华人家族企业集团双重治理研究
|
摘要
华人家族企业集团在中国以及东南亚地区等新兴市场中广泛存在,它们往往规模甚巨,同时在不同的产品市场进行着广泛的多元化经营。为什么这些家族企业能够不断地实现成长,在一定程度上破解华人家族企业“富不过三代”的魔咒?毋庸置疑,治理结构是至关重要的影响因素。而随着上世纪七八十年代中国大陆以及东南亚地区华人经济的崛起和华人企业的巨大成功,华人家族企业的治理结构也成为家族企业研究中的核心问题之一。
华人家族企业集团的治理模式表现出明显的双重治理特征。然而已有家族企业治理研究中的主流文献大多忽视了“家族”这一根本性的研究变量,只注重企业系统的经济契约分析,研究的逻辑思路停留在家族涉入如何影响企业绩效的问题上,将企业身后的家族同质化、符号化,对决定家族涉入的影响机制却语焉不详。
本文遵循“制度—行为—绩效”的研究思路,以“华人家族企业集团的双重治理”作为全文的研究主线,按照“家族—集团—企业”的论述层次,力图探究以下三个紧密相连的问题：第一,华人家族企业集团的形成过程及其微观基础。第二,华人家族企业集团双重治理的理论内涵、作用机制及其变迁过程。第三,“家族—公司”双重治理模式与整个企业集团中所有企业绩效的关系及其影响路径。本文的研究通过将家族涉入影响企业绩效的逻辑链条向前推演一个层次,以期对家族企业的治理理论进行拓展和完善。
本文通过回顾相关理论文献,首先对家族企业治理的基本理论问题进行了梳理,界定了华人家族企业集团双重治理的理论框架。在此框架下,有针对性地收集中国台湾地区(337位家族成员—20强家族企业集团—1665家企业)、中国大陆(572位家族成员—187家狭义上市家族企业集团—406家企业)以及东南亚地区的华人家族企业集团(37位家族成员—1个已实现四代传承的百年企业集团—30家企业)的资料进行分析。一方面,虽然海外的华人家族企业集团与中国大陆的家族企业集团在制度环境、生命周期等方面存在显著差异,但“本是同根生”的中华文化使其具有共性；另一方面,与中国大陆不同,海外华人的家族制度得到了长时段的延续,并未中断。并且,虽然同为海外华人家族企业,相较于东南亚地区,中国台湾已历经现代化进程的洗礼,这又使得三者具有特性。通过三者的比较研究,可更加全面地揭示华人家族企业集团双重治理的机制所在。
对应本文提出的三个问题,本文的主要结论如下：
(1)就华人家族企业集团的形成过程而言,两个微观基础均发挥了相应的作用。家族社会性契约的“嵌入”和企业层面的经济理性促成了企业集团的形成(对应问题一)。
(2)华人家族企业集团的治理模式呈现出双重治理的特征,在其构成上有别于主流研究中第二代公司治理文献的研究框架和研究结论。在家族治理中,家族是被治理的对象,是客体；在公司治理中,家族是治理的主体,并在企业集团层面上形成家族化的治理模式(对应问题二)。
(3)从静态的视角观察,三者的双重治理既有相似点也有差异。相似点表现在对家族成员内部权力配置结构的治理机制、金字塔式的控股结构等方面；差异体现在家族传承、持股方式等方面(对应问题二)。
(4)从动态的视角观察,双重治理模式在海外华人家族企业集团中长时段延续,钱德勒式的单线型管理革命难以在华人企业中产生(对应问题二)
(5)实证分析发现,在同一企业集团中,“业主+其他家族成员”管理的分子企业绩效最优,业主单独控制的企业绩效较优,非业主家族成员管理的企业绩效次之,无家族成员管理的企业绩效再次之。集团内上市企业的绩效显著优于非上市企业,分子企业的绩效与层级负相关,并与核心公司对分子企业的两权分离度负相关,核心公司在分子企业中的所有权对绩效的影响不明确(对应问题三)。
本文主要的创新之处在于：第一,深入家族内部,从理论上构建了华人家族企业集团双重治理的理论框架。第二,从实证上分析了双重治理对同一企业集团中所有企业绩效的影响机理,跳出了单纯比较家族企业和非家族企业绩效优劣的窠臼。第三,研究资料的创新,在国内首次采用中国台湾地区大型华人家族企业集团的数据,以及通过实地调研获得的东南亚华人家族企业集团的一手资料。
Chiness family business groups are very common in emerging markets such as China and Southeast Asia, also they are very big companies and very diversified in various industries. Why these family business can accomplish growth from time to time. It is no doubt that the governance structure is very important, and the governance model of Chinese family business have become the hot spot both in academic cirles and practical circles because of the rise of Chinese economy.
Dual governance structure is the most and foremost characteristics of Chinese family business, but the main literatures of family business governance neglect the "family" variable, which is foremost and key to family business. And the logic idea only focus on how the family involvement affect firm's value and performance, but did not research the mechanism which determine the involvement of family.
This paper is following on the research structure based on "Institution-Behavior-Performance" method. The main theme is aroud the subject of "the dual governance of Chinese family business groups", illustrating the theme by "Family-Business groups-Firms". The entire research is defining on the following questions:First, the formation of the Chinese family business groups and their micro structure bases. Second, the theorical meaning, effecting mechanism and the change process of the dual governance. Third, the relationship between the dual governce model and business groups performance. This paper can enrich the family governance theory by pushing the logic chain of how family involvement affect business goups performance.
With the literature review, the paper defines the theorical framework of the dual governance of Chinese family business groups. Following the framework. this paper collects the data of Chinese family business groups from Taiwan district(337 family members-20 biggest business groups-1665 firms), from Mainland China(572 family members-187 real public business groups-406 firms) and from Southeast Asia(37 family members-a 112 years old family business gourps-30 firms), with the hope that we can discovery the dual governance of Chinese family business groups by detailed comparisons.
Corresspongding to the above three questions, the main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
(1) For the formation the Chinese family business groups, the two micro bases have its effects respectively. The embeddness of the social contracts(the family contracts) and the economic rationality on the firm level have promoted the formation of Chinese family business groups. Which is the answer to question 1.
(2) The governance strucrure of Chinese family business groups is a dual governance model, and its composition is different from the mainstream literature's research structure and conclusions, which is guided by the second generation literature of coporate governance. In the family governance, the family itself is the object of the governance, but in the coporate governance, the family is the subject. Which is the answer to question 2.
(3) From the static perspective, the dual governance structure of the Taiwan district, Mainland China and the Southeast Asia not only have similarities, but also differences. The similarities are as follows:the governance mechanism of the allocation of the ownership, control and management between family members, the pyramidal holding structures et al. And the differences are as follows:the family succession, the way of how to holding et al. Which is also the answer to question 2.
(4) From the dynamic perpective, the dual governance structure have continue in the overseas Chinese family groups for a very long time. The single-line of the management revolution which is mentioned by A.D.Chandler, is very hard to occur in the Chinese family business groups. Which is also the answer to question 2.
(5) From the empirical studies, this paper finds that, the firm's performance is best when it is managed by "owner+other family members", and less when it is managd by owner only, and less when it is managed by other family members, and less by the professional managers. Also the performance of public firms in the business groups are superior to non-public firms, the relationship between layer and firm performance is negative. And the core company's ownership on the firm performance is not clear, but the separation of ownership and control of the core company on the firm have negative effect on its performance. Which is the answer to question 3.
The innovations of this paper are as follows. Firstly, to explore the detailed family data, and to construct the framework of dual governance of Chinese family business groups. Secondly, to study the performance differences of the firms which are belong to the same business groups. Thirdly, for the first time, to use the business groups from Taiwan district in domestic studies, and the first data which is collectd by the field investigation.
华人家族企业集团的治理模式表现出明显的双重治理特征。然而已有家族企业治理研究中的主流文献大多忽视了“家族”这一根本性的研究变量,只注重企业系统的经济契约分析,研究的逻辑思路停留在家族涉入如何影响企业绩效的问题上,将企业身后的家族同质化、符号化,对决定家族涉入的影响机制却语焉不详。
本文遵循“制度—行为—绩效”的研究思路,以“华人家族企业集团的双重治理”作为全文的研究主线,按照“家族—集团—企业”的论述层次,力图探究以下三个紧密相连的问题：第一,华人家族企业集团的形成过程及其微观基础。第二,华人家族企业集团双重治理的理论内涵、作用机制及其变迁过程。第三,“家族—公司”双重治理模式与整个企业集团中所有企业绩效的关系及其影响路径。本文的研究通过将家族涉入影响企业绩效的逻辑链条向前推演一个层次,以期对家族企业的治理理论进行拓展和完善。
本文通过回顾相关理论文献,首先对家族企业治理的基本理论问题进行了梳理,界定了华人家族企业集团双重治理的理论框架。在此框架下,有针对性地收集中国台湾地区(337位家族成员—20强家族企业集团—1665家企业)、中国大陆(572位家族成员—187家狭义上市家族企业集团—406家企业)以及东南亚地区的华人家族企业集团(37位家族成员—1个已实现四代传承的百年企业集团—30家企业)的资料进行分析。一方面,虽然海外的华人家族企业集团与中国大陆的家族企业集团在制度环境、生命周期等方面存在显著差异,但“本是同根生”的中华文化使其具有共性；另一方面,与中国大陆不同,海外华人的家族制度得到了长时段的延续,并未中断。并且,虽然同为海外华人家族企业,相较于东南亚地区,中国台湾已历经现代化进程的洗礼,这又使得三者具有特性。通过三者的比较研究,可更加全面地揭示华人家族企业集团双重治理的机制所在。
对应本文提出的三个问题,本文的主要结论如下：
(1)就华人家族企业集团的形成过程而言,两个微观基础均发挥了相应的作用。家族社会性契约的“嵌入”和企业层面的经济理性促成了企业集团的形成(对应问题一)。
(2)华人家族企业集团的治理模式呈现出双重治理的特征,在其构成上有别于主流研究中第二代公司治理文献的研究框架和研究结论。在家族治理中,家族是被治理的对象,是客体；在公司治理中,家族是治理的主体,并在企业集团层面上形成家族化的治理模式(对应问题二)。
(3)从静态的视角观察,三者的双重治理既有相似点也有差异。相似点表现在对家族成员内部权力配置结构的治理机制、金字塔式的控股结构等方面；差异体现在家族传承、持股方式等方面(对应问题二)。
(4)从动态的视角观察,双重治理模式在海外华人家族企业集团中长时段延续,钱德勒式的单线型管理革命难以在华人企业中产生(对应问题二)
(5)实证分析发现,在同一企业集团中,“业主+其他家族成员”管理的分子企业绩效最优,业主单独控制的企业绩效较优,非业主家族成员管理的企业绩效次之,无家族成员管理的企业绩效再次之。集团内上市企业的绩效显著优于非上市企业,分子企业的绩效与层级负相关,并与核心公司对分子企业的两权分离度负相关,核心公司在分子企业中的所有权对绩效的影响不明确(对应问题三)。
本文主要的创新之处在于：第一,深入家族内部,从理论上构建了华人家族企业集团双重治理的理论框架。第二,从实证上分析了双重治理对同一企业集团中所有企业绩效的影响机理,跳出了单纯比较家族企业和非家族企业绩效优劣的窠臼。第三,研究资料的创新,在国内首次采用中国台湾地区大型华人家族企业集团的数据,以及通过实地调研获得的东南亚华人家族企业集团的一手资料。
Chiness family business groups are very common in emerging markets such as China and Southeast Asia, also they are very big companies and very diversified in various industries. Why these family business can accomplish growth from time to time. It is no doubt that the governance structure is very important, and the governance model of Chinese family business have become the hot spot both in academic cirles and practical circles because of the rise of Chinese economy.
