苏珊·哈克逻辑哲学思想研究
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摘要
苏珊·哈克是当代著名的哲学家、逻辑学家,新古典实用主义的杰出代表。本文以哈克的逻辑哲学思想为研究对象,通过文本的深入分析和系统整理,紧紧扣住“逻辑哲学的中心问题应该围绕非形式论证与其形式刻画之间的符合关系”①这条主线,依次阐述逻辑的范围与限度、系统内外有效性、整体多元论、逻辑可修正性、“真”理论等内容,充分挖掘哈克逻辑哲学之精义,使之呈现为一个较为完整的理论体系。
伴随经典逻辑的发展和完善,涌现出一大批非经典逻辑,由此进入一个“择代逻辑时代”,构成了五彩纷呈、百家争鸣的繁荣景象。但学者们普遍聚焦于非经典逻辑在形式技术上的革新,而不太重视这种现象背后所蕴涵的具有根本性的哲学问题。与之相反,哈克以“择代逻辑时代”为背景,对非经典逻辑引起的重大哲学问题予以高度关注,详细考察了非经典逻辑产生的哲学动机以及给经典逻辑带来的各种挑战,深刻反思了逻辑的本质和地位,特别是形式化方法的作用和限度,从不同角度捍卫了逻辑的多样性和可修正性。
可以说,哈克的整个逻辑哲学都在为逻辑可修正性做辩护,但考察方式前后有所转变,存在两条不同的研究进路：蒯因式的和皮尔士式的。与《变异逻辑》中激进的“变异观”和含混的一元论相比,她在《逻辑哲学》中更加清晰地区分了逻辑的形而上学问题和认识论问题,从含混的一元论转向了整体多元论,否认了系统变异必定导致实质性竞争,但始终强调元逻辑观念方面的分歧,特别是系统外有效性观念的含混性、形式刻画的多样性和认知主体的可错性。此外,她不仅强有力地论证了逻辑修正的可能性和必要性,详细揭示了逻辑修正的各种表现形式,而且通过大量的案例分析,进一步评估了几种常见的挑战经典逻辑的潜在动机。不过,令人遗憾的是,这些所谓的“挑战”并不成功,尚未对经典逻辑构成严重威胁。因此,尽管逻辑在原则上确实是可修正的,但在现实操作中仍然需要好的理由。
哈克深受蒯因、皮尔士等人的影响,其逻辑哲学具有鲜明的实用主义特征：主张彻底的可错论和逻辑可修正性；从自然主义角度揭示逻辑的发生、发展历程；强调形式论证与非形式论证、系统内有效性与系统外有效性之间的相互依赖和动态符合关系；赞同逻辑的多样性和普遍性,反对一元论和极端相对主义；既极力反对逻辑尊崇主义将逻辑绝对化、神圣化和教条化,主张把逻辑从上帝拉回人间,强调逻辑对人类生活的关切；同时也坚决反对各种虚无主义、文化多元主义、时髦的女性主义等逻辑犬儒主义对逻辑的任意贬低和滥用；认为逻辑并非凌驾于理性审判之上的立法者,相反,它是人类的事业；与任何其他科学一样,逻辑探究之途也是充满荆棘和曲折多变的；所以,应该坚持坦诚的实在论和批判的常识主义眼光看待逻辑事业,理性地捍卫逻辑。
哈克的逻辑哲学思想新颖,独树一帜。其理论贡献不仅体现在她提出的一整套学说上,而且还体现在她开启的许多颇富吸引力的问题域上,极大地拓展了逻辑哲学的视野。她对形式化限度的清醒认识和对各种极端主义的严厉批判,对于当代逻辑学的健康发展具有特别重要的意义。但美中不足的是,哈克逻辑哲学中的某些核心概念和基本主张有待进一步澄清和辩护；在案例分析上也存在偏颇和失当之处,对现代逻辑最新进展关注不够；原则上的激进态度和现实中的保守策略之间存在内在的冲突等等。
本文在批判地吸收哈克思想观点的基础上,进一步认为：逻辑系统有其外在基础,即非形式论证及其直观有效性；各种逻辑系统试图从不同角度把握和刻画系统外有效性,这从根本上导致了逻辑的多样性和可修正性；实际上,经典逻辑提出了直观有效性的最低要求,即不能前提真而结论假；尽管非经典逻辑对直观有效性给出了不同的理解,但都必须满足最低要求；由于不同的逻辑对系统外有效性做了不同程度的刻画,它们在某种意义上都是“正确的”,所以,简单、经济等实用主义准则是选择和衡量逻辑系统的重要(但不是唯一一)参数。
Susan Haack is famous as contemporary philosopher, logician and neo-pragmatist. This dissertation studied in Susan Haack's philosophy of logics, aimed to clarify the essence of Haack's philosophy of logics and make it show as an integral system info, discussed the scope and limits of logic, extra-systematic validity and system-relative validity, global pluralism, revisability of logic, theories of truth in turn, based on analyzing and tidying up literatures profoundly, with the mainstay of "the center problem in philosophy of logic is about the relation between informal argument and formal argument".
Going with the development and maturation of classical logic, there are coming forth a lot of non-classical logics, and turn into "the age of alternative logics" which presents an omnifarious and competitive situation. Usually, scholars focused on the formal reformation, and gave little attention to the fundamental philosophy issues behind this situation. Contrarly, Haack gave high attention to the significant philosophy problems which arose by non-classical logics, with the background of "the age of alternative logics". She not only reviewed particularly the various philosophical motivations and challenges to classical logic of non-classical logics, but also reflected profoundly on the essence and status of logic, especially the function and limitation of formalization method, defended the plurality and revisability of logic from different points of view.
In some sense, the main purpose of Haack's philosophy of logics is to justify the revisability of logic, though the reviewing manner is changed. There are two different ways in Haack's arguments:Quinian and Peircian. Other than the radical viewpoint of "variance" and unclear monism in "Deviant Logic", she distinguished expressly the metaphysical and epistemological issues of logic in "Philosophy of Logics'", turned to global pluralism and denied that deviance of system must result in substantial rival. But she always emphasized the meta-logical divarication, especially the diversity of formalization and fallibility of agent. Besides, she not only argued adequately that it is possible and necessary to revise logic, but also investigated particularly the different forms to revise logic. With a mass of case-study, she evaluated some familiar motivations which challenged potentially to classical logic. However, these so-called "challenges" are unsuccessful, and so there is no serious threat to classical logic. Despite it is possible to revise logic in principle, but it still need rather better reasons in action.
Influenced by W. V. O. Quine and C. S. Peirce deeply, Haack's philosophy of logics takes on pragmatic characters obviously:claimed thorough fallibility and revisability of logic; investigated the genesis of logic from a point of naturalism; insisted that informal argument/extra-systematic validity and formal argument/system-relative validity depend on and accord with each other dynamically; agreed with pluralism and university of logic, and against monism and extreme relativism; opposed not only the absolutization, sanctification and dogmatism of logical deferentialism, but also the debase and abuse by logical cynicism, such as nihilism, culture relativism and fashionable feminism; pulled logic from God to Human, emphasized the affinity between logic and human lives; logic is not the lawmaker beyond judgement by reason, it is just a enterprise of human; like other sciences, logic inquire is also full of bramble and complicated, progress ragged and uneven; so we should insist on innocent realism and critical common sensism, defend logic with reason.
Haack's philosophy of logics is novel and particular. She not only put forward a systematic theory about logic's philosophy, but also exploited a lot of interesting question fields, enlarged the scope of philosophy of logic enormously. She's clear-headed about the limitation of formalization and criticized different extremists rigorously. It is very significant to the development of modern logic healthily. However, there are some shortcomings in Haack's philosophy of logics, for example, some core concepts and arguments need more clear and powerful accounts; the case-study is not adequate, there have some mistakes in her analysis; she is gives seldom attentions to the late literatures; besides, there is a tension between revisability of logic in principle and conservatism in action which hide in her theories.
Based on Haack's thoughts critically, I argued that:there is a basis out of logic systems, viz. the intuitive validity of informal argument. Different logics try to give different precise formulations that result in the plurality and revisability of logic in radically. In fact, classical logic have give the minimal condition of intuitive validity, namely it is cannot that premise is true but its conclusion is false. In some sense, different logics all are right, but they must satisfy the minimal condition of intuitive validity. The principles of Pragmatism, for example, simpleness and economy are very important(but not exclusive) criterions to select or evaluate certain logic system.
