审计任期与审计质量关系研究
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摘要
随着美国安然、世通财务丑闻,以及国内蓝田股份、东方电子财务舞弊案的不断曝光,公众对上市公司的财务信息真实性产生了很大的不信任感,同时也对独立审计质量抱有极大的置疑。美国于2002年出台了著名的《萨班斯——奥克斯莱法案》,自此之后,国内外就“审计任期和审计质量”的关系研究逐渐增多,但是至今并没有形成比较一致的观点,但这一议题越来越为各个国家所重视。到目前为止,为了提高审计质量,意大利、巴西、沙特阿拉伯和奥地利已对公众公司实行会计师事务所强制轮换,新加坡已对在该国设立的银行实施会计师事务所强制轮换,欧盟建议立法实行强制轮换,其他一些国家也正在就是否实施会计师事务所强制轮换进行审慎考虑,我国监管机构也于2004年要求实行签字注册会计师定期轮换。可以看出,世界范围内越来越多的国家开始倾向于将审计轮换(审计师轮换和事务所轮换)作为一项能够提高审计质量的主要措施。而这一制度安排得以实施的原因就在于,许多国家的监管机构认为较长的审计任期会导致审计质量的降低。
但是理论界对这一问题的争论从未停止过。一种观点认为审计任期越长,其所带来的对审计质量的负面影响就越大。公司与其聘任的会计师事务所之间的长期关系将会导致事务所与其客户管理层的利益密切相关,从而使事务所独立发表意见变得困难,进而给审计质量带来负面影响。另一种相反的观点认为,许多在审计初期发生的审计失败案更多的是由于审计师缺乏对被审计公司特殊信息的了解而被公司管理层蒙蔽所导致。审计师对被审计客户的熟悉程度对于发现财务舞弊是至关重要的。因此审计任期的累计有助于审计师专业胜任能力的提高,从而提高审计质量。
可见,国内外对二者关系的研究结论颇有争议。本文运用来自2002年、2003年沪深两市的经验数据,首先剔除了当年新上市公司、金融保险类企业和无法从公开渠道获得审计费用信息的样本数据,最后得到2248条样本数据,然后从盈余管理的角度入手,参照Peter Carey(2006)的研究设计模型以及夏立军、陈信元设计的考察审计独立性和审计任期关系的模型,在控制了企业经营风险因素、财务状况及审计师类型等因素的情况下,构建了“非标”审计意见预测模型、异常营运资本应计项目预测模型和关键财务指标基准模型,并使用Logistic回归分析方法,分别检验长审计任期对审计质量的影响,并得出结论。
本文的写作一共包括五部分:
第一部分,介绍本文的研究背景、研究方法、研究内容和框架。
第二部分,国内外相关研究成果述评。纵观国内外现有研究成果,多数观点认为强制轮换会使审计成本及价格上升、使审计专长受到损害,但是对审计独立性的影响存在激烈争论。实证检验虽然多数支持审计任期与审计质量正相关,但并未形成支持或反对强制轮换的一致证据,且在研究设计上仍存在诸多局限性,有待完善。审计任期与审计质量的关系仍需要进一步的经验证据。
第三部分,首先从委托代理理论的角度分析了现代公司制企业以及审计委托模式中的委托代理关系。委托代理理论是审计任期与审计质量关系研究最重要的理论依据,西方国家首先将代理理论运用到审计研究当中。委托代理理论的对本文的借鉴意义在于其有助于深刻理解审计质量的概念,并且从根本上解释了当前审计质量问题的生成机制和审计任期对审计质量的影响。然后本文对审计质量的概念作了如下界定:审计质量是审计师在审计过程中发现被审计单位财务报告中的违规行为,并在审计报告中披露已经发现的违规行为的联合概率。审计师发现客户财务报告存在违规行为的可能性取决于审计师的专业胜任能力,而披露财务报告违规行为的可能性则取决于审计师的独立性。审计师的专业胜任能力和独立性,决定了审计质量的高低。
然而审计信息使用者确定审计师发现并报告被审计单位财务报告违规行为的联合概率是困难的。因此相关实证研究往往选择某一审计质量的代理变量对其进行间接的描述。国内外对审计任期与审计质量关系的实证研究在研究方法上的主要区别就在于审计质量代理变量的选取。而审计质量的高低可以具体反映在已审财务信息中盈余管理的程度上,审计质量与盈余管理之间存在反向关系,即较高的审计质量形成较低程度的盈余管理。因此本文从盈余管理的角度出发,除了“非标”审计意见(“非标”审计意见预测模型)之外,提出了两个盈余管理指标作为审计质量代理变量,即异常营运资本应计项目(异常营运资本应计项目预测模型)和上市公司报告盈利和业绩增长的可能性(关键财务指标基准模型)。异常营运资本应计项目这一指标已经在国外相关研究中被采用,并且有研究表明其对盈余管理具有很强的识别能力。上市公司报告盈利和业绩增长的可能性这一审计质量代理变量的选取也具有一定新颖性。有研究发现,上市公司会尽量避免报告亏损,并且尽量避免报告业绩的小幅降低而偏向于报告业绩的小幅增长,并且上市公司公布的经营业绩倾向于刚好达到或者略好于市场预期,本文选取这一盈余管理指标作为审计质量代理变量正是出于上市公司的前两个行为偏好。