Dual governance structure is the most and foremost characteristics of Chinese family business, but the main literatures of family business governance neglect the "family" variable, which is foremost and key to family business. And the logic idea only focus on how the family involvement affect firm's value and performance, but did not research the mechanism which determine the involvement of family.
This paper is following on the research structure based on "Institution-Behavior-Performance" method. The main theme is aroud the subject of "the dual governance of Chinese family business groups", illustrating the theme by "Family-Business groups-Firms". The entire research is defining on the following questions:First, the formation of the Chinese family business groups and their micro structure bases. Second, the theorical meaning, effecting mechanism and the change process of the dual governance. Third, the relationship between the dual governce model and business groups performance. This paper can enrich the family governance theory by pushing the logic chain of how family involvement affect business goups performance.
With the literature review, the paper defines the theorical framework of the dual governance of Chinese family business groups. Following the framework. this paper collects the data of Chinese family business groups from Taiwan district(337 family members-20 biggest business groups-1665 firms), from Mainland China(572 family members-187 real public business groups-406 firms) and from Southeast Asia(37 family members-a 112 years old family business gourps-30 firms), with the hope that we can discovery the dual governance of Chinese family business groups by detailed comparisons.
Corresspongding to the above three questions, the main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
(1) For the formation the Chinese family business groups, the two micro bases have its effects respectively. The embeddness of the social contracts(the family contracts) and the economic rationality on the firm level have promoted the formation of Chinese family business groups. Which is the answer to question 1.
(2) The governance strucrure of Chinese family business groups is a dual governance model, and its composition is different from the mainstream literature's research structure and conclusions, which is guided by the second generation literature of coporate governance. In the family governance, the family itself is the object of the governance, but in the coporate governance, the family is the subject. Which is the answer to question 2.
(3) From the static perspective, the dual governance structure of the Taiwan district, Mainland China and the Southeast Asia not only have similarities, but also differences. The similarities are as follows:the governance mechanism of the allocation of the ownership, control and management between family members, the pyramidal holding structures et al. And the differences are as follows:the family succession, the way of how to holding et al. Which is also the answer to question 2.
(4) From the dynamic perpective, the dual governance structure have continue in the overseas Chinese family groups for a very long time. The single-line of the management revolution which is mentioned by A.D.Chandler, is very hard to occur in the Chinese family business groups. Which is also the answer to question 2.
(5) From the empirical studies, this paper finds that, the firm's performance is best when it is managed by "owner+other family members", and less when it is managd by owner only, and less when it is managed by other family members, and less by the professional managers. Also the performance of public firms in the business groups are superior to non-public firms, the relationship between layer and firm performance is negative. And the core company's ownership on the firm performance is not clear, but the separation of ownership and control of the core company on the firm have negative effect on its performance. Which is the answer to question 3.
The innovations of this paper are as follows. Firstly, to explore the detailed family data, and to construct the framework of dual governance of Chinese family business groups. Secondly, to study the performance differences of the firms which are belong to the same business groups. Thirdly, for the first time, to use the business groups from Taiwan district in domestic studies, and the first data which is collectd by the field investigation.
引文
①“隐形冠军”需要满足如下三个条件：中小企业、市场占有率第一或者第二、公众知名度低,如Hauni公司(卷烟机械)、Tetra公司(金鱼缸)、Hillebrand(酒类运输)等。有关“隐形冠军”的论述可参考Hermann Simon隐形冠军[M].北京：经济日报出版社,2005年。
①对此,储小平(2004)曾有十分形象的描述：“改革开放以来,我国一直倡导学习国外先进的管理理论和方法,提出要建立现代企业制度。谁也没有提倡发展家族企业和采用家族制方法来管理企业,谁也没有想到家族企业会大量出现。然而,家族企业雨后春笋般地发展起来。”储小平.家族企业的成长与社会资本的融合[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2004年。
①有趣的是,世界上其他国家也有类似的民谚,如葡萄牙语中的“富裕农民-贵族儿子-穷孙子”、西班牙语中的“酒店老板,儿子富人,孙子讨饭”、德语中用3个词代表三代人的命运“创造,继承,毁灭”,等等不一而足,这也说明了家族企业的成长是一个世界性的难题。(王陆庄、陈凌.中国家族企业成长中的障碍与出路,管理世界,2006年第8期)
②在日本叫做"Keiretsu(企业系列)”、在韩国是"Chaebol(企业财阀)”、在印度是"Business house(企业集团)”、在拉丁美洲被称为"Grupos(企业群体)”。
①“房”的核心概念由如下几个原则组成：(1)男系原则,只有男子才可称为“房”。(2)世代原则,只有儿子对父亲才构成“房”,孙子对祖父不构成此概念。(3)兄弟分化原则,每一个儿子只能单独构成一“房”。(4)从属原则,诸子构成的“房”绝对从属于以父亲为主的“家族”。(5)扩展原则,其在系谱上是连续性的,“房”既可以指一个儿子,也可以指属于同一祖先的男性后代的父系团体。(6)非异母原则,即“房”的概念无正室和妾室之分(陈其南,1985)。
①王明琳等(2010)对狭义家族上市公司的界定是：(1)上市公司的实际控制者可以追溯到家族或自然人且控制权大于等于15%。(2)至少有两位以上具有血亲关系的家族成员担任上市公司高管职务。本文对狭义家族上市公司的界定部分参考了上述标准,但放宽家族成员一定要任职的条件。
②贺小刚、连燕玲(2009)的研究曾测算了实际控制人的同乡、同学、同事的亲缘关系,为0.686.
③如宜华木业(000150)的刘绍喜,刘绍生为兄弟关系,刘绍喜、王少侬为夫妻关系。但年报中未做披露。通过谷歌等搜索引擎可确定他们的亲属关系。
①中间有短暂的被英国、法国和日本殖民统治的时期。
②甲必丹,荷文Kapietein的音译,即在有较多华人居住的城镇,任命华侨首领,以管理华侨的某些内部事务和处理与殖民当局的关系。甲必丹不能视为华侨领袖,甲必丹是代表官方对华侨内部事务进行一定程度管理的半官方华侨头面人物,至多只能算“侨长”,1619年苏鸣岗出任巴达维亚的第一任甲必丹。另：这并非荷兰人的创举。早在1511年葡萄牙殖民者占有马六甲后就实行这个制度。资料来源：李学民、黄昆章(2005)。
③转引自温广益等(1985)。
①流动小商贩和有固定摊位的商贩,据李学民,黄昆章(2005)。
②如1950年开始实行的“堡垒政策”,将输入业民族化。
③“阿里”指持有输入许可证的印尼原住民,“巴巴”指提供资金并实际负责经营的华人。
[1]Almeida H. & Wolfenzon D. A theory of pyramidal ownership and family business groups[J]. Journal of Finance,2006,61(6):2637-2681.
[2]Alvaro Vilaseca. The Shareholder Role in the Family Business:Conflict of Interests and Objectives Between Nonemployed Shareholders and Top Management Team, Family Business Review,2002,(15)299-320.
[3]Anderson, R.C. & Reeb, D.M. Founding family ownerships and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500[J]. Journal of Finance,2003, (58):1301-1328.
[4]Anderson, R.C. & Reeb, D.M. Board Composition:Balancing Family Influence in S&P 500 Firms[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,2004, (49):209-237.
[5]Astrachan, J.H., Klien, S.B. & Smyrnios, K.X. The F-PEC scale of family influence:A proposal for solving the family business definition[J]. Family Business Review,2002,15(1):45-58.
[6]Barney, J. Resource-based theories of competitive advantage:A ten year retrospective on the resource-based view[J]. Journal of management,2001, (27): 643-650.
[7]Barth,E., Gulbrandsen,T., and Schone, P. Family Ownership and Productivity:the Role of Owner-management[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2005,11:107-127.
[8]Becker, G.S. A treatise on the family[M]. Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1981.
[9]Bertrand, M., Johnson, S., Samphantharak, K. et al.. Mixing family with business:A study of Thai business groups and the families behind them [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(3):466-498.
[10]Burkart, Mike, Fausto Panunzi. & Andrei Shleifer. Family Firms[J]. Journal of Finance,2003,8(5):2167-2200.
[11]Carlock RS, Ward JL. Strategic planning for the family business:Parallel planing to unify the family and business. Houndsmill, NY:Palgrave,2001.
[12]Carney,M.,Corporate Governance and Competitive Advantage in Family-controlled Firms[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2005,5:249-265.
