基于谱系分析的城市交通资源产权配置研究
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摘要
城市交通运输业是城市经济的基础产业,其发展水平的高低直接关系到一个城市经济的发展速度。随着中国城市化和城市交通机动化的发展,城市交通的作用受到越来越广泛的重视。自20世纪90年代西方产权理论引入以来,理论界针对产权问题的讨论已成为主流议题。目前在城市交通领域的产权研究中,吸引投资、城市交通服务运营主体多元化等方面都展开了广泛的研究和尝试。发展交通的重点在于提高效率,而发挥效率的核心就是研究产权配置的内在机理问题,或者说产权配置的方式是否可以同配置对象自身的情况相适应的问题。本文以城市交通资源为重点研究对象,以产权适性为视角,选取有代表性的交通方式,对产权属性进行梳理并给出谱系排列,从而对产权效率问题进行研究。
按照新制度经济学的观点,不同的产权制度安排,所导致的所有者或当事人的行为取向是不一样的,当然,产生的产权效率也是不一样的。那么,为了能够达到一个合适的产权效率,或者说为了获得比较满意的产权结果,在一定的初始条件下,一个城市交通资源的产权配置是应当存在一个合理区间的,当我们把不同的交通资源所适用的产权配置方式及其各项因素按照一定的方式进行排列,这个时候就可以得到一个相应的谱系,从谱系中我们就可以得出在一定的目标下未来各交通资源发展中产权配置的建议,从而为市场的管制政策以及建立具有自组织功能的运输市场提供相应的指导。本文的主要工作包括:
①本文通过产权属性的概念描述了各种城市运输方式自身同产权契约之间的适配关系,解释了什么样的城市交通资源适用于什么样的产权配置方式才能获得较高经济效率的问题。建立了通过自然属性确定产权属性的逻辑框架,解决了如何获取一种城市交通资源产权属性的问题。本文回避了通过意识形态决定何种产权制度或契约更优越的论题,认为每个产权问题所研究的经济对象,都因为自身不断变化的自然属性决定了自身的产权属性,正是这个属性从产生后就决定并引导着相对应的产权契约不断的提高自身的经济效率。
②本文以产权理论中关于不同产权属性物品的分类为基础,提出了产权谱系的概念。以城市交通的各种交通资源为研究对象,建立了渐进的一维谱系序列,描述了不同产权的物品是如何由适于公共物品逐渐转向适于私人物品的。
③本文在产权属性的研究中提出了两个创新性的观点:首先是每个交通资源的产权属性不是一个点而是一个围绕着主要产权属性形成的区间,换而言之,即使是同一种运输方式中,在每一个组成的个体上依然存在着彼此间的不同,世界上不存在两个完全相同的轨道交通网络、也不存在两个完全相同的城市出租车市场,由于它们的不同要求不能唯一性的制定相应的产权契约,这也解释了为什么不同的城市同种交通资源采用不完全相同的产权契约形式而且效果都不错,或者同一城市同一种交通资源同时采用多种契约共存的现象。其次是产权的一维谱系是一个连续的谱系而不是离散的谱系,这表明虽然我们对不同交通资源的产权属性给了不同的定义,但是他们之间仍然存在契约相互交叉的情况。
④在产权二维谱系分析中,本文首次提出了产权自组织调整的概念,本文还提出由于产权契约自身的不完全性,一种交通资源会面临一个主契约与一些从属契约共同形成的契约组合。在这个契约组合仍不能使整体中的每一个组成部分达到效率最优的情况下,这种运输方式下的个体会自发的产生各种带有随机性的通过自我组织调整的方式获得个体产权效率最优的行为,当这种自组织行为不断发展,就会累积推动产权契约或契约组合的调整和发展。
⑤本文通过引入系统经济学的局整关系模型,描述和解释了各种交通资源作为一个系统,他们之间以及每个交通资源的个体之间的产权效率关系,为进一步研究产权契约之间的影响提供了研究基础和方向。本文认为城市交通系统作为一个复杂的网络型系统,在发展态势上体现出总体大于局部之和、阶段式发展等特点,在产权配置过程中也就决定了即使二维谱系可以确定出最优的契约组合方案,但是作为一个系统整体,必须由更宏观更高级的组织契约制度对各交通资源进行协调,对于整体社会的推进也必须具有更宏观的效率定义。
⑥研究和描述产权效率的具体方式有很多,目前国内外研究的角度也各有不同。本文通过引用柯布——道格拉斯(Cobb—Douglas)生产函数模型并对其进行部分改造,以北京相关统计数据为例,着重探讨了公共交通在运营过程中对区域经济社会发展的影响,并尝试对模型结果进行初步的解释和补充。从而以举证类比的方式解释了每一种交通资源作为城市基础推动力和城市经济发展之间的影响关系,从而为研究结论应用于实践提供了一种分析解释的方向。
⑦本文选取城市运输中重要交通资源之一的轨道交通为代表,建立了关于产权效率的评价指标体系,以北京轨道交通的特点为例,结合实际,通过三个指标层23个指标的分析归纳,判断产权效率的高低以及产权属性与产权契约组合之间的匹配程度,提供了产权效率不断改进的量化测评工具,也为模型在实际中不同情况下的灵活应用提供了一个样版。
Urban Transportation Industry is the basic industry of urban economy, the development level of which has a direct bearing on the speed of urban economic growth. With the development of urbanization and motorization in China, the effect of urban transportation has received increasing attention. Since the introduction of western property right theory in 1990s, the discussion of property right problem has become the main topic in theory circle. In current property research in the field of urban transportation, extensive researches and attempts have been carried out in the absorption of investment, diversity of operation main bodies in urban transportation service and so on. The key point to transportation development is improving efficiency, the core of which is studying on the inner mechanism of property right allocation, in other words, if the way of property right allocation is suitable for its object. Urban traffic resource is regarded as the major research object in the paper. From the perspective of property right adaptability, this paper will select some representative traffic modes, straighten out their property right attributes and summarize the pedigree, thereby giving the theoretical explanations to the above-mentioned problems.