伴随经典逻辑的发展和完善,涌现出一大批非经典逻辑,由此进入一个“择代逻辑时代”,构成了五彩纷呈、百家争鸣的繁荣景象。但学者们普遍聚焦于非经典逻辑在形式技术上的革新,而不太重视这种现象背后所蕴涵的具有根本性的哲学问题。与之相反,哈克以“择代逻辑时代”为背景,对非经典逻辑引起的重大哲学问题予以高度关注,详细考察了非经典逻辑产生的哲学动机以及给经典逻辑带来的各种挑战,深刻反思了逻辑的本质和地位,特别是形式化方法的作用和限度,从不同角度捍卫了逻辑的多样性和可修正性。
可以说,哈克的整个逻辑哲学都在为逻辑可修正性做辩护,但考察方式前后有所转变,存在两条不同的研究进路：蒯因式的和皮尔士式的。与《变异逻辑》中激进的“变异观”和含混的一元论相比,她在《逻辑哲学》中更加清晰地区分了逻辑的形而上学问题和认识论问题,从含混的一元论转向了整体多元论,否认了系统变异必定导致实质性竞争,但始终强调元逻辑观念方面的分歧,特别是系统外有效性观念的含混性、形式刻画的多样性和认知主体的可错性。此外,她不仅强有力地论证了逻辑修正的可能性和必要性,详细揭示了逻辑修正的各种表现形式,而且通过大量的案例分析,进一步评估了几种常见的挑战经典逻辑的潜在动机。不过,令人遗憾的是,这些所谓的“挑战”并不成功,尚未对经典逻辑构成严重威胁。因此,尽管逻辑在原则上确实是可修正的,但在现实操作中仍然需要好的理由。
哈克深受蒯因、皮尔士等人的影响,其逻辑哲学具有鲜明的实用主义特征：主张彻底的可错论和逻辑可修正性；从自然主义角度揭示逻辑的发生、发展历程；强调形式论证与非形式论证、系统内有效性与系统外有效性之间的相互依赖和动态符合关系；赞同逻辑的多样性和普遍性,反对一元论和极端相对主义；既极力反对逻辑尊崇主义将逻辑绝对化、神圣化和教条化,主张把逻辑从上帝拉回人间,强调逻辑对人类生活的关切；同时也坚决反对各种虚无主义、文化多元主义、时髦的女性主义等逻辑犬儒主义对逻辑的任意贬低和滥用；认为逻辑并非凌驾于理性审判之上的立法者,相反,它是人类的事业；与任何其他科学一样,逻辑探究之途也是充满荆棘和曲折多变的；所以,应该坚持坦诚的实在论和批判的常识主义眼光看待逻辑事业,理性地捍卫逻辑。
哈克的逻辑哲学思想新颖,独树一帜。其理论贡献不仅体现在她提出的一整套学说上,而且还体现在她开启的许多颇富吸引力的问题域上,极大地拓展了逻辑哲学的视野。她对形式化限度的清醒认识和对各种极端主义的严厉批判,对于当代逻辑学的健康发展具有特别重要的意义。但美中不足的是,哈克逻辑哲学中的某些核心概念和基本主张有待进一步澄清和辩护；在案例分析上也存在偏颇和失当之处,对现代逻辑最新进展关注不够；原则上的激进态度和现实中的保守策略之间存在内在的冲突等等。
本文在批判地吸收哈克思想观点的基础上,进一步认为：逻辑系统有其外在基础,即非形式论证及其直观有效性；各种逻辑系统试图从不同角度把握和刻画系统外有效性,这从根本上导致了逻辑的多样性和可修正性；实际上,经典逻辑提出了直观有效性的最低要求,即不能前提真而结论假；尽管非经典逻辑对直观有效性给出了不同的理解,但都必须满足最低要求；由于不同的逻辑对系统外有效性做了不同程度的刻画,它们在某种意义上都是“正确的”,所以,简单、经济等实用主义准则是选择和衡量逻辑系统的重要(但不是唯一一)参数。
Susan Haack is famous as contemporary philosopher, logician and neo-pragmatist. This dissertation studied in Susan Haack's philosophy of logics, aimed to clarify the essence of Haack's philosophy of logics and make it show as an integral system info, discussed the scope and limits of logic, extra-systematic validity and system-relative validity, global pluralism, revisability of logic, theories of truth in turn, based on analyzing and tidying up literatures profoundly, with the mainstay of "the center problem in philosophy of logic is about the relation between informal argument and formal argument".
Going with the development and maturation of classical logic, there are coming forth a lot of non-classical logics, and turn into "the age of alternative logics" which presents an omnifarious and competitive situation. Usually, scholars focused on the formal reformation, and gave little attention to the fundamental philosophy issues behind this situation. Contrarly, Haack gave high attention to the significant philosophy problems which arose by non-classical logics, with the background of "the age of alternative logics". She not only reviewed particularly the various philosophical motivations and challenges to classical logic of non-classical logics, but also reflected profoundly on the essence and status of logic, especially the function and limitation of formalization method, defended the plurality and revisability of logic from different points of view.
In some sense, the main purpose of Haack's philosophy of logics is to justify the revisability of logic, though the reviewing manner is changed. There are two different ways in Haack's arguments:Quinian and Peircian. Other than the radical viewpoint of "variance" and unclear monism in "Deviant Logic", she distinguished expressly the metaphysical and epistemological issues of logic in "Philosophy of Logics'", turned to global pluralism and denied that deviance of system must result in substantial rival. But she always emphasized the meta-logical divarication, especially the diversity of formalization and fallibility of agent. Besides, she not only argued adequately that it is possible and necessary to revise logic, but also investigated particularly the different forms to revise logic. With a mass of case-study, she evaluated some familiar motivations which challenged potentially to classical logic. However, these so-called "challenges" are unsuccessful, and so there is no serious threat to classical logic. Despite it is possible to revise logic in principle, but it still need rather better reasons in action.
Influenced by W. V. O. Quine and C. S. Peirce deeply, Haack's philosophy of logics takes on pragmatic characters obviously:claimed thorough fallibility and revisability of logic; investigated the genesis of logic from a point of naturalism; insisted that informal argument/extra-systematic validity and formal argument/system-relative validity depend on and accord with each other dynamically; agreed with pluralism and university of logic, and against monism and extreme relativism; opposed not only the absolutization, sanctification and dogmatism of logical deferentialism, but also the debase and abuse by logical cynicism, such as nihilism, culture relativism and fashionable feminism; pulled logic from God to Human, emphasized the affinity between logic and human lives; logic is not the lawmaker beyond judgement by reason, it is just a enterprise of human; like other sciences, logic inquire is also full of bramble and complicated, progress ragged and uneven; so we should insist on innocent realism and critical common sensism, defend logic with reason.
Haack's philosophy of logics is novel and particular. She not only put forward a systematic theory about logic's philosophy, but also exploited a lot of interesting question fields, enlarged the scope of philosophy of logic enormously. She's clear-headed about the limitation of formalization and criticized different extremists rigorously. It is very significant to the development of modern logic healthily. However, there are some shortcomings in Haack's philosophy of logics, for example, some core concepts and arguments need more clear and powerful accounts; the case-study is not adequate, there have some mistakes in her analysis; she is gives seldom attentions to the late literatures; besides, there is a tension between revisability of logic in principle and conservatism in action which hide in her theories.
Based on Haack's thoughts critically, I argued that:there is a basis out of logic systems, viz. the intuitive validity of informal argument. Different logics try to give different precise formulations that result in the plurality and revisability of logic in radically. In fact, classical logic have give the minimal condition of intuitive validity, namely it is cannot that premise is true but its conclusion is false. In some sense, different logics all are right, but they must satisfy the minimal condition of intuitive validity. The principles of Pragmatism, for example, simpleness and economy are very important(but not exclusive) criterions to select or evaluate certain logic system.
引文
①当然,哈克的立场前后略有变化。但从整体上来看,她是一个逻辑多元论者。另外,“可错”与“可修正”具有不同的含义,哈克是在不同的层面上谈逻辑的可错性和可修正性,后文将详细阐述这一点。
②King, P. J.100 Philosophers:The Life and Work of the World's Greatest Thinkers. New York:Barron,2004中译本参见：皮得·J·金.大哲学家100：世界上最伟大的思想家生平及成就简述[M].戴联斌等译.北京：三联书店,2007,p.180.
③由于《变异逻辑,模糊逻辑》完全重印了《变异逻辑》的内容,甚至页码也是一致的。因此,笔者在引用相关内容时,直接使用了《变异逻辑,模糊逻辑》的页码。唯一需要注意的是,《变异逻辑》出版于1974年,是哈克发表的第一部著作;而它的扩展版《变异逻辑,模糊逻辑》出版于1996年,新增了一个再版序言和五篇论文。
① Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.ⅸ.
② Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.ⅸ-ⅹ.
③ Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.ⅹⅳ,该书书名“逻辑”(logics)一词使用了复数形式,暗示了鲜明的多元论立场。
④苏珊·哈克.证据与探究[M].陈波等译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2004,p.225.
⑤苏珊·哈克.逻辑哲学[M].罗毅译.北京：商务印书馆,2003,中文版序言,p.1.
①可以参见哈克与陈波共同主编的《当代世界学术名著哲学系列》总序言以及《证据与探究》背封上的几位著名哲学家的评语。苏珊·哈克.证据与探究[M].陈波等译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2004.
②尽管出生和成长于英格兰(1990年移民美国),但哈克深受美国实用主义的影响,所以有学者建议最好把她称为“美国哲学家”。请参见：Haack. S. Susan Haack:A Lady of Distinction, The Philosopher Responds to Her Critics. Ed. Cornelis de Wall, New York:Promethius Books Publishers,2007, p.9.
① Haack, S. Susan Haack:A Lady of Distinction, The Philosopher Responds to Her Critics. Ed. Cornelis de Wall, New York:Promethius Books Publishers,2007, p.165.
② Haack, S. Susan Haack:A Lady of Distinction, The Philosopher Responds to Her Critics. Ed. Cornelis de Wall, New York:Promethius Books Publishers,2007, p.165.
③苏珊·哈克.证据与探究[M].陈波等译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2004,p.234.
①皮得·J·金.大哲学家100：世界上最伟大的思想家生平及成就简述[M].戴联斌等译.北京：三联书店出版,2007,p.180.
②亦可参见中译本内封上对哈克的介绍。苏珊·哈克.理性地捍卫科学[M].曾国屏等译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2008.
③van Benthem, J. "Logical Dynamics Meets Logical Pluralism?" Australasian Journal of logic,2008(6), p.182.
④van Benthem, J (ed. etc.,). "The Age of Alternative Logics." In Logic, Epistemology, and The Unity of Science, vol.3, edited by Shahid Rahman and John Symons, Dordrecht, Netherlands:Springer,2006.
⑤van Benthem, J (ed. etc.,). "The Age of Alternative Logics." In Logic, Epistemology, and The Unity of Science, vol.3, edited by Shahid Rahman and John Symons, Dordrecht, Netherlands:Springer,2006, p.1.