[13]Carney, M. Minority Family Business in Emerging Markets:Organization Forms and Competitive Advantage[J]. Family Business Review,2007,4:289-300.
[14]Carney, M, & Gedajlovic, E, The Co-evolution of Institutional Environments and Organizational Strategies:The Rise of Family Business Groups in the ASEAN Region", Organization Studies,2002,23(1):1-29.
[15]Chami. R. What difference about family business[R]. Working Paper,2001.
[16]Chang,S.J. Business Groups in East Asia:Post-crisis Restructuring and New Growth[J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management.2006(23):407-417.
[17]Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H. & Litz, R. A unified systems perspective of family firm performance:an extension and integration[J]. Journal Business Venturing, 2003, (18):467-472.
[18]Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H. & Litz, R. Comparing the agency costs of family and non-family firms:conceptual issue and exploratory evidence[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2004,27 (2):335-354.
[19]Chua, J.H, Chrisman JJ, Sharma P. Defining the Family Business by Behavior[J]. Entrepreneurship:Theory and Practice,1999(3):19-39.
[20]Chua, J. H., Steier, L. P. & Chrisman, J. J. How Family Firms Solve Intra-Family Agency Problems Using Interlocking Directorates[J].Entrepreneurship:Theory and Practice,2006,30(6):777-783.
[21]Chung C.N. Markets, Culture and Instituions:the Emergence of Large Business Groups in Taiwan:1950s-1970s[J], Journal of Management Studies,2001,38(5):719-745.
[22]Chung C.N., Luo X.W., Human Agents, Contexts, and Institutional Change:the Decline of Family in the Leadership of Business Groups[J]. Organization Science,2008,19(1):124-142.
[23]Chung C.N., Luo X.W.,, Institutional Logics or Agency Costs:the Influence of Corporate Governance Models on Business Group Restructuring in Emerging Economics [J],Organization Science,2008,19(1):124-142.
[24]Chung, H.M., Ding,H,B. Political Connections and Family Business Diversification.2010 Working Paper.
[25]Churchill, N.C. & Hatten, K.J. Non-Market-Based Transfers of Wealth and Power:A Research Framework for Family Business[J]. Family Business Review, 1997,10(1):53-67.
[26]Claessens. Stijn, Simeon Djankov, & Larry H.P. L. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations[J], Journal of Financial Economics,2000, (58):81-112.
[27]Claessens, Stjin, Simeon Djankov, Joseph Fan, & Larry L. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings[J]. Journal of Finance, 2002,57 (6):2741-2771.
[28]Coase, R. The Nature of the Firm[J]. Economica,1937(4):386-405.
[29]Daily, C.M. & Dollinger, M.J. An empirical examination of ownership structure in family and professionally managed firms[J]. Family Business Review,1992, 15(2):117-136.
[30]Davis, P. Realizing the Potential of the Family Business [J].Organizational Dymamics,1983,12(1):47-56.
[31]Demsetz, H. Towards a Theory of Property Rights[J]. American Economic Review,1967,57(2):347-359.
[32]Demsetz, H. The structure of ownership and theory of the firm[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1983, (26):375-390.
[33]Donaldson, L., and Davis, J. Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory[J]. Australian Journal of Management,1991,16:-64.
[34]Donelly, R.G. The family business[J], Harvard Business Review.1964,(1): 427-445
[35]Dyer, W. Gibb Jr. The Family:The missing variable in organizational research[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2003(3):401-416.
[36]Eisenhardt, K.M. Agency theory:An assessment and review[J]. Academy of Management Review,1989,14(1):57-74.
[37]Faccio, M. & Larry H.P. L. The Separation of ownership and control:An analysis of ultimate ownership in western European countries [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002, (65):365-395.
[38]Fama, E.F. & Jensen, M.C. Agency problems and residual claims[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26:325-344.
[39]Fama, E.F. & Jensen, M.C. Separation of ownership and control[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1983, (26):301-325.
[40]Friedman, E, Johnson, S, & Mitton, T. Popping and tunneling[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics. Forthcoming,2003.
[41]Fisman, R. Estimating the Value of Political Connections[J]. American Economic Review,2001,91(4):1095-1102.
[42]Gomez-Mejia, L.R., Nunez-Nickel, M. & Gutierrez, I. The Role of Family Ties in Agency Contracts[J]. Academy of Management Journal,2001,44(1):81-95.
[43]Goto, Business Groups in a market economy[J], European Economic Review, 1982(19):53-70.
[44]Granovetter, M. Economic Institutions as Social Constructions:A Framework for Analysis[J]. Acta Sociologica,1992,35(1):3-11.
[45]Granovetter, M, Business Groups and Social Organization, in the Handbook of Economic Sociology, ed Smelser and Swedberg,2005.
[46]Handler WC.Methodological Issues and Considerations in Studying Family Businesses[J]. Family Business Review,1989,2(3):257-276.
[47]Howard E. Aldrich, Jennifer E. Cliff The pervasive effects of family on entrepreneur ship:toward a family embeddedness perspective", Journal of Business Venturing,2003(18):573-596.
[48]James, H.S.Jr. What can the family contribute to business? Examining contractual relationships[J]. Family Business Review,1999,12(1):61-71.
[49]Jensen, M.C. & Meckling, W.H. Theory of the firm:managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4): 305-360.
[50]Johnson, S. & Mitton, T. Cronyism and capital controls:evidence from Malaysia[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2003,67(2):351-382.
[51]Keister, L.A. Engineering Growth:Business Group Structure and Firm Performance in China's Transition Economy [J].The American Journal of Sociology 1998,22 (2):404-440.
[52]Khan, H. A. Corporate governance of family business in Asia:What's right and what's wrong[R]. Tokyo:Asian Development Bank Institute Working Paper, 1999
[53]Khanna, Tarun, Palepu K., Why Focused Strategies May Be Wrong for Emerging Markets[J]. Harvard Business Review,1997,75(4):41-51.
[54]Khanna, Tarun, Palepu, K. Policy Shocks, Market Intermediaries, and Corporate Strategy:The Evolution of Business Groups in Chile and India. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy [J].1999,8(2):271-310.
[55]Khanna, Tarun,. Business Groups and Social Welfare in Emerging Markets: Existing Evidence and unanswered Questions [J].European Economic Review, 2001,45 (5):748-761.
[56]Khanna, Tarun, Yishay Palepu. Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups,2007,45 (2): 213-252.
[57]Khanna, Tarun, Yishay Yafeh. Business Groups in Emerging Markets:Paragons or Parasites? [J].Journal of Economic Literature,2007,45 (2):331-372.
[58]Kim, H., R. E. Hoskisson, et al.. The Evolution and Restructuring of Diversified Business Groups in Emerging Markets:The Lessons from Chaebols in Korea[J]. Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2004,21(1):25-48.
[59]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W. Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World[J]. Journal of finance,2000,55(1): 1-33.
[60]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W. Corporate Ownership around the World[J]. Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471-517.
[61]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W. Law and Finance[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1998,106(6):1113-1155.
[62]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W. Trust in Large Organization[J]. American Economic Review,1997,87(2):333-338.
[63]Leff, N.H. Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship in the Developing Countries:the Economic Groups. Economic Development and Cultural Chang[J]. 1978,26(4):661-675.
[64]Lins, Karl. Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003, (3):159-184.
[65]Luo X.W., Chung, C.N. Keeping it all in the Family:The Role of Particularistic Relationship in Business Groups Performance during Institutional Transsiton[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,2005(50):404-439.
[66]Maman, D. The Emergence of Business Groups:Israel and South Korean Compared[J], Organization Studies 2002(23):737-758.
[67]Maury,B., Family Ownership and Firm Performance:Empirical evidence from Western European corporations [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2006,12:321-341.
[68]Macneil, I.R. Relational Contract Theory:Challenges and Queries[J]. Northwestern University Law Review,2000,94(3):881-894.
[69]Miller,D., & Le Breton-Miller, I.,Family Governance and Firm Performance: Agency,Stewardship,and Capabilities [J].Family Business Review,2006,19(1): 73-87.
[70]Mishra,C.S.,Randoy,T.,&Jenssen,J,I.The Effect of Founding Family Influence on Firm Value and Corporate Governance[J].Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting,2001,12(30):235-259.
[71]Morck Randall, A History of Corporate Governance around the World:Family Business Groups to Professional Managers [C]. The University of Chicago Pres, 2005.
[72]Morck Randall, & Bernard Yeung. Agency Problems in Large Family Business Groups[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2003a,27(4):367-382.
[73]Mustakallio, M. Autio, E. & Zahra, S.A. Relational and Contractual Governance in Family Firms:Effects on Strategic Decision Making[J]. Family Business Review,2002,15(3):205-222.
[74]Neubauer, F.F. & Lank, A.G. The family business:Its governance for sustainability[M]. New York, Routledge,1998.
[75]Perez-Gonzalez, F. Inherited Control and Firm Performance. American Economic Review,2006,(96):1559-1588
[76]Pollak, R. A. A Traction Cost Approach to Families and Households. Journal of Economic Literature,1985,(23):581-608.
[77]Porath, Y.B. The F-Connection:Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange. Population and Develpoment Review,1980,(6):1-30.
[78]Redding, S.G. The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism[M]. New York:Walter de Gruyter,1990.
[79]Redding, S.G. Weak Organizations and Strong Linkages:Managerial Ideology and Chinese Family Business Networks[M]//Hamilton, G.G. Business Networks and Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia. Hong Kong:University of Hong Kong,1991:33-47.
[80]Schulze, W.S., Lubatkin, M.H. & Dino, R.N. Altruism and agency in family firms[J]. Academy of Management Proceedings,2000,11:11-15.
[81]Schulze, W.S., Lubatkin, M.H. & Dino, R.N. Altruism, agency and the competitiveness of family firms[J]. Managerial and Decision Economics,2002, 23:247-259.
[82]Schulze, W.S., Lubatkin, M.H. & Dino, R.N. Exploring the agency consequence of ownership dispersion among the directors of private family firms[J]. Academy of Management Proceedings,2003,46(2):179-194.
[83]Schulze, W.S., Lubatkin, M.H. & Dino, R.N. Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms[J]. Journal of Business Venturing,2003,18(4):473-490.
