我国保险生态系统的评价及对策研究
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摘要
经过长期的发展演进,保险逐步形成了自身的内在逻辑和运行规律,成为一种具有诸多生态学特征的、有生命力的组织活动。从我国保险理论研究的现状看,保险业固有的生态学原理和特征尚未被人们发现和认知,至今无人研究。改革开放近30年来,我国保险业得到快速发展,保费总量持续增长,险种日趋多元化,保险组织不断完善,保险领域日益拓宽,保险在国民经济和人民生活中扮演了越来越重要的角色。然而,在快速发展过程中,我国保险业同时暴露出了一系列严峻而深刻的问题。行业管理中也存在背离保险业内在规律的一系列认识误区和思维偏差,影响了我国保险业的持续,健康发展。基于保险业固有的生态学特征以及我国保险业的发展现状,本文将生态学原理引入保险领域,提出了“保险生态”概念,建立了基本理论框架,对保险业发展现阶段存在的问题进行了深入、系统的研究。
本文完成了以下工作:提出保险生态系统概念:保险生态系统是各种保险组织为了生存和发展,与其生存环境及内部其他组织之间在长期的密切联系和相互作用过程中,通过分工合作形成的具有一定结构特征,执行一定功能作用的复杂联系、有序竞争、良性协作的动态平衡系统。
保险生态系统由生态环境和生态组织构成。根据“保险生态”基本理论,构建保险资源——保险主体——客户、中介——监管机构四元结构模型,概括了其主要特征:保险生态系统是保险生态学一个主要结构和功能单位,属于保险生态学研究的最高层次;保险生态系统是一个具有动态特征的系统,能量流动、物质循环、信息传递是保险生态系统三大功能;保险生态系统具有自我调节能力,确保了保险资源与主体之间、保险主体与客户、中介之间及生态组织与生态环境之间的相互适应,但这种调节机制是有限的。
通过对保险生态四元结构基本模型的指标分解,本文建立区域保险生态系统评价指标体系,为区域保险生态系统的评估提供了基本依据。评价指标体系包括定量分析和定性评价两部分,定量分析由经济发展水平、保险组织发展水平、社会信用及法制环境等3个目标层、9个准则层和54项指标层组成;定性评价主要包括保险法律法规完善程度和执行状况、政策对保险活动的支持程度、信用机制的健全程度及政府对保险业的支持和干预程度等。
以保险生态基本理论、四元结构模型和评价指标体系为指导,通过量化分析与定性评价,本文对上海、重庆、贵州三地保险生态系统进行了优劣排序;并从生态环境和生态组织两方面,对中国与印度两国保险生态系统进行对比分析。
通过对我国保险生态系统现状的分析评估,并得出结论:我国保险生态系统还未达到良性循环和动态平衡状态,一系列的根本性问题还未得到解决。对此,针对性提出了相关对策和建议。
本文创新之处在于:首先,创造性的将生态学原理引入保险领域,构建了保险生态系统的四元结构模型,在保险理论的创新研究方面作出了有意义的尝试;其次,建立了区域保险生态系统评价指标体系,为保险生态研究提供量化工具。最后,运用区域保险生态系统评价指标体系,重点对上海、重庆、贵州三地的保险生态进行优劣排序。
研究过程中,综合运用了定性分析与定量分析相结合的方法,并通过数据统计分析完成了关键指标的量化分析与评估。
运用生态学理论研究保险问题,目前在保险领域还是一片空白。“保险生态”问题的提出,属于“原创理论”,将在很大程度上转变保险理论研究的视角和思维模式,拓宽了保险理论研究的领域,确立起更加符合生态学原理和保险内在规律的保险发展观,对于推动我国保险业长远、可持续发展具有重要的指导意义和现实意义。
After long period of development and evolvement, gradually , insurance have had its own internal logic and rule, and it becomes an animated movement with many ecosystem characteristics. However, in consideration of the actuality of our insurance theory study, the inherent ecological principles and characteristics of insurance are not be discovered, and nobody has studied them. 30 years after the Chinese reformation and opening policy, with the high speed growth of our national economy and foundation and consummation of socialism marketing economy system ,our insurance developed with high speed.With the of volume of premium continual grew, insurance products of different risk type. the increasingly multiplied, the insurance organizations continually consummated, the insurance fields progressively expanded.Insurance played a more and more important role in the national economy. Meanwhile, during the period of high speed development, our insurance exposed a series of austere and profound questions need to be resolved imminently.There are also wrong thoughts and behavior in the industry administration, which deviated from the essential rule of insurance and badly impacted the durative and healthy development of our insurance. On the basis of inherent ecological characteristics and development condition of our insurance industry, this dissertation in troduced ecologic principles into insurance area ,and put forward the concept of insurance ecology and founded its basic theory framework ,in order to study the present development questions in insurance deeply and systematically .
The insurance ecologic system is a complexly connected, competed and benign coincident homeostasis system with certain structure and characteristics and with certain function , which the insurance organizations constructed in order to exist and develop through work-dividing and cooperation during the time of reciprocity with its living environment and other internal organizations.