①当然,皮尔士也独立发展出了与弗雷格类似的现代逻辑系统。因此,有学者提出,即使没有弗雷格,现代逻辑同样会产生。不过,这并没有否认弗雷格作为现代逻辑之父的地位。
②“由假得全原则”是指“经典逻辑中存在这样的一个定理：A△→A→B,意思是从逻辑矛盾推出任何命题”；“实无穷抽象法”是指经典逻辑“把无穷当作已经完成的一个整体,而不只是一个潜在的无穷延伸的过程,于是在经典逻辑中就可以研究本质上是非构造性的对象。”请参见：陈波.逻辑哲学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2005,pp.3-5。除此之外,经典逻辑还具有其他重要特征,譬如：1、排中律和双重否定消去原则；2、无矛盾原则；3、单调性；4、联结词可交换性等等。
①此处主要指演绎逻辑,有的文献中非经典逻辑也包括现代归纳逻辑等内容。
①这里参照了马里兰大学图书馆的统计数据。网址是：http://umaryland.worldcat.org/wcidentities/lccn-n93-4030,2010-10-20.
②常永青.对《逻辑哲学》一书简介[J].国外社会科学,1983(3),p.34.
①陈波.逻辑哲学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2005,序言,p.1.
②陈波.逻辑哲学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2005,序言,p.2.2002年2月至2003年2月,陈波应邀到美国迈阿密大学哲学系,在哈克的指导下从事研究工作。期间,他阅读了哈克已出版的全部著作,“发现她不仅在逻辑哲学、认识论等领域享有盛誉,而且在科学哲学、实用主义和后现代思潮研究、法哲学等方面也造诣很深……”。请参见：陈波.序二[A].意义、真理与行动——实用主义经典文选[C].苏珊·哈克主编.北京：东方出版社,2007,p.5.
①陈波.逻辑哲学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2005,p.19.
①在与哈克教授的交流过程中,笔者获悉目前哈克门下有一位博士生正在研究她的实用主义思想。
①K·J·欣迪卡.逻辑哲学[J].倪鼎夫译.哲学译丛,1982(6),p.66.
②罗素.我们关于外间世界的知识[M].陈启伟译.上海：上海译文出版社,2006,p.24.③Dewey, J. Reconstruction in Philosophy. New York:Henry Holt and Company,1920, pp.133-134.
④转引自：Copi, Irving M. Symbolic Logic. New York:Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.1979, p.1.
⑤例如,德国著名哲学家施太格缪勒(Wolfgang Stenguller)在《当代哲学主流》中感叹说：“对现代逻辑的研究在近二十年来所呈现出的如此之大的规模,以至今天大概已不再有任何一个人能够通观这个领域的每一个细节了。”请参见：施太格缪勒.当代哲学主流[M].王炳文等译.北京：商务印书馆,1986,p.441.
⑥Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.1.
⑦苏珊·哈克.逻辑哲学[M].罗毅译.北京：商务印书馆,2003,中文版序言,p.1
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.ⅹⅰ.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.ⅹⅰ.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.ⅹⅰ.
④胡泽洪.20世纪我国逻辑哲学研究的回顾与反思[J].学术研究,2008(11),p.15.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.1.
⑥苏珊·哈克.逻辑哲学[M].罗毅译.北京：商务印书馆,2003,中文版序言,p.1.
①王路.逻辑哲学研究述评(上)[J].哲学动态,2003(4),p.29.
②演绎证成问题是哈克论证逻辑可修正性的一个重要论据,然而在《逻辑哲学》中只字未提,着实让人困惑。国内学者陈波教授在其《逻辑哲学》中专辟一章来讨论“演绎的证成”问题。笔者认为,这是对哈克逻辑哲学体系的一个重要完善和补充。
③胡泽洪.20世纪我国逻辑哲学研究的回顾与反思[J].学术研究,2008(11),p.15.
④陈波.哲学逻辑的对象和意义[J].哲学研究,1987(3),pp.39-40.
⑥陈波.“哲学逻辑”词义探源和辨析[J].哲学动态,1997(3),p.43.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.2.
②关于“扩充逻辑”和“变异逻辑”的严格定义,参见本文第五章第一节。
③彭漪涟,马钦荣.逻辑学大辞典(修订本)[M].上海：上海辞书出版社.2010,p.356.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.1.
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.2.
⑥Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.ⅹⅲ.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.4-5.
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.5.
①有学者把这种基于实用理由的宽容方针称为“与经典逻辑类似”标准。请参见：陈波.逻辑哲学三题[J].求索,1990(6),p.43.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.6.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.5.
④Kneale, W. and Kneale, M. The Development of Logic. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1962, p.741.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.7.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.7.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.9.
①笔者猜测,哈克潜在地包含了这样的意思：经典逻辑以及传统逻辑是争议最少的,因此一般不作讨论。她所要审查的主要是非经典逻辑以及归纳逻辑等。
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.8-9.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.10.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.4.
②雷谢尔的逻辑图内容较多,具体可参见：Rescher, N. Topics in Philosophical Logic. Dordrecht, Holland: D.Reidel Publishing Company,1968, pp.6-9.
③Honderich, T. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy.2nd edition, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2005, p.982.
①陈波.逻辑哲学三题[J].求索,1990(6),pp.43-47.
②蔡曙山.逻辑学与现代科学的发展——兼论金岳霖先生的道路[J].中国社会科学,2000(4),pp.79-88.
③胡泽洪.对逻辑学范围与性质的反思[J].华南师范大学学报(社科版),2002(2),pp.3-7.
④本节部分内容已公开发表,请参见：颜中军.论苏珊·哈克的认知证成方案[J].毕节学院学报,2010(5),pp.46-50.
①Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.14.
②Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.14.
③Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.17.
④Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.17.
⑤具体分析可参见：Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.18.
⑥Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, pp.32-33.
⑦Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.22, p.32
⑧Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.27, p.32.
⑨Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.33.
①Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.29.
②Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.70, p.226.
③Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.101.
④Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.101.
⑤Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.101.
⑥Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.103.
⑦Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.103.
⑧Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.104.
①Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.105.
②Haack, S. Defending Science within Reason. New York:Prometheus Books,2003, p.19.
①Haack, S. Defending Science within Reason. New York:Prometheus Books,2003, p.23.
②Haack, S. Defending Science within Reason. New York:Prometheus Books,2003, p.32.
③Haack, S. Defending Science within Reason. New York:Prometheus Books,2003, p.31.
④Haack, S. Defending Science within Reason. New York:Prometheus Books,2003, p.34.
①Haack, S. Defending Science within Reason. New York:Prometheus Books,2003, p.37.
②Hempel, C. G. "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation." In Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York:Free Press,1965, pp.3-37.
③Haack, S. Defending Science within Reason. New York:Prometheus Books,2003, p.38.
④Haack, S. Defending Science within Reason. New York:Prometheus Books,2003, p.26.
①Haack, S. Defending Science within Reason. New York:Prometheus Books,2003, p.52.
②柯岚.法律方法中的形式主义与反形式主义[J].法律科学.2007(2),p.33.
①请参见：Langdell, C. C. A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts, with a Summary of the Topics Covered by the Cases. Boston, MA:Little Brown, fisrt edition,1871,2nd edition,1879.
②Holmes, O. W. "Book Notice of William Anson, Principles of the English Law of Contracts, and Christopher Columbus Langdell, Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts,2nd edition." American Law Review,1880(14), p.234.
③Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), p.8.
④Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), p.8.
⑤Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), p.9.
①Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), p.15.
②Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), p.16.
③Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), pp.17-18.
④Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), p.19.
⑤Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), p.21.
①Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), pp.23-24.
②Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), p.25.
③杨玉成,崔人元.实用主义——美利坚的“精髓”[A].杜威等著.实用主义[C].杨玉成,崔人元编译.北京：世界知识出版社,2007,p.5.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.14.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.15.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.15.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.222.
④这不禁让人回想起皮尔士在《如何使我们的观念清楚明白》一文中对笛卡尔(Descartes)关于“自我”的“直观能力”的批判。哈克的上述思想极有可能是受到了皮尔士的影响。
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.23.
②当然,原因之一可能是：“某些”、“几个”、“少量”等语词不如“至少有一个”精确,尽管“某些”、“几个”、“少量”之间存在细微的差别,但它们都必须满足最低条件,即“至少有一个”
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.24.
④Quine, W. V. O. Word and Object. Cambridge:MIT,1960, p.160后文将看到,包括经典逻辑在内的形式系统经常犯了刻画过多或过少、甚至既过多又过少的毛病。这是形式化局限性的表现,也是导致逻辑可修正的根源之一。
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.17.
①苏珊·哈克.逻辑哲学[M].罗毅译.北京：商务印书馆,2003,p.29.
①Kneale, W. and Kneale, M. The Development of Logic. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1962, p.521.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.19.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.19.
Haack. S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.21.
Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.22.
Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.22.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.14.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.27.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.30.
③Strawson, P. F. Introduction to Logical Theory. London:Methuen,1952, p.79.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.38.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.41.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.42.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.43.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.46.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.46.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.46.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.47.
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.48.
⑥Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.49.
⑦Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.49.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1978, p.50.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.50.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.50-51.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.55.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.16.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.33.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.32.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.16-17.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978. p.221.
②鉴于基本立场的重要转变,本文粗略地以1970年为界,把蒯因的学术生涯大致分为前期和后期。
③请参见：Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of Logic. Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, first edition,1970, second edition,1986本文的相关引文均指第二版。
②Read, S. "Monism:The One True Logic." In A Logical Approach to Philosophy, D. Devidi and T. Kenyon (eds.), Netherlands:Springer,2006, p.193.
⑤可以参考：Field, H. "'Pluralism in Logic." The Review of Symbolic Logic, Vol.2,2009(6), p.344.