[84]Schulze, W.S., Lubatkin, M.H., Dino, R.N., et al.. Agency relationships in family firms:theory and evidence[J]. Organization Science,2001,12(2):99-116.
[85]Shleifer, Andrei. & Robert Vishny. A survey of corporate governance[J]. The Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783.
[86]Steier, L. Family Firms, Plural Forms of Governance, and the Evolving Role of Trust[J]. Family Business Review,2001,14(4):353-367.
[87]Tagiuri, R. & Davis, J. Bivalent attributes of the family firms[J]. Family Business Review,1996,9(2):199-208.
[88]Villalonga, B., Amit, R., How Do Family Ownership, Control and Management Affect Firm Value?[J] Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(2):385-417.
[89]Wernerfelt B. A resources-based view of the firm[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1984,5(2):170-192.
[90]Williamson, O.E. Corporate control and business behavior[M]. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,1970.
[91]Whyte, M.K. The Chinese Family and Economic Development:Obstacle or Engine?[J]. Economic Development and Cultural Change,1996,45(1):1-30.
[92]Wong, Siu-lun. The Chinese Family Firm:A Model[J]. The British Journal of Sociology,1985,36(1):58-72.
[93]Yeh Yin-hua,Do Controlling Shareholders Enhance Corporate Value[J].Corporate Governance,2005,13(2):313-325.
[94]阿道夫·A.伯利,加纳德·c.米恩斯.现代公司与私有产权[M].甘华鸣等译,北京：商务印书馆,2005.
[95]阿尔弗雷德·D.钱德勒.看得见的手[M],北京：商务印书馆,1987年.
[96]阿尔弗雷德·D.钱德勒.大企业与国民财富[M],北京：北京大学出版社,2004年
[97]安德烈·比尔基埃等.家庭史[M].北京：三联书店,1998.
[98]奥利弗·E.威廉姆森.治理机制[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2001.
[99]奥利弗·E.威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度[M].北京：商务印书馆,2003.
[100]彼得·德鲁克.管理——任务、责任、实践[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,1987.
[101]白纯.台湾经济政策研究[M].北京：军事科学出版社,2008年.
[102]曹建海,黄群慧.制度转型、管理提升与民营企业成长——以浙江华峰集团为例[J].中国工业经济,2004(1)：99-107.
[103]蔡仁龙.印尼华人企业集团研究[M].中国香港：香港社会科学出版社,2004年.
[104]柴垣和夫.三井和三菱——日本资本主义与财阀[M].上海：上海译文出版社,1978.
[105]陈灿.关系治理与绩效：中国家族企业治理行为研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2007.
[106]陈凌.信息特征、交易成本和家族式组织[J].经济研究,1998,(7)：27-33.
[107]陈凌.超越钱德勒命题——重新评价《看得见的手》[J].管理世界,2005,(5)： 160-165.
[108]陈凌.民营经济与中国家族企业成长[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2006.
[109]陈凌,应丽芬.从家庭/网络家庭到企业/企业网络[J].学海,2006(4)：161-166.
[110]陈凌,应丽芬.代际传承：家族企业继任管理与创新[J].管理世界,2003(6)：89-97.
[111]陈凌,曹正汉.制度与能力：中国民营企业20年成长的解析[M].上海：世纪出版集团上海人民出版社,2007.
[112]陈凌,郭萍,叶长兵.非家族经理进入家族企业研究：以山西票号为例[J].管理世界,2010,(12)：143-154.
[113]陈凌,李新春,储小平.中国家族企业的社会角色：过去、现在和未来[M].杭州：浙江大学出版社,2011年.
[114]陈凌,鲁莉劫.家族企业、治理结构与企业绩效[J].中山大学学报,2009,49(3)：203-212.
[115]陈凌,鲁莉劫,朱建安.中国家族企业成长与企业社会责任[J].管理世界,2008,(12)：160-164.
[116]陈凌,王河森.华人企业集团家族治理模式演进研究[J].东南亚研究,2011,(3)：73-78.
[117]陈凌,王陆庄.中国家族企业成长中的障碍与出路[J].管理世界,2006,(8)：136-139.
[118]陈凌,王萌,朱建安.中国家族企业的现代转型[J].管理世界,2011,(4)：163-166.
[119]陈凌,叶长兵,鲁莉劫.中国家族上市公司最终所有权、控制权及其分离[J].浙江社会科学,2009,(5)：8-15.
[120]陈其南.房与传统中国家族制度[J].汉学研究(中国台湾),1985(3)：127-183.
[121]储小平.家族企业的成长与社会资本的融合[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2004.
[122]储小平.家族企业研究——个具有现代意义的话题[J].中国社会科学,2000,(5)：51-58.
[123]储小平.华人家族企业的界定[J].经济理论与经济管理,2004,(1)：41-45.
[124]储小平.职业经理与家族企业的成长[J].管理世界,2002,(4)：100-108.
[125]储小平,李怀祖.信任与家族企业的成长[J].管理世界,2003,(3)：98-106.
[126]储小平.儒家伦理与海外华人经济的发展[J].汕头大学学报(人文科学版),1997,(5)：80-86.
[127]储小平,李怀祖.信任与家族企业的成长[J].管理世界,2003,(3)：98-106.
[128]陈清泰等.中国大企业集团年度发展报告(2008)[M].北京：中国发展出版社,2009.
[129]恩纳斯托·J·珀扎.家族企业[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005.
[130]费孝通.乡土中国生育制度[M].北京：北京大学出版社,1998.
[131]冯根福.双重委托代理理论[J].经济研究,2004,(12)：16-25.
[132]弗郎西斯·福山.信任：社会美德与创造经济繁荣[M].海口：海南出版社,2001.
[133]戈登·雷丁.华人资本主义精神[M].上海：格致出版社,上海人民出版社,2009.
[134]郭晓利.企业集团的国际比较[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2002.
[135]郭跃进.论家族企业家族化水平的测定原理与方法[J].中国工业经济,2002,(12)：87-91.
[136]韩朝华.战略与制度：中国企业集团的成长分析[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2000.
[137]贺涛.台湾经济发展轨迹[M].北京：中国经济出版社,2009年.
[138]赫尔曼·西蒙.隐形冠军[M].北京：经济日报出版社,2005.
[139]黄泰岩,张培丽.2008年中国经济研究热点排名与分析[J].经济学动态,2009(2)：16-20.
[140]黄山,蓝海林.中国行业机会诱导下企业集团的多元化行为研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2007.
[141]金祥荣,余立智.控制权市场缺失与民营家族制企业成长中的产权障碍[J].中国农村经济,2002,(8)：33-34.
[142]贺小刚,李新春,连燕玲.家族成员的权力集中度与企业绩效[C]//第五届创业与家族企业国际研讨会论文集,2009.
[143]贺小刚,连燕玲.家族权威与企业价值：基于家族上市公司的实证研究[J].经济研究,2009(4)：90-102.
[144]贺小刚,连燕玲,李婧,梅琳.家族控制中的亲缘效应分析与检验[J].中国工业经济,2010(1)：135-146.
[145]贺小刚,李新春,连燕玲,张远飞.家族内部的权力偏离及其对治理效率的影响[J].中国工业经济,2010(10)：96-106.
[146]贺小刚,连燕玲,李婧,苗藤藤.家族权威的配置效应分析与实证检验[J].财经研究,2010(10)：122-132.
[147]贺小刚,李婧,陈蕾.家族成员组合与公司治理效率[J].南开管理评论,2010(6)：149-160.
[148]贺小刚,连燕玲,余冬兰.家族和谐与企业可持续成长[J].经济管理,2010(1)：50-60.
[149]胡军,朱文胜,庞道满.劳动契约、交易费用与关系治理——华人家族企业内部治理行为分析[J].暨南学报(哲学社会科学版),2002,24(3)：14-19.
[150]胡旭阳,史晋川.民营企业的政治资源与民营企业多元化投资——以中国民营企业500强为例[J].中国工业经济,2008(4)：5-14.
[151]今井贤一,小宫隆太郎.现代日本企业制度[M].北京：经济科学出版社,1995.
[152]金勇兴.温州企业集团发展研究[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,1999.
[153]克林·盖尔西克等.家族企业的繁衍[M].北京：图书出版社,经济日报出版社,1998.
[154]柯荣浦.企业集团管理体制研究[M].北京：中国经济出版社,2004.
[155]赖建清.所有权、控制权与公司绩效[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2007
[156]梁磊,王洪涛.企业集团发展模式与运行机制比较[M].北京：机械工业出版社,2003.
[157]兰德尔·S·卡洛克,约翰·L·沃德.家族企业战略计划[M].北京：中信出版社,2002,
[158]蓝海林.中国多元化企业的战略管理研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2008.
[159]李非.台湾经济发展通论[M].北京：九州出版社,2004年.
[160]李国鼎.台湾的经济计划及其实施[M].南京：东南大学出版社,1995年.
[161]李国鼎.台湾经济发展背后的政策演变[M].南京：东南大学出版社,1997 年.
[162]李维安,武立东.公司治理教程[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2002.
[163]李维安,武立冬.企业集团的公司治理——规模起点、治理边界及子公司治理[J].南开管理评论,1999(4)：4-8.
[164]李新春.中国的家族制度与企业组织[J].中国社会科学季刊(香港),1998,(秋季卷).
[165]李新春,任丽霞.民营企业的家族意图与家族治理行为研究[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),2004(6)：239-249.
[166]李新春,陈灿.家族企业的关系治理：一个探索性研究[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),2005,45(6)：107-115.
[167]李新春,储小平,朱沆.民营企业成长研究报告——基于广东省民营企业的调研分析[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2008.
[168]李新春,杨学儒,姜岳新,胡晓红.内部人所有权与企业价值——对中国民营上市公司的研究[J].经济研究,2008,(11)：27-38.
[169]李新春,檀宏斌,杨学儒.家族企业内部两权分离-基于百年家族企业香港利丰的案例研究[C]//第五届创业与家族企业会议论文集,2009.
[170]李亚.民营企业集团管理实务与案例[M].北京：中国发展出版社,2009.
[171]李增泉,辛显刚,于旭辉.金融发展、债务融资约束与金字塔结构——来自民营企业集团的证据[J].管理世界,2008,(1)：123-135.
