央地分权以及相对绩效评估下的区域竞争研究
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摘要
改革开放以来,中国经济经历了三十多年的高速增长,在此过程中,央地分权和由此产生的地方竞争扮演了非常重要的角色。在原有计划机制下,地方政府没有足够的决策自主权,无法制定和实施因地制宜的经济政策。同时,在统收统支的财政体制下,它们既不对产出负责,也不对投入负责。与这种“弱力合同“相对应,地方政府的生产激励也严重不足。
改革初期,中央政府对地方采取了“放权让利”和“承包制”等政策措施。其典型特征是,地方向中央缴纳一个固定数量的利润或税收,而其余的收益则由地方所有。从激励理论的角度看,这相当于中央政府将原有的弱力合同改成了“强力合同”,进而极大地提高了地方从事生产的积极性。提供强力合同,尽管可以提高地方的积极性,但也造成了一些新的问题。由于只能拿到一个固定份额,中央政府难以分享由于经济增长带来的巨大好处,其典型表现是中央财政占整个财政的比例逐年下降,这极大地削弱了中央政府对整个经济的宏观调控能力。
1994年分税制改革,在本质上可以看成是制定了央地之间的利润分成合同,可以让中央与地方共同分担经济发展中的风险,也共同分享经济发展的好处。但是,与之前的放权让利或承包制合同相比,地方政府的激励强度会下降。为了解决激励不足的问题,中央政府对地方政府又实行了以GDP锦标赛为特征的相对绩效考核。
然而,锦标赛制度并非一种完美的机制。首先,它在提高地方政府“好”的激励的同时,也会增强它们的“坏”的激励。一方面,各地方政府都不遗余力地改善基础设施,大张旗鼓地招商引资,目的就是为了提高本地的GDP。从某种程度上,这种“好”的激励是中国经济高速增长的重要推动力。但另一方面,各地方也采取一些“以邻为壑”的竞争战略,因为这样可以降低其他地方的GDP绩效。长期困扰中国经济发展的重复建设和恶性竞争就是其典型表现。
中央政府的目标是多元化的,但在GDP锦标赛考核体系下,地方政府官员的升迁主要与可以观测的GD指标相关,而与民生等一些“难易度量”的指标没有明显的关系。由此,GDP锦标赛导致的一个直接后果就是,尽管社会目标是多任务的,但各地方过度关注GDP,而忽略民生指标。认识得这一点就不难理解,为什么近年来中国经济高速增长的同时,各种民生问题却日益严重。
基于上述认识,本文将分别从纵向和横向两个角度对央地分权与相对绩效评估下区域竞争进行深入研究,其中第一章对相关文献做了回顾和评述,而第二章、第三章和第四章是本文的主体部分。
在第二章中,我们讨论了央地目标差异对分权合同中利润分成的影响。从委托代理角度看,中央政府与地方政府的目标必然存在差异,这必然会影响央地分权合同的制定和实施。具体地,我们假设中央政府关注多个目标之间的协调发展,但地方政府在施政过程中却有积极性通过非协调发展而获得一些“额外收益”。这样,中央在向地方提供分权合同时,不但要让地方政府要有充分的“整体激励”,还要让地方政府的施政努力在多任务之间有合理分配。正因如此,我们发现的-个有趣的结果是,最优的央地利润分享比例与地方政府额外收益动机呈现出非线性关系,先随其下降,再随其上升,最后又随其下降。
如果说第二章是从“纵向”角度考虑了央地分权的话,我们在第三章和第四章就是从“横向”角度考察以GDP锦标赛为特征的央地分权对区域竞争的影响。其中,我们主要关注了相对绩效评估下地区之间的“恶性竞争”和“重复建设”问题。
在第三章,我们将相对绩效评估引入到同质产品博弈。按照博弈时序,我们考虑了古诺博弈和斯塔克尔伯格博弈；按照相对绩效的考核方式,我们又区分了基于利润和基于产量的相对绩效。我们发现,不管是哪种相对绩效,相对绩效考核强度增加都会激化区域间竞争。进一步,如果相对绩效评估强度超过一定的临界值,地区之间就会出现恶性竞争。
在第四章,我们又将相对绩效评估引入到差异化产品博弈。与之对应,我们不但考虑了恶性竞争,还考虑了重复建设问题。从概念上,项目建设的“重复性”可以理解为产品选择的同质性。我们同样发现,不管是哪种相对绩效,相对绩效考核强度增加都会激化区域间竞争。进一步,如果相对绩效评估强度超过一定的临界值,地区之间就会出现重复建设。
最后,第五章对本文分析进行了简单的总结,讨论了其中可能蕴含的一些政策含义。我们也讨论了本文分析的不足和有待进一步拓展的地方。
Since reform and opening, China has experienced a rapid economic growth for more than thirty years. In this process, decentralization between central and local governments together with ensuing interregional competition has played a crucial role
In the era of planned economy, local governments had no enough decision-making autonomy, and hence could not make and implement specific localized economic policies. Meanwhile, under the highly centralized fiscal regime, they were not responsible for either input or output. As a result, they also lacked incentive to develop local economies.
