公司治理对研发投入绩效影响的研究
|
摘要
随着高科技突飞猛进的发展,企业面临着前所未有的机遇和挑战,而科技研发的重要性也日益显现。近年来,我国的研发投入经费持续保持增长趋势,但是研发投入的绩效却远低于西方发达国家。企业的研发活动是实现其技术升级的最基本渠道,企业要想在新世纪日益激烈的竞争中生存,必须要加强在科技研发方面的投入,不断更新生产技术使企业时刻处于行业的技术前沿,进而保持企业市场竞争的优势地位,保证企业的长远发展。由于企业研发活动具有获益不确定性、跨期性和信息不对称性,这使得研发活动中的委托代理问题凸显,严重制约了企业研发投入的效率。良好的公司治理可以有效的降低成本,缓解信息不对称程度和解决委托代理问题。因此,研究公司治理对企业研发投入绩效的影响具有重要的理论和现实意义。
全文共分为七章：第一章为绪论,主要阐述了本研究的选题背景和意义,回顾了国内外的相关研究成果的现状,列示了本研究的研究内容和研究框架,说明了本文的研究方法和研究思路。第二章为理论综述。对研发投入、绩效和公司治理进行了概念界定,引用了熊彼特创新理论、内生增长理论和委托代理理论等理论基础。第三章为企业研发投入绩效滞后效应研究,实证证实了公司研发投入绩效存在着显著的滞后效应。第四章为基于拓展的柯-道生产函数对企业研发投入绩效累积效应的研究,实证检验了企业研发投入绩效的累积效应。第五章为公司治理水平测度研究,采用主成分分析法对公司治理水平进行了合理的评价。第六章为公司治理对研发投入绩效的调节效应研究,构建了公司治理对研发投入绩效调节效应检验模型,分别采用层次调节回归分析法和分组回归分析法实证检验了公司治理对研发投入绩效的正向调节效应。第七章为研究结论与展望,对本文的研究结果进行了总结和归纳,提炼了三个主要创新点,针对本文尚存在的研究不足,提出了日后研究的建议和思路。
本研究主要取得了以下四个方面的研究成果：
首先,构建了双向固定效应检验模型,实证研究发现企业研发投入绩效存在着显著的滞后效应。在同时考虑个体效应和时间效应的基础上,控制了资本结构、企业规模、成长性和自由现金流等因索的影响,构建了双向固定效应检验模型,实证检验发现,滞后两年的企业研发投入绩效的效应明显大于滞后一年和滞后三年的效应,且显著性水平最高,这意味着企业的研发投入绩效存在着显著的滞后效应。
其次,拓展了柯布-道格拉斯生产函数,实证检验发现企业研发投入绩效存在着显著的累积效应。考虑到我国转轨时期制度环境因素对企业生产的影响,特将市场化程度因素引入,拓展了柯布-道格拉斯生产函数。采用OLS回归分析实证检验了研发投入绩效的累积效应。研究结果表明,企业研发投入绩效存在显著的累积效应。研发投入绩效在滞后三年内存在着显著的累积效应,而在第五年及之后时期中并不存在显著的累积效应。
再次,测度了我国上市公司治理水平。分别从股权结构特征、董事会特征、监事会特征、管理层特征、信息披露特征、会计师事务所特征和其它委员会特征等七个方面,选取了二十个公司治理评价指标,建立了公司治理水平评价体系,构建了公司治理水平评价模型,采用主成分分析法对样本企业的公司治理水平进行了合理的评价。
最后,构建了公司治理对研发投入绩效的调节效应模型,分别运用层次调节回归分析法和分组回归分析法检验了公司治理对研发投入绩效的调节效应。实证结果显示,公司治理对企业研发投入绩效存在着显著的调节效应,且公司治理在企业研发投入绩效中发挥着正向的调节效应,公司治理水平的改善有利于提高企业研发投入绩效。
本文的主要贡献在于：第一,拓展了柯布-道格拉斯生产函数,丰富了研究企业研发投入绩效累积效应的方法。增强了柯布-道格拉斯生产函数在中国市场中的解释力度,为研究企业投入绩效累积效应提供了新的视角和工具。第二,建立了公司治理水平评价指标体系,构建了公司治理水平的测度模型并进行了实证检验。第三,构建了公司治理对企业研发投入绩效的调节效应模型,验证了公司治理对企业研发投入绩效的正向调节效应。
With the rapid development of high-tech, corporate is facing unprecedented opportunities and challenges and the importance of research and development of science and technology is also increasingly apparent. In recent years, funding for R&D investment in China continued to maintain the growth trend, but the performance of R&D investment are far lower than developed countries in the West. Corporate R&D activities are the basic channels to achieve its technical upgrading, in order to survive in the increasingly fierce competition in the new century, the corporate must strengthen investment in research and development in science and technology and constantly updated production technology to make corporate s stay at cutting edge of technology in the industry, so as to maintain the dominance of the corporate market competition, and to ensure the long-term development of the corporate. As the corporate R&D activities are benefited uncertainty, inter-temporal and information asymmetries, which makes research and development activities in the principal-agent problem highlights, it has seriously hampered the efficiency of R&D investment. Good corporate governance can effectively reduce costs, mitigate information asymmetries and principal-agent problem. Therefore, to study the impact of corporate governance on corporate R&D investment performance has important theoretical and practical significance.
The paper is divided into seven chapters:The first chapter is an introduction, which mainly interprets the topics background and significance of the research, reviews the current situation of the domestic and foreign related research, lists the research content and research framework and illustrates the research method and research ideas; the second chapter is theory summary. It defines R&D investment, performance and corporate governance and discusses the theoretical basis of Schumpeter's innovation theory, the endogenous growth theory and the principal-agent theory; Chapter three is the study of lag effects of corporate R&D investment performance, which empirically confirms the company's R&D investment performance existing significant lag effects; Chapter four is the study of the cumulative effect of corporate R&D investment performance based on the modified Cobb-Douglas production function, which empirically tests of the cumulative effect of the corporate R&D investment performance; Chapter five studies the level of corporate governance measure and makes a reasonable evaluation of the level of corporate governance by the method of principal component analysis;Chapter six studies the moderating effect of corporate governance on R& D of investment performance and also build a test model for it which adopt hierarchical moderated regression analysis and grouping regression analysis to empirically test positive moderating role; Chapter seven is research conclusions and prospects review, which summarize the results of this study, refined three main innovations and proposed future research suggestions and ideas for the weaknesses in the study in this article.
This study acquires four main research results in the following aspects:
First, it build a two-way fixed effects test model and found that the performance of corporate R&D investment exist significant lag effect by empirical research method. On the basis of taking the individual effects and time effects into account, the paper build a two-way fixed effects test model by controlling the capital structure, firm size, growth, free cash flow and other factors. Empirical test found that the effect of corporate R&D investment performance of two period lag is obviously higher than that of one period lag and three period lag and is the highest significant level, which means that R&D investment performance exists significant lag effect.
Second, it has extended Cobb-Douglas production function and found that there is a significant cumulative effect in performance of corporate R&D investment by empirical test. Take the impact of institutional and environment factors of transition period in China on corporate production into account, the paper particularly cites the factors of market degree into the Cobb-Douglas production function and has extended Cobb-Douglas production function. It empirically tests of the cumulative effect of the R&D investment performance by OLS regression analysis. The study results show that the performance of corporate R&D investment exists significant cumulative effect. There is significant cumulative effect in R&D investment performance of three lag period, while it does not exist significant cumulative effect in or after the fifth period.
Third, the paper measures the level of corporate governance scientifically and reasonably. From the aspects of the mechanism of shareholding structure, the mechanism of the Board, the mechanism of Board of Supervisors, pay incentives mechanism, information disclosure mechanisms, audit mechanisms and other mechanisms of the commission, it selects twenty corporate governance evaluations, establishes the evaluation system of the level of corporate governance, builds the evaluation model of corporate governance and make a reasonable evaluation of the sample corporate governance level by principal component analysis method.
Finally, the paper builds moderating effect model of the corporate governance on performance of R&D investment and test the moderating effect of the corporate governance on R&D investment performance by hierarchical moderated regression analysis and grouping regression analysis. The empirical results show that the moderating effect of corporate governance on performance of corporate R&D investment is significant, the corporate governance plays a positive moderating effect in corporate R&D investment performance and the improvement of the level of corporate governance will help improve the performance of corporate R&D investment.
The main contribution of this paper is:first, fixing the Cobb-Douglas production function to enrich the research method of the cumulative effect of corporate R&D investment performance. Enhancing the explanatory power of the Cobb-Douglas production function in the Chinese market and providing the research of the cumulative effect of corporate investment performance with a new perspective and tools; second, establishing the level of corporate governance evaluation index system, constructing a measuring model of the level of corporate governance and conducting an empirical test; Third, building the regulating effect model of corporate governance on corporate R&D investment performance, revealing the positive moderating effect of corporate governance on the performance of R&D investment.
全文共分为七章：第一章为绪论,主要阐述了本研究的选题背景和意义,回顾了国内外的相关研究成果的现状,列示了本研究的研究内容和研究框架,说明了本文的研究方法和研究思路。第二章为理论综述。对研发投入、绩效和公司治理进行了概念界定,引用了熊彼特创新理论、内生增长理论和委托代理理论等理论基础。第三章为企业研发投入绩效滞后效应研究,实证证实了公司研发投入绩效存在着显著的滞后效应。第四章为基于拓展的柯-道生产函数对企业研发投入绩效累积效应的研究,实证检验了企业研发投入绩效的累积效应。第五章为公司治理水平测度研究,采用主成分分析法对公司治理水平进行了合理的评价。第六章为公司治理对研发投入绩效的调节效应研究,构建了公司治理对研发投入绩效调节效应检验模型,分别采用层次调节回归分析法和分组回归分析法实证检验了公司治理对研发投入绩效的正向调节效应。第七章为研究结论与展望,对本文的研究结果进行了总结和归纳,提炼了三个主要创新点,针对本文尚存在的研究不足,提出了日后研究的建议和思路。
本研究主要取得了以下四个方面的研究成果：
首先,构建了双向固定效应检验模型,实证研究发现企业研发投入绩效存在着显著的滞后效应。在同时考虑个体效应和时间效应的基础上,控制了资本结构、企业规模、成长性和自由现金流等因索的影响,构建了双向固定效应检验模型,实证检验发现,滞后两年的企业研发投入绩效的效应明显大于滞后一年和滞后三年的效应,且显著性水平最高,这意味着企业的研发投入绩效存在着显著的滞后效应。
其次,拓展了柯布-道格拉斯生产函数,实证检验发现企业研发投入绩效存在着显著的累积效应。考虑到我国转轨时期制度环境因素对企业生产的影响,特将市场化程度因素引入,拓展了柯布-道格拉斯生产函数。采用OLS回归分析实证检验了研发投入绩效的累积效应。研究结果表明,企业研发投入绩效存在显著的累积效应。研发投入绩效在滞后三年内存在着显著的累积效应,而在第五年及之后时期中并不存在显著的累积效应。
再次,测度了我国上市公司治理水平。分别从股权结构特征、董事会特征、监事会特征、管理层特征、信息披露特征、会计师事务所特征和其它委员会特征等七个方面,选取了二十个公司治理评价指标,建立了公司治理水平评价体系,构建了公司治理水平评价模型,采用主成分分析法对样本企业的公司治理水平进行了合理的评价。
最后,构建了公司治理对研发投入绩效的调节效应模型,分别运用层次调节回归分析法和分组回归分析法检验了公司治理对研发投入绩效的调节效应。实证结果显示,公司治理对企业研发投入绩效存在着显著的调节效应,且公司治理在企业研发投入绩效中发挥着正向的调节效应,公司治理水平的改善有利于提高企业研发投入绩效。
本文的主要贡献在于：第一,拓展了柯布-道格拉斯生产函数,丰富了研究企业研发投入绩效累积效应的方法。增强了柯布-道格拉斯生产函数在中国市场中的解释力度,为研究企业投入绩效累积效应提供了新的视角和工具。第二,建立了公司治理水平评价指标体系,构建了公司治理水平的测度模型并进行了实证检验。第三,构建了公司治理对企业研发投入绩效的调节效应模型,验证了公司治理对企业研发投入绩效的正向调节效应。
With the rapid development of high-tech, corporate is facing unprecedented opportunities and challenges and the importance of research and development of science and technology is also increasingly apparent. In recent years, funding for R&D investment in China continued to maintain the growth trend, but the performance of R&D investment are far lower than developed countries in the West. Corporate R&D activities are the basic channels to achieve its technical upgrading, in order to survive in the increasingly fierce competition in the new century, the corporate must strengthen investment in research and development in science and technology and constantly updated production technology to make corporate s stay at cutting edge of technology in the industry, so as to maintain the dominance of the corporate market competition, and to ensure the long-term development of the corporate. As the corporate R&D activities are benefited uncertainty, inter-temporal and information asymmetries, which makes research and development activities in the principal-agent problem highlights, it has seriously hampered the efficiency of R&D investment. Good corporate governance can effectively reduce costs, mitigate information asymmetries and principal-agent problem. Therefore, to study the impact of corporate governance on corporate R&D investment performance has important theoretical and practical significance.