[172]李学民,黄昆章.印尼华侨华人史[M].广州：广东高等教育出版社,2005.
[173]李卓.中日家族制度比较研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2004.
[174]连燕玲,贺小刚,张远飞.家族权威配置机理与功效[J].管理世界,2011,(11)：30-42.
[175]林善浪,张禹东,伍华佳.华商管理学[J].上海：复旦大学出版社,2006年
[176]刘淼,修峰,叶丹.企业集团内部连锁董事理论研究综述[J].经济理论研究28-30.
[177]卢昌崇,陈仕华,Schwalbach连锁董事理论：来自中国企业的实证检验[J].中国工业经济,2006(1)：113-120.
[178]鲁莉劫, 陈凌.国外家族企业治理结构研究新进展[J].郑州大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2009,42(3)：85-89.
[179]罗伯特·殷.案例研究：设计与方法(第3版[M],重庆：重庆大学出版社,2004年.
[180]马金城,王磊.系族控制人掏空与支持上市公司的博弈[J].管理世界,2009(12)：150-163.
[181]马丽波.家族企业的生命周期轮回与多维演进研究[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2009.
[182]毛蕴诗.企业集团—扩展动因、模式与案例[M],广州：广东人民出版社,2000年.
[183]宁向东,陈宁.系族企业的特征：一个初步描述[J].财经问题研究,2005,(4)：29-33.
[184]潘必胜.家族企业与中国市场化进程[J].中国社会科学季刊,1999年冬季 号：119-128.
[185]潘必胜.乡镇企业中的家族经营问题——兼论家族企业在中国的历史命运[J].中国农村观察,1998(1)：12-18.
[186]潘必胜.产权、家族效率与家族非效率——农业社会中家庭经济分析[J].中国农村观察,2001(4)：27-35.
[187]潘必胜.中国的家族企业——所有权和控制权(1895-1956)[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2009.
[188]彭罗斯.企业成长理论[M].上海：三联书店,上海人民出版社,2007.
[189]任兵,区玉辉,彭维刚.连锁董事、区域企业间连锁董事网与区域经济发展[J].管理世界,2004(3)：112-125.
[190]上海证券交易所研究中心.中国公司治理报告(2005)：民营上市公司治理[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2005.
[191]单玉丽.台湾经济60年[M].北京：知识产权出版社,2010年.
[192]宋旭琴.我国多元化企业组织结构与绩效的关系研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2006年.
[193]苏东蔚.多元化经营与企业价值：我国上市公司多元化溢价的实证分析[J].经济学(季刊),2005(4)：135-158.
[194]苏启林,朱文.上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究,2003,(8)：36-45.
[195]孙治本.家族主义与现代台湾企业[J].社会学研究,1995,(5)：36-42.
[196]唐慧.印度尼西亚历届政府华侨华人政策的形成与演变[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2006.
[197]王河森,陈凌,王明琳.亲情原则还是能力取向?——家族上市公司权力配置机制的实证研究[J].财经研究,2012(2)：102-108.
[198]王风彬.企业间组织的跨层次分析——兼析企业专业化与集团多元化的关系[J].中国工业经济,2008(3)：49-57.
[199]王世权.日本家族企业成长的理论解析及其影响因素分析-基于三井财阀的案例[J].产业经济评论,2008,8(2)：22-45.
[200]王明琳,周生春.控制性家族类型、双重三层委托代理问题与企业价值[J].管理世界,2006,(8)：83-93.
[201]王明琳,陈凌,叶长兵.中国民营上市公司的家族治理与企业价值[J].南开管理评论,2010,(1)：61-67.
[202]汪慕恒.东南亚华人企业集团研究[M].厦门：厦门大学出版社,1995年.
[203]王宣喻,储小平.私营企业内部治理结构的演变模式研究[J].经济科学,2002,(3)：89-93.
[204]王宣喻,李新春,陈凌.资本合作与信任拓展：一个跨越家族的创业故事[J].管理世界,2006(8)：113-125.
[205]王宣喻,李新春.1988-2007：中国大陆家族企业研究之回顾与展望[C]//第三届创业与家族企业国际研讨会论文集,2007.
[206]王绪圻.试论台湾大型家族企业集团世代交替[J].台湾研究,1997,(4)：59-66.
[207]武立东.中国民营上市公司治理及其评价研究[M].天津：南开大学出版 社,2007.
[208]谢明亮.协调与合作视角下的企业集团治理研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2007.
[209]徐金发,姚铮.交易费用与企业集团多层次结构分析[J].中国工业经济,1991(10)：30-34.
[210]许奇挺.内部资本市场有效性研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2008.
[211]许永斌,郑金芳.中国民营上市公司家族控制权特征与公司绩效实证研究[J].会计研究,2007,(11)： 50-57.
[212]徐杨杰.中国家族制度史[M].北京：人民出版社,1992.
[213]岩崎育夫.新加坡华人企业集团[M].厦门：厦门大学出版社,1999.
[214]杨兴君,宗长玉,江艺.民营企业控制多家上市公司实证研究[R].金信证券,2003.
[215]杨学儒,李新春.家族涉入指数的构建与测量研究[J].中国工业经济,2009(5)：97-107.
[216]姚俊,吕源,蓝海林.我国上市公司多元化与经济绩效关系的实证研究[J].管理世界,2004(11)：119-127.
[217]叶银华.家族控股集团、核心企业与报酬互动研究——台湾与香港证券市场之比较[J].管理评论(台湾),1999,18(2)
[218]伊万·兰兹伯格.家业永续[M].北京：商务印书馆,2005.
[219]约翰·赖斯比特.亚洲大趋势[M].北京：外文出版社、经济日报出版社、上海远东出版社,1996年.
[220]于左.企业集团规制政策：德隆危机的反思[J].中国工业经济,2004(11)：83-90.
[221]云冠平,陈乔之.东南亚华人企业经营管理研究[M].北京：经济管理出版社,2000.
[222]余立智.现代家庭组织理论研究的最新进展及其启示[J].财经论丛,2006(2)：8-13.
[223]张珉.我国家族企业与职业经理之间的合作困境及其突破—从信任的角度[D].博士学位论文,复旦大学,2004.
[224]张富春,冯子标.企业集团：中间组织与有组织的市场[J].中国工业经济,1997(12)：45-50.
[225]赵鲁光.转型时期企业集团的形成、组织结构与绩效——理论与实证研究综述[J].经济社会体制比较,2005(4)：132-136.
[226]赵增耀等.企业集团治理[M].北京：机械工业出版社,2002.
[227]詹淑婷,钟喜梅.家族控制与金字塔结构[J].公司治理评论,2009(4)：58-75.
[228]郑宏泰,黄绍伦.香港华人家族企业个案研究[M].香港：香港明报出版社,2004.
[229]中国集团公司促进会.母子公司关系研究——企业集团的组织结构和管理控制[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2004.
[230]中国民(私)营经济研究会家族企业研究课题组.中国家族企业发展报告[M].北京：中信出版社,2011.
[231]中华全国工商业联合会.1993-2006中国私营企业大型调查[M].北京：中华工商联合出版社,2007.
[232]滋贺秀三.中国家族法原理[M].北京：法律出版社,2003.
[233]中华征信所.2007年版台湾地区集团企业研究[M].台北：中华征信企业股份有限公司出版社,2007年.
[234]曾晓祥.印度尼西亚“主公”问题的探讨[J].学术论坛,2004(3)：133-136.
[235]郑学益.商战之魂：东南亚华人企业集团探微[M].北京：北京大学出版社,1997年。
①对此,储小平(2004)曾有十分形象的描述：“改革开放以来,我国一直倡导学习国外先进的管理理论和方法,提出要建立现代企业制度。谁也没有提倡发展家族企业和采用家族制方法来管理企业,谁也没有想到家族企业会大量出现。然而,家族企业雨后春笋般地发展起来。”储小平.家族企业的成长与社会资本的融合[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2004年。
①有趣的是,世界上其他国家也有类似的民谚,如葡萄牙语中的“富裕农民-贵族儿子-穷孙子”、西班牙语中的“酒店老板,儿子富人,孙子讨饭”、德语中用3个词代表三代人的命运“创造,继承,毁灭”,等等不一而足,这也说明了家族企业的成长是一个世界性的难题。(王陆庄、陈凌.中国家族企业成长中的障碍与出路,管理世界,2006年第8期)
②在日本叫做"Keiretsu(企业系列)”、在韩国是"Chaebol(企业财阀)”、在印度是"Business house(企业集团)”、在拉丁美洲被称为"Grupos(企业群体)”。
①“房”的核心概念由如下几个原则组成：(1)男系原则,只有男子才可称为“房”。(2)世代原则,只有儿子对父亲才构成“房”,孙子对祖父不构成此概念。(3)兄弟分化原则,每一个儿子只能单独构成一“房”。(4)从属原则,诸子构成的“房”绝对从属于以父亲为主的“家族”。(5)扩展原则,其在系谱上是连续性的,“房”既可以指一个儿子,也可以指属于同一祖先的男性后代的父系团体。(6)非异母原则,即“房”的概念无正室和妾室之分(陈其南,1985)。
①王明琳等(2010)对狭义家族上市公司的界定是：(1)上市公司的实际控制者可以追溯到家族或自然人且控制权大于等于15%。(2)至少有两位以上具有血亲关系的家族成员担任上市公司高管职务。本文对狭义家族上市公司的界定部分参考了上述标准,但放宽家族成员一定要任职的条件。
②贺小刚、连燕玲(2009)的研究曾测算了实际控制人的同乡、同学、同事的亲缘关系,为0.686.