⑥例如根据意义变化论题,蒯因认为不同的逻辑对逻辑常项的涵义理解不同,它们之间不存在实质的冲突,而是不可比较的。这正是哈克所说的整体多元论的表现形式之一。但后来出于本体论方面的考虑,他把模态逻辑等统统排除在逻辑范围之外,而唯一可接受的逻辑只剩下一阶演算。这种不一致使他遭受了很多批评。
③Rahman, S., and Redmond, J. "Huge MacColl and the Birth of Logical Pluralism." In British Logic in the Nineteeth Century, vol.4 of Handbook of the History of Logic, Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods(eds.), Amsterdam: North-Holland,2008, pp.533-604.
④Beall, JC and Restall, G. Logical Pluralism. Oxford:Clarendon Press,2006.
①Beall, JC and Restall, G. Logical Pluralism. Oxford:Clarendon Press,2006, p.3.
②Beall, JC and Restall, G. Logical Pluralism. Oxford:Clarendon Press.2006, p.29.
③Beall, JC and Restall, G. Logical Pluralism. Oxford:Clarendon Press,2006, p.29.
④Russell, G. "One True Logic?" Journal of Philosophical Logic,2008(37), pp.593-611.
⑤Field, H."Pluralism in logic." The Review of Symbolic Logic, Vol.2,2009(6), p.343.
⑥Carnap, R. The Logical Syntax of Language. Translated by A. Smeaton, Paterson, NJ:Littlefield Adams,1959, p.15.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1978, p.223.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.223.
③Beall, JC and Restall, G. Logical Pluralism. Oxford:Clarendon Press,2006, p.29.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.223-224.
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.155.
⑥Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.224.
①Lewis, C. I. "Alternative Systems of Logic." The Monist, vol.41,1931译文转引自：陈波.逻辑哲学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2005,pp.34-24.
②霍书全.逻辑多元论与多值逻辑[J].中山大学研究生学刊(社会科学版),2002(1),p.1.
③Read. S. "Monism:The One True Logic." in A Logical Approach to Philosophy, D. Devidi and T. Kenyon (eds.), Netherlands:Springer,2006, pp.193-209.
④Read, S. "Monism:The One True Logic." in A Logical Approach to Philosophy, D. Devidi and T. Kenyon (eds.), Netherlands:Springer,2006, p.193.
⑤Read, S. "Monism:The One True Logic." in A Logical Approach to Philosophy, D. Devidi and T. Kenyon (eds.), Netherlands:Springer,2006, p.209.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.231加星号的地方表示存在元逻辑竞争。
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.228.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.229.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.231.
①Haack. S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.228.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.226.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.231.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.231.
①Jacquette, D. "Introduction:Philosophy of Logic Today." In Philosophy of logic, Dale Jacquette(ed.), Amsterdam:Elsevier B.V.,2007, pp.5-6.
②Heather M. and Rossiter, N. "Logical Monism:The Global Identity of Applicable Logic." In Essays on the Foundations of Mathematics and Logic, G. Sica(ed.), Monza, Italy:Polimetrica International Scientific Publisher, pp.39-52.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.25.
①蒯因的整体知识观来源于法国著名的科学史家、哲学家迪昂(Pierre Duhem).一般称为“迪昂—蒯因论题”。可参见：陈波.蒯因哲学研究[M].北京：生活·读书·新知三联书店,1998,pp.165-166.
②Quine, W. V. O. From a Logical Point of View. Second edition, revised, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.41.
③Quine, W. V. O. From a Logical Point of View. Second edition, revised, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.42.
④Quine, W. V. O. From a Logical Point of View. Second edition, revised, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.43.
⑤Quine, W. V. O. From a Logical Point of View. Second edition, revised, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, pp.42-43.
⑥Quine,W. V. O. From a Logical Point of View. Second edition, revised, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.45.
②Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of Logic. Second edition, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1986, p.100.
③Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of Logic. Second edition, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1986, p.100.
③陈波.蒯因哲学研究[M].北京：生活·读书·新知三联书店,1998,p.217.
①Putnam, H. Philosophy of Logic. New York:Routledge, first edition in 1971, new edition in 2010, p.76在本文中,相关引文均指新版。中译文亦可参见：普特南.逻辑哲学[A].普特南文选[C].李真编译.北京：社会科学文献出版社,2009,p.94.该中译文包括了普特南的《逻辑哲学》这本小册子(仅76页)的全部内容。
②Putnam, H. "Vagueness and Alternative Logic." In Realism and Reason:Philosophical Papers, vol.3, London: Cambridge University Press,1983, pp.271-273.
③Putnam, H. "The Logic of Quantum Mechanics." In Mathematics, Matter and Method:Philosophical Papers, vol.1, second edition, London:Cambridge University Press,1979, pp.180-184.
④Putnam, H. "The Logic of Quantum Mechanics." In Mathematics, Matter and Method:Philosophical Papers, vol.1, second edition, London:Cambridge University Press,1979, p.174.
⑤Putnam, H. "The Logic of Quantum Mechanics." In Mathematics, Matter and Method:Philosophical Papers, vol.1, second edition, London:Cambridge University Press,1979, p.184.
①Putnam, H. "The Logic of Quantum Mechanics." In Mathematics, Matter and Method:Philosophical Papers, vol.1, second edition, London:Cambridge University Press,1979, p.190.
②Putnam, H. "The Logic of Quantum Mechanics." In Mathematics, Matter and Method:Philosophical Papers, vol.1, second edition, London:Cambridge University Press,1979, p.196.
③Putnam, H. "There Is at Least One A Priori Truth." In Realism and Reason:Philosophical Papers, vol.3, London:Cambridge University Press,1983, p.98.
④Putnam, H. "There Is at Least One A Priori Truth." In Realism and Reason:Philosophical Papers, vol.3, London:Cambridge University Press,1983, p.100.
⑤Putnam, H. "There Is at Least One A Priori Truth." In Realism and Reason:Philosophical Papers, vol.3, London:Cambridge University Press,1983, p.99.
②Putnam, H. "There Is at Least One A Priori Truth." In Realism and Reason:Philosophical Papers, vol.3, London:Cambridge University Press,1983, p.111.
③Putnam, H. "There Is at Least One A priori Truth." In Realism and Reason:Philosophical Papers, vol.3, London:Cambridge University Press,1983, p.113.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.26.
③康德.逻辑学讲义[M].许景行译.北京：商务印书馆,1991,pp.11-12.
①Peirce, C. S. Collected Papers. C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, and A. Burks(eds.), Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1931-1958,5.387以后简称[CP],数字“5.387”表示第5卷第387段。
②康德.逻辑学讲义[M].许景行译.北京：商务印书馆,1991,p.6.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.238.
①哈克暂时保留了大前提1。它涉及到形式与内容之间的区分及其相互关系。结合下文将看到,要反驳康德论题,不仅要反驳小前提和大前提2,而且必须进一步反驳大前提1。另外,康德逻辑绝对主义论题非常复杂,后面的逻辑真理的分析性也是康德逻辑绝对主义的一个重要组成部分。为了行文方便,我们分开论述。
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.238.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.238.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.238.
②需要指出的是,哈克把康德看作强心理主义的代表有失公允。因为康德曾明确地提出要区分心理学和逻辑(即业里士多德逻辑,他称之为“一般的逻辑”,又译作“普通逻辑”。但要注意的是,国内所谓的“普通逻辑”通常用来指一门课程而非某种逻辑理论),区分思维的形式和内容。不过,“思维规律”确实容易 引起误解,并目康德所谓的“先验逻辑”是不是现代意义上的“逻辑”,这也是值得商榷的。因此,问题的关键并不在于逻辑是否是思维的形式(大前提2),而在于思维的形式是否就是先验有效的(大前提1)。
①具体内容可参见：Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.239.
②颜中军.试论弗雷格的反心理主义逻辑观[J].自然辩证法研究,2008(8),pp.6-10.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.240.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.240.
⑤Dewey, J. Experience and Nature. Chicago:Open Court,1929, p.196.
⑥Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.241.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.241.
②康德.逻辑学讲义[M].许景行译.北京：商务印书馆,1991,pp.2-3.
③康德.逻辑学讲义[M].许景行译.北京：商务印书馆,1991,p.45.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.28.
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.241-242.
⑥Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.29.
①Frege, G. The Foundations of Arithmetic. Translated by J. L. Austin, Oxford:Blackwell,1950, p.234.
②Pepper, S. World Hypotheses. Berkeley and Los Angeles:University of California Press,1961, p.24.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics.Cambridgt:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.236.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.236.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.214.
①实际上,逻辑的可修正性应该作为“两个教条”中论证的前提而非结论。请参见：Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambirdge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.237.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.233.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.234.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.234.
苏珊·哈克.证据与探究[M].陈波等译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2004,p.225.
①Quine, W. V. O. From a Logical Point of View. Second edition, revised, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.42.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.35-36.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.36,“在水上重修木筏”是认识论中的一个重要隐喻。哈克借此意指：就在现有逻辑的基础上修改逻辑本身,而无需推倒重来或借助现有逻辑之外的任何东西。
②Popper, K. R. "A Realist View of Physics, Logic and History." In Physics, Logic and History, W. Yourgrau and A. D. Breck eds. New York:Plenum Press,1970, p.18.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.37.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.37乍看起来,哈克与蒯因的观点几乎一样,很容易让人想起蒯因的“最小代价原则”。
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.38.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.39.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.39.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.40.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.40.
②休谟用的是“演证(demonstration)一词,不过从他的论述来看,这个词大致相当于“演绎”
③陈波.一个与归纳问题类似的演绎问题——演绎的证成[J].中国社会科学,2005(2),p.86.
④Haack, S. "The Justification of Deduction." Mind,1976(85), p.112.
①Haack, S. "The Justification of Deduction." Mind,1976(85), p.114.