In the view of new institutional economics, different property rights arrangements will lead to different behavior orientations of the owners and parties, as well as different efficiency of property rights. In order to reach an ideal efficiency or to get a satisfactory property result, under certain initial conditions, there should be a rational inter-region for the property right allocation of a city's traffic resources. When we arrange the different ways and factors of property right allocation which are appropriate to various traffic resources in a certain way, a corresponding pedigree will be obtained. Then we can make suggestions for property right allocation with a certain aim in the future development of traffic resources, and provide guidance to market regulation policy and the establishment of self-organizing transportation market. The major task of this paper includes:
①This paper describes the integration relations between various urban transportation modes and property right contracts through property right attributes, explains the problem that how the urban traffic resources match with their ways of property right allocation so that higher economic efficiency can be gained, establishes the logical framework of determining the property right attribute through the natural attribute, and solves the problem of how to define the property right attribute of a urban traffic resource. This paper skirts round the topic of determining which property right system is superior to the others by ideology and argues that for every economic object in property right studies, their continually changing natural attributes determine their property right attributes and help the corresponding property right contracts to improve economic efficiency.
②Based on the classification of goods with different property right attributes in the property right theory, the concept of property right pedigree is presented in this paper. Regarding various urban traffic resources as the research objects, this paper establishes the progressive one-dimensional pedigree and describes how the goods with different property right gradually change their adaptation from public goods to private goods.
③In the study of property right attributes, two innovative viewpoints are proposed. On one hand, the property right attribute of every traffic resource Is not a point, but a space which is formed around the main property right attribute. In the other words, even in the same transportation mode, there are differences among the individual parts. There are neither two perfectly identical rail transit networks in the world, nor the urban taxi industries. Because their different requirements can not determine the corresponding property right contracts uniquely. That also explains why it works out well when the same traffic resource in different cities use the not identical property right contracts or the same traffic resource in the same city uses a variety of property right contracts. On the other hand, the one-dimensional pedigree of property right is continuous, but not discrete. It shows that although we give different definitions to property right attributes of different traffic resources, there are intersecting contracts among them.
④In the analysis of two-dimensional pedigree of property right, this paper first proposes the concept of self-organizing adjustment of property right. Because of the incompleteness of property right contract, one kind of traffic resource will face the contract combination of a main contract and some subordinative ones. In the situation that the contract combination still can not bring each component part to the optimal efficiency, the individual parts of this transportation mode will spontaneously take the random action to acquire optimal efficiency through self-organizing adjustment. If the self-organizing action continuously expands, it will promote the adjustment and development of property right contract and the contract combination.
⑤Through introducing the part-whole relation model in system economics, this paper describes and explains the relations of property right efficiency among various traffic resources which are considered as a system and the individual parts of every traffic resource. It will provide the basis and direction for further study of the effect between property right contracts. This paper believes that as a complicated network system, in future development tendency urban traffic system reflect its characteristics that a whole is greater than the sum of its parts, it develops in a progressive sequence and so on. During the process of property right allocation, even the two-dimensional pedigree can provide the plan of optimal contract combination, as a whole system, a more macroscopic and advanced organizing contract system is needed to coordinate traffic resources, which is also of more macroscopic efficiency significance for the progress of the whole society.
⑥By introducing Cobb-Douglas productive function and transforming it partly, taking Beijing's statistical data for example, this paper emphasizes the influence on regional social and economic development in the course of public traffic operation, and tries to make the preliminary interpretation and supplement to the result of the function. So that it explains the relationship between traffic resource, as the city's basic driving force, and economic development in the way of quoting and analogy. Also an interpretation of property right efficiency's practical significance is given.
