,并对完善土地储备的管理措施进行了探讨。建立健全城市土地利用规划制度,科学客观评价储备土地实际价值,加强土地储备的管理,建立社会化的资金筹措机制,加强土地收购储备风险控制以及贷款的控制,确定合理的土地收购价格。加强城市土地收购储备中的法律法规。土地收购储备制度从表面上看,既是土地储备,也是资金储备,土地收购储备运作过程中需要大量资金,这成为土地收购储备制度顺利实施的关键所在。通过扩大筹资渠道、土地储备过程中开发项目方式多样化等手段,合理确定土地收购价格等从资金流入方向和资金流出方向的来构建资金内部良性循环体系。并提出要提高土地收购储备机构自有资金的比例才是保证土地收购储备过程中资金顺利流动的根本。土地收益分配体系也是土地收购储备财政保障制度必不可少的组成部分。正如十七届三中全会所提倡的,在土地制度改革中,必须探索一条满足工业化、城市化建设用地需要与保护耕地政策相协调的新途径。其出路在于:一是继续实行土地占补平衡政策,二是继续实行严格的节约用地制度,三是改革完善征地制度,规范政府和企业征地行为。由此可见,本文所研究的土地收购储备问题具有与时俱进的现实意义。
Land reserve is the land reserve centers in the city recover the land together from the land owners, by purchasing, exchanging, conversioning or some other ways. These lands reserved will be uesd by land reserve center for series land consolidation, for example, employees and residents’housings, house dismantlementin, land leveling and so on. Then put the land to the market, according to the urban planning and urban land remise of the annual plan. October 12th,2008, the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China(CPC)started its third plenary session and obtained consistency to promote the rural reform.And a number of major issues in the decision also emphasized that the reasonable flow of land and the land system innovation, which reflected that the land reform development in the national economy has played an increasingly important role. Our urban land owned by the State, through the introduction of the land there is a fee to use the period to form the land market. In such a system of land within the framework of the state is the only land owners, the state-owned land have rights to sell and rent which form the monopolistic urban land market level. And achieve the legal national land-use rights can access market circulation in terms of the contract, transfer and sublet to form a competitive land on the secondary market. Land reserve system, the emergence of its phenomenon is not an accident, which were an inevitable result of our country’s economic structural reform, land use reform and the deepening of land management system reform.
As the land reserve system being implemented and developed, China's land market standardization has made considerable progresses. As the establishment of land reserve system has not a long time, there still not be perfect. Because of the lack of supporting laws, regulations and not clear legal status, there have been many problems in practice. A land bank agency fuzzy nature of the position, responsibilities, rights are not clear, the land reserve policy for the effective implementation difficult, and a lack of effective supervision mechanism, the land reserve system of fairness, impartiality, so it is difficult to ensure.These problems affect the land market healthy development in a long term. To make a better service to our country's economic construction,we should strengthen the land reserve system and establish more channels to raise funds to protect the smooth progress of a land bank.Through a land bank of the operating mechanism and its development in current status, this paper points out the three steps in a land bank, the acquisition of land, land reserves and land supply, had some problems in the operation. And made scientific analysis for every aspect of the se problems. In the land purchase and reserve mechanism, there is a phenomenon of rent-seeking. The acquisition of land in the session, a number of local governments to pursue money one-sided and almost all land acquisition projects have a ride in the public interest, free to sell, lease state-owned land. There are a number of development zones have been circled but without reserve, while the real industrial enterprises also can not sign, which impact the enterprise’s further development. In a land bank, the city government had interests on the allocation of land resources and land distribution issues, the pursuit of a strong local economic interests had been a trend. When the interests of the country's conflict with local interests, local governments must safeguard their best interests, which leads to the emergence of the rent-seeking activities between central government and local governments. In the process of land supply, the rent-seeking behavior happened between government and the developers, the focus of which is the authorization of developers. The innovation in this article is using the game analysis to analyse land acquisition reserves. This includes the central and local governments in the game, the local government’s land between the different sessions in the game and the government and the developers in the game.
This paper made a deep analysis of the land purchase and reserve mechanism on the basis of all the procedures, proposed the basic frame work for a land reserve system to run effectively, and improve the management of the land bank discussed. Establish and improve the urban land-use planning system, make an objective and scientific evaluation to the real value of the land reserves, strengthen the management of the social fund-raising mechanisms in the land bank, enhance the acquisition of land reserve loans, as well as risk management control, fix a reasonable price of land and strengthen the laws and regulations. The acquisition of land reserve system is not only a land bank but also reserve funds.Land reserves in the course of the operation need a lot of money, which has become the key to the land purchase and reserve system’s smooth implementation. By expanding financing channels for a land bank in the process of development projects, such as ways to diversify the means to determine a reasonable price of land from the direction of capital flows and financial direction of the outflow of funds to build a virtuous circle in-house system. And the way to improve the land purchase and reserve funds of its own institutions is to ensure that the ratio of land reserves in the capital flow is smooth.Finally, this paper presents reasonable proposals for the land reserves. Establish and improve the urban land-use planning system, use an objective and scientific evaluation to evalue land reserves, strengthen the management of land reserves, establish a social fund-raising mechanisms, enhance land reserve loans as well as risk management control, determine a reasonable price of land. Strengthen the laws and regulations. As the Central Committee decision, in the reform of the land system, it must be found a new way to meet the purposes of industrialization and urbanization of land for construction and the need to protect arable land policy. Its way out: First, continue to implement the balance of land policy. Second, continue to implement a strict system of land conservation and the third is reforming the land requisition system to improve and standardize government and enterprises behavior. As we can see, this article, studied the land reserves, has a time significance.
引文
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