The paper is divided into seven chapters:The first chapter is an introduction, which mainly interprets the topics background and significance of the research, reviews the current situation of the domestic and foreign related research, lists the research content and research framework and illustrates the research method and research ideas; the second chapter is theory summary. It defines R&D investment, performance and corporate governance and discusses the theoretical basis of Schumpeter's innovation theory, the endogenous growth theory and the principal-agent theory; Chapter three is the study of lag effects of corporate R&D investment performance, which empirically confirms the company's R&D investment performance existing significant lag effects; Chapter four is the study of the cumulative effect of corporate R&D investment performance based on the modified Cobb-Douglas production function, which empirically tests of the cumulative effect of the corporate R&D investment performance; Chapter five studies the level of corporate governance measure and makes a reasonable evaluation of the level of corporate governance by the method of principal component analysis;Chapter six studies the moderating effect of corporate governance on R& D of investment performance and also build a test model for it which adopt hierarchical moderated regression analysis and grouping regression analysis to empirically test positive moderating role; Chapter seven is research conclusions and prospects review, which summarize the results of this study, refined three main innovations and proposed future research suggestions and ideas for the weaknesses in the study in this article.
This study acquires four main research results in the following aspects:
First, it build a two-way fixed effects test model and found that the performance of corporate R&D investment exist significant lag effect by empirical research method. On the basis of taking the individual effects and time effects into account, the paper build a two-way fixed effects test model by controlling the capital structure, firm size, growth, free cash flow and other factors. Empirical test found that the effect of corporate R&D investment performance of two period lag is obviously higher than that of one period lag and three period lag and is the highest significant level, which means that R&D investment performance exists significant lag effect.
Second, it has extended Cobb-Douglas production function and found that there is a significant cumulative effect in performance of corporate R&D investment by empirical test. Take the impact of institutional and environment factors of transition period in China on corporate production into account, the paper particularly cites the factors of market degree into the Cobb-Douglas production function and has extended Cobb-Douglas production function. It empirically tests of the cumulative effect of the R&D investment performance by OLS regression analysis. The study results show that the performance of corporate R&D investment exists significant cumulative effect. There is significant cumulative effect in R&D investment performance of three lag period, while it does not exist significant cumulative effect in or after the fifth period.
Third, the paper measures the level of corporate governance scientifically and reasonably. From the aspects of the mechanism of shareholding structure, the mechanism of the Board, the mechanism of Board of Supervisors, pay incentives mechanism, information disclosure mechanisms, audit mechanisms and other mechanisms of the commission, it selects twenty corporate governance evaluations, establishes the evaluation system of the level of corporate governance, builds the evaluation model of corporate governance and make a reasonable evaluation of the sample corporate governance level by principal component analysis method.
Finally, the paper builds moderating effect model of the corporate governance on performance of R&D investment and test the moderating effect of the corporate governance on R&D investment performance by hierarchical moderated regression analysis and grouping regression analysis. The empirical results show that the moderating effect of corporate governance on performance of corporate R&D investment is significant, the corporate governance plays a positive moderating effect in corporate R&D investment performance and the improvement of the level of corporate governance will help improve the performance of corporate R&D investment.
The main contribution of this paper is:first, fixing the Cobb-Douglas production function to enrich the research method of the cumulative effect of corporate R&D investment performance. Enhancing the explanatory power of the Cobb-Douglas production function in the Chinese market and providing the research of the cumulative effect of corporate investment performance with a new perspective and tools; second, establishing the level of corporate governance evaluation index system, constructing a measuring model of the level of corporate governance and conducting an empirical test; Third, building the regulating effect model of corporate governance on corporate R&D investment performance, revealing the positive moderating effect of corporate governance on the performance of R&D investment.
引文
[1]熊彼特.经济发展理论[M].北京：商务印书馆,1990.
[2]解维敏,方红星.金融发展、融资约束与企业研发投入[J].金融研究,2011,(5)：171-183
[3]Baysinger B D,Kosnik R D, Turk T A. Effects of Board and Owership Structure on Corporate R&D Strategy [J].Academy of Managerment Journal,1991,34 (1):205-214.
[4]Liddle B.Privatization Decision and Civil Engineering Project [J]Journal of Management in Engineering,1997, (5):73-78.
[5]Yannelis D, Christopoulos A G, Kalantzis F G. Estimating the Demand for ADSL and ISDN Services in Greece [J]. Telecommunications Policy,2009,33(10):621-627.
[6]Gompers, P Ishii J, Metrick A. Corporate Governance and Equity Prices [J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2003,118(1):107-156.
[7]Ahuja G, Lampert C M, Tandon V. Moving Beyond Schumpeter: Management Research on the Determinants of Technological Innovation [J].2008,2(1):1-98.
[8]Hill C W, Snell S A.External Control, Corporate Strategy and Firm Performance in Research-intensive Industries [J]. Strategic Management Journal,1988, (9):577-590.
[9]Connelly B L, Hoskisson R E, Tihanyi L, Certo S T.Ownership as a form of Corporate Governance[J]. Journal of Management Studies,2010,47(8):1561-1589.
[10]Edmans A. Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia [J]. The Journal of Finance,2009,64(6):2481-2513.
[11]Tribo J A, Berrone P, Surroca J. Do the Type and Number of Blockholders Influence R&D Investments? New evidence from Spain [J]. Corporate Governance:An International Review,2007, 15(5):828-842.
[12]Hu A G. Ownership, Government R&D, Private R&D. and Productivity in Chinese Industry [J].Journal of Comparative Eeonomies,2001,29(1):136-157.
[13]Balkin D B, Markman G D, Gomez-Mejia L R. Is CEO Pay in High-technology Firms Related to Innovation? [J]. Academy of Management Journal,2000,43(5):1118-1129.
[14]Nakahara T. Innovation Management Using Intellectual Capital [J]. International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management,2001,1(10):96-110.
[15]Barker V L, Mueller G C. CEO Characteristics and Firm R&D Spending [J]. Management Science, 2002,48(6):782-801.
[16]Catherine D Corolleur F Carrere M, Mangematin. Turning Scientific Knowledge into Capital:The Experience of Biotech Start-ups in France [J].Research Policy,2003, (10):52-71.
[17]Roe M.The Inevitable Instability of American Corporate Governance[R]. Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper,2004.
[18]Graham J R, Harvey C R, Rajgopal S.The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,40(3):3-73.
[19]Coles J L, Daniel N D, Naveen L. Managerial Incentives and Risk-taking [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,70(20):431-468.
[20]Wu J, Tu R. CEO Stock Option Pay and R&D Spending.A Behavioral Agency Explanation[J], Journal of Business Research,2007,60(5):482-492.
[21]Jensen M C, Meckling W H.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[22]Marta A. Geletkanycz. CEO outside Directorships and Firm Performance:A Reconciliation of Agency and Embeddedness Views [J].The Academy of Management Journal,2011,54(2):335-352.
[23]Minna Y. An Examination of the Effectiveness of CEO Stock Option Granting Decisions toward R&D Investments [J]. Journal of Business & Economics Research,2011,12(5):446-458.
[24]Yunlu D G, Murphy D D.R&D Intensity and Economic Recession Investigating the Moderating Role of CEO Characteristics[J] Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies,2012,19(3):284-293.
[25]Hochberg Y V. Venture Capital and Corporate Governance in the Newly Public Firm[R].Working Paper,2011.
[26]Anderson RC, Mansi SA, Reeb DM. Board Characteristics, Accounting Report Integrity, and the Cost of Debt [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2004,37(3):315-342.
[27]Pugliese A, Bezemer P, Zattoni A.Huse M, Bosch F, Volberda H W. Board of Directors's Contribution to Strategy:A Literature Review and Research Agenda [J]. Corporate Governance: An International Review,2009,17(3):292-306.
[28]Boone A 1, Field L C,Karpoff J M., Raheja C G.The Determinants of Corporate Board Size and Composition:An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,(85):66-101.
[29]Chung K H, Wright P, Kedia B.Corporate Governance and Market Valuation of Capital and R&D Investments [J]. Review of Financial Economics,2003,12(2):161-172.
[30]Gani L, Jermias J. Investigating the Effect of Board Independence on Performance across Different Strategies [J]. International Journal of Accounting2006,41(3):295-314.
[31]Chouaibi J, Affes H, Boujelbene Y. Characteristics of the Board of Directors and Involvement in Innovation Activities:A Cognitive Perspective [J]. International Journal of Managerial and Financial Accounting,2010,2(3):240-255.
[32]Chung K, Wdght P, Kedia B.Corporate Governance and Market Valuation of Capital and R&D Investments[J].Review of Financial Economics,2003,(12):161-172.
[33]张旭升,孟庆伟.企业技术创新的产权激励模式[J].科研管理,1998,(3)：31-37.
[34]萧延高,唐小我.国有企业技术创新的动力缺陷与制度安排[J].四川师范大学学报(社会科学版),2001,(1)：25-31.
[351刘三林,孟凡萍.技术创新与制度和管理创新的一体化[J].研究与发展管理,2000,(5)：17-20.
[36]夏冬.企业治理与企业创新：所有权结构、经营者特征与企业创新的关系研究[D].西安：西安交通大学,2003.
[37]陈隆,张宗益,杨雪松.上市企业公司治理结构对技术创新的影响[J].科技管理研究,2005,(9)：137-141.