Insurance ecologic system is constructed with ecologic environment system and ecologic organization system. According to insurance ecology basic theory ,A insurance quaternion structure model is established, including insurance resources, insurance subjects, customers and insurance intermediary, insurance regulation authority, its most characteristics is summarized that insurance ecologic system is a structure and function item of most importance in the insurance ecology, which is the highest level the insurance ecology studied. Insurance ecologic system is a system with dynamic characteristics. Fluid energy, cycling matter and information transferred are three major functions of insurance ecologic system. Insurance ecologic system has self-adjust ability of insurance ecologic sys, which assured the adaptation by one another between insurance resource and insurance subjects, between insurance subjects, customers and insurance intermediary, between ecologic organization and ecologic environment, but The adjust mechanism is limited.
Through item analyses to the insurance quaternion structure model, a quality appraisal system of district insurance ecologic system is to be established , which supplied basic proof to the appraisal of district insurance ecology. The appraisal system included qualitative appraisal and quantificational analysis, quantificational analysis is composed of 3 objective arrangements, 9 rule arrangements and 54 item arrangements such as economic level, insurance organization development level, social credit and legal environment. qualitative appraisal included the maturity degree of insurance law and its executive situation, the degree of support to insurance movement from policy, healthiness of credit mechanism and degree of support and interference to insurance from government.
With the guidance of insurance ecology theory, quaternion structure model and appraisal system, through qualitative appraisal and quantificational analysis, the insurance ecologic system of Shanghai, Chongqing and Guiyang is arranged by excellence, and the insurance ecologic system of both China and India are comparatively analyzed from both sides of ecologic environment and ecologic organization.
Through analysis and appraisal on actuality of our insurance ecologic system, the conclusion is that our insurance ecologic system did not reach the benign cycle and homeostasis. a series of essential questions did not been resolved. This dissertation pertinently put forward correlative counterstrategy and suggestion.
The innovation of this dissertation is, firstly ,creatively introduced ecologic principle into insurance area, and constructed insurance quaternion structure model, supplied a gap of theoretic study on our insurance., secondly, quality appraisal system of district insurance ecologic system is to be established, which supplied quantificational tools to insurance study. lastly, using the appraisal system of district insurance ecologic system to arrange the insurance ecologic system of Shanghai, Chongqing and Guizhou is by excellence,
During the period of analysis, qualitative and quantificational analytic techniques was used, and finished quantificational analysis and appraisal of pivotal items was finished through data statistics.
From now on, it is a vacancy in the insurance area that use ecologic theory to study insurance. The brought out of question of insurance ecology is an important theoretical innovation ,which could change the visual angle and thinking pattern of insurance theoretic study, and expand the studying area of insurance theory, and erect an insurance development concept more coincident to ecologic principle and internal rule of insurance, and will be of great directive and practical significance to impel the long-range and continuable development of our insurance industry.
本文完成了以下工作:提出保险生态系统概念:保险生态系统是各种保险组织为了生存和发展,与其生存环境及内部其他组织之间在长期的密切联系和相互作用过程中,通过分工合作形成的具有一定结构特征,执行一定功能作用的复杂联系、有序竞争、良性协作的动态平衡系统。
保险生态系统由生态环境和生态组织构成。根据“保险生态”基本理论,构建保险资源——保险主体——客户、中介——监管机构四元结构模型,概括了其主要特征:保险生态系统是保险生态学一个主要结构和功能单位,属于保险生态学研究的最高层次;保险生态系统是一个具有动态特征的系统,能量流动、物质循环、信息传递是保险生态系统三大功能;保险生态系统具有自我调节能力,确保了保险资源与主体之间、保险主体与客户、中介之间及生态组织与生态环境之间的相互适应,但这种调节机制是有限的。
通过对保险生态四元结构基本模型的指标分解,本文建立区域保险生态系统评价指标体系,为区域保险生态系统的评估提供了基本依据。评价指标体系包括定量分析和定性评价两部分,定量分析由经济发展水平、保险组织发展水平、社会信用及法制环境等3个目标层、9个准则层和54项指标层组成;定性评价主要包括保险法律法规完善程度和执行状况、政策对保险活动的支持程度、信用机制的健全程度及政府对保险业的支持和干预程度等。
以保险生态基本理论、四元结构模型和评价指标体系为指导,通过量化分析与定性评价,本文对上海、重庆、贵州三地保险生态系统进行了优劣排序;并从生态环境和生态组织两方面,对中国与印度两国保险生态系统进行对比分析。
通过对我国保险生态系统现状的分析评估,并得出结论:我国保险生态系统还未达到良性循环和动态平衡状态,一系列的根本性问题还未得到解决。对此,针对性提出了相关对策和建议。
本文创新之处在于:首先,创造性的将生态学原理引入保险领域,构建了保险生态系统的四元结构模型,在保险理论的创新研究方面作出了有意义的尝试;其次,建立了区域保险生态系统评价指标体系,为保险生态研究提供量化工具。最后,运用区域保险生态系统评价指标体系,重点对上海、重庆、贵州三地的保险生态进行优劣排序。
研究过程中,综合运用了定性分析与定量分析相结合的方法,并通过数据统计分析完成了关键指标的量化分析与评估。
运用生态学理论研究保险问题,目前在保险领域还是一片空白。“保险生态”问题的提出,属于“原创理论”,将在很大程度上转变保险理论研究的视角和思维模式,拓宽了保险理论研究的领域,确立起更加符合生态学原理和保险内在规律的保险发展观,对于推动我国保险业长远、可持续发展具有重要的指导意义和现实意义。