最后对审计任期与审计质量的关系进行分析。经过分析本文认为长审计任期对审计独立性的负面影响超过了其提升审计师专业胜任能力的积极影响,即长审计任期条件下审计质量更低。
第四部分,审计任期与审计质量关系的实证检验。
本章借鉴国内外相关研究方法和成果,结合我国研究背景,提出本文的研究假设——长审计任期会降低审计质量,通过实证研究的方法,以中国证券市场2002、2003年A股公司作为研究样本,参照Peter Carey(2006)的研究设计模型以及夏立军、陈信元设计的考察审计独立性和审计任期关系的模型,在控制企业经营风险因素、财务状况及审计师类型等因素的情况下,构建审计任期与审计质量的模型,并使用Logistic回归分析方法检验长审计任期与审计质量之间的关系。
⑴运用“非标”审计意见预测模型估计的结果显示,长审计任期和出具“非标”审计意见的可能性之间显著负相关,即长审计任期条件下审计质量更低。在敏感性测试程序中,显示了相同的结论,即审计任期越长,出具非标审计意见的可能性越低,审计质量越差。
⑵运用异常营运资本应计项目预测模型估计的结果显示,长审计任期与异常营运资本应计项目绝对值之间负相关但不显著,即长审计任期并没有与低审计质量相联系。
⑶关键财务指标基准模型检验的结果提供了适当的证据表明长审计任期条件下审计质量更低。
三个模型的检验结果并不一致,没有为原假设提供强有力的证据支持,因此本文认为,长审计任期与审计质量之间弱负相关。该结论给我们的启示是,鉴于实证研究并未发现长审计任期损害审计质量的一致证据,特别在是审计轮换是否真的有助于审计质量的提高、审计轮换的社会收益是否超过其制度成本等问题并不十分清楚的条件下,国内监管部门不应盲目效仿国外的经验做法,而需结合我国国情制定相应的政策措施。
第五部分,基于前文分析,提出政策建议。由于实证检验并没有提供一致且有力的证据支持长审计任期会降低审计质量的基本假设,因此本文认为事务所强制轮换不一定有助于审计质量的提高。尤其是在事务所强制轮换所带来的社会收益不确定的情况下,监管机构更应该审慎的考虑提高审计质量的政策措施。本文提出如下建议:一,构建新的审计委托模式;二,严格控制上市公司的信息披露;三,健全审计收费制度;四,加强审计业诚信教育和审计行业治理。
与国内以往相关研究不同,本文的创新之处在于,对前人研究设计的模型进行了修正和发展,在模型设计中选取了异常营运资本应计项目和上市公司报告盈利和业绩增长的可能性作为审计质量代理变量,并且在模型中引入了企业破产指数作为控制变量。而实证部分同时采用三个不同的模型分别进行回归分析,也进一步增强了本文结论的说服力。
With the exposure of a series of financial scandal cases, the public has more and more doubt about the financial messages brought up with the listed companies and the audit quality. US has appeared the famous bill“Sarbanes-Oxley Bill”in 2002. From then on, there are increasing researches in domestic and abroad focusing on the relation between auditor tenure and audit quality. Up to now, Italy, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and Austria have put the mandatory auditor rotation in practice in order to improve audit quality. Singapore has implemented mandatory rotation policy in the banking. The Europe is thinking of implementing mandatory auditor rotation through legislation. Many other countries are also thinking of whether to bring mandatory rotation policy into effect. China began to implement mandatory auditor rotation policy from 2004.