[38]安同良,施浩.中国制造业企业 R&D行为模式的观测与实证[J].经济研究,2006,(2)：21-30.
[39]李丹蒙,夏立军.股权性质、制度环境与上市公司R&D强度[J].财经研究,2008,(4)：93-104.
[40]冯根福,温军.中国上市公司治理与企业技术创新关系的实证分析[J].中国工业经济,2008,(7)：91-102.
[41]任海云.股权结构与企业R&D投入关系的实证研究——基于A股制造业上市公司的数据分析[J].中国软科学,2010,(5)：126-135.
[42]孙建国,胡朝霞.中小企业板上市公司股权结构、公司治理与企业绩效：基于随机前沿生产函数的分析[J].投资研究,2012,(1)：110-122.
[43]吴延兵.中国工业R&D产出弹性测算(1993-2002)[J].经济学(季刊),2008,7(3)：869-890.
[44]Hall B H,Oriani R. Does the Market Value R&D Investment by European Firms? Evidence from a Panel of Manufaeturing Firms in France, Germany, and Italy [J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2006, (24):971-993.
[45]杨建君,李恒,薛琦.基于公司治理的企业家技术创新行为特征分析[J].中国软科学,2002,(12)：125-128.
[46]夏冬.所有权结构与企业创新效率[J].南开管理评论,2003,(3)：32-36.
[47]刘晓敏,李垣,史会斌.治理机制对企业技术创新的影响路径研究[J].科学学研究,2005,(5)：697-702.
[48]杨勇,达庆利,周勤.公司治理对企业技术创新投资影响的实证研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2007,(11)：61-65.
[49]刘运国,刘雯.我国上市公司的高管任期与R&D支出[J].管理世界,2007,(1)：128-136.
[50]周杰,薛有志.公司内部治理机制对R&D投入的影响——基于总经理持股与董事会结构的实证研究[J].研究与发展管理,2008,(3)：1-9.
[51]甄丽明,唐清泉.管理层风险偏爱、报酬激励与企业R&D投入——基于我国上市公司的经验研究[C].第三届(2008)中国管理学年会论文集,2008.
[52]宁静,井润田.CEO特征,R&D强度以及外部治理环境关系的实证研究[J].科研管理,2009,30(5)：178-]86.
[53]马富萍.高管持股与技术创新的相关性研究：基于文献综述[J].科技管理研究,2009,(11)298-300.
[54]张业韬,王成军,刘渐和.高管持股对企业创新投入的影响研究——来自创业板上市公司的经验证据[J].财会通讯,2012,(6)：132-136.
[55]赵洪江,陈学华,复晖.公司自主创新投入与治理结构特征实证研究[J].中国软科学,2008,(7)：145-149.
[56]谷棋,于东智.公司治理、董事会行为与经营绩效[J].财经问题研究,2001,(1)：58-65.
[57]肖曙光.独立董事制度与我国上市公司业绩的相关性研究[J].系统工程,2006,(8)：87-92.
[58]胡勤勤,沈艺峰.独立外部董事能否提高上市公司的经营业绩[J].世界经济,2002,(7)：55-62.
[59]胡永平.企业R&D支出的影响因素与我国企业R&D支出的特征分析[J].江苏商论,2006,(11)：105-106.
[60]胡永平,何建国.对重庆上市公司R&D支出影响因素的实证研究[J].科技政策与管理,2007,(4)：59-62.
[61]杨勇；达庆利.网络外部性下不对称企业技术创新投资决策研究[J].管理工程学报,2007,(1)：47-50.
[62]何强,陈松.我国上市公司董事会结构对R&D投入的影响[J].系统管理学报,2009,18(6)：612-619.
[63]黄国良,董飞.我国企业研发投入的影响因素研究——基于管理者能力与董事会结构的实证研究 [J].科技进步与对策,2010,27(17)：103-105.
[64]徐伟,尹元甲.基于创新型企业的董事会与创新投入实证研究[J].科技管理研究,2011,(20)：104-107.
[65]Chang S C,Chen S S, Lin C W.The Influence of Corporate Interal Governance on the Wealth Effect of R&D Expenditure Increases[R].Working Paper,2008.
[66]Chuang K, Wright P, Kedia B. Corporate Governance and Market Valuation of Capital and R&D Investments [J]. Review of Financial Economics,2003, (12):161-172.
[67]文芳.上市公司高管团队特征与R&D投资研究[J].山西财经大学学报,2008,30(8)：77-83.
[68]Bernardin H J, Kane J S, Ross S, Spina J D, Johnson D L. Performance Appraisal Design, Development, and Implementation[J]. Handbook of human resource management,1995, (10):462-493.
[69]Jensen M C, Murphy K J. Performance Pay and Top-management Incentives [J].Journal of Political Economy,1990, (98):225-264.
[70]Campbell J. P, Mccloy R, Oppler S H, Sager C E. A theory of Performance [J].Personnel Selection in Organizations,1993, (53):35-70.
[71]Brumbrach A. Performance management [M]. London:The Cromwell Press,1998.
[72]Fama E F, Jensen M C. Separation of ownership and Control [J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983 (26):301-325.
[73]林毅夫,蔡防,李周.中国的奇迹：发展战略与经济改革[M].上海：上海三联书店,1999.
[74]Shirley M M, Xu L C.Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts:Evidence from China [J]. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,2001, (17):168-200.
[75]Denis.D K, McConnell J J.International Corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003,38(1):1-36.
[76]Blair M M. Ownership and Control:Rethinking Corporrate Governance for the Twenty- First Century [M].Washington:Brookings Institution,1995.
[77]钱颖一.企业的治理结构改革和融资结构改革[J].经济研究,1995,(1)：20-29.
[78]Rajan R G, Zingales L. The Governance of the New Enterprise, in Xavier Vives, ed.:Corporate Governance, Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives [M]. Cambridge:Cambridge Universtiy Press, 2000.
[79]李维安.现代公司治理研究——资本结构、公司治理和国有企业股份制改造[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社.2001.
[80]Bergek A, Jacobsson S,Carisson B,Lindmark S,Rickne S. Analyzing the Functional Dynamics of Technological Innovation Systems:A Scheme of Analysis [J]. Research Policy,2008,37(3):407-429.
[81]张志会.熊彼特创新理论复兴的评析[D].沈阳：东北大学,2007.
[82]林如海,彭维湘.企业创新理论及其对企业创新能力评价意义的研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2009,(11)：118-121.
[83]夏征农,陈至立.辞海[M].上海：上海辞书出版社,2009.
[84]Heine K, Baumann F.Innovation, Tort Law, and Competition [R]. Working Paper,2012.
[85]Cuervo-Cazurra A, Annique C. Why Some Firms Never Invest in Formal R&D[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2010,31(7):759-779.
[86]Bhaskaran S R, kishnan V. Effort, Revenue, and Cost Sharing Mechanisms for Collaborative New Product Development [J]. Journal Management Science,2009,55(7):1152-1169.
[87]Hausmann R, Hidalgo C A. The Network Structure of Economic Output [J]. Journal of Economic Growth,2011,16(4):309-342.
[88]伊诺思.石油加工业中的发明与创新[M].北京：商务印书馆,1992.
[89]Peters B. Persistence of Innovation: Stylized Facts and Panel Data Evidence [J]. The Journal of Technology Transfer,2009,34(2):226-243.
[90]徐细雄,万迪防,梁巧转.技术创新策略与创新战略动机关系的若干命题[J].科学学研究,2005,(6)：841-844.
[91]张世贤.阀值效应：技术创新的低产业化分析——以中国医药技术产业化为例[J].中国工业经济,2005,(4)：12-13.
[92]程源,傅家骥.企业技术战略的理论构架和内涵[J].科研管理,2002,(5)：75-80.
[93]许治.政府公关R&D与内生经济增长[D].兰州：西北大学,2006
[94]Acemoglu D, Gancia G,, Zilibotti F. Competing Engines of Growth:Innovation and Standardization[J]. Journal of Economic Theory,2012,147(2):570-601.
[95]Acemoglu D, Cao D V. Innovation by Entrants and Incumbents[R]. Working Paper,2010.
[96]Arrow K J.The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing [J]. The Review of Economic Studies, 1962,29(3):155-173.
[97]He J, Liu T, Ding X. A Kind of Endogenous Growth Model Considering the Restraints of Nonrenewable Resources and Environment Pollution[C]. CINC 2009 International Conference, 2009:449-452.
[98]Gillingham K,Newell R G, Pizer W A.Modeling Endogenous Technological Change for Climate Policy Analysis[J]. Energy Economics,2008,30(6):2734-2753.
[99]Romer P M.Capital, Labor, and Productivity [J].Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.Microeconomics,1990, (19):337-367.
[100]Lentz R, Mortensen D T. Mortensen. An Empirical Model of Growth Through Product Innovation [J]. Econometrica,2008,76(6):1317-1373.
[101]Luttmer E G. J.On the Mechanics of Firm Growth [J]. Review of Economic Studies,2011, 78(3):1042-1068.
[102]Segerstrom P S, Anant T C, Dinopoulos E.A Schumpeterian Model of the Product Life Cycle [J]. The American Economic Review,1990,80(5):1077-1091.
[103]Aghion P, Howitt P, Violante G L.Technological Change and Earning Volatility[R]. Working Paper, 2000.
[104]王则柯.经济学的常识理性[J].社会科学战线,2006,(2)：56-62.
[105]Carree M A, Thurik A R. The Impact of Entrepreneurship on Economic Growth [J].International Handbook Series on Entrepreneurship,2010, (5):557-594.
[106]吴恒煜.信息不对称的市场：逆向选择、信息传递与信息甄别[J].商业研究,2002,(23)：19-21.
[107]Peterson P A, Jeong J. Exploring the Impact of Advertising and R&D Expenditures on Corporate Brand Value and firm-level Financial Performance [J]. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 2010,38(6):677-690.
[108]Carol C. Intangible Capital and U.S. Economic Growth [J]. Review of Income and Wealth,2009, 55(3):661-685.
[109]Adam S. The Wealth of Nations [M].America:Bantam Classics,2003.
[110]林钟高,徐虹.分共、控制权配置与内部控制效率研究[J].会计研究,2009,(3)：64-71.
[111]王雷,党兴华,杨敏利.两权分离度,剩余控制权,剩余索取权与公司绩效——基于两类国有上市公司的实证研究[J].管理评论,2010,(9)：24-35.
[112]任海云.公司治理对R&D投入与企业绩效关系调节效应研究[J].管理科学,2011,(5)：37-47.
[113]宋增基,郑海健,张宗益.公司治理的监督机制与激励机制间的替代效应[J]管理学报,2011,8(6)：836-843.
[114]法律出版社.中华人名共和国民法通则(最新修正版)[M].北京：法律出版社,2009.
[115]Frank M Z, Goyal V K. Capital Structure Decisions:Which Factors Are Reliably Important? [J]. Financial Management,2009,38(1):1-37.
[116]Charles P. Himmelberg., R Glenn Hubbard., Inessa love. Investment Protection Ownership and the Cost of Captial[J].National Bank of Belgium Working Paper,2010,
[117]刘国新,万君泰.市场结构对技术创新的影响分析[J].管理工程学报,1997,(1)：10-14.