At the beginning of reform, the central government delegated some decision-making power to local government through subcontracting system. Typically, local governments turned over a fixed lump-sum tax or profit to the central government and then kept the residuals. From the viewpoint of incentive theory, the central government was offering a high-powered incentive contract by this subcontracting arrangement. Although this reform greatly increased the incentives for the local governments, it also brought forth a lot of new problems. One important problem is that, as the central government only got a fixed payment, it could not share the fruit of rapid economic growth. Therefore, the proportion of central fiscal revenue to overall fiscal revenue declined gradually, which seriously deceased central government's capacity to intervene national economy.
The fiscal reform initiated in1994, in essence, constructed a profit-sharing contract between the central government and local governments, in lieu of which they could take risks and share benefits together. However, compared to former subcontracting arrangement, profit-sharing contract will lower incentive power. To solve this problem, the central government also introduced and strengthened GDP oriented yardstick competition or relative performance evaluation among local governments.
Naturally, GDP-oriented yardstick competition is not a perfect incentive system. It created not only "good" incentives but also "bad" incentives from the local governments. On the one hand, local governments assiduously improved infrastructure, and attracted foreign investment to increase their own GDP performances. In some sense, these kinds of "good" incentives are the main driving forces for Chinese economic growth. On the other hand, in order to lower competitors'GDP performances, local governments also have strong incentives to take some beggar-thy-neighbor strategies. The prolonged phenomena of regional duplicative investments and vicious competitions are its typical representations.
The central government often has more diversified aims than local ones. However, under GDP tournament, local governments (officials) paid excessive attention to those observable indices related to GDP but omitted those unobservable indices related to public welfare. This explains why general public are not so content while Chinese economy still grows rapidly in recent years.
Based on above observations, this thesis plans to do thorough research on decentralization and regional competition under relative performance evaluation from both "vertical" and "horizontal" angles. Chapter Ⅰ is a brief review of related literature. Chapters Ⅱ, Ⅲ and Ⅳ are main body of the thesis.
In chapter Ⅱ, we analyze how aim discrepancy between the central government and a local government affects the form of profit-sharing contract. More concretely, we assume that the central government cares harmonious development of two policy targets, while the local government can obtain "extra benefit" through unbalanced development. As a result, when offering profit-sharing contract, the central government should care about not only the overall incentive from local government, but also the reasonable allocation of this overall incentive among different policy dimensions. We find that the optimal profit sharing proportion has a nonlinear relationship with the local government's propensity for extra benefit. That is, with the "extra benefit" propensity (represented by a parameter) increasing, equilibrium share of the local government first decreases, then increases and finally decreases again.
Insofar as chapter Ⅱ analyzes decentralization "vertically", chapter Ⅲ and Ⅳ try to discuss its effects "horizontally", that is, how GDP tournament affect regional competition. Our main focus is the regional vicious competition and duplicative investment.
In chapter Ⅲ, we introduce relative performance evaluation to oligopoly competition with homogenous product. According to game timing, we analyze Cournot and Stackelberg competition; and according to the form of relative performance evaluation (RPE), we analyze profit-based RPE and quantity-based RPE. We show that, regardless to RPE form, stronger RPE will induce fiercer regional competition because it lowers each firm's perceived cost. When RPE exceeds some threshold level, vicious competition will occur, that is, market price will be lower than marginal cost.
In chapter Ⅳ, we introduce both kinds of RPE into differentiated product competition. By employing location model, we can consider not only vicious competition, but also duplicative investment. In our conception,"duplicativeness" means that two firms are finally located too near along the linear city. We find that, regardless to the form of RPE, stronger RPE will induce fiercer price competition. Furthermore, if RPE exceeds some threshold, duplicative investment will occur.