Rotation of audit partners is one of the main policy initiatives that has been implemented in many jurisdictions around the world to deal with concerns about audit quality. The basis of any requirement limiting the tenure of audit partners is that there is a reduction in audit quality associated with long periods of tenure. But the debates on this question have never stopped.
One viewpoint supporting a negative association between long audit partner tenure and audit quality believes that erosion of independence may arise with the development of personal relationships between an auditor and their client, and deterioration in the audit partner’s capacity to effect critical appraisal may be more serious with long auditor tenure.
While the other people believes that many audit failure cases happened in the beginning of auditor tenure are associated with lack of familiarity to the client and auditors are more likely to be blinded by client’s statement. So the familiarity to the client is believed to be important for auditors to find fraudulent practices in the financial reports of companies. And auditors’capacities to find fraudulent practices in the financial reports will be improved with long auditor tenure.
Audit quality is dependent to auditor's professional competence and auditor’s independence. So the real relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality is dependent to how auditor tenure will effect the two aspects of audit quality.
Most relative empirical studies in domestic and abroad use the audit quality as the dependent variable, auditor tenure as test variable, and control some other variables to identify the relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality. Besides the sample selection, the difference among these studies is the selection of deputy variable of audit quality and control variables. Audit quality is difficult to observe, so financial information quality is usually used to be a measurement of audit quality. There are two ways to select a deputy variable of audit quality: one is based on the accounting method, indicators of earnings management are usually used as deputy variables in these studies; the other method is based on the market, perceptions of investors and information intermediaries are used to be measurement of audit quality. This article is based on accounting method and use indicators of earning management as the deputy variables of audit quality: abnormal working capital accruals and the extent to which key earnings targets are just beaten or missed.
In order to enhance persuasion of this article, we also select the auditor’s propensity to issue a going-concern opinion as a deputy variable of audit quality. So this article includes three models: Issuing going-concern audit opinions model, Abnormal working capital accruals model and Just beating or missing earnings benchmarks model.
Based on relative research method and result of domestic and abroad, we plan to identify the real relationship between long auditor tenure and audit quality through positive test method. Based on the analyses on different viewpoints, we make the following hypothesis:
H1: There is a negative association between audit quality and long auditor tenure.
We take China listed companies in the period of 2002 to 2003 as samples, by controlling audit risk, financial condition, operation results and the features of auditors to test the relationship between long auditor tenure and audit opinion by using logistics’regression analysis.
The results from Issuing going-concern audit opinions model show that there is a significant positive relationship between long auditor tenure and audit quality which is opposite to our basic hypothesis.
The results from Abnormal working capital accruals model show that there is a positive relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality but not significant which demonstrate that long auditor tenure is not associated with low audit quality. The results from Just beating or missing earnings benchmarks model show that there is a negative relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality.
The results from the three models are not consistent, so we conclude that there is a week negative relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality.
Because the positive test didn’t provide a strong evidence to support our basic hypothesis (Long auditor tenure will lower audit quality), we conclude that it will not work out to solve audit quality problem if we just rely on mandatory auditor rotation. Regulators should not always pay much great attention to mandatory rotation especially when we could not accurately estimate the social benefits and the system costs of mandatory rotation. Policies should gear to our special conditions but not always follow the practices of foreign.