②Haack, S. "The Justification of Deduction." Mind,1976(85), p.113.
①Haack, S. "The Justification of Deduction." Mind,1976(85). p.117.
②Haack, S. "The Justification of Deduction." Mind,1976(85), p.118.
③Haack, S. "The Justification of Deduction." Mind,1976(85), p.118.
①苏珊·哈克.证据与探究[M].陈波等译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2004,p.227.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.232.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.232.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.237.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.152.
①哈克在《变异逻辑》中几乎把“修正”和“变异”视为同义词,可以互换。但在《逻辑哲学》中，逻辑“修改”的含义更为宽泛,不仅仅指“变异”,而且还包括其他六种类型。具体分析请参看第五章“逻辑修正的表现形式”。
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.41.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.41.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.41.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.42.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.1.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.1阿克曼早在1967年就注意到了这一点,请参见：Ackerman, R. An Introduction to Many-Valued Logics. London:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1967, p.15.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.2.
②Brouwer, L. E. J. "Historical Background, Principles and Methods of Intuitionism." South African Journal of Science,1952(49), pp.139-146.
③Putnam, H. "The logic of Quantum Mechanics." In Mathematics, Matter and Method:Philosophical Papers, vol.1, second edition, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1979, pp.174-197.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.3.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.3.
③以下分类和定义参看：Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.4.
④根据蒯因的解释,词汇的本质出现是指以下情况：如果替换该语词就会导致语句的真值发生改变。可参考：Quine, W. V.O. Mathematical Logic. New York:Norton,1940, p.2.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.5.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.5.
②Quine, W. V. O. The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. New York:Random House, Inc.,1966, p.105.
③Quine, W. V. O. The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. New York:Random House, Inc.,1966, p.113.
④Quine, W. V. O. Word and Object. Cambridge:MIT,1960, p.59.
①Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of Logic. Second edition, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1986, p.81.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.8.
③Putnam, H. "The Analytic and the Synthetic." In Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers, vol.2, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1975, pp.50-51.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.9.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.9.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.9-10.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.10.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.10.
⑤即有可能不成立,强调其“可能性”
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.11.
②Putnam, H. "The Logic of Quantum Mechanics." In Mathematics, Matter and Method, Philosophical Papers, vol.1, Second Edition, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1979, p.189.
③关于联结词的“核心”意义的详细说明,请参见：Putnam, H. "Three-Valued Logic." Philosophical Studies,1957(8), pp.73-80.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.12.
⑤Prior, A. N. "The Runabout Inference-Ticket", Analysis,1960(21), pp.38-39; "Conjunction and Contonktion Revisited." Analysis,1964(24), pp.191-195; Reprinted in Contemporary Philosophical Logic, edited by Irving M. Copi and James A. Gould, New York:ST. Martin's Press,1978, pp.37-38, pp.49-53.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.13斯蒂文森和贝尔纳普对普赖尔的批评请参见：Stenvenson, J. T. "Roundabout the Runabout Inference-Ticket." Belnap, N. D. "Tonk, Plonk and Plink." All of them in Contemporary Philosophical Logic, edited by Irving M. Copi and James A. Gould, New York:ST. Martin's Press,1978, pp.39-43, pp.44-48.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.13.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambirdge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.230.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.14.
②Quine, W. V. O. The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. New York:Random House, Inc.,1966, p.102.
①Quine, W. V. O. Word and Object. Cambridge:MIT,1960, p.27此处译文参考了北京大学陈波教授所做的翻译。请参见：陈波.逻辑哲学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2005,pp.17-18。
②Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of Logic. Second Edition, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1986, p.81.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.16.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.17.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.18.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.18.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.21.
①Quine, W. V. O. Pilosophy of Logic. Second edition, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1986, p.83.
②该文最初发表于1969年,后以“量子力学的逻辑”为题收录于《普特南哲学论文选集》第一卷。请参见：Putnam, H. "The Logic of Quantum Mechanics." In Mathematics, Matter and Method:Philosophical Papers, vol.1, second edition, London:Cambridge university press,1979, pp.174-197.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.21.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.22.
④Quine, W. V. O. The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. New York:Random House, Inc.,1966, p.102.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.23.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.21.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.23.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.23.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.152.
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.153.
⑥Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.153-155.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.156.
②请参见：Burgess, J. P. Philosophical Logic. Princeton:Princeton University Press,2009, pp.vii-viii.
③具体内容请参见：Aberdein A., and Read, S. "The Philosophy of Alternative Logics." in The Development of Modern Logic, edited by Leila Haaparanta, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2009, pp.613-723.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.42.
Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.42.
Haack, S. Deviant Logic. Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.43.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.44.
②哈克注意到,尽管这个反驳意见大体上是可取的,但它自身也存在某些缺陷。例如,到底什么样的东西才称得上是“题材中立的”,不同的学者可能持有不同的意见。另外,对于同一个非形式论证,并不存在唯一正确的刻画。参见：Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.45.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.167.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.166.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.46.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.46.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.46.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.46.
⑧Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.109.
④请参见：Pap, A. Elements of Analytic Philosophy. London:Macmillan,1949, p.116亦可参见：Black, M. "Reasoning With Loose Concepts." Dialogue,1963(2), p.10.
①[CP15.446
②[CP15.506
③[CP15.506
④Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.110.
⑤Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.110.
⑥Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.110.
⑦Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.111.
⑧Alston, W. P. Philosophy of Language. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:Prentice-Hall, Inc.1964, p.88.
①Quine, W. V. O. Word and Object. Cambridge:MIT,1960, p.128.
②例如,魏斯曼(F. Waismann)提出了“开放语境”的动态语言观。基本思想是：适用于目前情境的谓词,如果情境发生变化,也许变得不再适用了。例如,是否应该把一个相关的猫科动物称为“猫”,如果它突然长至12英尺高?这与类型(1a)相似。但它考虑情境转换,因此不属于哈克的分类。参见：Waismann, F. "Verifiability." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplement,1945(19). p.123.
③Alston, W. P. Philosophy of Language. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:Prentice-Hall, Inc.1964, p.96.
①Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.114.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.164.
③Dummett, M. "Wang's Paradox." Synthese,1975(30), pp.301-324.
④在文献中“模糊逻辑”(fuzzy logic)通常有两种含义：一种是广义的,泛指所有关于模糊性问题的逻辑；另一种是狭义的,专指基于模糊集之上的逻辑。
④Zadeh, L. A. "Fuzzy Languages and Their Relation to Human Intelligence." Proceedings of the International Conference, Man and Computer, S. Karger,1972.
⑤Zadeh, L. A. "Fuzzy Logic and Approximate Reasoning." Synthese,1975(30), p.407.
⑥Zadeh, L. A., and Bellman, R. E. Local and Fuzzy Logic, Memorandum ERL-M584, Electrocnics Research Laboratory. Berkeley:University of California,1976, p.64.
①Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.ⅹⅱ除了扎德的模糊逻辑之外,她还把“逻辑迈侬主义”(logical Meingonianism)、“辩证逻辑”(原文为dialethic logic,在某些文献中也用dialectic logic)、女性主义逻辑(feminist logic)视为当代逻辑极端主义的代表。例如,她认为,与扎德试图用模糊性取代精确性一样,辩证逻辑不仅承认和容忍矛盾,而且还试图反映矛盾本身。发展辩证逻辑的一个主要动机是解决语义悖论,但是它所提出的方案很可能“比疾病本身更糟糕”。参见：Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.ⅹⅲ-ⅹⅵ.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.167.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.168.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.167.
⑤Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.115.
⑥Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.116.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.163.
②Russell, B. "Vagueness." Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology,1923(1), pp.88-89.
③Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.117.
④Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.117.
⑤Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.118.
⑤哈克在《逻辑哲学》中把特意“误导形式策略”改称为“新奇的释意策略”,以免别人把她的立场混同于罗素的立场。因为罗素主张每一个句子都有唯一正确的逻辑形式,而哈克明确反对这一点。请参见:Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.153.
①请参见：Quine, W. V. O. Word and Object. Cambridge:MIT,1960类似的观点还可参见:Alston, W. P. Philosophy of Language. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:Prentice-Hall,1964, p.86.
②Russell, B. "Vaguness." Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology,1923(1), pp.84-92.
③Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.119.
④Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.124.
⑤Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.ⅹⅰ-ⅹⅱ.
① Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.124-125.
②亚里士多德.亚里士多德全集第一卷[M].苗力田主编,秦典华译,北京：中国人民大学出版社,1990,pp.57-61.在本文的讨论中,将来偶然命题仅限于将来偶然单称命题。
③ Lukasiewicz, J. "Philosophical Remarks on Many-Valued Systems of Propositional Logic." in Polish Logic 1920-1939, ed. by S. McCall, Oxford:Clarendon Press,1967, p.53.
②亚里士多德.亚里士多德全集第一卷[M].苗力田主编,秦典华译,北京：中国人民大学出版社,1990,p.58.
③亚里士多德.亚里士多德全集第一卷[M].苗力田主编,秦典华译,北京：中国人民大学出版社,1990,p.59.
④亚里士多德.亚里士多德全集第一卷[M].苗力田主编,秦典华译,北京：中国人民大学出版社,1990,p.58.
①亚里士多德.亚里士多德全集第一卷[M].苗力田主编,秦典华译,北京:中国人民大学出版社,1990,pp.59-60.
②亚里士多德.亚里士多德全集第一卷[M].苗力田主编,秦典华译,北京：中国人民大学出版社,1990,p.60.
③亚里士多德.亚里士多德全集第一卷[M].苗力田主编,秦典华译,北京：中国人民大学出版社,1990,p.61.
④亚里士多德.亚里士多德全集第一卷[M].苗力田主编,秦典华译,北京：中国人民大学出版社,1990,p.60.