⑦This paper elects rail transit which is one of the most important traffic resources in urban transportation as the representative, establishes the evaluation index system of property right efficiency, judges the level of property right efficiency and matching degree between property right attribute and property right contract by analyzing and inducing three index layers and twenty-three indexes, and provides the quantitative evaluation tool for improvement of property right efficiency.
按照新制度经济学的观点,不同的产权制度安排,所导致的所有者或当事人的行为取向是不一样的,当然,产生的产权效率也是不一样的。那么,为了能够达到一个合适的产权效率,或者说为了获得比较满意的产权结果,在一定的初始条件下,一个城市交通资源的产权配置是应当存在一个合理区间的,当我们把不同的交通资源所适用的产权配置方式及其各项因素按照一定的方式进行排列,这个时候就可以得到一个相应的谱系,从谱系中我们就可以得出在一定的目标下未来各交通资源发展中产权配置的建议,从而为市场的管制政策以及建立具有自组织功能的运输市场提供相应的指导。本文的主要工作包括:
①本文通过产权属性的概念描述了各种城市运输方式自身同产权契约之间的适配关系,解释了什么样的城市交通资源适用于什么样的产权配置方式才能获得较高经济效率的问题。建立了通过自然属性确定产权属性的逻辑框架,解决了如何获取一种城市交通资源产权属性的问题。本文回避了通过意识形态决定何种产权制度或契约更优越的论题,认为每个产权问题所研究的经济对象,都因为自身不断变化的自然属性决定了自身的产权属性,正是这个属性从产生后就决定并引导着相对应的产权契约不断的提高自身的经济效率。
②本文以产权理论中关于不同产权属性物品的分类为基础,提出了产权谱系的概念。以城市交通的各种交通资源为研究对象,建立了渐进的一维谱系序列,描述了不同产权的物品是如何由适于公共物品逐渐转向适于私人物品的。
③本文在产权属性的研究中提出了两个创新性的观点:首先是每个交通资源的产权属性不是一个点而是一个围绕着主要产权属性形成的区间,换而言之,即使是同一种运输方式中,在每一个组成的个体上依然存在着彼此间的不同,世界上不存在两个完全相同的轨道交通网络、也不存在两个完全相同的城市出租车市场,由于它们的不同要求不能唯一性的制定相应的产权契约,这也解释了为什么不同的城市同种交通资源采用不完全相同的产权契约形式而且效果都不错,或者同一城市同一种交通资源同时采用多种契约共存的现象。其次是产权的一维谱系是一个连续的谱系而不是离散的谱系,这表明虽然我们对不同交通资源的产权属性给了不同的定义,但是他们之间仍然存在契约相互交叉的情况。
④在产权二维谱系分析中,本文首次提出了产权自组织调整的概念,本文还提出由于产权契约自身的不完全性,一种交通资源会面临一个主契约与一些从属契约共同形成的契约组合。在这个契约组合仍不能使整体中的每一个组成部分达到效率最优的情况下,这种运输方式下的个体会自发的产生各种带有随机性的通过自我组织调整的方式获得个体产权效率最优的行为,当这种自组织行为不断发展,就会累积推动产权契约或契约组合的调整和发展。
⑤本文通过引入系统经济学的局整关系模型,描述和解释了各种交通资源作为一个系统,他们之间以及每个交通资源的个体之间的产权效率关系,为进一步研究产权契约之间的影响提供了研究基础和方向。本文认为城市交通系统作为一个复杂的网络型系统,在发展态势上体现出总体大于局部之和、阶段式发展等特点,在产权配置过程中也就决定了即使二维谱系可以确定出最优的契约组合方案,但是作为一个系统整体,必须由更宏观更高级的组织契约制度对各交通资源进行协调,对于整体社会的推进也必须具有更宏观的效率定义。
⑥研究和描述产权效率的具体方式有很多,目前国内外研究的角度也各有不同。本文通过引用柯布——道格拉斯(Cobb—Douglas)生产函数模型并对其进行部分改造,以北京相关统计数据为例,着重探讨了公共交通在运营过程中对区域经济社会发展的影响,并尝试对模型结果进行初步的解释和补充。从而以举证类比的方式解释了每一种交通资源作为城市基础推动力和城市经济发展之间的影响关系,从而为研究结论应用于实践提供了一种分析解释的方向。
⑦本文选取城市运输中重要交通资源之一的轨道交通为代表,建立了关于产权效率的评价指标体系,以北京轨道交通的特点为例,结合实际,通过三个指标层23个指标的分析归纳,判断产权效率的高低以及产权属性与产权契约组合之间的匹配程度,提供了产权效率不断改进的量化测评工具,也为模型在实际中不同情况下的灵活应用提供了一个样版。
Urban Transportation Industry is the basic industry of urban economy, the development level of which has a direct bearing on the speed of urban economic growth. With the development of urbanization and motorization in China, the effect of urban transportation has received increasing attention. Since the introduction of western property right theory in 1990s, the discussion of property right problem has become the main topic in theory circle. In current property research in the field of urban transportation, extensive researches and attempts have been carried out in the absorption of investment, diversity of operation main bodies in urban transportation service and so on. The key point to transportation development is improving efficiency, the core of which is studying on the inner mechanism of property right allocation, in other words, if the way of property right allocation is suitable for its object. Urban traffic resource is regarded as the major research object in the paper. From the perspective of property right adaptability, this paper will select some representative traffic modes, straighten out their property right attributes and summarize the pedigree, thereby giving the theoretical explanations to the above-mentioned problems.