但是理论界对这一问题的争论从未停止过。一种观点认为审计任期越长,其所带来的对审计质量的负面影响就越大。公司与其聘任的会计师事务所之间的长期关系将会导致事务所与其客户管理层的利益密切相关,从而使事务所独立发表意见变得困难,进而给审计质量带来负面影响。另一种相反的观点认为,许多在审计初期发生的审计失败案更多的是由于审计师缺乏对被审计公司特殊信息的了解而被公司管理层蒙蔽所导致。审计师对被审计客户的熟悉程度对于发现财务舞弊是至关重要的。因此审计任期的累计有助于审计师专业胜任能力的提高,从而提高审计质量。
可见,国内外对二者关系的研究结论颇有争议。本文运用来自2002年、2003年沪深两市的经验数据,首先剔除了当年新上市公司、金融保险类企业和无法从公开渠道获得审计费用信息的样本数据,最后得到2248条样本数据,然后从盈余管理的角度入手,参照Peter Carey(2006)的研究设计模型以及夏立军、陈信元设计的考察审计独立性和审计任期关系的模型,在控制了企业经营风险因素、财务状况及审计师类型等因素的情况下,构建了“非标”审计意见预测模型、异常营运资本应计项目预测模型和关键财务指标基准模型,并使用Logistic回归分析方法,分别检验长审计任期对审计质量的影响,并得出结论。
本文的写作一共包括五部分:
第一部分,介绍本文的研究背景、研究方法、研究内容和框架。
第二部分,国内外相关研究成果述评。纵观国内外现有研究成果,多数观点认为强制轮换会使审计成本及价格上升、使审计专长受到损害,但是对审计独立性的影响存在激烈争论。实证检验虽然多数支持审计任期与审计质量正相关,但并未形成支持或反对强制轮换的一致证据,且在研究设计上仍存在诸多局限性,有待完善。审计任期与审计质量的关系仍需要进一步的经验证据。
第三部分,首先从委托代理理论的角度分析了现代公司制企业以及审计委托模式中的委托代理关系。委托代理理论是审计任期与审计质量关系研究最重要的理论依据,西方国家首先将代理理论运用到审计研究当中。委托代理理论的对本文的借鉴意义在于其有助于深刻理解审计质量的概念,并且从根本上解释了当前审计质量问题的生成机制和审计任期对审计质量的影响。然后本文对审计质量的概念作了如下界定:审计质量是审计师在审计过程中发现被审计单位财务报告中的违规行为,并在审计报告中披露已经发现的违规行为的联合概率。审计师发现客户财务报告存在违规行为的可能性取决于审计师的专业胜任能力,而披露财务报告违规行为的可能性则取决于审计师的独立性。审计师的专业胜任能力和独立性,决定了审计质量的高低。
然而审计信息使用者确定审计师发现并报告被审计单位财务报告违规行为的联合概率是困难的。因此相关实证研究往往选择某一审计质量的代理变量对其进行间接的描述。国内外对审计任期与审计质量关系的实证研究在研究方法上的主要区别就在于审计质量代理变量的选取。而审计质量的高低可以具体反映在已审财务信息中盈余管理的程度上,审计质量与盈余管理之间存在反向关系,即较高的审计质量形成较低程度的盈余管理。因此本文从盈余管理的角度出发,除了“非标”审计意见(“非标”审计意见预测模型)之外,提出了两个盈余管理指标作为审计质量代理变量,即异常营运资本应计项目(异常营运资本应计项目预测模型)和上市公司报告盈利和业绩增长的可能性(关键财务指标基准模型)。异常营运资本应计项目这一指标已经在国外相关研究中被采用,并且有研究表明其对盈余管理具有很强的识别能力。上市公司报告盈利和业绩增长的可能性这一审计质量代理变量的选取也具有一定新颖性。有研究发现,上市公司会尽量避免报告亏损,并且尽量避免报告业绩的小幅降低而偏向于报告业绩的小幅增长,并且上市公司公布的经营业绩倾向于刚好达到或者略好于市场预期,本文选取这一盈余管理指标作为审计质量代理变量正是出于上市公司的前两个行为偏好。
最后对审计任期与审计质量的关系进行分析。经过分析本文认为长审计任期对审计独立性的负面影响超过了其提升审计师专业胜任能力的积极影响,即长审计任期条件下审计质量更低。
第四部分,审计任期与审计质量关系的实证检验。
本章借鉴国内外相关研究方法和成果,结合我国研究背景,提出本文的研究假设——长审计任期会降低审计质量,通过实证研究的方法,以中国证券市场2002、2003年A股公司作为研究样本,参照Peter Carey(2006)的研究设计模型以及夏立军、陈信元设计的考察审计独立性和审计任期关系的模型,在控制企业经营风险因素、财务状况及审计师类型等因素的情况下,构建审计任期与审计质量的模型,并使用Logistic回归分析方法检验长审计任期与审计质量之间的关系。
⑴运用“非标”审计意见预测模型估计的结果显示,长审计任期和出具“非标”审计意见的可能性之间显著负相关,即长审计任期条件下审计质量更低。在敏感性测试程序中,显示了相同的结论,即审计任期越长,出具非标审计意见的可能性越低,审计质量越差。
⑵运用异常营运资本应计项目预测模型估计的结果显示,长审计任期与异常营运资本应计项目绝对值之间负相关但不显著,即长审计任期并没有与低审计质量相联系。
⑶关键财务指标基准模型检验的结果提供了适当的证据表明长审计任期条件下审计质量更低。
三个模型的检验结果并不一致,没有为原假设提供强有力的证据支持,因此本文认为,长审计任期与审计质量之间弱负相关。该结论给我们的启示是,鉴于实证研究并未发现长审计任期损害审计质量的一致证据,特别在是审计轮换是否真的有助于审计质量的提高、审计轮换的社会收益是否超过其制度成本等问题并不十分清楚的条件下,国内监管部门不应盲目效仿国外的经验做法,而需结合我国国情制定相应的政策措施。