⑤亚里士多德.亚里士多德全集第一卷[M].苗力田主编,秦典华译,北京:中国人民大学出版社,1990,p.61.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.74.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.78.
②Lukasiewicz, J. "Philosophical Remarks on Many-Valued Systems of Propositional Logic." in Polish Logic 1920-1939, ed. by S. McCall, Oxford:Clarendon Press,1967, p.53.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.257-258.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.84-85.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.85笔者注意到,哈克的某些表述是不一致的或不严谨的。例如在《逻辑哲学》中,她竟然说：“多值逻辑像经典逻辑一样,都是真值函项的”。紧接其后,在分析克利尼(S. C. Kleene)的三值矩阵时,她又指出：“当然,这需要一个非真值函项的逻辑”。参见：Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.215-216.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.87.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.87.
⑤Prior, A. N. "Three-valued Logic and Future Contingents." Philosophical Quarterly,1953(3), pp.317-326.
⑥Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.88.
①Lukasiewicz, J. Aristotle s Syllogistic. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1957, pp.166-167.
②Lukasiewicz, J. Aristotle's Syllogistic. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1957, pp.166-169.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.89.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.89-90.
⑤van Fraassen, B. C. "Singular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps, and Free Logic". Journal of Philosophy,1966(63), pp.481-495.
⑥Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.85-86.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.90.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.90.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.211.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.210-213.
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.215.
⑥本节大部分内容已经公开发表,请参见：颜中军.论直觉主义逻辑对经典逻辑的挑战[J].湘潭大学学报(哲社版),2011(3),pp.125-128.
⑥Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.91.
⑦保罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆,2003,p.93.
② van Dalen, D. "Intuitionistic Logic." in Handbook of Philosophical Logic (2nd Edition), vol.5, edited by Dov M. Gabby and F. Guenthner, Netherlands:Kluwer Academic Publishers,2002, p.3.
⑧冯棉.经典逻辑与直觉主义逻辑[M].上海：上海人民出版社.1989.p.50.
④ van Dalen, D. "Intuitionistic Logic." in Handbook of Philosophical Logic (2nd Edition), vol.5, edited by Dov M. Gabby and F. Guenthner, Netherlands:Kluwer Academic Publishers,2002, pp.4-5.
① Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.91.
② Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.92.
③ Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of Logic. Second edition, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1986, p.88.
④ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.93.
⑤ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.93.
①在本文中,“┠c”表示经典命题逻辑中的定理,其中下标“C”代表经典逻辑(classical propositional logic)类似地在后文中,下标“I”表示直觉主义命题逻辑(intuitional propositional logic)。
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.98.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.98.
① Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.99.
② Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.99-100
③ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.101.
④ Brouwer, L. E. J. "Historical Background, Principles and Methods of Intuitionism." South African Journal of Science,1952(49), pp.139-146.
⑤转引自：Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.95.
⑥ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.94.
⑦ Heyting, A. Intuitionism:An Introduction. Amsterdan:North-Holland, first edition 1956, second revised edtion 1966, third edition 1971, p.106本文相关引文均指1971版。
①Kolmogorov, A. N. "On the Principle of Excluded Middle." Reprinted in From Frege to Godel:A Source Book in Mathematical Logic,1879-1931, ed. by J. van Heijenhoort,1967, Cambridge:Harvard University Press, p.421.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.103.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.103.
④达米特坦承,他的观点与直觉主义者本身存在某些不符,但他自信其论证是相当有力的。请参考：保罗·贝罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆,2003,p.125.
⑤保罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆,2003,PP.113-114.
⑥保罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆.2003,p.114.
⑦保罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆,2003,PP.114-115.
①保罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆,2003,p.116.
②保罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆,2003,p.124.
③保罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆,2003,p.126.
④ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.104.
⑤ Dummett, M. "Wang's paradox." Synthese,1975(30), p.301.
⑥ Dummett, M. "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics." The Philosophical Review, Vol.68, No.3 (Jul., 1959), p.347.
⑦ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.105-106.
① Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.106.
② Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.106.
③ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.107.
④ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.107.
⑤ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.108.
⑤例如,他说：“毕竟,这些考虑不仅应用于数学,也应用于其他所有领域：虽然它们已经确切表明关于思想和实体的实在论观点存在某些错误,但这并不意味着在数学之外的极端主观理念论。”请参见：Dummett, M. "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. " The Philosophical Review,1959(68), p.348.
①例如,当形式主义者提到直觉主义逻辑已经形式化了时,海廷回答说：“我很抱歉,使你失望。逻辑并不是我的立足点。”请参见：保罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆,2003,p.82.
②保罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆,2003,pp.82-83.
③Heyting, A. Intuitionism:An Introduction. Amsterdam:North-Holland Publishing Company,1956, p.116.
④哥德尔变换的具体步骤及相关定理证明可参见：冯棉.直觉主义逻辑与经典逻辑[M].上海：上海人民出版社,1989,pp.212-218.特别是定义4.7.2、命题4.7.4、定义4.7.4以及命题4.7.9。
⑤Fitting, M. C. Intuitionistic Logic, Model Theory and Forcing. Amsterdam:North-Holland,1969, p.43.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.97.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.108.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.108.
④本节内容已公开发表,请参见：颜中军.从相干逻辑看逻辑的可修正性[J].毕节学院学报,2011(3),pp.44-48.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.ⅹⅳ.
①冯棉.相干逻辑研究[M].上海：华东师范大学出版社,2010,p.1.
①冯棉.相干逻辑研究[M].上海：华东师范大学出版社,2010,pp.38-39.
②冯棉.相干逻辑研究[M].上海：华东师范大学出版社,2010,pp.28-29.
①可参见：冯棉.相干逻辑研究[M].上海：华东师范大学出版社,2010,p131.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.201.
②冯棉.相干逻辑研究[M].上海：华东师范大学出版社,2010,pp.28-29.
④Dunn, M., and Restall, G. "Relevance Logic." In Handbook of Philosophical Logic (second edition), vol.6, Dov M. Gabbay and F. Guenthner(eds.), Netherlands:Kluwer Academic Publishers,2002, p.30.
①Anderson, A. R., and Belnap, N. D. "Modalities in Ackermann's 'Rigorous Implication'." Journal of symbolic logic,1959(24), pp.107-111.
②Anderson, A. R., and Belnap, N. D. "Enthymemes." Journal of philosophy,1961(58), pp.713-723.
③Meyer, R. K. "E and S4." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic,1970(11), pp.181-199. Meyer, R. K. "Intuitionism, Entailment, Negation." in Truth, Syntax and Modality, H. Leblanc(ed.), Amsterdam:North Holland, 1973, pp.168-198.
④Meyer, R. K. "Intuitionism, Entailment, Negation." In Truth, Syntax and Modality, H. Leblanc(ed.), Amsterdam:North Holland,1973, pp.168-198.
⑤冯棉.相干逻辑研究[M].上海：华东师范大学出版社,2010,p.9.
① Anderson, A. R. "Some Open Problems Concerning the System E of Entailment." Acta Philosophica Fennica, 1963(16), pp.7-18.
② Anderson, A. R., Belnap, N. D., and Dunn, J. M. Entailment:The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, vol.Ⅱ, Princeton:Princeton University Press,1992, pp.332-375.
③ Dunn M., and Restall, G. "Relevance Logic." In Handbook of Philosophical Logic (second edition), vol.6, Dov
M. Gabbay and F. Guenthner(eds.), Netherlands:Kluwer Academic Publishers,2002, pp.86-98.
①弗雷格.逻辑[A].弗雷格哲学论著选辑[C].王路译,北京：商务印书馆,1994,p.179.
②Haack, S. "The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth." Midwest Studies in Philosophy,2008(ⅩⅩⅩⅡ), p.20.
①例如,当人们满怀虔敬之情说“真理引导我们前进”时,此处的“真理”通常被当作某种神秘的力量。请参见：Haack, S. "The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth." Midwest Studies in Philosophy,2008 (ⅩⅩⅩⅡ), p.21.
②Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." in Putting Philosophy to Work, New York:
① Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.46.
② Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.46.
③ Haack, S. "The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth." Midwest Studies in Philosophy,2008 (ⅩⅩⅫ), p.24.
④ Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.46.
⑤ Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.47.
① Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.49.
② Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.50.
③ Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.50.
④ Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.51.
⑤ Ramsey, F. P. "The Foundations of Mathematics." In The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays, ed.by R. B. Braithwaite, London:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1931, pp.1-61.
① Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.51.
②哈克和罗蒂的观点针锋相对。她几乎在任何场合下都极力反对罗蒂,视为论敌,并且言辞之间带有明显的不屑和轻蔑。这在学术界已经造成很大的影响。令人遗憾的是,罗蒂从未做出正面回应。本来期待一场精彩的双边论战,结果变成了哈克的单独宣战。Rorty, R. Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1992, p.32.
③ Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, pp.52-53.
④ [CP12.138,5.211。
⑤ Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.44.
① Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.54.
② Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.55.
③ Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.55.
① Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.56.
② Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.56.
③ Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.57.
④ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.243.
①Zadeh, L. A. "Fuzzy Sets." Information and Control,1965(8), pp.338-353.
②Zadeh, L. A. "Fuzzy Logic and Approximate Reasoning." Synthese,1975(30), pp.407-428.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.244.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.245.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.245.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.245.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.245.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.246.
④Unger, P. Ignorance. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1975, pp.47-91, pp.272-319.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.247.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p,248.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.248.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.248.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.249.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.249.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.250-251.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.251.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.251.
④Bradley, F. H. Essays on Truth and Reality. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1914, p.252.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.252.
⑥Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.252.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.253.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.253.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.254.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.254.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.254.
① Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.256.
② Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.256.
③ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.257.
④ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.258. "Mly" 即副词的简写。因为在英语中,副词通常带有后缀“ly”
⑤笔者曾就真理观请教于哈克教授。她回信说,她并不赞同实用主义真理观,不管是何种形式的实用主义。 她开始比较赞同拉姆齐的观点,正如正文所示的那样；但后来觉得塔斯基的真理论更好些。
①本节部分内容已公开发表,请参见：颜中军.殊型句与真值承担者[J].大理学院学报,2010(9),pp.10-12.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.74.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.74-75.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.75.
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.75-76.
⑥Haack, R. J., and Haack, S. "Token-Sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, vol.79,1970. p.41.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.76-77.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.79.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1978, p.80.
① Strawson, P. F. "On Referring." Mind, vol.59, No.235 (Jul.,1950), pp.326-329.
② Strawson, P. F. Introduction to Logical Thoery. London:Methuen,1952, p.4.
③ Haack, R. J., and Haack, S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.43.
④ Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.43.
⑤ Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, pp.43-44.
⑥ Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.80.
⑦ Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.80.
⑧ Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.81.
①Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.47.
②Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.47.
① Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, pp.48-49.
② Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.50.
③ Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.51.
①Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.51.
②Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.52.
③Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.57.
④Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.57.
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.82.
①例如,她注意到,戴维森纲领的失败恰好说明了塔斯基把自己的真理语义学严格限制在形式语言范围之内实属明智之举。具体内容可以参考下一节的相关论述。
② Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.82.
③ Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.82-83.
④ Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.84.
⑤ Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.85.
① Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.83.
② Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.84.
③ Popper, K. R. "Truth, Rationality and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge." In Conjectures and Refutations, New York:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1963, pp.224-226.
④ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.324.
⑤ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.324.
① Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976),p.324.
② Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), pp.324-325.
③ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.325.
④ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), pp.325-326.
⑤参见：Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul., 1976), p.326.
① Haack, S. Putting Philosophy to Work. Amherst, New York:Prometheus Books,2008, p.227.
② Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), pp.326-327.
③ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.327.
④ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.327.
⑤ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.327.
① Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.115.
② Popper, K. R."Truth, Rationality and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge." In Conjectures and Refutations, New York:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1963, p.225.
③ Popper, K. R."Truth, Rationality and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge." In Conjectures and Refutations, New York:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1963, p.225.
④ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.328.
⑤ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.328.
⑥ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.330.
⑦ Tarski, A. "The Semantic Conception of Truth." In Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. by H. Feigl and W. Sellars, New York:Appleton-Century Crofts,1949, p.71.
①Haack, S. "is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.331.
②Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.331.
③Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.332.
④Popper, K. R."Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge." In Conjectures and Refutations, New York:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1963, p.225.
⑤Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.332.
⑥Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), pp.332-333.
① Popper, K. R. "Truth, Rationality and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge." In Conjectures and Refutations, New York:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1963, pp.233-234.
② Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.334.
③ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.334.
④ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), pp.335-336.
① Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.47.
② Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.48.
③ Strawson, P. F. "On Referring." Mind,1950(59), pp.320-344.
④ Lewy, C. "How Are the Calculuses of Logic and Mathematics Applicable to Reality?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplement,1946(20), pp.30-39.
⑤ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.50.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.50.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.51.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.53.
④Russell, B. "On Denoting." Mind,14,1905, pp.479-493.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.54.
②Russell, B. "Review of McColl." Mind,15,1906, pp.255-260.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.54.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.55.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.55.
⑥Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.55.
Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.57.
Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.57.
Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.58.
Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.58.
① Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.59.
② Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.59.
③请参见：Kleene, S. C. Introduction to Metamathematics. Amsterdam:North-Holland,1952.
③ Haack. S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.60.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.60.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.61.
③Prior, A. N. "Many-Valued Logic and Modal Systems:An Intuitive Approch." Philosophical Review,1955(64), pp.626-630.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.61.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.63.
⑥Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of Logic. Second edition, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1986, p.84.
①Putnam, H. "Three-Valued Logic." Philosophical Studies,1957(8), p.74.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.65.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.65.
④具体证明过程请参见：Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.67-68.
⑤Tarski, A. "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages." In Logic, Semantics and Metamathematics, translated by J. H. Woodger, Oxford:Oxford University Press,1956, pp.152-178.
⑥Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.68.
⑦Putnam, H. "Three-Valued Logic." Philosophical Studies,1957(8), pp.73-80.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.69.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.70.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.71.
①康德.纯粹理性批判[M].邓晓芒译.北京：人民出版社.2004,p.131.
①康德.纯粹理性批判[M].邓晓芒译.北京：人民出版社,2004,p.55.
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①Putnam, H. Philosophy of Logic. New York:Routledge, first edition 1971, new edition 2010, p.76.
① Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.242.
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②King, P. J.100 Philosophers:The Life and Work of the World's Greatest Thinkers. New York:Barron,2004中译本参见：皮得·J·金.大哲学家100：世界上最伟大的思想家生平及成就简述[M].戴联斌等译.北京：三联书店,2007,p.180.
③由于《变异逻辑,模糊逻辑》完全重印了《变异逻辑》的内容,甚至页码也是一致的。因此,笔者在引用相关内容时,直接使用了《变异逻辑,模糊逻辑》的页码。唯一需要注意的是,《变异逻辑》出版于1974年,是哈克发表的第一部著作;而它的扩展版《变异逻辑,模糊逻辑》出版于1996年,新增了一个再版序言和五篇论文。
① Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.ⅸ.
② Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.ⅸ-ⅹ.
③ Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.ⅹⅳ,该书书名“逻辑”(logics)一词使用了复数形式,暗示了鲜明的多元论立场。
④苏珊·哈克.证据与探究[M].陈波等译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2004,p.225.
⑤苏珊·哈克.逻辑哲学[M].罗毅译.北京：商务印书馆,2003,中文版序言,p.1.
①可以参见哈克与陈波共同主编的《当代世界学术名著哲学系列》总序言以及《证据与探究》背封上的几位著名哲学家的评语。苏珊·哈克.证据与探究[M].陈波等译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2004.
②尽管出生和成长于英格兰(1990年移民美国),但哈克深受美国实用主义的影响,所以有学者建议最好把她称为“美国哲学家”。请参见：Haack. S. Susan Haack:A Lady of Distinction, The Philosopher Responds to Her Critics. Ed. Cornelis de Wall, New York:Promethius Books Publishers,2007, p.9.
① Haack, S. Susan Haack:A Lady of Distinction, The Philosopher Responds to Her Critics. Ed. Cornelis de Wall, New York:Promethius Books Publishers,2007, p.165.
② Haack, S. Susan Haack:A Lady of Distinction, The Philosopher Responds to Her Critics. Ed. Cornelis de Wall, New York:Promethius Books Publishers,2007, p.165.
③苏珊·哈克.证据与探究[M].陈波等译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2004,p.234.
①皮得·J·金.大哲学家100：世界上最伟大的思想家生平及成就简述[M].戴联斌等译.北京：三联书店出版,2007,p.180.
②亦可参见中译本内封上对哈克的介绍。苏珊·哈克.理性地捍卫科学[M].曾国屏等译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2008.
③van Benthem, J. "Logical Dynamics Meets Logical Pluralism?" Australasian Journal of logic,2008(6), p.182.
④van Benthem, J (ed. etc.,). "The Age of Alternative Logics." In Logic, Epistemology, and The Unity of Science, vol.3, edited by Shahid Rahman and John Symons, Dordrecht, Netherlands:Springer,2006.
⑤van Benthem, J (ed. etc.,). "The Age of Alternative Logics." In Logic, Epistemology, and The Unity of Science, vol.3, edited by Shahid Rahman and John Symons, Dordrecht, Netherlands:Springer,2006, p.1.
①当然,皮尔士也独立发展出了与弗雷格类似的现代逻辑系统。因此,有学者提出,即使没有弗雷格,现代逻辑同样会产生。不过,这并没有否认弗雷格作为现代逻辑之父的地位。
②“由假得全原则”是指“经典逻辑中存在这样的一个定理：A△→A→B,意思是从逻辑矛盾推出任何命题”；“实无穷抽象法”是指经典逻辑“把无穷当作已经完成的一个整体,而不只是一个潜在的无穷延伸的过程,于是在经典逻辑中就可以研究本质上是非构造性的对象。”请参见：陈波.逻辑哲学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2005,pp.3-5。除此之外,经典逻辑还具有其他重要特征,譬如：1、排中律和双重否定消去原则；2、无矛盾原则；3、单调性；4、联结词可交换性等等。
①此处主要指演绎逻辑,有的文献中非经典逻辑也包括现代归纳逻辑等内容。
①这里参照了马里兰大学图书馆的统计数据。网址是：http://umaryland.worldcat.org/wcidentities/lccn-n93-4030,2010-10-20.
②常永青.对《逻辑哲学》一书简介[J].国外社会科学,1983(3),p.34.
①陈波.逻辑哲学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2005,序言,p.1.
②陈波.逻辑哲学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2005,序言,p.2.2002年2月至2003年2月,陈波应邀到美国迈阿密大学哲学系,在哈克的指导下从事研究工作。期间,他阅读了哈克已出版的全部著作,“发现她不仅在逻辑哲学、认识论等领域享有盛誉,而且在科学哲学、实用主义和后现代思潮研究、法哲学等方面也造诣很深……”。请参见：陈波.序二[A].意义、真理与行动——实用主义经典文选[C].苏珊·哈克主编.北京：东方出版社,2007,p.5.
①陈波.逻辑哲学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2005,p.19.
①在与哈克教授的交流过程中,笔者获悉目前哈克门下有一位博士生正在研究她的实用主义思想。
①K·J·欣迪卡.逻辑哲学[J].倪鼎夫译.哲学译丛,1982(6),p.66.
②罗素.我们关于外间世界的知识[M].陈启伟译.上海：上海译文出版社,2006,p.24.③Dewey, J. Reconstruction in Philosophy. New York:Henry Holt and Company,1920, pp.133-134.
④转引自：Copi, Irving M. Symbolic Logic. New York:Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.1979, p.1.