Finally, chapter V concludes the thesis with a brief discussion of the potential policy implications and some possible extensions for further research.
改革初期,中央政府对地方采取了“放权让利”和“承包制”等政策措施。其典型特征是,地方向中央缴纳一个固定数量的利润或税收,而其余的收益则由地方所有。从激励理论的角度看,这相当于中央政府将原有的弱力合同改成了“强力合同”,进而极大地提高了地方从事生产的积极性。提供强力合同,尽管可以提高地方的积极性,但也造成了一些新的问题。由于只能拿到一个固定份额,中央政府难以分享由于经济增长带来的巨大好处,其典型表现是中央财政占整个财政的比例逐年下降,这极大地削弱了中央政府对整个经济的宏观调控能力。
1994年分税制改革,在本质上可以看成是制定了央地之间的利润分成合同,可以让中央与地方共同分担经济发展中的风险,也共同分享经济发展的好处。但是,与之前的放权让利或承包制合同相比,地方政府的激励强度会下降。为了解决激励不足的问题,中央政府对地方政府又实行了以GDP锦标赛为特征的相对绩效考核。
然而,锦标赛制度并非一种完美的机制。首先,它在提高地方政府“好”的激励的同时,也会增强它们的“坏”的激励。一方面,各地方政府都不遗余力地改善基础设施,大张旗鼓地招商引资,目的就是为了提高本地的GDP。从某种程度上,这种“好”的激励是中国经济高速增长的重要推动力。但另一方面,各地方也采取一些“以邻为壑”的竞争战略,因为这样可以降低其他地方的GDP绩效。长期困扰中国经济发展的重复建设和恶性竞争就是其典型表现。
中央政府的目标是多元化的,但在GDP锦标赛考核体系下,地方政府官员的升迁主要与可以观测的GD指标相关,而与民生等一些“难易度量”的指标没有明显的关系。由此,GDP锦标赛导致的一个直接后果就是,尽管社会目标是多任务的,但各地方过度关注GDP,而忽略民生指标。认识得这一点就不难理解,为什么近年来中国经济高速增长的同时,各种民生问题却日益严重。
基于上述认识,本文将分别从纵向和横向两个角度对央地分权与相对绩效评估下区域竞争进行深入研究,其中第一章对相关文献做了回顾和评述,而第二章、第三章和第四章是本文的主体部分。
在第二章中,我们讨论了央地目标差异对分权合同中利润分成的影响。从委托代理角度看,中央政府与地方政府的目标必然存在差异,这必然会影响央地分权合同的制定和实施。具体地,我们假设中央政府关注多个目标之间的协调发展,但地方政府在施政过程中却有积极性通过非协调发展而获得一些“额外收益”。这样,中央在向地方提供分权合同时,不但要让地方政府要有充分的“整体激励”,还要让地方政府的施政努力在多任务之间有合理分配。正因如此,我们发现的-个有趣的结果是,最优的央地利润分享比例与地方政府额外收益动机呈现出非线性关系,先随其下降,再随其上升,最后又随其下降。
如果说第二章是从“纵向”角度考虑了央地分权的话,我们在第三章和第四章就是从“横向”角度考察以GDP锦标赛为特征的央地分权对区域竞争的影响。其中,我们主要关注了相对绩效评估下地区之间的“恶性竞争”和“重复建设”问题。
在第三章,我们将相对绩效评估引入到同质产品博弈。按照博弈时序,我们考虑了古诺博弈和斯塔克尔伯格博弈；按照相对绩效的考核方式,我们又区分了基于利润和基于产量的相对绩效。我们发现,不管是哪种相对绩效,相对绩效考核强度增加都会激化区域间竞争。进一步,如果相对绩效评估强度超过一定的临界值,地区之间就会出现恶性竞争。
在第四章,我们又将相对绩效评估引入到差异化产品博弈。与之对应,我们不但考虑了恶性竞争,还考虑了重复建设问题。从概念上,项目建设的“重复性”可以理解为产品选择的同质性。我们同样发现,不管是哪种相对绩效,相对绩效考核强度增加都会激化区域间竞争。进一步,如果相对绩效评估强度超过一定的临界值,地区之间就会出现重复建设。
最后,第五章对本文分析进行了简单的总结,讨论了其中可能蕴含的一些政策含义。我们也讨论了本文分析的不足和有待进一步拓展的地方。
Since reform and opening, China has experienced a rapid economic growth for more than thirty years. In this process, decentralization between central and local governments together with ensuing interregional competition has played a crucial role
In the era of planned economy, local governments had no enough decision-making autonomy, and hence could not make and implement specific localized economic policies. Meanwhile, under the highly centralized fiscal regime, they were not responsible for either input or output. As a result, they also lacked incentive to develop local economies.