After long period of development and evolvement, gradually , insurance have had its own internal logic and rule, and it becomes an animated movement with many ecosystem characteristics. However, in consideration of the actuality of our insurance theory study, the inherent ecological principles and characteristics of insurance are not be discovered, and nobody has studied them. 30 years after the Chinese reformation and opening policy, with the high speed growth of our national economy and foundation and consummation of socialism marketing economy system ,our insurance developed with high speed.With the of volume of premium continual grew, insurance products of different risk type. the increasingly multiplied, the insurance organizations continually consummated, the insurance fields progressively expanded.Insurance played a more and more important role in the national economy. Meanwhile, during the period of high speed development, our insurance exposed a series of austere and profound questions need to be resolved imminently.There are also wrong thoughts and behavior in the industry administration, which deviated from the essential rule of insurance and badly impacted the durative and healthy development of our insurance. On the basis of inherent ecological characteristics and development condition of our insurance industry, this dissertation in troduced ecologic principles into insurance area ,and put forward the concept of insurance ecology and founded its basic theory framework ,in order to study the present development questions in insurance deeply and systematically .
The insurance ecologic system is a complexly connected, competed and benign coincident homeostasis system with certain structure and characteristics and with certain function , which the insurance organizations constructed in order to exist and develop through work-dividing and cooperation during the time of reciprocity with its living environment and other internal organizations.
Insurance ecologic system is constructed with ecologic environment system and ecologic organization system. According to insurance ecology basic theory ,A insurance quaternion structure model is established, including insurance resources, insurance subjects, customers and insurance intermediary, insurance regulation authority, its most characteristics is summarized that insurance ecologic system is a structure and function item of most importance in the insurance ecology, which is the highest level the insurance ecology studied. Insurance ecologic system is a system with dynamic characteristics. Fluid energy, cycling matter and information transferred are three major functions of insurance ecologic system. Insurance ecologic system has self-adjust ability of insurance ecologic sys, which assured the adaptation by one another between insurance resource and insurance subjects, between insurance subjects, customers and insurance intermediary, between ecologic organization and ecologic environment, but The adjust mechanism is limited.
Through item analyses to the insurance quaternion structure model, a quality appraisal system of district insurance ecologic system is to be established , which supplied basic proof to the appraisal of district insurance ecology. The appraisal system included qualitative appraisal and quantificational analysis, quantificational analysis is composed of 3 objective arrangements, 9 rule arrangements and 54 item arrangements such as economic level, insurance organization development level, social credit and legal environment. qualitative appraisal included the maturity degree of insurance law and its executive situation, the degree of support to insurance movement from policy, healthiness of credit mechanism and degree of support and interference to insurance from government.
With the guidance of insurance ecology theory, quaternion structure model and appraisal system, through qualitative appraisal and quantificational analysis, the insurance ecologic system of Shanghai, Chongqing and Guiyang is arranged by excellence, and the insurance ecologic system of both China and India are comparatively analyzed from both sides of ecologic environment and ecologic organization.
Through analysis and appraisal on actuality of our insurance ecologic system, the conclusion is that our insurance ecologic system did not reach the benign cycle and homeostasis. a series of essential questions did not been resolved. This dissertation pertinently put forward correlative counterstrategy and suggestion.
The innovation of this dissertation is, firstly ,creatively introduced ecologic principle into insurance area, and constructed insurance quaternion structure model, supplied a gap of theoretic study on our insurance., secondly, quality appraisal system of district insurance ecologic system is to be established, which supplied quantificational tools to insurance study. lastly, using the appraisal system of district insurance ecologic system to arrange the insurance ecologic system of Shanghai, Chongqing and Guizhou is by excellence,
During the period of analysis, qualitative and quantificational analytic techniques was used, and finished quantificational analysis and appraisal of pivotal items was finished through data statistics.
From now on, it is a vacancy in the insurance area that use ecologic theory to study insurance. The brought out of question of insurance ecology is an important theoretical innovation ,which could change the visual angle and thinking pattern of insurance theoretic study, and expand the studying area of insurance theory, and erect an insurance development concept more coincident to ecologic principle and internal rule of insurance, and will be of great directive and practical significance to impel the long-range and continuable development of our insurance industry.
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