[118]胡明茂,张建雄,兰燕飞.不对称信息下供应商占主导的委托代理模型[J].系统工程,2012,30(4)：106-110.
[119]Viral V. Acharya. A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation [J].Journal of Stability,2009,5(3):224-255.
[120]唐顾洋.我国上市公司股权结构与研发投入的关系研究[D].成都：西南材经大学,2007.
[121]Wang E C. R&D Efficiency and Economic Performance:A Cross-country Analysis using the Stochastic Frontier Approach [J] Journal of Policy Modeling,2007,29(2):345-360.
[122]Lev B, Sougiannis T. The Capitalization, Amortization, and Value Relevance of R&D [J].Journal of Accounting and Economids,1996,(21):107-138.
[123]Young D, Byrne S O.Eva and Value-based Management:A Practical Guide to Implementation [M]. New York:McGraw-Hill Press,2000.
[124]Gamer J L, Nam J, Ottoo R E. Determinants of Corporate Growth Opportunities of Emerging Firms [J] Journal of Economics and Business,2002,54(1):73-93.
[125]Brown J, Petersen B C. Cash Holdings and R&D Smoothing [J]Journal of Corporate Finance,2011, 17(3):694-709.
[126]Czarnitzki D, Hottenrott H. R&D Investment and Financing Constraints of Small and medium-sized Firms [J].Small Business Economics,2011,36(1):65-83.
[127]Markides C. Dynamic View of Strategy [J].Sloan Management Review,1999,40(3):155-163.
1128]Li D. Financial Constraints, R&D Investment, and Stock Returns [J].Review of Financial Studies, 2011,24(9):2974-3007.
[129]Aboody D, Lev B. R&D Productivity in the Chemical Industry [R].Working Paper,2001.
[130]Walters D, Lancaster G. Implementing Value Strategy through the Value [J].Management decision, 2000,38(3):160-178.
[131]何玮.我国大中型工业企业研究与开发费用支出对产出的影响——1990-2000年大中型工业企业 数据的实证分析[J]经济科学,2003,(3)：5-11.
[132]梁莱歆,张焕凤.高科技上市公司R&D投入绩效的实证研究[[J].中南大学学报(社会科学版),2005,(2)：232-236.
[133]王玉春,郭媛嫣.上市公司R&D投入与产出效果的实证分析[J].产业经济研究,2008,(6)：44-52.
[134]谢小芳,李懿东,唐清泉.市场认同研发投入的价值吗?——来自沪深A股市场的经验证据[J].中国会计评论,2009,(3)：299-314.
[135]任海云,师萍.公司R&D投入与绩效的实证研究——基于A股制造业上市公司的数据分析[J].科技进步与对策,2009,(2)：89-93.
[136]李维安,邱艾超.民营企业治理转型、政治联系与公司业绩[J].管理科学,2010,23(4)：2-14.
[137]姚益龙,梁红玉,宁吉安.媒体监督影响企业绩效机制研究——来自中国快速消费品行业的经验证据[J].中国工业经济,2011,(9)：151-160.
[138]高瑕,井润田,万媛媛.管理者决断权、高管薪酬与企业绩效的实证研究[J].管理评论,2012,24(4)：107-114.
[139]甄丽明,唐清泉.技术引进对企业绩效的影响及其中介因素的研究——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理评论,2010,22(9)：14-23.
[140]贺小刚,李新春,连燕玲.家族成员的权利集中度与企业绩效——对家族上市公司的研究[J].管理科学学报,2011,14(5)：86-96.
[141]周艳,曾静.企业R&D投入与企业价值相关关系实证研究——基于沪深两市上市公司的数据挖掘[J].管理评论,2011,32(1)：146-151.
[142]李婧,贺小刚,茆键.亲缘关系、创新能力与企业绩效[J].南开管理评论,2010,13(3)：117-124.
[143]于成学.我国企业研发投入与产出增长率关系的实证研究[J].科技管理究,2009,(3)：315-318.
[144]康艳玲,黄国良,陈克兢.高管特征对研发投入的影响——基于高技术产业的实证分析[J].科技进步与对策,2011,(28)：147-150.
[145]Keizer J A, Dijkstra L, Halman J. Explaining Innovative Efforts of SMEs:An Exploratory Survey among SMEs in the Mechanical and Electrical Engineering Sector in Netherlands [J].Technovation, 2002,22 (1):1-13.
[146]Sher P J, Yang P. The Effects of Innovative Capabilities and R&D Clustering on Firm Performance: The Evidence of Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry [J].Technovation,2005,25(1):33-43.
[147]魏锋,,石淦.多元化经营、研发投入与公司绩效[J].经济与管理研究,2008,(11)：49-54.
[148]梁莱歆,金杨,赵娜.基于企业生命周期的R&D投入与企业绩效关系研究——来自上市公司经验数据[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2010,(12)：11-17.
[149]刘莉亚,剑平,覃覃筱,代飞.面板数据计量模型适应性的比较研究[J].管理科学学报,2011,14(2)：86-96.
[150]Hausman J A, Taylor W E. Panel Data and Unobservable Individual Effects [J].Econometrica,1981, 49(6):1377-1398.
[151]Cazavan A, Jeanjean T. The Negative Impact of R&D Capitalization:A Value Relevance Approach [J]. European Accounting Review,2006,15 (1):37-61.
[152]Brown J R, Martinsson G, Petersen B C. Do Financing Constraints Matter for R&D? New Tests and Evidence [R].Working Paper,2010.
[153]Czarnitzki D, Hottenrott H, Thorwarth S. Industrial Research Versus Development Investment:The Implications of Financial Constraints [J].Cambridge Journal of Economics,2011,35(3):527-544.
[154]李中,周勤.内生性约束下研发投入、研发效率与企业绩效——中国高技术产业细分行业的样本[J].软科学,2012,26(7)：11-14.
[155]薛云奎,王志台.无形资产信息披露及其价值相关性研究——来自上海股市的经验证据[J].会计研究,2001,(11)：40-47.
[156]金杨.基于企业生命周期的R&D投入与企业绩效[D].长沙：中南大学,2010.
[157]Griliches Z. Productivity, R&D, and Basic Research at the Firm Level in the 1970s [J].American Economic Review,1986,76(1):141-154.
[158]Cobb C, Douglas P H. A Theory of Production [J]. American Economic Review,1928,18(1):139-165.
[159]Slow R W. A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth [J].Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1956,70(1):65-94.
[160]Bitzer J, Kerekes M Does Foreign Direct Investment Transfer Technology across Borders? New Evidence [J]. Economics Letters,2008,100(3):355-358.
[161]Tronconi C, Marzetti G V. Organization Capital and Firm Performance:Empirical Evidence for European Firms [J]. Economics Letters,2011,112(2):141-143.
[162]Lee T. Do Government Policies Affect Growth? Examining a Model with R&D and Factor Accumulation [J].Research in Economics,2011,65 (1):62-70.
[163]Branstetter LC, Sakakibara M. When Do Research Consortia Work Well and Why? Evidence from Japanese Panel Data [J]. Empirical Economics,2002,92(3):143-159
[164]Czarnitzki D, Hussinger K. The Link between R&D Subsidies, R&D Spending and Technological Performance [R]. ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper,2004.
[165]朱有为,徐康宁.研发资本累积对生产率增长的影响——对中国高技术产业的检验(1996-2004)[J].中国软科学,2007,(4)：57-67.
[166]解维敏,唐清泉.企业研发投入与实际绩效：破题A股上市公司[J].改革,2011,(3)：100-107.
[167]樊纲,王小鲁.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2011年度报告[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2011.
[168]Le S A, Walters B, Kroll M. The Moderationg Effects of External Monitors on the Ralationship between R&D Spending and Firm Performance [J].Journal of Business Research,2006, (59):278-287.
[169]Yeh Y H, Shu P G,Su Y H, Ho F S. Board Structure, Intra-Industry Competition and R&D Announcement Effect [R].Working Paper,2008.
[170]Chuang K H, Shen C H. Corporate Governance and Market Reactions to Capital and R&D Investment Decisions [R].Working Paper,2009.
[171]Berle A, Gardiner M.The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M].New York:Macmillan,1932.
[172]Jensen, M. C. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems [J].Journal of Finance,1993,48(3):831-880.
[173]Yermack D. Flights of Fancy:Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisites, and Inferior Shareholder Returns [J] Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(1):211-242.
[174]Lipton M, Lorsch J W. Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance [J].Business Lawyer, 1992,48(1):175-191.
[175]Cadbury S D. Committee on the financial Aspects of Corporate Governance [M].London:Gee Publishing Ltd,1992.
[176]Weisbach W S.Outside Directors and CEO Turnover [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988, (20): 431-460.
[177]Ang J S, Cole R A, Lin J W. Agency Cost and Ownership Structure [J]. Journal of Finance,2000, 55(1):81-106.
[178]Rosenstein S, Wyatt J G. Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder Wealth [J] Journal of Financial Economics,1993,26(2):59-77.
[179]Fama E F.Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm [J] Journal of Political Economy,1980, (88):288-307.
[180]Schellenger M H, Wood D D, Tashakori A. Board of director composition, shareholder wealth, and dividend policy[J]. Journal of Management,1989,15(3):457-467.
[181]Leftwich R W, Watts R L Zimmerman J L.Voluntary Corporate Disclosure:The Case of Interim Reporting [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1981, (19):50-77.
[182]Basinger M A, Jones M M, Holscher M A. Methionine Antagonism of Cisplatinum Nephrotoxicity [J]. Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology,1990,103(1):1-15.
[183]Molz R. Manageriar Domination of Boards of Directors and Financial Performance [J]. Journal of Business Research,1988,16(3):235-249.
[184]Shleifer A, Vishny R. A Survey of Corporate Governance [J].Joumal of Finanee,1997, 34(52):737-783.
[185]Baysinger B D, Butler H N. Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors:Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition [J] Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations,1985, (1):101-124.
[186]McConnell J J, Servaes H.Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1990,27(2):595-612.
[187]Yermack D. Do Corporation award CEO Stock Options Effectively? [J].Journal of Financial Economics,1995,39(1):237-269.
[188]Bhagat S, Black B. The Uncertain Relationship between Board Composition and Firm Performance [J].Business Layer,1999, (54):921-963.
[189]王跃堂,赵子夜,魏晓雁.董事会的独立性是否影响公司绩效[J].经济研究,2006,(5)：62-73.
[190]郑志刚,吕秀华.董事会独立性的交互效应和中国资本市场独立董事制度政策效果的评估[J].管理世界,2009,(7)：133-144.
[191]谭卓,缪柏其,方世建.中国上市公司股权集中度、董事会独立性和公司绩效——基于结构方程模型的研究[J].运筹与管理,2008,17(5)：125-130
[192]于东智,池国华.董事会规模、稳定性与公司绩效：理论与经验分析[J]经济研究,2004,(4)：70-79.
[193]袁萍.独立董事的信号作用博弈模型[J].运筹与管理,2006,(5)：99-103.
[194]李明辉.股权结构、公司治理对股权代理成本的影响——基于中国上市公司2001-2006年数据的研究[J].金融研究,2009,(2)：149-168.
[195]薛祖云,黄彤.董事会、监事会制度特征与会计信息质量——来自中国资本市场的经验分析[J].财 经理论与实,2004,(4)：84-89.