第五部分,基于前文分析,提出政策建议。由于实证检验并没有提供一致且有力的证据支持长审计任期会降低审计质量的基本假设,因此本文认为事务所强制轮换不一定有助于审计质量的提高。尤其是在事务所强制轮换所带来的社会收益不确定的情况下,监管机构更应该审慎的考虑提高审计质量的政策措施。本文提出如下建议:一,构建新的审计委托模式;二,严格控制上市公司的信息披露;三,健全审计收费制度;四,加强审计业诚信教育和审计行业治理。
与国内以往相关研究不同,本文的创新之处在于,对前人研究设计的模型进行了修正和发展,在模型设计中选取了异常营运资本应计项目和上市公司报告盈利和业绩增长的可能性作为审计质量代理变量,并且在模型中引入了企业破产指数作为控制变量。而实证部分同时采用三个不同的模型分别进行回归分析,也进一步增强了本文结论的说服力。
With the exposure of a series of financial scandal cases, the public has more and more doubt about the financial messages brought up with the listed companies and the audit quality. US has appeared the famous bill“Sarbanes-Oxley Bill”in 2002. From then on, there are increasing researches in domestic and abroad focusing on the relation between auditor tenure and audit quality. Up to now, Italy, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and Austria have put the mandatory auditor rotation in practice in order to improve audit quality. Singapore has implemented mandatory rotation policy in the banking. The Europe is thinking of implementing mandatory auditor rotation through legislation. Many other countries are also thinking of whether to bring mandatory rotation policy into effect. China began to implement mandatory auditor rotation policy from 2004.
Rotation of audit partners is one of the main policy initiatives that has been implemented in many jurisdictions around the world to deal with concerns about audit quality. The basis of any requirement limiting the tenure of audit partners is that there is a reduction in audit quality associated with long periods of tenure. But the debates on this question have never stopped.
One viewpoint supporting a negative association between long audit partner tenure and audit quality believes that erosion of independence may arise with the development of personal relationships between an auditor and their client, and deterioration in the audit partner’s capacity to effect critical appraisal may be more serious with long auditor tenure.
While the other people believes that many audit failure cases happened in the beginning of auditor tenure are associated with lack of familiarity to the client and auditors are more likely to be blinded by client’s statement. So the familiarity to the client is believed to be important for auditors to find fraudulent practices in the financial reports of companies. And auditors’capacities to find fraudulent practices in the financial reports will be improved with long auditor tenure.