③如宜华木业(000150)的刘绍喜,刘绍生为兄弟关系,刘绍喜、王少侬为夫妻关系。但年报中未做披露。通过谷歌等搜索引擎可确定他们的亲属关系。
①中间有短暂的被英国、法国和日本殖民统治的时期。
②甲必丹,荷文Kapietein的音译,即在有较多华人居住的城镇,任命华侨首领,以管理华侨的某些内部事务和处理与殖民当局的关系。甲必丹不能视为华侨领袖,甲必丹是代表官方对华侨内部事务进行一定程度管理的半官方华侨头面人物,至多只能算“侨长”,1619年苏鸣岗出任巴达维亚的第一任甲必丹。另：这并非荷兰人的创举。早在1511年葡萄牙殖民者占有马六甲后就实行这个制度。资料来源：李学民、黄昆章(2005)。
③转引自温广益等(1985)。
①流动小商贩和有固定摊位的商贩,据李学民,黄昆章(2005)。
②如1950年开始实行的“堡垒政策”,将输入业民族化。
③“阿里”指持有输入许可证的印尼原住民,“巴巴”指提供资金并实际负责经营的华人。
[1]Almeida H. & Wolfenzon D. A theory of pyramidal ownership and family business groups[J]. Journal of Finance,2006,61(6):2637-2681.
[2]Alvaro Vilaseca. The Shareholder Role in the Family Business:Conflict of Interests and Objectives Between Nonemployed Shareholders and Top Management Team, Family Business Review,2002,(15)299-320.
[3]Anderson, R.C. & Reeb, D.M. Founding family ownerships and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500[J]. Journal of Finance,2003, (58):1301-1328.
[4]Anderson, R.C. & Reeb, D.M. Board Composition:Balancing Family Influence in S&P 500 Firms[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,2004, (49):209-237.
[5]Astrachan, J.H., Klien, S.B. & Smyrnios, K.X. The F-PEC scale of family influence:A proposal for solving the family business definition[J]. Family Business Review,2002,15(1):45-58.
[6]Barney, J. Resource-based theories of competitive advantage:A ten year retrospective on the resource-based view[J]. Journal of management,2001, (27): 643-650.
[7]Barth,E., Gulbrandsen,T., and Schone, P. Family Ownership and Productivity:the Role of Owner-management[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2005,11:107-127.
[8]Becker, G.S. A treatise on the family[M]. Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1981.
[9]Bertrand, M., Johnson, S., Samphantharak, K. et al.. Mixing family with business:A study of Thai business groups and the families behind them [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(3):466-498.
[10]Burkart, Mike, Fausto Panunzi. & Andrei Shleifer. Family Firms[J]. Journal of Finance,2003,8(5):2167-2200.
[11]Carlock RS, Ward JL. Strategic planning for the family business:Parallel planing to unify the family and business. Houndsmill, NY:Palgrave,2001.
[12]Carney,M.,Corporate Governance and Competitive Advantage in Family-controlled Firms[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2005,5:249-265.
[13]Carney, M. Minority Family Business in Emerging Markets:Organization Forms and Competitive Advantage[J]. Family Business Review,2007,4:289-300.
[14]Carney, M, & Gedajlovic, E, The Co-evolution of Institutional Environments and Organizational Strategies:The Rise of Family Business Groups in the ASEAN Region", Organization Studies,2002,23(1):1-29.
[15]Chami. R. What difference about family business[R]. Working Paper,2001.
[16]Chang,S.J. Business Groups in East Asia:Post-crisis Restructuring and New Growth[J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management.2006(23):407-417.
[17]Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H. & Litz, R. A unified systems perspective of family firm performance:an extension and integration[J]. Journal Business Venturing, 2003, (18):467-472.
[18]Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H. & Litz, R. Comparing the agency costs of family and non-family firms:conceptual issue and exploratory evidence[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2004,27 (2):335-354.
[19]Chua, J.H, Chrisman JJ, Sharma P. Defining the Family Business by Behavior[J]. Entrepreneurship:Theory and Practice,1999(3):19-39.
[20]Chua, J. H., Steier, L. P. & Chrisman, J. J. How Family Firms Solve Intra-Family Agency Problems Using Interlocking Directorates[J].Entrepreneurship:Theory and Practice,2006,30(6):777-783.
[21]Chung C.N. Markets, Culture and Instituions:the Emergence of Large Business Groups in Taiwan:1950s-1970s[J], Journal of Management Studies,2001,38(5):719-745.
[22]Chung C.N., Luo X.W., Human Agents, Contexts, and Institutional Change:the Decline of Family in the Leadership of Business Groups[J]. Organization Science,2008,19(1):124-142.
[23]Chung C.N., Luo X.W.,, Institutional Logics or Agency Costs:the Influence of Corporate Governance Models on Business Group Restructuring in Emerging Economics [J],Organization Science,2008,19(1):124-142.
[24]Chung, H.M., Ding,H,B. Political Connections and Family Business Diversification.2010 Working Paper.
[25]Churchill, N.C. & Hatten, K.J. Non-Market-Based Transfers of Wealth and Power:A Research Framework for Family Business[J]. Family Business Review, 1997,10(1):53-67.
[26]Claessens. Stijn, Simeon Djankov, & Larry H.P. L. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations[J], Journal of Financial Economics,2000, (58):81-112.
[27]Claessens, Stjin, Simeon Djankov, Joseph Fan, & Larry L. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings[J]. Journal of Finance, 2002,57 (6):2741-2771.
[28]Coase, R. The Nature of the Firm[J]. Economica,1937(4):386-405.
[29]Daily, C.M. & Dollinger, M.J. An empirical examination of ownership structure in family and professionally managed firms[J]. Family Business Review,1992, 15(2):117-136.
[30]Davis, P. Realizing the Potential of the Family Business [J].Organizational Dymamics,1983,12(1):47-56.
[31]Demsetz, H. Towards a Theory of Property Rights[J]. American Economic Review,1967,57(2):347-359.
[32]Demsetz, H. The structure of ownership and theory of the firm[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1983, (26):375-390.
[33]Donaldson, L., and Davis, J. Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory[J]. Australian Journal of Management,1991,16:-64.
[34]Donelly, R.G. The family business[J], Harvard Business Review.1964,(1): 427-445
[35]Dyer, W. Gibb Jr. The Family:The missing variable in organizational research[J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2003(3):401-416.
[36]Eisenhardt, K.M. Agency theory:An assessment and review[J]. Academy of Management Review,1989,14(1):57-74.
[37]Faccio, M. & Larry H.P. L. The Separation of ownership and control:An analysis of ultimate ownership in western European countries [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002, (65):365-395.
[38]Fama, E.F. & Jensen, M.C. Agency problems and residual claims[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26:325-344.
[39]Fama, E.F. & Jensen, M.C. Separation of ownership and control[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1983, (26):301-325.
[40]Friedman, E, Johnson, S, & Mitton, T. Popping and tunneling[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics. Forthcoming,2003.
[41]Fisman, R. Estimating the Value of Political Connections[J]. American Economic Review,2001,91(4):1095-1102.
[42]Gomez-Mejia, L.R., Nunez-Nickel, M. & Gutierrez, I. The Role of Family Ties in Agency Contracts[J]. Academy of Management Journal,2001,44(1):81-95.
[43]Goto, Business Groups in a market economy[J], European Economic Review, 1982(19):53-70.
[44]Granovetter, M. Economic Institutions as Social Constructions:A Framework for Analysis[J]. Acta Sociologica,1992,35(1):3-11.
[45]Granovetter, M, Business Groups and Social Organization, in the Handbook of Economic Sociology, ed Smelser and Swedberg,2005.
[46]Handler WC.Methodological Issues and Considerations in Studying Family Businesses[J]. Family Business Review,1989,2(3):257-276.
[47]Howard E. Aldrich, Jennifer E. Cliff The pervasive effects of family on entrepreneur ship:toward a family embeddedness perspective", Journal of Business Venturing,2003(18):573-596.
[48]James, H.S.Jr. What can the family contribute to business? Examining contractual relationships[J]. Family Business Review,1999,12(1):61-71.
[49]Jensen, M.C. & Meckling, W.H. Theory of the firm:managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4): 305-360.
[50]Johnson, S. & Mitton, T. Cronyism and capital controls:evidence from Malaysia[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2003,67(2):351-382.
[51]Keister, L.A. Engineering Growth:Business Group Structure and Firm Performance in China's Transition Economy [J].The American Journal of Sociology 1998,22 (2):404-440.
[52]Khan, H. A. Corporate governance of family business in Asia:What's right and what's wrong[R]. Tokyo:Asian Development Bank Institute Working Paper, 1999
[53]Khanna, Tarun, Palepu K., Why Focused Strategies May Be Wrong for Emerging Markets[J]. Harvard Business Review,1997,75(4):41-51.
[54]Khanna, Tarun, Palepu, K. Policy Shocks, Market Intermediaries, and Corporate Strategy:The Evolution of Business Groups in Chile and India. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy [J].1999,8(2):271-310.
[55]Khanna, Tarun,. Business Groups and Social Welfare in Emerging Markets: Existing Evidence and unanswered Questions [J].European Economic Review, 2001,45 (5):748-761.
[56]Khanna, Tarun, Yishay Palepu. Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups,2007,45 (2): 213-252.
[57]Khanna, Tarun, Yishay Yafeh. Business Groups in Emerging Markets:Paragons or Parasites? [J].Journal of Economic Literature,2007,45 (2):331-372.
[58]Kim, H., R. E. Hoskisson, et al.. The Evolution and Restructuring of Diversified Business Groups in Emerging Markets:The Lessons from Chaebols in Korea[J]. Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2004,21(1):25-48.
[59]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W. Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World[J]. Journal of finance,2000,55(1): 1-33.
[60]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W. Corporate Ownership around the World[J]. Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471-517.
[61]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W. Law and Finance[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1998,106(6):1113-1155.
[62]La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W. Trust in Large Organization[J]. American Economic Review,1997,87(2):333-338.
[63]Leff, N.H. Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship in the Developing Countries:the Economic Groups. Economic Development and Cultural Chang[J]. 1978,26(4):661-675.
[64]Lins, Karl. Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003, (3):159-184.
[65]Luo X.W., Chung, C.N. Keeping it all in the Family:The Role of Particularistic Relationship in Business Groups Performance during Institutional Transsiton[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,2005(50):404-439.
[66]Maman, D. The Emergence of Business Groups:Israel and South Korean Compared[J], Organization Studies 2002(23):737-758.
[67]Maury,B., Family Ownership and Firm Performance:Empirical evidence from Western European corporations [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2006,12:321-341.