At the beginning of reform, the central government delegated some decision-making power to local government through subcontracting system. Typically, local governments turned over a fixed lump-sum tax or profit to the central government and then kept the residuals. From the viewpoint of incentive theory, the central government was offering a high-powered incentive contract by this subcontracting arrangement. Although this reform greatly increased the incentives for the local governments, it also brought forth a lot of new problems. One important problem is that, as the central government only got a fixed payment, it could not share the fruit of rapid economic growth. Therefore, the proportion of central fiscal revenue to overall fiscal revenue declined gradually, which seriously deceased central government's capacity to intervene national economy.
The fiscal reform initiated in1994, in essence, constructed a profit-sharing contract between the central government and local governments, in lieu of which they could take risks and share benefits together. However, compared to former subcontracting arrangement, profit-sharing contract will lower incentive power. To solve this problem, the central government also introduced and strengthened GDP oriented yardstick competition or relative performance evaluation among local governments.
Naturally, GDP-oriented yardstick competition is not a perfect incentive system. It created not only "good" incentives but also "bad" incentives from the local governments. On the one hand, local governments assiduously improved infrastructure, and attracted foreign investment to increase their own GDP performances. In some sense, these kinds of "good" incentives are the main driving forces for Chinese economic growth. On the other hand, in order to lower competitors'GDP performances, local governments also have strong incentives to take some beggar-thy-neighbor strategies. The prolonged phenomena of regional duplicative investments and vicious competitions are its typical representations.
The central government often has more diversified aims than local ones. However, under GDP tournament, local governments (officials) paid excessive attention to those observable indices related to GDP but omitted those unobservable indices related to public welfare. This explains why general public are not so content while Chinese economy still grows rapidly in recent years.
Based on above observations, this thesis plans to do thorough research on decentralization and regional competition under relative performance evaluation from both "vertical" and "horizontal" angles. Chapter Ⅰ is a brief review of related literature. Chapters Ⅱ, Ⅲ and Ⅳ are main body of the thesis.
In chapter Ⅱ, we analyze how aim discrepancy between the central government and a local government affects the form of profit-sharing contract. More concretely, we assume that the central government cares harmonious development of two policy targets, while the local government can obtain "extra benefit" through unbalanced development. As a result, when offering profit-sharing contract, the central government should care about not only the overall incentive from local government, but also the reasonable allocation of this overall incentive among different policy dimensions. We find that the optimal profit sharing proportion has a nonlinear relationship with the local government's propensity for extra benefit. That is, with the "extra benefit" propensity (represented by a parameter) increasing, equilibrium share of the local government first decreases, then increases and finally decreases again.
Insofar as chapter Ⅱ analyzes decentralization "vertically", chapter Ⅲ and Ⅳ try to discuss its effects "horizontally", that is, how GDP tournament affect regional competition. Our main focus is the regional vicious competition and duplicative investment.
In chapter Ⅲ, we introduce relative performance evaluation to oligopoly competition with homogenous product. According to game timing, we analyze Cournot and Stackelberg competition; and according to the form of relative performance evaluation (RPE), we analyze profit-based RPE and quantity-based RPE. We show that, regardless to RPE form, stronger RPE will induce fiercer regional competition because it lowers each firm's perceived cost. When RPE exceeds some threshold level, vicious competition will occur, that is, market price will be lower than marginal cost.
In chapter Ⅳ, we introduce both kinds of RPE into differentiated product competition. By employing location model, we can consider not only vicious competition, but also duplicative investment. In our conception,"duplicativeness" means that two firms are finally located too near along the linear city. We find that, regardless to the form of RPE, stronger RPE will induce fiercer price competition. Furthermore, if RPE exceeds some threshold, duplicative investment will occur.
Finally, chapter V concludes the thesis with a brief discussion of the potential policy implications and some possible extensions for further research.
引文
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