Audit quality is dependent to auditor's professional competence and auditor’s independence. So the real relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality is dependent to how auditor tenure will effect the two aspects of audit quality.
Most relative empirical studies in domestic and abroad use the audit quality as the dependent variable, auditor tenure as test variable, and control some other variables to identify the relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality. Besides the sample selection, the difference among these studies is the selection of deputy variable of audit quality and control variables. Audit quality is difficult to observe, so financial information quality is usually used to be a measurement of audit quality. There are two ways to select a deputy variable of audit quality: one is based on the accounting method, indicators of earnings management are usually used as deputy variables in these studies; the other method is based on the market, perceptions of investors and information intermediaries are used to be measurement of audit quality. This article is based on accounting method and use indicators of earning management as the deputy variables of audit quality: abnormal working capital accruals and the extent to which key earnings targets are just beaten or missed.
In order to enhance persuasion of this article, we also select the auditor’s propensity to issue a going-concern opinion as a deputy variable of audit quality. So this article includes three models: Issuing going-concern audit opinions model, Abnormal working capital accruals model and Just beating or missing earnings benchmarks model.
Based on relative research method and result of domestic and abroad, we plan to identify the real relationship between long auditor tenure and audit quality through positive test method. Based on the analyses on different viewpoints, we make the following hypothesis:
H1: There is a negative association between audit quality and long auditor tenure.
We take China listed companies in the period of 2002 to 2003 as samples, by controlling audit risk, financial condition, operation results and the features of auditors to test the relationship between long auditor tenure and audit opinion by using logistics’regression analysis.
The results from Issuing going-concern audit opinions model show that there is a significant positive relationship between long auditor tenure and audit quality which is opposite to our basic hypothesis.
The results from Abnormal working capital accruals model show that there is a positive relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality but not significant which demonstrate that long auditor tenure is not associated with low audit quality. The results from Just beating or missing earnings benchmarks model show that there is a negative relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality.
The results from the three models are not consistent, so we conclude that there is a week negative relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality.
Because the positive test didn’t provide a strong evidence to support our basic hypothesis (Long auditor tenure will lower audit quality), we conclude that it will not work out to solve audit quality problem if we just rely on mandatory auditor rotation. Regulators should not always pay much great attention to mandatory rotation especially when we could not accurately estimate the social benefits and the system costs of mandatory rotation. Policies should gear to our special conditions but not always follow the practices of foreign.
引文
1.蔡春,审计理论结构研究,东北财经大学出版社,2001年3月
2.李若山,注册会计师:经济警察吗,中国财政经济出版社,2003年7月
3.李爽、吴溪,审计定价研究:中国证券市场的初步证据,中国财政经济出版社,2004年2月.
4.李爽、吴溪,审计师变更研究:中国证券市场的初步证据,中国财政经济出版社,2002年3月
5.李爽、吴溪,会计信息、独立审计与公共政策,中国财政经济出版社,2004年7月
6.张立民、刘英来,中国审计改革与发展研究,中国财政经济出版社,2003年11月
7.张为国、邱星芳,后安然时代,中国财政经济出版社,2003年1月
8.行业发展研究资料(No.2003-4):美国萨班斯法案,中国注册会计师协会编译,2003年11月11日
9.任迎伟、缪丹,审计师自愿变更对其独立性的影响研究,西南民族大学学报,人文社科版,2003年第12期.pp.51-56
10.余玉苗、李琳,审计师任期与审计质量之间关系的理论分析,经济评论,2003年5期
11.夏立军、陈信元、方轶强,审计任期与审计独立性:来自中国证券市场的经验证据,中国会计与财务研究,2005年3期
12.夏立军、杨海斌,注册会计师对上市公司盈余管理的反应,会计研究,2002年第3期.pp.28-34
13.陈信元、夏立军,审计任期与审计质量:来自中国证券市场的经验证据,会计研究,2006年第1期.pp.44-53
14.刘启亮,事务所任期与审计质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据,审计研究,2006年第4期.pp.40-49
15. SEC: Auditor Independence Requirements,Accounting Horizons,Vo1.15 no.4,December 2001
16. Mautz,R. K., and H. A. Sharaf.,The Philosophy of Auditing. Sarasota, FL: American Accounting Association, 1961.
17. DeFond, M. L.,along,T. J.,and Li,S.,The impact of improved auditor independence on audit market concentration in China, Journal of accounting and economics, 2000.