[68]Macneil, I.R. Relational Contract Theory:Challenges and Queries[J]. Northwestern University Law Review,2000,94(3):881-894.
[69]Miller,D., & Le Breton-Miller, I.,Family Governance and Firm Performance: Agency,Stewardship,and Capabilities [J].Family Business Review,2006,19(1): 73-87.
[70]Mishra,C.S.,Randoy,T.,&Jenssen,J,I.The Effect of Founding Family Influence on Firm Value and Corporate Governance[J].Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting,2001,12(30):235-259.
[71]Morck Randall, A History of Corporate Governance around the World:Family Business Groups to Professional Managers [C]. The University of Chicago Pres, 2005.
[72]Morck Randall, & Bernard Yeung. Agency Problems in Large Family Business Groups[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,2003a,27(4):367-382.
[73]Mustakallio, M. Autio, E. & Zahra, S.A. Relational and Contractual Governance in Family Firms:Effects on Strategic Decision Making[J]. Family Business Review,2002,15(3):205-222.
[74]Neubauer, F.F. & Lank, A.G. The family business:Its governance for sustainability[M]. New York, Routledge,1998.
[75]Perez-Gonzalez, F. Inherited Control and Firm Performance. American Economic Review,2006,(96):1559-1588
[76]Pollak, R. A. A Traction Cost Approach to Families and Households. Journal of Economic Literature,1985,(23):581-608.
[77]Porath, Y.B. The F-Connection:Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange. Population and Develpoment Review,1980,(6):1-30.
[78]Redding, S.G. The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism[M]. New York:Walter de Gruyter,1990.
[79]Redding, S.G. Weak Organizations and Strong Linkages:Managerial Ideology and Chinese Family Business Networks[M]//Hamilton, G.G. Business Networks and Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia. Hong Kong:University of Hong Kong,1991:33-47.
[80]Schulze, W.S., Lubatkin, M.H. & Dino, R.N. Altruism and agency in family firms[J]. Academy of Management Proceedings,2000,11:11-15.
[81]Schulze, W.S., Lubatkin, M.H. & Dino, R.N. Altruism, agency and the competitiveness of family firms[J]. Managerial and Decision Economics,2002, 23:247-259.
[82]Schulze, W.S., Lubatkin, M.H. & Dino, R.N. Exploring the agency consequence of ownership dispersion among the directors of private family firms[J]. Academy of Management Proceedings,2003,46(2):179-194.
[83]Schulze, W.S., Lubatkin, M.H. & Dino, R.N. Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms[J]. Journal of Business Venturing,2003,18(4):473-490.
[84]Schulze, W.S., Lubatkin, M.H., Dino, R.N., et al.. Agency relationships in family firms:theory and evidence[J]. Organization Science,2001,12(2):99-116.
[85]Shleifer, Andrei. & Robert Vishny. A survey of corporate governance[J]. The Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783.
[86]Steier, L. Family Firms, Plural Forms of Governance, and the Evolving Role of Trust[J]. Family Business Review,2001,14(4):353-367.
[87]Tagiuri, R. & Davis, J. Bivalent attributes of the family firms[J]. Family Business Review,1996,9(2):199-208.
[88]Villalonga, B., Amit, R., How Do Family Ownership, Control and Management Affect Firm Value?[J] Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(2):385-417.
[89]Wernerfelt B. A resources-based view of the firm[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1984,5(2):170-192.
[90]Williamson, O.E. Corporate control and business behavior[M]. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,1970.
[91]Whyte, M.K. The Chinese Family and Economic Development:Obstacle or Engine?[J]. Economic Development and Cultural Change,1996,45(1):1-30.
[92]Wong, Siu-lun. The Chinese Family Firm:A Model[J]. The British Journal of Sociology,1985,36(1):58-72.
[93]Yeh Yin-hua,Do Controlling Shareholders Enhance Corporate Value[J].Corporate Governance,2005,13(2):313-325.
[94]阿道夫·A.伯利,加纳德·c.米恩斯.现代公司与私有产权[M].甘华鸣等译,北京：商务印书馆,2005.
[95]阿尔弗雷德·D.钱德勒.看得见的手[M],北京：商务印书馆,1987年.
[96]阿尔弗雷德·D.钱德勒.大企业与国民财富[M],北京：北京大学出版社,2004年
[97]安德烈·比尔基埃等.家庭史[M].北京：三联书店,1998.
[98]奥利弗·E.威廉姆森.治理机制[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2001.
[99]奥利弗·E.威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度[M].北京：商务印书馆,2003.
[100]彼得·德鲁克.管理——任务、责任、实践[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,1987.
[101]白纯.台湾经济政策研究[M].北京：军事科学出版社,2008年.
[102]曹建海,黄群慧.制度转型、管理提升与民营企业成长——以浙江华峰集团为例[J].中国工业经济,2004(1)：99-107.
[103]蔡仁龙.印尼华人企业集团研究[M].中国香港：香港社会科学出版社,2004年.
[104]柴垣和夫.三井和三菱——日本资本主义与财阀[M].上海：上海译文出版社,1978.
[105]陈灿.关系治理与绩效：中国家族企业治理行为研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2007.
[106]陈凌.信息特征、交易成本和家族式组织[J].经济研究,1998,(7)：27-33.
[107]陈凌.超越钱德勒命题——重新评价《看得见的手》[J].管理世界,2005,(5)： 160-165.
[108]陈凌.民营经济与中国家族企业成长[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2006.
[109]陈凌,应丽芬.从家庭/网络家庭到企业/企业网络[J].学海,2006(4)：161-166.
[110]陈凌,应丽芬.代际传承：家族企业继任管理与创新[J].管理世界,2003(6)：89-97.
[111]陈凌,曹正汉.制度与能力：中国民营企业20年成长的解析[M].上海：世纪出版集团上海人民出版社,2007.
[112]陈凌,郭萍,叶长兵.非家族经理进入家族企业研究：以山西票号为例[J].管理世界,2010,(12)：143-154.
[113]陈凌,李新春,储小平.中国家族企业的社会角色：过去、现在和未来[M].杭州：浙江大学出版社,2011年.
[114]陈凌,鲁莉劫.家族企业、治理结构与企业绩效[J].中山大学学报,2009,49(3)：203-212.
[115]陈凌,鲁莉劫,朱建安.中国家族企业成长与企业社会责任[J].管理世界,2008,(12)：160-164.
[116]陈凌,王河森.华人企业集团家族治理模式演进研究[J].东南亚研究,2011,(3)：73-78.
[117]陈凌,王陆庄.中国家族企业成长中的障碍与出路[J].管理世界,2006,(8)：136-139.
[118]陈凌,王萌,朱建安.中国家族企业的现代转型[J].管理世界,2011,(4)：163-166.
[119]陈凌,叶长兵,鲁莉劫.中国家族上市公司最终所有权、控制权及其分离[J].浙江社会科学,2009,(5)：8-15.
[120]陈其南.房与传统中国家族制度[J].汉学研究(中国台湾),1985(3)：127-183.
[121]储小平.家族企业的成长与社会资本的融合[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2004.
[122]储小平.家族企业研究——个具有现代意义的话题[J].中国社会科学,2000,(5)：51-58.
[123]储小平.华人家族企业的界定[J].经济理论与经济管理,2004,(1)：41-45.
[124]储小平.职业经理与家族企业的成长[J].管理世界,2002,(4)：100-108.
[125]储小平,李怀祖.信任与家族企业的成长[J].管理世界,2003,(3)：98-106.
[126]储小平.儒家伦理与海外华人经济的发展[J].汕头大学学报(人文科学版),1997,(5)：80-86.
[127]储小平,李怀祖.信任与家族企业的成长[J].管理世界,2003,(3)：98-106.
[128]陈清泰等.中国大企业集团年度发展报告(2008)[M].北京：中国发展出版社,2009.
[129]恩纳斯托·J·珀扎.家族企业[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2005.
[130]费孝通.乡土中国生育制度[M].北京：北京大学出版社,1998.
[131]冯根福.双重委托代理理论[J].经济研究,2004,(12)：16-25.
[132]弗郎西斯·福山.信任：社会美德与创造经济繁荣[M].海口：海南出版社,2001.
[133]戈登·雷丁.华人资本主义精神[M].上海：格致出版社,上海人民出版社,2009.
[134]郭晓利.企业集团的国际比较[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2002.
[135]郭跃进.论家族企业家族化水平的测定原理与方法[J].中国工业经济,2002,(12)：87-91.
[136]韩朝华.战略与制度：中国企业集团的成长分析[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2000.
[137]贺涛.台湾经济发展轨迹[M].北京：中国经济出版社,2009年.
[138]赫尔曼·西蒙.隐形冠军[M].北京：经济日报出版社,2005.
[139]黄泰岩,张培丽.2008年中国经济研究热点排名与分析[J].经济学动态,2009(2)：16-20.
[140]黄山,蓝海林.中国行业机会诱导下企业集团的多元化行为研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2007.
[141]金祥荣,余立智.控制权市场缺失与民营家族制企业成长中的产权障碍[J].中国农村经济,2002,(8)：33-34.
[142]贺小刚,李新春,连燕玲.家族成员的权力集中度与企业绩效[C]//第五届创业与家族企业国际研讨会论文集,2009.
[143]贺小刚,连燕玲.家族权威与企业价值：基于家族上市公司的实证研究[J].经济研究,2009(4)：90-102.
[144]贺小刚,连燕玲,李婧,梅琳.家族控制中的亲缘效应分析与检验[J].中国工业经济,2010(1)：135-146.
[145]贺小刚,李新春,连燕玲,张远飞.家族内部的权力偏离及其对治理效率的影响[J].中国工业经济,2010(10)：96-106.
[146]贺小刚,连燕玲,李婧,苗藤藤.家族权威的配置效应分析与实证检验[J].财经研究,2010(10)：122-132.
[147]贺小刚,李婧,陈蕾.家族成员组合与公司治理效率[J].南开管理评论,2010(6)：149-160.
[148]贺小刚,连燕玲,余冬兰.家族和谐与企业可持续成长[J].经济管理,2010(1)：50-60.