[196]Morek R, Shleifer A, Vishay R.Management Ownership and Market Valuation:An Empirical Analysis [J].Journal of Finaneial Eeonomies,1988, (20):293-315.
[197]施东辉,司徒大年.中国上市公司治理水平及对绩效影响的经验研究[J].世界经济,2004,(5)：67-79.
[198]林建秀.上市公司治理水平的影响因素与价值效应[Z].厦门：第八届会计与财务问题国际研讨会,2007.
[199]徐向艺,张立达.上市公司股权结构与公司价值关系研究——个分组检验的结果[J].中国工业济经,2008,(4)：102-109.
[200]南开大学公司治理研究中心公司治理评价课题组.中国上市公司治理指数与公司绩效的实证分析[J].管理世界,2006,(3)：104-113.
[201]田利辉.国有股权对上市公司绩效影响的U型曲线及政府两手论[J].经济研究,2005,(10)：48-58.
[202]万伦来,王立平,蒋有光.中国上市公司信息披露影响因素的实证研究——基于长江三角洲地区上市公司的经验证据[J].产业经济研究,2007,(3)：1-10.
[203]舒岳.股权结构与环境信息披露的实证研究——来自沪市上市公司的经验数据[J].财会通讯,2010,(6)：57-59.
[204]Shleifer A, Vishny R W. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986,94(3):461-488.
[205]Bethel J E, Julia P L, Opler T. Block Share Purchases and Corporate Performance [J]. The Journal of Finance,1998,53(2):605-634.
[206]Kaplan S K. Minton B A. Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards:Determinants and Implications for Managers [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1994,36(2):225-258.
[207]Hossain M,et al. Voluntary Disclosure in an Emerging Capital Market:Some Empirical Evidence from Companies Listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange[J]. The Internationul Journal of Accounting,1994,29(4):334-351.
[208]Chau G C, Gray S J. Ownership Structure and Corporate Voluntary Disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore [J]. The International Journal of Accounting,2002,37(2):247-265.
[209]Demsetz H.Lehn K. The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1985,93(6):1155-1177.
[210]LaPorta,et al. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation [C]. NBER Working Paper 7403National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA 1999.
[211]La Porta, Vishny, R W.et al. Law and Finance [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1998, (106):1113-1155.
[212]Claessens S, Djankov S. Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech Republic [J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,1999,27(3):498-513.
[213]Burkart M, Gromb D, Panunzi F. Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1997,112(3):693-728.
|214]Eisenhardt K M. Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review [J]. Academy of Management Review, 1989,14(1):57-74.
[215]Grossman S J, Hart O D. Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation[J].The Bell Journal of Economics,1980,11(1):42-64.
[216]Morck R. Management ownership and market valuation:An Empirical Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988, (20):293-315.
[217]刘银国,高莹,白文周.股权结构与公司绩效相关性研究[J].管理世界,2010,(9)：177-179.
[218]曹廷求,杨秀丽,孙宇光.股权结构与公司绩效：度量方法和内生性[J].经济研究,2007,(10)：126-137
[219]陈德萍,陈永圣.股权集中度、股权制衡度与公司绩效关系研究——2007-2009年中小企业板块的实证检验[J].会计研究,2011,(1)：38-43.
[220]徐向艺,王俊韡.控制权转移、股权结构与目标公司绩效——来自深、沪上市公司2001-2009的经验数据[J].中国工业经济,2011,(8)：89-98.
[221]徐莉萍,辛宁,陈工孟.股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营业绩的影响[JJ.经济研究,2006,(1)：90-100.
[222]刘星,刘伟.监督,抑或共谋?——我国上市公司股权结构与公司价值的关系研究[J].会计研究,2007,(6)：68-75.
[223]王吕锐,倪娟.外部监督、股权激励与股权代理成本[J].经济问题,2011,(9)：35-38.
[224]王化成,程小可,刘婷立.中国上市公司盈余质量研究[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2008.
[225]Luo S, Courtenay S M, Hossain M. The Effect of Voluntary Disclosure, Ownership Structure and Proprietary Cost on the Return——future Earnings Relation [J].Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,2006, 14(5):501-521.
[226]邹叶.控股股东超强控制与财务重述实证研究——来自中国上市公司的经验数据[D].武汉：华中科技大学,2009.
[227]Murphy K J. Incentives, Learning, and Compensation:A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts [J]. RAND Journal of Economics,1986,17(1):59-76.
[228]Murphy K J. Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration:An Empirical Analysis [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1985, (7):11-42.
[229]Coughlan A, Schmidt R. Mangerial Compensation, Management Turnover and Firm Performance:An Empirical Investigation [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1985, (7):43-66.
[230]张俊瑞,赵进文,张建.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效相关性的实证分析[J].会计研究,2003,(9)：29-34.
[231]孙月静,张文泉.董事会结构、公司绩效与高官层报酬[J].中国软科学,2007,(9)：97-103.
[232]高雷,宋顺林.高管报酬激励与企业绩效[J].财经科学,2007,(4)：96-104.
[233]周嘉南,黄登仕.2006.上市公司高级管理层报酬业绩敏感度与风险之间关系的实证检验[J].会计研究,2006,(4)：44-50.
[234]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000,(3)：32-39.
[235]吴育辉,吴世农.高管薪酬：激励还是自利?——来自中国上市公司的证据[J].会计研究,2010,(11)：40-48.
[236]Holmstrom B, Tirole J. Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1993,101(4):678-709.
[237]Morck R, Shleifer A, Vishny R W. Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control[C]. NBER Working Paper,1988.
[238]丑建忠,黄志忠,谢军.股权激励能够抑制大股东掏空吗[J].经济管理,2008,(17)：48-53.
[239]黄学利.信息披露和中小上市公司治理结构研究[J].经济问题探索,2009,(10)：139-143.
[240]陈晓,红林莎.企业治理结构和自愿性信息披露关系的实证研究——基于中小上市公司的经验分析[J].经济与管理研究,2009,(5)：109-116.
[241]王华,黄之骏.经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值——基于内生性视角的经验分析[J].管理世界,2006,(9)：101-116.
[242]黄桂田,张悦.企业改革30年：管理层激励效应：基于上市公司的样本分析[J].金融研究,2008,(12)：101-112.
[243]苏冬蔚,林大庞.股权激励、盈余管理与公司治理[J].经济研究,2010,(11)：88-100.
[244]黄珺,周春娜.股权结构、管理层行为对环境信息披露影响的实证研究——来自沪市重污染行业的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2012(1)：133-143.
[245]陈关亭.上市公司财务敏感区间与项目的审计意见[J].会计研究,2005,(7)：32-38.
[246]Aggarwal R, Klapper L, Wysocki P D. Portfolio Preferences of Foreign Institutional Investors [J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2005, (29):2919-2946.
[247]王克敏,陈井勇.股权结构、投资者保护与公司绩效[J].管理世界,2004,(7)：127-133.
[248]Dye R. Auditing Standards, Legal Liability, and Auditing Wealth [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1993, (101):887-914.
[249]方红址,戴捷敏.公司动机、审计师声誉和自愿性内部控制鉴证报告——基于 A 股公司2008—2009年年报的经验研究[J].会计研究,2012,(2)：87-95.
[250]王咏梅,王鹏.‘四大’与‘非四大’审计质量市场认同度的差异性研究[J].审计研究.2006,(5)：49-56.
[251]吴水澎,李奇凤.国际四大、国内十大与国内非十大的审计质量——来自2003年中国上市公司的经验[J].当代财经,2006,(2)：114-118.
[252]王艳艳,陈汉文.审计质量与会计信息透明度——来自中国上市公司的经验据[J].会汁研究,2006,(4)：9-15.
[253]方红星,孙翯,金韵韵.公司特征、外部审计与内部控制信息的自愿披露[J].会计研究,2009,(10)：44-52.
[254]Kaiser H F. A Second Generation Little Jiffy [J]. Psychometrika,1970, (35):401-415.
[255]Albert H. Ownership, Government R&D, Private R&D, and Productivity in Chinese Industry [J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2001,29(1):136-157.
[256]李冬伟,汪克夷.智力资本与高科技企业绩效关系的关系——环境的调节效应[J].科学学研究,2009,27(11)：1700-1707.
[257]李冬伟,李建良.智力资本、冗余资源与企业价值——基于一个调节效应模型的实证分析[J].科学学与科学科技管理,2010,31(11)：119-128.
[258]McConnell J J, Servaes H. Equity Ownership and the Two Faces of Debt [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1995,39(1):131-157.
[2]解维敏,方红星.金融发展、融资约束与企业研发投入[J].金融研究,2011,(5)：171-183
[3]Baysinger B D,Kosnik R D, Turk T A. Effects of Board and Owership Structure on Corporate R&D Strategy [J].Academy of Managerment Journal,1991,34 (1):205-214.
[4]Liddle B.Privatization Decision and Civil Engineering Project [J]Journal of Management in Engineering,1997, (5):73-78.
[5]Yannelis D, Christopoulos A G, Kalantzis F G. Estimating the Demand for ADSL and ISDN Services in Greece [J]. Telecommunications Policy,2009,33(10):621-627.
[6]Gompers, P Ishii J, Metrick A. Corporate Governance and Equity Prices [J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2003,118(1):107-156.
[7]Ahuja G, Lampert C M, Tandon V. Moving Beyond Schumpeter: Management Research on the Determinants of Technological Innovation [J].2008,2(1):1-98.
[8]Hill C W, Snell S A.External Control, Corporate Strategy and Firm Performance in Research-intensive Industries [J]. Strategic Management Journal,1988, (9):577-590.
[9]Connelly B L, Hoskisson R E, Tihanyi L, Certo S T.Ownership as a form of Corporate Governance[J]. Journal of Management Studies,2010,47(8):1561-1589.
[10]Edmans A. Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia [J]. The Journal of Finance,2009,64(6):2481-2513.
[11]Tribo J A, Berrone P, Surroca J. Do the Type and Number of Blockholders Influence R&D Investments? New evidence from Spain [J]. Corporate Governance:An International Review,2007, 15(5):828-842.
[12]Hu A G. Ownership, Government R&D, Private R&D. and Productivity in Chinese Industry [J].Journal of Comparative Eeonomies,2001,29(1):136-157.
[13]Balkin D B, Markman G D, Gomez-Mejia L R. Is CEO Pay in High-technology Firms Related to Innovation? [J]. Academy of Management Journal,2000,43(5):1118-1129.
[14]Nakahara T. Innovation Management Using Intellectual Capital [J]. International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management,2001,1(10):96-110.
[15]Barker V L, Mueller G C. CEO Characteristics and Firm R&D Spending [J]. Management Science, 2002,48(6):782-801.
[16]Catherine D Corolleur F Carrere M, Mangematin. Turning Scientific Knowledge into Capital:The Experience of Biotech Start-ups in France [J].Research Policy,2003, (10):52-71.
[17]Roe M.The Inevitable Instability of American Corporate Governance[R]. Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper,2004.
[18]Graham J R, Harvey C R, Rajgopal S.The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,40(3):3-73.
[19]Coles J L, Daniel N D, Naveen L. Managerial Incentives and Risk-taking [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006,70(20):431-468.
