基于均衡利益的国有企业高管人员激励理论研究
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摘要
国有企业高管的积极性发挥程度如何,直接影响到企业的发展和盈利能力。而国有企业高管作为经营性人力资本的所有者,是企业的核心资源,因委托代理关系的存在及其工作过程和工作成果的不可观测性,只有通过激励的手段才能最大程度地发挥其全部潜力。因此,对其有效激励尤显重要。本文借鉴前人研究成果,对国有企业高管人员需求进行了梳理,引入高管人员需求模型,设计激励机制,从一个新的视角上对高管人员激励问题进行了研究,所得结论具有重要的意义。
本文首先对国有企业高管激励机制研究的理论基础进行了深入分析,主要包括管理学激励理论、现代经济学激励理论和制度经济学激励理论,其中任何一种理论都不能完整地说明企业激励机制的问题,必须把这些理论的研究成果有机结合起来,才能形成完整的关于国有企业高管激励机制的完整理论体系。
需求是激励的前提,只有存在需求,激励才成为可能。本文针对国有企业高管人员的需求特征和需求要素,在综合分析现有研究成果的基础上,结合胜任力理论、职业生涯理论和人力资源管理理论,从现岗位的能岗匹配程度和未来岗位的适应性、高管的职业特征和道德伦理的角度分析,提出国有企业高管人员的需求模型,主要包括授权性需求、发展性需求、职业性需求和道义性需求,并对每一个维度的内涵进行了深入分析。
国有企业高管行为失范问题是激励约束机制研究的重要内容。本文运用博弈论方法对国有企业高管的行为失范风险进行了全面分析。在分析国有企业高管的规范管理时,重点对国有企业董事会及其高管团队的委托-代理关系的博弈均衡进行了深入研究,并就长短期激励有效结合对国有企业高管努力水平的影响进行了博弈分析。研究结果表明,国有企业所有者只有加大国有企业高管的行为失范成本,或者减少行为失范收入和加大监督概率,才能减少行为失范的发生,提升国有企业高管的积极性。
国有企业高管激励机制的设计是本文的核心。本文将国有企业高管的不同需求维度归一为需求满足度。围绕需求满足度的实现情况对国有企业高管激励机制进行了深入研究和充分讨论。首先分析了委托-代理关系下的激励机制问题作为研究平台,对不对称信息条件下和对称信息条件下国有企业高管激励机制进行了分析,就监控机制和激励机制的整合问题进行了扩展研究,最后对激励机制的建立对国有企业高管的激励机制对其贡献性努力和收益性努力的影响进行了探讨。研究表明,由于不对称信息在企业监督管理中的分布是不均衡的,因此,首先建立满足激励相容约束和参与相容约束条件的最优激励契约模型是保障激励效果的关键。
在理论提出和分析的基础上,通过对襄樊市动态股权制实施状况的分析,为本研究寻求来自实践证据的支持。由于动态股权制的设计理念充分考虑了国有企业高管的多维心理需求,促进了国有企业高管队伍稳定和满意度提高,经济效益明显改善。来自襄樊市的国有企业动态股权制改革实践为本文提供了实践操作证据,支持和加强了本文基于均衡利益需求的国有企业高管激励的理论研究。
What extent that the executives of state-owned enterprises play an active role directly impacted enterprises development and profitability.The executives of state-owned enterprises as a operational human capital is the core of enterprise resources,as the existence of principal-agent relationship and the process and the results of the work can not be observed,only through incentives in order to maximize its full Potential.As a result,their effective incentive particularly became important.In this dissertation,learning from previous research,doing up the needs of executives of state-owned enterprises,brought out the executives' demand model, designed the incentives mechanism,concluded an important Significance from a new perspective on the issue of incentives executives.
This dissertation firstly analysis the theoretical basis of the incentives mechanism of state-owned enterprises' executives.That included management incentive theory,modern economic theory of incentives and incentive system economics theory,any theory can not be a complete understanding of enterprises incentives.The problem must be overcome through combining the theoretical research results to form a complete incentives theoretical system of state-owned enterprise.