In the view of new institutional economics, different property rights arrangements will lead to different behavior orientations of the owners and parties, as well as different efficiency of property rights. In order to reach an ideal efficiency or to get a satisfactory property result, under certain initial conditions, there should be a rational inter-region for the property right allocation of a city's traffic resources. When we arrange the different ways and factors of property right allocation which are appropriate to various traffic resources in a certain way, a corresponding pedigree will be obtained. Then we can make suggestions for property right allocation with a certain aim in the future development of traffic resources, and provide guidance to market regulation policy and the establishment of self-organizing transportation market. The major task of this paper includes:
①This paper describes the integration relations between various urban transportation modes and property right contracts through property right attributes, explains the problem that how the urban traffic resources match with their ways of property right allocation so that higher economic efficiency can be gained, establishes the logical framework of determining the property right attribute through the natural attribute, and solves the problem of how to define the property right attribute of a urban traffic resource. This paper skirts round the topic of determining which property right system is superior to the others by ideology and argues that for every economic object in property right studies, their continually changing natural attributes determine their property right attributes and help the corresponding property right contracts to improve economic efficiency.
②Based on the classification of goods with different property right attributes in the property right theory, the concept of property right pedigree is presented in this paper. Regarding various urban traffic resources as the research objects, this paper establishes the progressive one-dimensional pedigree and describes how the goods with different property right gradually change their adaptation from public goods to private goods.
③In the study of property right attributes, two innovative viewpoints are proposed. On one hand, the property right attribute of every traffic resource Is not a point, but a space which is formed around the main property right attribute. In the other words, even in the same transportation mode, there are differences among the individual parts. There are neither two perfectly identical rail transit networks in the world, nor the urban taxi industries. Because their different requirements can not determine the corresponding property right contracts uniquely. That also explains why it works out well when the same traffic resource in different cities use the not identical property right contracts or the same traffic resource in the same city uses a variety of property right contracts. On the other hand, the one-dimensional pedigree of property right is continuous, but not discrete. It shows that although we give different definitions to property right attributes of different traffic resources, there are intersecting contracts among them.
④In the analysis of two-dimensional pedigree of property right, this paper first proposes the concept of self-organizing adjustment of property right. Because of the incompleteness of property right contract, one kind of traffic resource will face the contract combination of a main contract and some subordinative ones. In the situation that the contract combination still can not bring each component part to the optimal efficiency, the individual parts of this transportation mode will spontaneously take the random action to acquire optimal efficiency through self-organizing adjustment. If the self-organizing action continuously expands, it will promote the adjustment and development of property right contract and the contract combination.
⑤Through introducing the part-whole relation model in system economics, this paper describes and explains the relations of property right efficiency among various traffic resources which are considered as a system and the individual parts of every traffic resource. It will provide the basis and direction for further study of the effect between property right contracts. This paper believes that as a complicated network system, in future development tendency urban traffic system reflect its characteristics that a whole is greater than the sum of its parts, it develops in a progressive sequence and so on. During the process of property right allocation, even the two-dimensional pedigree can provide the plan of optimal contract combination, as a whole system, a more macroscopic and advanced organizing contract system is needed to coordinate traffic resources, which is also of more macroscopic efficiency significance for the progress of the whole society.
⑥By introducing Cobb-Douglas productive function and transforming it partly, taking Beijing's statistical data for example, this paper emphasizes the influence on regional social and economic development in the course of public traffic operation, and tries to make the preliminary interpretation and supplement to the result of the function. So that it explains the relationship between traffic resource, as the city's basic driving force, and economic development in the way of quoting and analogy. Also an interpretation of property right efficiency's practical significance is given.
⑦This paper elects rail transit which is one of the most important traffic resources in urban transportation as the representative, establishes the evaluation index system of property right efficiency, judges the level of property right efficiency and matching degree between property right attribute and property right contract by analyzing and inducing three index layers and twenty-three indexes, and provides the quantitative evaluation tool for improvement of property right efficiency.
引文
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