[20]Wu J, Tu R. CEO Stock Option Pay and R&D Spending.A Behavioral Agency Explanation[J], Journal of Business Research,2007,60(5):482-492.
[21]Jensen M C, Meckling W H.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[22]Marta A. Geletkanycz. CEO outside Directorships and Firm Performance:A Reconciliation of Agency and Embeddedness Views [J].The Academy of Management Journal,2011,54(2):335-352.
[23]Minna Y. An Examination of the Effectiveness of CEO Stock Option Granting Decisions toward R&D Investments [J]. Journal of Business & Economics Research,2011,12(5):446-458.
[24]Yunlu D G, Murphy D D.R&D Intensity and Economic Recession Investigating the Moderating Role of CEO Characteristics[J] Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies,2012,19(3):284-293.
[25]Hochberg Y V. Venture Capital and Corporate Governance in the Newly Public Firm[R].Working Paper,2011.
[26]Anderson RC, Mansi SA, Reeb DM. Board Characteristics, Accounting Report Integrity, and the Cost of Debt [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2004,37(3):315-342.
[27]Pugliese A, Bezemer P, Zattoni A.Huse M, Bosch F, Volberda H W. Board of Directors's Contribution to Strategy:A Literature Review and Research Agenda [J]. Corporate Governance: An International Review,2009,17(3):292-306.
[28]Boone A 1, Field L C,Karpoff J M., Raheja C G.The Determinants of Corporate Board Size and Composition:An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,(85):66-101.
[29]Chung K H, Wright P, Kedia B.Corporate Governance and Market Valuation of Capital and R&D Investments [J]. Review of Financial Economics,2003,12(2):161-172.
[30]Gani L, Jermias J. Investigating the Effect of Board Independence on Performance across Different Strategies [J]. International Journal of Accounting2006,41(3):295-314.
[31]Chouaibi J, Affes H, Boujelbene Y. Characteristics of the Board of Directors and Involvement in Innovation Activities:A Cognitive Perspective [J]. International Journal of Managerial and Financial Accounting,2010,2(3):240-255.
[32]Chung K, Wdght P, Kedia B.Corporate Governance and Market Valuation of Capital and R&D Investments[J].Review of Financial Economics,2003,(12):161-172.
[33]张旭升,孟庆伟.企业技术创新的产权激励模式[J].科研管理,1998,(3)：31-37.
[34]萧延高,唐小我.国有企业技术创新的动力缺陷与制度安排[J].四川师范大学学报(社会科学版),2001,(1)：25-31.
[351刘三林,孟凡萍.技术创新与制度和管理创新的一体化[J].研究与发展管理,2000,(5)：17-20.
[36]夏冬.企业治理与企业创新：所有权结构、经营者特征与企业创新的关系研究[D].西安：西安交通大学,2003.
[37]陈隆,张宗益,杨雪松.上市企业公司治理结构对技术创新的影响[J].科技管理研究,2005,(9)：137-141.
[38]安同良,施浩.中国制造业企业 R&D行为模式的观测与实证[J].经济研究,2006,(2)：21-30.
[39]李丹蒙,夏立军.股权性质、制度环境与上市公司R&D强度[J].财经研究,2008,(4)：93-104.
[40]冯根福,温军.中国上市公司治理与企业技术创新关系的实证分析[J].中国工业经济,2008,(7)：91-102.
[41]任海云.股权结构与企业R&D投入关系的实证研究——基于A股制造业上市公司的数据分析[J].中国软科学,2010,(5)：126-135.
[42]孙建国,胡朝霞.中小企业板上市公司股权结构、公司治理与企业绩效：基于随机前沿生产函数的分析[J].投资研究,2012,(1)：110-122.
[43]吴延兵.中国工业R&D产出弹性测算(1993-2002)[J].经济学(季刊),2008,7(3)：869-890.
[44]Hall B H,Oriani R. Does the Market Value R&D Investment by European Firms? Evidence from a Panel of Manufaeturing Firms in France, Germany, and Italy [J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2006, (24):971-993.
[45]杨建君,李恒,薛琦.基于公司治理的企业家技术创新行为特征分析[J].中国软科学,2002,(12)：125-128.
[46]夏冬.所有权结构与企业创新效率[J].南开管理评论,2003,(3)：32-36.
[47]刘晓敏,李垣,史会斌.治理机制对企业技术创新的影响路径研究[J].科学学研究,2005,(5)：697-702.
[48]杨勇,达庆利,周勤.公司治理对企业技术创新投资影响的实证研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2007,(11)：61-65.
[49]刘运国,刘雯.我国上市公司的高管任期与R&D支出[J].管理世界,2007,(1)：128-136.
[50]周杰,薛有志.公司内部治理机制对R&D投入的影响——基于总经理持股与董事会结构的实证研究[J].研究与发展管理,2008,(3)：1-9.
[51]甄丽明,唐清泉.管理层风险偏爱、报酬激励与企业R&D投入——基于我国上市公司的经验研究[C].第三届(2008)中国管理学年会论文集,2008.
[52]宁静,井润田.CEO特征,R&D强度以及外部治理环境关系的实证研究[J].科研管理,2009,30(5)：178-]86.
[53]马富萍.高管持股与技术创新的相关性研究：基于文献综述[J].科技管理研究,2009,(11)298-300.
[54]张业韬,王成军,刘渐和.高管持股对企业创新投入的影响研究——来自创业板上市公司的经验证据[J].财会通讯,2012,(6)：132-136.
[55]赵洪江,陈学华,复晖.公司自主创新投入与治理结构特征实证研究[J].中国软科学,2008,(7)：145-149.
[56]谷棋,于东智.公司治理、董事会行为与经营绩效[J].财经问题研究,2001,(1)：58-65.
[57]肖曙光.独立董事制度与我国上市公司业绩的相关性研究[J].系统工程,2006,(8)：87-92.
[58]胡勤勤,沈艺峰.独立外部董事能否提高上市公司的经营业绩[J].世界经济,2002,(7)：55-62.
[59]胡永平.企业R&D支出的影响因素与我国企业R&D支出的特征分析[J].江苏商论,2006,(11)：105-106.
[60]胡永平,何建国.对重庆上市公司R&D支出影响因素的实证研究[J].科技政策与管理,2007,(4)：59-62.
[61]杨勇；达庆利.网络外部性下不对称企业技术创新投资决策研究[J].管理工程学报,2007,(1)：47-50.
[62]何强,陈松.我国上市公司董事会结构对R&D投入的影响[J].系统管理学报,2009,18(6)：612-619.
[63]黄国良,董飞.我国企业研发投入的影响因素研究——基于管理者能力与董事会结构的实证研究 [J].科技进步与对策,2010,27(17)：103-105.
[64]徐伟,尹元甲.基于创新型企业的董事会与创新投入实证研究[J].科技管理研究,2011,(20)：104-107.
[65]Chang S C,Chen S S, Lin C W.The Influence of Corporate Interal Governance on the Wealth Effect of R&D Expenditure Increases[R].Working Paper,2008.
[66]Chuang K, Wright P, Kedia B. Corporate Governance and Market Valuation of Capital and R&D Investments [J]. Review of Financial Economics,2003, (12):161-172.
[67]文芳.上市公司高管团队特征与R&D投资研究[J].山西财经大学学报,2008,30(8)：77-83.
[68]Bernardin H J, Kane J S, Ross S, Spina J D, Johnson D L. Performance Appraisal Design, Development, and Implementation[J]. Handbook of human resource management,1995, (10):462-493.
[69]Jensen M C, Murphy K J. Performance Pay and Top-management Incentives [J].Journal of Political Economy,1990, (98):225-264.
[70]Campbell J. P, Mccloy R, Oppler S H, Sager C E. A theory of Performance [J].Personnel Selection in Organizations,1993, (53):35-70.
[71]Brumbrach A. Performance management [M]. London:The Cromwell Press,1998.
[72]Fama E F, Jensen M C. Separation of ownership and Control [J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983 (26):301-325.
[73]林毅夫,蔡防,李周.中国的奇迹：发展战略与经济改革[M].上海：上海三联书店,1999.
[74]Shirley M M, Xu L C.Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts:Evidence from China [J]. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,2001, (17):168-200.
[75]Denis.D K, McConnell J J.International Corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003,38(1):1-36.
[76]Blair M M. Ownership and Control:Rethinking Corporrate Governance for the Twenty- First Century [M].Washington:Brookings Institution,1995.
[77]钱颖一.企业的治理结构改革和融资结构改革[J].经济研究,1995,(1)：20-29.
[78]Rajan R G, Zingales L. The Governance of the New Enterprise, in Xavier Vives, ed.:Corporate Governance, Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives [M]. Cambridge:Cambridge Universtiy Press, 2000.
[79]李维安.现代公司治理研究——资本结构、公司治理和国有企业股份制改造[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社.2001.
[80]Bergek A, Jacobsson S,Carisson B,Lindmark S,Rickne S. Analyzing the Functional Dynamics of Technological Innovation Systems:A Scheme of Analysis [J]. Research Policy,2008,37(3):407-429.
[81]张志会.熊彼特创新理论复兴的评析[D].沈阳：东北大学,2007.
[82]林如海,彭维湘.企业创新理论及其对企业创新能力评价意义的研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2009,(11)：118-121.
[83]夏征农,陈至立.辞海[M].上海：上海辞书出版社,2009.
[84]Heine K, Baumann F.Innovation, Tort Law, and Competition [R]. Working Paper,2012.
[85]Cuervo-Cazurra A, Annique C. Why Some Firms Never Invest in Formal R&D[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2010,31(7):759-779.
[86]Bhaskaran S R, kishnan V. Effort, Revenue, and Cost Sharing Mechanisms for Collaborative New Product Development [J]. Journal Management Science,2009,55(7):1152-1169.
[87]Hausmann R, Hidalgo C A. The Network Structure of Economic Output [J]. Journal of Economic Growth,2011,16(4):309-342.
[88]伊诺思.石油加工业中的发明与创新[M].北京：商务印书馆,1992.
[89]Peters B. Persistence of Innovation: Stylized Facts and Panel Data Evidence [J]. The Journal of Technology Transfer,2009,34(2):226-243.
[90]徐细雄,万迪防,梁巧转.技术创新策略与创新战略动机关系的若干命题[J].科学学研究,2005,(6)：841-844.
[91]张世贤.阀值效应：技术创新的低产业化分析——以中国医药技术产业化为例[J].中国工业经济,2005,(4)：12-13.
[92]程源,傅家骥.企业技术战略的理论构架和内涵[J].科研管理,2002,(5)：75-80.
[93]许治.政府公关R&D与内生经济增长[D].兰州：西北大学,2006
[94]Acemoglu D, Gancia G,, Zilibotti F. Competing Engines of Growth:Innovation and Standardization[J]. Journal of Economic Theory,2012,147(2):570-601.
[95]Acemoglu D, Cao D V. Innovation by Entrants and Incumbents[R]. Working Paper,2010.
[96]Arrow K J.The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing [J]. The Review of Economic Studies, 1962,29(3):155-173.
[97]He J, Liu T, Ding X. A Kind of Endogenous Growth Model Considering the Restraints of Nonrenewable Resources and Environment Pollution[C]. CINC 2009 International Conference, 2009:449-452.