Demand is the premise of incentives,only the existence of demand can lead to incentives.In this dissertation,direction at executives of state-owned enterprises needs and demand characteristics,through comprehensive analysising of existing research results,combinated the competence theory,theory of career and human resource management theory,from the current position of the match and be able to post jobs in the future Adaptability,with executives of the characteristics of professional ethics and moral point of view,put forward the demand models of executives of state-owned enterprises,which including the authorization of the main demands,the development needs of professional,moral needs of the demand,and every dimension connotation was caused to be analysised deeply.
Executives of state-owned enterprises behavior problem is the important content of incentive and restriction mechanism.This dissertation carried out a comprehensive analysis of behavior problem using game theory methods,when standardizing the management of the executives,the focus of the board of directors of state-owned enterprises and team executives --- commissioned by the agency's balance of the game,had an in-depth study on the long and short-term incentives for the effective integration of state-owned enterprises executives,analysised the effects through game theory.The research results showed that the owners of state-owned enterprises only increase the cost of behavior problem of the state-owned enterprises executives or reduced the loss of income and increase the probability of supervision can reduce the occurrence of behavior problem,and enhance the enthusiasm of executives of state-owned enterprises.
Incentive mechanism designing of executives of state-owned enterprises is the core of this dissertation.This dissertation drives the different needs of the dimensions to meet the demand for a degree.Focus on meeting the needs of the degree of achievement of the state-owned enterprises executive incentives to carry out an deeply research and thorough discussion.First of all,the analysis of the principal - agent relationship under the incentive mechanism as a platform for research on the conditions under asymmetric information and symmetric information under the condition of state-owned enterprises executives,monitoring mechanisms and incentives to integrate the issues of expansion of research.Finally,incentives for the establishment of state-owned enterprises executives incentive to contribute to their efforts and the efforts of the impact of the proceeds were discussed.Research results showed that as a result of information asymmetry in the corporate supervision and management of the distribution is uneven,therefore,first of all set up to meet the incentive compatibility constraints and constraints involved in the optimal incentive contract model is the key to protect the incentive effect.
Explore the support coming from practice evidence on basis suggesting from dynamic stock system operation in Xiang Fan City based on theory research. Because the designing idea of dynamic stock system has considered many dimensions mentality need of state-owned enterprises executives,has boosted state-owned enterprise height being in charge of team stability and the degree of satisfaction improvement,economic results improved noticeably.Reforming practice of dynamic stock system operation in Xiang Fan City having provided practice to the main body of a operation handling evidence,support and having reinforced the main thought of this dissertation that covered incentive mechanism of state-owned enterprises executives based on balanced profit.
本文首先对国有企业高管激励机制研究的理论基础进行了深入分析,主要包括管理学激励理论、现代经济学激励理论和制度经济学激励理论,其中任何一种理论都不能完整地说明企业激励机制的问题,必须把这些理论的研究成果有机结合起来,才能形成完整的关于国有企业高管激励机制的完整理论体系。
需求是激励的前提,只有存在需求,激励才成为可能。本文针对国有企业高管人员的需求特征和需求要素,在综合分析现有研究成果的基础上,结合胜任力理论、职业生涯理论和人力资源管理理论,从现岗位的能岗匹配程度和未来岗位的适应性、高管的职业特征和道德伦理的角度分析,提出国有企业高管人员的需求模型,主要包括授权性需求、发展性需求、职业性需求和道义性需求,并对每一个维度的内涵进行了深入分析。
国有企业高管行为失范问题是激励约束机制研究的重要内容。本文运用博弈论方法对国有企业高管的行为失范风险进行了全面分析。在分析国有企业高管的规范管理时,重点对国有企业董事会及其高管团队的委托-代理关系的博弈均衡进行了深入研究,并就长短期激励有效结合对国有企业高管努力水平的影响进行了博弈分析。研究结果表明,国有企业所有者只有加大国有企业高管的行为失范成本,或者减少行为失范收入和加大监督概率,才能减少行为失范的发生,提升国有企业高管的积极性。
国有企业高管激励机制的设计是本文的核心。本文将国有企业高管的不同需求维度归一为需求满足度。围绕需求满足度的实现情况对国有企业高管激励机制进行了深入研究和充分讨论。首先分析了委托-代理关系下的激励机制问题作为研究平台,对不对称信息条件下和对称信息条件下国有企业高管激励机制进行了分析,就监控机制和激励机制的整合问题进行了扩展研究,最后对激励机制的建立对国有企业高管的激励机制对其贡献性努力和收益性努力的影响进行了探讨。研究表明,由于不对称信息在企业监督管理中的分布是不均衡的,因此,首先建立满足激励相容约束和参与相容约束条件的最优激励契约模型是保障激励效果的关键。
在理论提出和分析的基础上,通过对襄樊市动态股权制实施状况的分析,为本研究寻求来自实践证据的支持。由于动态股权制的设计理念充分考虑了国有企业高管的多维心理需求,促进了国有企业高管队伍稳定和满意度提高,经济效益明显改善。来自襄樊市的国有企业动态股权制改革实践为本文提供了实践操作证据,支持和加强了本文基于均衡利益需求的国有企业高管激励的理论研究。