[149]胡军,朱文胜,庞道满.劳动契约、交易费用与关系治理——华人家族企业内部治理行为分析[J].暨南学报(哲学社会科学版),2002,24(3)：14-19.
[150]胡旭阳,史晋川.民营企业的政治资源与民营企业多元化投资——以中国民营企业500强为例[J].中国工业经济,2008(4)：5-14.
[151]今井贤一,小宫隆太郎.现代日本企业制度[M].北京：经济科学出版社,1995.
[152]金勇兴.温州企业集团发展研究[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,1999.
[153]克林·盖尔西克等.家族企业的繁衍[M].北京：图书出版社,经济日报出版社,1998.
[154]柯荣浦.企业集团管理体制研究[M].北京：中国经济出版社,2004.
[155]赖建清.所有权、控制权与公司绩效[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2007
[156]梁磊,王洪涛.企业集团发展模式与运行机制比较[M].北京：机械工业出版社,2003.
[157]兰德尔·S·卡洛克,约翰·L·沃德.家族企业战略计划[M].北京：中信出版社,2002,
[158]蓝海林.中国多元化企业的战略管理研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2008.
[159]李非.台湾经济发展通论[M].北京：九州出版社,2004年.
[160]李国鼎.台湾的经济计划及其实施[M].南京：东南大学出版社,1995年.
[161]李国鼎.台湾经济发展背后的政策演变[M].南京：东南大学出版社,1997 年.
[162]李维安,武立东.公司治理教程[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2002.
[163]李维安,武立冬.企业集团的公司治理——规模起点、治理边界及子公司治理[J].南开管理评论,1999(4)：4-8.
[164]李新春.中国的家族制度与企业组织[J].中国社会科学季刊(香港),1998,(秋季卷).
[165]李新春,任丽霞.民营企业的家族意图与家族治理行为研究[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),2004(6)：239-249.
[166]李新春,陈灿.家族企业的关系治理：一个探索性研究[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),2005,45(6)：107-115.
[167]李新春,储小平,朱沆.民营企业成长研究报告——基于广东省民营企业的调研分析[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2008.
[168]李新春,杨学儒,姜岳新,胡晓红.内部人所有权与企业价值——对中国民营上市公司的研究[J].经济研究,2008,(11)：27-38.
[169]李新春,檀宏斌,杨学儒.家族企业内部两权分离-基于百年家族企业香港利丰的案例研究[C]//第五届创业与家族企业会议论文集,2009.
[170]李亚.民营企业集团管理实务与案例[M].北京：中国发展出版社,2009.
[171]李增泉,辛显刚,于旭辉.金融发展、债务融资约束与金字塔结构——来自民营企业集团的证据[J].管理世界,2008,(1)：123-135.
[172]李学民,黄昆章.印尼华侨华人史[M].广州：广东高等教育出版社,2005.
[173]李卓.中日家族制度比较研究[M].北京：人民出版社,2004.
[174]连燕玲,贺小刚,张远飞.家族权威配置机理与功效[J].管理世界,2011,(11)：30-42.
[175]林善浪,张禹东,伍华佳.华商管理学[J].上海：复旦大学出版社,2006年
[176]刘淼,修峰,叶丹.企业集团内部连锁董事理论研究综述[J].经济理论研究28-30.
[177]卢昌崇,陈仕华,Schwalbach连锁董事理论：来自中国企业的实证检验[J].中国工业经济,2006(1)：113-120.
[178]鲁莉劫, 陈凌.国外家族企业治理结构研究新进展[J].郑州大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2009,42(3)：85-89.
[179]罗伯特·殷.案例研究：设计与方法(第3版[M],重庆：重庆大学出版社,2004年.
[180]马金城,王磊.系族控制人掏空与支持上市公司的博弈[J].管理世界,2009(12)：150-163.
[181]马丽波.家族企业的生命周期轮回与多维演进研究[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2009.
[182]毛蕴诗.企业集团—扩展动因、模式与案例[M],广州：广东人民出版社,2000年.
[183]宁向东,陈宁.系族企业的特征：一个初步描述[J].财经问题研究,2005,(4)：29-33.
[184]潘必胜.家族企业与中国市场化进程[J].中国社会科学季刊,1999年冬季 号：119-128.
[185]潘必胜.乡镇企业中的家族经营问题——兼论家族企业在中国的历史命运[J].中国农村观察,1998(1)：12-18.
[186]潘必胜.产权、家族效率与家族非效率——农业社会中家庭经济分析[J].中国农村观察,2001(4)：27-35.
[187]潘必胜.中国的家族企业——所有权和控制权(1895-1956)[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2009.
[188]彭罗斯.企业成长理论[M].上海：三联书店,上海人民出版社,2007.
[189]任兵,区玉辉,彭维刚.连锁董事、区域企业间连锁董事网与区域经济发展[J].管理世界,2004(3)：112-125.
[190]上海证券交易所研究中心.中国公司治理报告(2005)：民营上市公司治理[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2005.
[191]单玉丽.台湾经济60年[M].北京：知识产权出版社,2010年.
[192]宋旭琴.我国多元化企业组织结构与绩效的关系研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2006年.
[193]苏东蔚.多元化经营与企业价值：我国上市公司多元化溢价的实证分析[J].经济学(季刊),2005(4)：135-158.
[194]苏启林,朱文.上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究,2003,(8)：36-45.
[195]孙治本.家族主义与现代台湾企业[J].社会学研究,1995,(5)：36-42.
[196]唐慧.印度尼西亚历届政府华侨华人政策的形成与演变[M].北京：世界知识出版社,2006.
[197]王河森,陈凌,王明琳.亲情原则还是能力取向?——家族上市公司权力配置机制的实证研究[J].财经研究,2012(2)：102-108.
[198]王风彬.企业间组织的跨层次分析——兼析企业专业化与集团多元化的关系[J].中国工业经济,2008(3)：49-57.
[199]王世权.日本家族企业成长的理论解析及其影响因素分析-基于三井财阀的案例[J].产业经济评论,2008,8(2)：22-45.
[200]王明琳,周生春.控制性家族类型、双重三层委托代理问题与企业价值[J].管理世界,2006,(8)：83-93.
[201]王明琳,陈凌,叶长兵.中国民营上市公司的家族治理与企业价值[J].南开管理评论,2010,(1)：61-67.
[202]汪慕恒.东南亚华人企业集团研究[M].厦门：厦门大学出版社,1995年.
[203]王宣喻,储小平.私营企业内部治理结构的演变模式研究[J].经济科学,2002,(3)：89-93.
[204]王宣喻,李新春,陈凌.资本合作与信任拓展：一个跨越家族的创业故事[J].管理世界,2006(8)：113-125.
[205]王宣喻,李新春.1988-2007：中国大陆家族企业研究之回顾与展望[C]//第三届创业与家族企业国际研讨会论文集,2007.
[206]王绪圻.试论台湾大型家族企业集团世代交替[J].台湾研究,1997,(4)：59-66.
[207]武立东.中国民营上市公司治理及其评价研究[M].天津：南开大学出版 社,2007.
[208]谢明亮.协调与合作视角下的企业集团治理研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2007.
[209]徐金发,姚铮.交易费用与企业集团多层次结构分析[J].中国工业经济,1991(10)：30-34.
[210]许奇挺.内部资本市场有效性研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2008.
[211]许永斌,郑金芳.中国民营上市公司家族控制权特征与公司绩效实证研究[J].会计研究,2007,(11)： 50-57.
[212]徐杨杰.中国家族制度史[M].北京：人民出版社,1992.
[213]岩崎育夫.新加坡华人企业集团[M].厦门：厦门大学出版社,1999.
[214]杨兴君,宗长玉,江艺.民营企业控制多家上市公司实证研究[R].金信证券,2003.
[215]杨学儒,李新春.家族涉入指数的构建与测量研究[J].中国工业经济,2009(5)：97-107.
[216]姚俊,吕源,蓝海林.我国上市公司多元化与经济绩效关系的实证研究[J].管理世界,2004(11)：119-127.
[217]叶银华.家族控股集团、核心企业与报酬互动研究——台湾与香港证券市场之比较[J].管理评论(台湾),1999,18(2)
[218]伊万·兰兹伯格.家业永续[M].北京：商务印书馆,2005.
[219]约翰·赖斯比特.亚洲大趋势[M].北京：外文出版社、经济日报出版社、上海远东出版社,1996年.
[220]于左.企业集团规制政策：德隆危机的反思[J].中国工业经济,2004(11)：83-90.
[221]云冠平,陈乔之.东南亚华人企业经营管理研究[M].北京：经济管理出版社,2000.
[222]余立智.现代家庭组织理论研究的最新进展及其启示[J].财经论丛,2006(2)：8-13.
[223]张珉.我国家族企业与职业经理之间的合作困境及其突破—从信任的角度[D].博士学位论文,复旦大学,2004.
[224]张富春,冯子标.企业集团：中间组织与有组织的市场[J].中国工业经济,1997(12)：45-50.
[225]赵鲁光.转型时期企业集团的形成、组织结构与绩效——理论与实证研究综述[J].经济社会体制比较,2005(4)：132-136.
[226]赵增耀等.企业集团治理[M].北京：机械工业出版社,2002.
[227]詹淑婷,钟喜梅.家族控制与金字塔结构[J].公司治理评论,2009(4)：58-75.
[228]郑宏泰,黄绍伦.香港华人家族企业个案研究[M].香港：香港明报出版社,2004.
[229]中国集团公司促进会.母子公司关系研究——企业集团的组织结构和管理控制[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2004.
[230]中国民(私)营经济研究会家族企业研究课题组.中国家族企业发展报告[M].北京：中信出版社,2011.
[231]中华全国工商业联合会.1993-2006中国私营企业大型调查[M].北京：中华工商联合出版社,2007.
[232]滋贺秀三.中国家族法原理[M].北京：法律出版社,2003.
[233]中华征信所.2007年版台湾地区集团企业研究[M].台北：中华征信企业股份有限公司出版社,2007年.
[234]曾晓祥.印度尼西亚“主公”问题的探讨[J].学术论坛,2004(3)：133-136.
[235]郑学益.商战之魂：东南亚华人企业集团探微[M].北京：北京大学出版社,1997年。