[98]Gillingham K,Newell R G, Pizer W A.Modeling Endogenous Technological Change for Climate Policy Analysis[J]. Energy Economics,2008,30(6):2734-2753.
[99]Romer P M.Capital, Labor, and Productivity [J].Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.Microeconomics,1990, (19):337-367.
[100]Lentz R, Mortensen D T. Mortensen. An Empirical Model of Growth Through Product Innovation [J]. Econometrica,2008,76(6):1317-1373.
[101]Luttmer E G. J.On the Mechanics of Firm Growth [J]. Review of Economic Studies,2011, 78(3):1042-1068.
[102]Segerstrom P S, Anant T C, Dinopoulos E.A Schumpeterian Model of the Product Life Cycle [J]. The American Economic Review,1990,80(5):1077-1091.
[103]Aghion P, Howitt P, Violante G L.Technological Change and Earning Volatility[R]. Working Paper, 2000.
[104]王则柯.经济学的常识理性[J].社会科学战线,2006,(2)：56-62.
[105]Carree M A, Thurik A R. The Impact of Entrepreneurship on Economic Growth [J].International Handbook Series on Entrepreneurship,2010, (5):557-594.
[106]吴恒煜.信息不对称的市场：逆向选择、信息传递与信息甄别[J].商业研究,2002,(23)：19-21.
[107]Peterson P A, Jeong J. Exploring the Impact of Advertising and R&D Expenditures on Corporate Brand Value and firm-level Financial Performance [J]. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 2010,38(6):677-690.
[108]Carol C. Intangible Capital and U.S. Economic Growth [J]. Review of Income and Wealth,2009, 55(3):661-685.
[109]Adam S. The Wealth of Nations [M].America:Bantam Classics,2003.
[110]林钟高,徐虹.分共、控制权配置与内部控制效率研究[J].会计研究,2009,(3)：64-71.
[111]王雷,党兴华,杨敏利.两权分离度,剩余控制权,剩余索取权与公司绩效——基于两类国有上市公司的实证研究[J].管理评论,2010,(9)：24-35.
[112]任海云.公司治理对R&D投入与企业绩效关系调节效应研究[J].管理科学,2011,(5)：37-47.
[113]宋增基,郑海健,张宗益.公司治理的监督机制与激励机制间的替代效应[J]管理学报,2011,8(6)：836-843.
[114]法律出版社.中华人名共和国民法通则(最新修正版)[M].北京：法律出版社,2009.
[115]Frank M Z, Goyal V K. Capital Structure Decisions:Which Factors Are Reliably Important? [J]. Financial Management,2009,38(1):1-37.
[116]Charles P. Himmelberg., R Glenn Hubbard., Inessa love. Investment Protection Ownership and the Cost of Captial[J].National Bank of Belgium Working Paper,2010,
[117]刘国新,万君泰.市场结构对技术创新的影响分析[J].管理工程学报,1997,(1)：10-14.
[118]胡明茂,张建雄,兰燕飞.不对称信息下供应商占主导的委托代理模型[J].系统工程,2012,30(4)：106-110.
[119]Viral V. Acharya. A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation [J].Journal of Stability,2009,5(3):224-255.
[120]唐顾洋.我国上市公司股权结构与研发投入的关系研究[D].成都：西南材经大学,2007.
[121]Wang E C. R&D Efficiency and Economic Performance:A Cross-country Analysis using the Stochastic Frontier Approach [J] Journal of Policy Modeling,2007,29(2):345-360.
[122]Lev B, Sougiannis T. The Capitalization, Amortization, and Value Relevance of R&D [J].Journal of Accounting and Economids,1996,(21):107-138.
[123]Young D, Byrne S O.Eva and Value-based Management:A Practical Guide to Implementation [M]. New York:McGraw-Hill Press,2000.
[124]Gamer J L, Nam J, Ottoo R E. Determinants of Corporate Growth Opportunities of Emerging Firms [J] Journal of Economics and Business,2002,54(1):73-93.
[125]Brown J, Petersen B C. Cash Holdings and R&D Smoothing [J]Journal of Corporate Finance,2011, 17(3):694-709.
[126]Czarnitzki D, Hottenrott H. R&D Investment and Financing Constraints of Small and medium-sized Firms [J].Small Business Economics,2011,36(1):65-83.
[127]Markides C. Dynamic View of Strategy [J].Sloan Management Review,1999,40(3):155-163.
1128]Li D. Financial Constraints, R&D Investment, and Stock Returns [J].Review of Financial Studies, 2011,24(9):2974-3007.
[129]Aboody D, Lev B. R&D Productivity in the Chemical Industry [R].Working Paper,2001.
[130]Walters D, Lancaster G. Implementing Value Strategy through the Value [J].Management decision, 2000,38(3):160-178.
[131]何玮.我国大中型工业企业研究与开发费用支出对产出的影响——1990-2000年大中型工业企业 数据的实证分析[J]经济科学,2003,(3)：5-11.
[132]梁莱歆,张焕凤.高科技上市公司R&D投入绩效的实证研究[[J].中南大学学报(社会科学版),2005,(2)：232-236.
[133]王玉春,郭媛嫣.上市公司R&D投入与产出效果的实证分析[J].产业经济研究,2008,(6)：44-52.
[134]谢小芳,李懿东,唐清泉.市场认同研发投入的价值吗?——来自沪深A股市场的经验证据[J].中国会计评论,2009,(3)：299-314.
[135]任海云,师萍.公司R&D投入与绩效的实证研究——基于A股制造业上市公司的数据分析[J].科技进步与对策,2009,(2)：89-93.
[136]李维安,邱艾超.民营企业治理转型、政治联系与公司业绩[J].管理科学,2010,23(4)：2-14.
[137]姚益龙,梁红玉,宁吉安.媒体监督影响企业绩效机制研究——来自中国快速消费品行业的经验证据[J].中国工业经济,2011,(9)：151-160.
[138]高瑕,井润田,万媛媛.管理者决断权、高管薪酬与企业绩效的实证研究[J].管理评论,2012,24(4)：107-114.
[139]甄丽明,唐清泉.技术引进对企业绩效的影响及其中介因素的研究——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理评论,2010,22(9)：14-23.
[140]贺小刚,李新春,连燕玲.家族成员的权利集中度与企业绩效——对家族上市公司的研究[J].管理科学学报,2011,14(5)：86-96.
[141]周艳,曾静.企业R&D投入与企业价值相关关系实证研究——基于沪深两市上市公司的数据挖掘[J].管理评论,2011,32(1)：146-151.
[142]李婧,贺小刚,茆键.亲缘关系、创新能力与企业绩效[J].南开管理评论,2010,13(3)：117-124.
[143]于成学.我国企业研发投入与产出增长率关系的实证研究[J].科技管理究,2009,(3)：315-318.
[144]康艳玲,黄国良,陈克兢.高管特征对研发投入的影响——基于高技术产业的实证分析[J].科技进步与对策,2011,(28)：147-150.
[145]Keizer J A, Dijkstra L, Halman J. Explaining Innovative Efforts of SMEs:An Exploratory Survey among SMEs in the Mechanical and Electrical Engineering Sector in Netherlands [J].Technovation, 2002,22 (1):1-13.
[146]Sher P J, Yang P. The Effects of Innovative Capabilities and R&D Clustering on Firm Performance: The Evidence of Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry [J].Technovation,2005,25(1):33-43.
[147]魏锋,,石淦.多元化经营、研发投入与公司绩效[J].经济与管理研究,2008,(11)：49-54.
[148]梁莱歆,金杨,赵娜.基于企业生命周期的R&D投入与企业绩效关系研究——来自上市公司经验数据[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2010,(12)：11-17.
[149]刘莉亚,剑平,覃覃筱,代飞.面板数据计量模型适应性的比较研究[J].管理科学学报,2011,14(2)：86-96.
[150]Hausman J A, Taylor W E. Panel Data and Unobservable Individual Effects [J].Econometrica,1981, 49(6):1377-1398.
[151]Cazavan A, Jeanjean T. The Negative Impact of R&D Capitalization:A Value Relevance Approach [J]. European Accounting Review,2006,15 (1):37-61.
[152]Brown J R, Martinsson G, Petersen B C. Do Financing Constraints Matter for R&D? New Tests and Evidence [R].Working Paper,2010.
[153]Czarnitzki D, Hottenrott H, Thorwarth S. Industrial Research Versus Development Investment:The Implications of Financial Constraints [J].Cambridge Journal of Economics,2011,35(3):527-544.
[154]李中,周勤.内生性约束下研发投入、研发效率与企业绩效——中国高技术产业细分行业的样本[J].软科学,2012,26(7)：11-14.
[155]薛云奎,王志台.无形资产信息披露及其价值相关性研究——来自上海股市的经验证据[J].会计研究,2001,(11)：40-47.
[156]金杨.基于企业生命周期的R&D投入与企业绩效[D].长沙：中南大学,2010.
[157]Griliches Z. Productivity, R&D, and Basic Research at the Firm Level in the 1970s [J].American Economic Review,1986,76(1):141-154.
[158]Cobb C, Douglas P H. A Theory of Production [J]. American Economic Review,1928,18(1):139-165.
[159]Slow R W. A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth [J].Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1956,70(1):65-94.
[160]Bitzer J, Kerekes M Does Foreign Direct Investment Transfer Technology across Borders? New Evidence [J]. Economics Letters,2008,100(3):355-358.
[161]Tronconi C, Marzetti G V. Organization Capital and Firm Performance:Empirical Evidence for European Firms [J]. Economics Letters,2011,112(2):141-143.
[162]Lee T. Do Government Policies Affect Growth? Examining a Model with R&D and Factor Accumulation [J].Research in Economics,2011,65 (1):62-70.
[163]Branstetter LC, Sakakibara M. When Do Research Consortia Work Well and Why? Evidence from Japanese Panel Data [J]. Empirical Economics,2002,92(3):143-159
[164]Czarnitzki D, Hussinger K. The Link between R&D Subsidies, R&D Spending and Technological Performance [R]. ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper,2004.
[165]朱有为,徐康宁.研发资本累积对生产率增长的影响——对中国高技术产业的检验(1996-2004)[J].中国软科学,2007,(4)：57-67.
[166]解维敏,唐清泉.企业研发投入与实际绩效：破题A股上市公司[J].改革,2011,(3)：100-107.
[167]樊纲,王小鲁.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2011年度报告[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2011.
[168]Le S A, Walters B, Kroll M. The Moderationg Effects of External Monitors on the Ralationship between R&D Spending and Firm Performance [J].Journal of Business Research,2006, (59):278-287.
[169]Yeh Y H, Shu P G,Su Y H, Ho F S. Board Structure, Intra-Industry Competition and R&D Announcement Effect [R].Working Paper,2008.
[170]Chuang K H, Shen C H. Corporate Governance and Market Reactions to Capital and R&D Investment Decisions [R].Working Paper,2009.
[171]Berle A, Gardiner M.The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M].New York:Macmillan,1932.
[172]Jensen, M. C. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems [J].Journal of Finance,1993,48(3):831-880.
[173]Yermack D. Flights of Fancy:Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisites, and Inferior Shareholder Returns [J] Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(1):211-242.
[174]Lipton M, Lorsch J W. Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance [J].Business Lawyer, 1992,48(1):175-191.
[175]Cadbury S D. Committee on the financial Aspects of Corporate Governance [M].London:Gee Publishing Ltd,1992.