What extent that the executives of state-owned enterprises play an active role directly impacted enterprises development and profitability.The executives of state-owned enterprises as a operational human capital is the core of enterprise resources,as the existence of principal-agent relationship and the process and the results of the work can not be observed,only through incentives in order to maximize its full Potential.As a result,their effective incentive particularly became important.In this dissertation,learning from previous research,doing up the needs of executives of state-owned enterprises,brought out the executives' demand model, designed the incentives mechanism,concluded an important Significance from a new perspective on the issue of incentives executives.
This dissertation firstly analysis the theoretical basis of the incentives mechanism of state-owned enterprises' executives.That included management incentive theory,modern economic theory of incentives and incentive system economics theory,any theory can not be a complete understanding of enterprises incentives.The problem must be overcome through combining the theoretical research results to form a complete incentives theoretical system of state-owned enterprise.
Demand is the premise of incentives,only the existence of demand can lead to incentives.In this dissertation,direction at executives of state-owned enterprises needs and demand characteristics,through comprehensive analysising of existing research results,combinated the competence theory,theory of career and human resource management theory,from the current position of the match and be able to post jobs in the future Adaptability,with executives of the characteristics of professional ethics and moral point of view,put forward the demand models of executives of state-owned enterprises,which including the authorization of the main demands,the development needs of professional,moral needs of the demand,and every dimension connotation was caused to be analysised deeply.
Executives of state-owned enterprises behavior problem is the important content of incentive and restriction mechanism.This dissertation carried out a comprehensive analysis of behavior problem using game theory methods,when standardizing the management of the executives,the focus of the board of directors of state-owned enterprises and team executives --- commissioned by the agency's balance of the game,had an in-depth study on the long and short-term incentives for the effective integration of state-owned enterprises executives,analysised the effects through game theory.The research results showed that the owners of state-owned enterprises only increase the cost of behavior problem of the state-owned enterprises executives or reduced the loss of income and increase the probability of supervision can reduce the occurrence of behavior problem,and enhance the enthusiasm of executives of state-owned enterprises.
Incentive mechanism designing of executives of state-owned enterprises is the core of this dissertation.This dissertation drives the different needs of the dimensions to meet the demand for a degree.Focus on meeting the needs of the degree of achievement of the state-owned enterprises executive incentives to carry out an deeply research and thorough discussion.First of all,the analysis of the principal - agent relationship under the incentive mechanism as a platform for research on the conditions under asymmetric information and symmetric information under the condition of state-owned enterprises executives,monitoring mechanisms and incentives to integrate the issues of expansion of research.Finally,incentives for the establishment of state-owned enterprises executives incentive to contribute to their efforts and the efforts of the impact of the proceeds were discussed.Research results showed that as a result of information asymmetry in the corporate supervision and management of the distribution is uneven,therefore,first of all set up to meet the incentive compatibility constraints and constraints involved in the optimal incentive contract model is the key to protect the incentive effect.
Explore the support coming from practice evidence on basis suggesting from dynamic stock system operation in Xiang Fan City based on theory research. Because the designing idea of dynamic stock system has considered many dimensions mentality need of state-owned enterprises executives,has boosted state-owned enterprise height being in charge of team stability and the degree of satisfaction improvement,economic results improved noticeably.Reforming practice of dynamic stock system operation in Xiang Fan City having provided practice to the main body of a operation handling evidence,support and having reinforced the main thought of this dissertation that covered incentive mechanism of state-owned enterprises executives based on balanced profit.
引文
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