18. Johnson, V. E., I. K. Khurana, and J. K. Reynolds,Audit firm tenure and the quality of financial reports. Contemporary Accounting Research,2002.
19. James N. Myers & Linda A. Myers,Exploring the Term of the Auditor-Client Relationship and the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation,The Accounting Review, July 2003.
20. Joe Hoyle,Mandatory Auditor Rotation: The Arguments and An Alternative,The Journal Of Accountancy,May 1978.
21. Anthony H. Catanach Jr.& Paul L. Walker, The International Debate Over Mandatory Auditor Rotation: A Conceptual Research Framework.
22. SEC: Auditor Independence Requirements,Accounting Horizons,Vo1.15 no.4,December 2001.
23. Henry R. Jaenicke and Alan S. Glazer, etc,Staff Report: A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence(July 2001),Accounting Horizons,December 2002.
2.李若山,注册会计师:经济警察吗,中国财政经济出版社,2003年7月
3.李爽、吴溪,审计定价研究:中国证券市场的初步证据,中国财政经济出版社,2004年2月.
4.李爽、吴溪,审计师变更研究:中国证券市场的初步证据,中国财政经济出版社,2002年3月
5.李爽、吴溪,会计信息、独立审计与公共政策,中国财政经济出版社,2004年7月
6.张立民、刘英来,中国审计改革与发展研究,中国财政经济出版社,2003年11月
7.张为国、邱星芳,后安然时代,中国财政经济出版社,2003年1月
8.行业发展研究资料(No.2003-4):美国萨班斯法案,中国注册会计师协会编译,2003年11月11日
9.任迎伟、缪丹,审计师自愿变更对其独立性的影响研究,西南民族大学学报,人文社科版,2003年第12期.pp.51-56
10.余玉苗、李琳,审计师任期与审计质量之间关系的理论分析,经济评论,2003年5期
11.夏立军、陈信元、方轶强,审计任期与审计独立性:来自中国证券市场的经验证据,中国会计与财务研究,2005年3期
12.夏立军、杨海斌,注册会计师对上市公司盈余管理的反应,会计研究,2002年第3期.pp.28-34
13.陈信元、夏立军,审计任期与审计质量:来自中国证券市场的经验证据,会计研究,2006年第1期.pp.44-53
14.刘启亮,事务所任期与审计质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据,审计研究,2006年第4期.pp.40-49
15. SEC: Auditor Independence Requirements,Accounting Horizons,Vo1.15 no.4,December 2001
16. Mautz,R. K., and H. A. Sharaf.,The Philosophy of Auditing. Sarasota, FL: American Accounting Association, 1961.
17. DeFond, M. L.,along,T. J.,and Li,S.,The impact of improved auditor independence on audit market concentration in China, Journal of accounting and economics, 2000.
18. Johnson, V. E., I. K. Khurana, and J. K. Reynolds,Audit firm tenure and the quality of financial reports. Contemporary Accounting Research,2002.
19. James N. Myers & Linda A. Myers,Exploring the Term of the Auditor-Client Relationship and the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation,The Accounting Review, July 2003.
20. Joe Hoyle,Mandatory Auditor Rotation: The Arguments and An Alternative,The Journal Of Accountancy,May 1978.
21. Anthony H. Catanach Jr.& Paul L. Walker, The International Debate Over Mandatory Auditor Rotation: A Conceptual Research Framework.
22. SEC: Auditor Independence Requirements,Accounting Horizons,Vo1.15 no.4,December 2001.
23. Henry R. Jaenicke and Alan S. Glazer, etc,Staff Report: A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence(July 2001),Accounting Horizons,December 2002.