[176]Weisbach W S.Outside Directors and CEO Turnover [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988, (20): 431-460.
[177]Ang J S, Cole R A, Lin J W. Agency Cost and Ownership Structure [J]. Journal of Finance,2000, 55(1):81-106.
[178]Rosenstein S, Wyatt J G. Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder Wealth [J] Journal of Financial Economics,1993,26(2):59-77.
[179]Fama E F.Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm [J] Journal of Political Economy,1980, (88):288-307.
[180]Schellenger M H, Wood D D, Tashakori A. Board of director composition, shareholder wealth, and dividend policy[J]. Journal of Management,1989,15(3):457-467.
[181]Leftwich R W, Watts R L Zimmerman J L.Voluntary Corporate Disclosure:The Case of Interim Reporting [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1981, (19):50-77.
[182]Basinger M A, Jones M M, Holscher M A. Methionine Antagonism of Cisplatinum Nephrotoxicity [J]. Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology,1990,103(1):1-15.
[183]Molz R. Manageriar Domination of Boards of Directors and Financial Performance [J]. Journal of Business Research,1988,16(3):235-249.
[184]Shleifer A, Vishny R. A Survey of Corporate Governance [J].Joumal of Finanee,1997, 34(52):737-783.
[185]Baysinger B D, Butler H N. Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors:Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition [J] Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations,1985, (1):101-124.
[186]McConnell J J, Servaes H.Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1990,27(2):595-612.
[187]Yermack D. Do Corporation award CEO Stock Options Effectively? [J].Journal of Financial Economics,1995,39(1):237-269.
[188]Bhagat S, Black B. The Uncertain Relationship between Board Composition and Firm Performance [J].Business Layer,1999, (54):921-963.
[189]王跃堂,赵子夜,魏晓雁.董事会的独立性是否影响公司绩效[J].经济研究,2006,(5)：62-73.
[190]郑志刚,吕秀华.董事会独立性的交互效应和中国资本市场独立董事制度政策效果的评估[J].管理世界,2009,(7)：133-144.
[191]谭卓,缪柏其,方世建.中国上市公司股权集中度、董事会独立性和公司绩效——基于结构方程模型的研究[J].运筹与管理,2008,17(5)：125-130
[192]于东智,池国华.董事会规模、稳定性与公司绩效：理论与经验分析[J]经济研究,2004,(4)：70-79.
[193]袁萍.独立董事的信号作用博弈模型[J].运筹与管理,2006,(5)：99-103.
[194]李明辉.股权结构、公司治理对股权代理成本的影响——基于中国上市公司2001-2006年数据的研究[J].金融研究,2009,(2)：149-168.
[195]薛祖云,黄彤.董事会、监事会制度特征与会计信息质量——来自中国资本市场的经验分析[J].财 经理论与实,2004,(4)：84-89.
[196]Morek R, Shleifer A, Vishay R.Management Ownership and Market Valuation:An Empirical Analysis [J].Journal of Finaneial Eeonomies,1988, (20):293-315.
[197]施东辉,司徒大年.中国上市公司治理水平及对绩效影响的经验研究[J].世界经济,2004,(5)：67-79.
[198]林建秀.上市公司治理水平的影响因素与价值效应[Z].厦门：第八届会计与财务问题国际研讨会,2007.
[199]徐向艺,张立达.上市公司股权结构与公司价值关系研究——个分组检验的结果[J].中国工业济经,2008,(4)：102-109.
[200]南开大学公司治理研究中心公司治理评价课题组.中国上市公司治理指数与公司绩效的实证分析[J].管理世界,2006,(3)：104-113.
[201]田利辉.国有股权对上市公司绩效影响的U型曲线及政府两手论[J].经济研究,2005,(10)：48-58.
[202]万伦来,王立平,蒋有光.中国上市公司信息披露影响因素的实证研究——基于长江三角洲地区上市公司的经验证据[J].产业经济研究,2007,(3)：1-10.
[203]舒岳.股权结构与环境信息披露的实证研究——来自沪市上市公司的经验数据[J].财会通讯,2010,(6)：57-59.
[204]Shleifer A, Vishny R W. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986,94(3):461-488.
[205]Bethel J E, Julia P L, Opler T. Block Share Purchases and Corporate Performance [J]. The Journal of Finance,1998,53(2):605-634.
[206]Kaplan S K. Minton B A. Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards:Determinants and Implications for Managers [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1994,36(2):225-258.
[207]Hossain M,et al. Voluntary Disclosure in an Emerging Capital Market:Some Empirical Evidence from Companies Listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange[J]. The Internationul Journal of Accounting,1994,29(4):334-351.
[208]Chau G C, Gray S J. Ownership Structure and Corporate Voluntary Disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore [J]. The International Journal of Accounting,2002,37(2):247-265.
[209]Demsetz H.Lehn K. The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1985,93(6):1155-1177.
[210]LaPorta,et al. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation [C]. NBER Working Paper 7403National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA 1999.
[211]La Porta, Vishny, R W.et al. Law and Finance [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1998, (106):1113-1155.
[212]Claessens S, Djankov S. Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech Republic [J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,1999,27(3):498-513.
[213]Burkart M, Gromb D, Panunzi F. Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1997,112(3):693-728.
|214]Eisenhardt K M. Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review [J]. Academy of Management Review, 1989,14(1):57-74.
[215]Grossman S J, Hart O D. Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation[J].The Bell Journal of Economics,1980,11(1):42-64.
[216]Morck R. Management ownership and market valuation:An Empirical Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988, (20):293-315.
[217]刘银国,高莹,白文周.股权结构与公司绩效相关性研究[J].管理世界,2010,(9)：177-179.
[218]曹廷求,杨秀丽,孙宇光.股权结构与公司绩效：度量方法和内生性[J].经济研究,2007,(10)：126-137
[219]陈德萍,陈永圣.股权集中度、股权制衡度与公司绩效关系研究——2007-2009年中小企业板块的实证检验[J].会计研究,2011,(1)：38-43.
[220]徐向艺,王俊韡.控制权转移、股权结构与目标公司绩效——来自深、沪上市公司2001-2009的经验数据[J].中国工业经济,2011,(8)：89-98.
[221]徐莉萍,辛宁,陈工孟.股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营业绩的影响[JJ.经济研究,2006,(1)：90-100.
[222]刘星,刘伟.监督,抑或共谋?——我国上市公司股权结构与公司价值的关系研究[J].会计研究,2007,(6)：68-75.
[223]王吕锐,倪娟.外部监督、股权激励与股权代理成本[J].经济问题,2011,(9)：35-38.
[224]王化成,程小可,刘婷立.中国上市公司盈余质量研究[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2008.
[225]Luo S, Courtenay S M, Hossain M. The Effect of Voluntary Disclosure, Ownership Structure and Proprietary Cost on the Return——future Earnings Relation [J].Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,2006, 14(5):501-521.
[226]邹叶.控股股东超强控制与财务重述实证研究——来自中国上市公司的经验数据[D].武汉：华中科技大学,2009.
[227]Murphy K J. Incentives, Learning, and Compensation:A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts [J]. RAND Journal of Economics,1986,17(1):59-76.
[228]Murphy K J. Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration:An Empirical Analysis [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1985, (7):11-42.
[229]Coughlan A, Schmidt R. Mangerial Compensation, Management Turnover and Firm Performance:An Empirical Investigation [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1985, (7):43-66.
[230]张俊瑞,赵进文,张建.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效相关性的实证分析[J].会计研究,2003,(9)：29-34.
[231]孙月静,张文泉.董事会结构、公司绩效与高官层报酬[J].中国软科学,2007,(9)：97-103.
[232]高雷,宋顺林.高管报酬激励与企业绩效[J].财经科学,2007,(4)：96-104.
[233]周嘉南,黄登仕.2006.上市公司高级管理层报酬业绩敏感度与风险之间关系的实证检验[J].会计研究,2006,(4)：44-50.
[234]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000,(3)：32-39.
[235]吴育辉,吴世农.高管薪酬：激励还是自利?——来自中国上市公司的证据[J].会计研究,2010,(11)：40-48.
[236]Holmstrom B, Tirole J. Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1993,101(4):678-709.
[237]Morck R, Shleifer A, Vishny R W. Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control[C]. NBER Working Paper,1988.
[238]丑建忠,黄志忠,谢军.股权激励能够抑制大股东掏空吗[J].经济管理,2008,(17)：48-53.
[239]黄学利.信息披露和中小上市公司治理结构研究[J].经济问题探索,2009,(10)：139-143.
[240]陈晓,红林莎.企业治理结构和自愿性信息披露关系的实证研究——基于中小上市公司的经验分析[J].经济与管理研究,2009,(5)：109-116.
[241]王华,黄之骏.经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值——基于内生性视角的经验分析[J].管理世界,2006,(9)：101-116.
[242]黄桂田,张悦.企业改革30年：管理层激励效应：基于上市公司的样本分析[J].金融研究,2008,(12)：101-112.
[243]苏冬蔚,林大庞.股权激励、盈余管理与公司治理[J].经济研究,2010,(11)：88-100.
[244]黄珺,周春娜.股权结构、管理层行为对环境信息披露影响的实证研究——来自沪市重污染行业的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2012(1)：133-143.
[245]陈关亭.上市公司财务敏感区间与项目的审计意见[J].会计研究,2005,(7)：32-38.
[246]Aggarwal R, Klapper L, Wysocki P D. Portfolio Preferences of Foreign Institutional Investors [J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2005, (29):2919-2946.
[247]王克敏,陈井勇.股权结构、投资者保护与公司绩效[J].管理世界,2004,(7)：127-133.
[248]Dye R. Auditing Standards, Legal Liability, and Auditing Wealth [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1993, (101):887-914.
[249]方红址,戴捷敏.公司动机、审计师声誉和自愿性内部控制鉴证报告——基于 A 股公司2008—2009年年报的经验研究[J].会计研究,2012,(2)：87-95.
[250]王咏梅,王鹏.‘四大’与‘非四大’审计质量市场认同度的差异性研究[J].审计研究.2006,(5)：49-56.
[251]吴水澎,李奇凤.国际四大、国内十大与国内非十大的审计质量——来自2003年中国上市公司的经验[J].当代财经,2006,(2)：114-118.
[252]王艳艳,陈汉文.审计质量与会计信息透明度——来自中国上市公司的经验据[J].会汁研究,2006,(4)：9-15.
[253]方红星,孙翯,金韵韵.公司特征、外部审计与内部控制信息的自愿披露[J].会计研究,2009,(10)：44-52.
[254]Kaiser H F. A Second Generation Little Jiffy [J]. Psychometrika,1970, (35):401-415.
[255]Albert H. Ownership, Government R&D, Private R&D, and Productivity in Chinese Industry [J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2001,29(1):136-157.
[256]李冬伟,汪克夷.智力资本与高科技企业绩效关系的关系——环境的调节效应[J].科学学研究,2009,27(11)：1700-1707.
[257]李冬伟,李建良.智力资本、冗余资源与企业价值——基于一个调节效应模型的实证分析[J].科学学与科学科技管理,2010,31(11)：119-128.
[258]McConnell J J, Servaes H. Equity Ownership and the Two Faces of Debt [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1995,39(1):131-157.