⑤例如,德国著名哲学家施太格缪勒(Wolfgang Stenguller)在《当代哲学主流》中感叹说：“对现代逻辑的研究在近二十年来所呈现出的如此之大的规模,以至今天大概已不再有任何一个人能够通观这个领域的每一个细节了。”请参见：施太格缪勒.当代哲学主流[M].王炳文等译.北京：商务印书馆,1986,p.441.
⑥Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.1.
⑦苏珊·哈克.逻辑哲学[M].罗毅译.北京：商务印书馆,2003,中文版序言,p.1
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.ⅹⅰ.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.ⅹⅰ.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.ⅹⅰ.
④胡泽洪.20世纪我国逻辑哲学研究的回顾与反思[J].学术研究,2008(11),p.15.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.1.
⑥苏珊·哈克.逻辑哲学[M].罗毅译.北京：商务印书馆,2003,中文版序言,p.1.
①王路.逻辑哲学研究述评(上)[J].哲学动态,2003(4),p.29.
②演绎证成问题是哈克论证逻辑可修正性的一个重要论据,然而在《逻辑哲学》中只字未提,着实让人困惑。国内学者陈波教授在其《逻辑哲学》中专辟一章来讨论“演绎的证成”问题。笔者认为,这是对哈克逻辑哲学体系的一个重要完善和补充。
③胡泽洪.20世纪我国逻辑哲学研究的回顾与反思[J].学术研究,2008(11),p.15.
④陈波.哲学逻辑的对象和意义[J].哲学研究,1987(3),pp.39-40.
⑥陈波.“哲学逻辑”词义探源和辨析[J].哲学动态,1997(3),p.43.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.2.
②关于“扩充逻辑”和“变异逻辑”的严格定义,参见本文第五章第一节。
③彭漪涟,马钦荣.逻辑学大辞典(修订本)[M].上海：上海辞书出版社.2010,p.356.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.1.
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.2.
⑥Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.ⅹⅲ.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.4-5.
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.5.
①有学者把这种基于实用理由的宽容方针称为“与经典逻辑类似”标准。请参见：陈波.逻辑哲学三题[J].求索,1990(6),p.43.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.6.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.5.
④Kneale, W. and Kneale, M. The Development of Logic. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1962, p.741.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.7.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.7.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.9.
①笔者猜测,哈克潜在地包含了这样的意思：经典逻辑以及传统逻辑是争议最少的,因此一般不作讨论。她所要审查的主要是非经典逻辑以及归纳逻辑等。
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.8-9.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.10.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.4.
②雷谢尔的逻辑图内容较多,具体可参见：Rescher, N. Topics in Philosophical Logic. Dordrecht, Holland: D.Reidel Publishing Company,1968, pp.6-9.
③Honderich, T. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy.2nd edition, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2005, p.982.
①陈波.逻辑哲学三题[J].求索,1990(6),pp.43-47.
②蔡曙山.逻辑学与现代科学的发展——兼论金岳霖先生的道路[J].中国社会科学,2000(4),pp.79-88.
③胡泽洪.对逻辑学范围与性质的反思[J].华南师范大学学报(社科版),2002(2),pp.3-7.
④本节部分内容已公开发表,请参见：颜中军.论苏珊·哈克的认知证成方案[J].毕节学院学报,2010(5),pp.46-50.
①Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.14.
②Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.14.
③Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.17.
④Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.17.
⑤具体分析可参见：Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.18.
⑥Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, pp.32-33.
⑦Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.22, p.32
⑧Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.27, p.32.
⑨Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.33.
①Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.29.
②Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.70, p.226.
③Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.101.
④Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.101.
⑤Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.101.
⑥Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.103.
⑦Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.103.
⑧Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.104.
①Haack, S. Evidence and Inquiry. Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers,1993, p.105.
②Haack, S. Defending Science within Reason. New York:Prometheus Books,2003, p.19.
①Haack, S. Defending Science within Reason. New York:Prometheus Books,2003, p.23.
②Haack, S. Defending Science within Reason. New York:Prometheus Books,2003, p.32.
③Haack, S. Defending Science within Reason. New York:Prometheus Books,2003, p.31.
④Haack, S. Defending Science within Reason. New York:Prometheus Books,2003, p.34.
①Haack, S. Defending Science within Reason. New York:Prometheus Books,2003, p.37.
②Hempel, C. G. "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation." In Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York:Free Press,1965, pp.3-37.
③Haack, S. Defending Science within Reason. New York:Prometheus Books,2003, p.38.
④Haack, S. Defending Science within Reason. New York:Prometheus Books,2003, p.26.
①Haack, S. Defending Science within Reason. New York:Prometheus Books,2003, p.52.
②柯岚.法律方法中的形式主义与反形式主义[J].法律科学.2007(2),p.33.
①请参见：Langdell, C. C. A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts, with a Summary of the Topics Covered by the Cases. Boston, MA:Little Brown, fisrt edition,1871,2nd edition,1879.
②Holmes, O. W. "Book Notice of William Anson, Principles of the English Law of Contracts, and Christopher Columbus Langdell, Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts,2nd edition." American Law Review,1880(14), p.234.
③Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), p.8.
④Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), p.8.
⑤Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), p.9.
①Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), p.15.
②Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), p.16.
③Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), pp.17-18.
④Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), p.19.
⑤Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), p.21.
①Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), pp.23-24.
②Haack, S. "On Logic in the Law:'Something, But Not All'." Ratio Juris,2007(20), p.25.
③杨玉成,崔人元.实用主义——美利坚的“精髓”[A].杜威等著.实用主义[C].杨玉成,崔人元编译.北京：世界知识出版社,2007,p.5.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.14.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.15.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.15.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.222.
④这不禁让人回想起皮尔士在《如何使我们的观念清楚明白》一文中对笛卡尔(Descartes)关于“自我”的“直观能力”的批判。哈克的上述思想极有可能是受到了皮尔士的影响。
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.23.
②当然,原因之一可能是：“某些”、“几个”、“少量”等语词不如“至少有一个”精确,尽管“某些”、“几个”、“少量”之间存在细微的差别,但它们都必须满足最低条件,即“至少有一个”
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.24.
④Quine, W. V. O. Word and Object. Cambridge:MIT,1960, p.160后文将看到,包括经典逻辑在内的形式系统经常犯了刻画过多或过少、甚至既过多又过少的毛病。这是形式化局限性的表现,也是导致逻辑可修正的根源之一。
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.17.
①苏珊·哈克.逻辑哲学[M].罗毅译.北京：商务印书馆,2003,p.29.
①Kneale, W. and Kneale, M. The Development of Logic. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1962, p.521.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.19.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.19.
Haack. S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.21.
Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.22.
Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.22.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.14.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.27.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.30.
③Strawson, P. F. Introduction to Logical Theory. London:Methuen,1952, p.79.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.38.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.41.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.42.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.43.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.46.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.46.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.46.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.47.
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.48.
⑥Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.49.
⑦Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.49.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1978, p.50.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.50.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.50-51.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.55.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.16.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.33.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.32.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.16-17.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978. p.221.
②鉴于基本立场的重要转变,本文粗略地以1970年为界,把蒯因的学术生涯大致分为前期和后期。
③请参见：Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of Logic. Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, first edition,1970, second edition,1986本文的相关引文均指第二版。
②Read, S. "Monism:The One True Logic." In A Logical Approach to Philosophy, D. Devidi and T. Kenyon (eds.), Netherlands:Springer,2006, p.193.
⑤可以参考：Field, H. "'Pluralism in Logic." The Review of Symbolic Logic, Vol.2,2009(6), p.344.
⑥例如根据意义变化论题,蒯因认为不同的逻辑对逻辑常项的涵义理解不同,它们之间不存在实质的冲突,而是不可比较的。这正是哈克所说的整体多元论的表现形式之一。但后来出于本体论方面的考虑,他把模态逻辑等统统排除在逻辑范围之外,而唯一可接受的逻辑只剩下一阶演算。这种不一致使他遭受了很多批评。
③Rahman, S., and Redmond, J. "Huge MacColl and the Birth of Logical Pluralism." In British Logic in the Nineteeth Century, vol.4 of Handbook of the History of Logic, Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods(eds.), Amsterdam: North-Holland,2008, pp.533-604.
④Beall, JC and Restall, G. Logical Pluralism. Oxford:Clarendon Press,2006.
①Beall, JC and Restall, G. Logical Pluralism. Oxford:Clarendon Press,2006, p.3.
②Beall, JC and Restall, G. Logical Pluralism. Oxford:Clarendon Press.2006, p.29.
③Beall, JC and Restall, G. Logical Pluralism. Oxford:Clarendon Press,2006, p.29.
④Russell, G. "One True Logic?" Journal of Philosophical Logic,2008(37), pp.593-611.
⑤Field, H."Pluralism in logic." The Review of Symbolic Logic, Vol.2,2009(6), p.343.
⑥Carnap, R. The Logical Syntax of Language. Translated by A. Smeaton, Paterson, NJ:Littlefield Adams,1959, p.15.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1978, p.223.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.223.
③Beall, JC and Restall, G. Logical Pluralism. Oxford:Clarendon Press,2006, p.29.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.223-224.
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.155.
⑥Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.224.
①Lewis, C. I. "Alternative Systems of Logic." The Monist, vol.41,1931译文转引自：陈波.逻辑哲学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2005,pp.34-24.
②霍书全.逻辑多元论与多值逻辑[J].中山大学研究生学刊(社会科学版),2002(1),p.1.
③Read. S. "Monism:The One True Logic." in A Logical Approach to Philosophy, D. Devidi and T. Kenyon (eds.), Netherlands:Springer,2006, pp.193-209.
④Read, S. "Monism:The One True Logic." in A Logical Approach to Philosophy, D. Devidi and T. Kenyon (eds.), Netherlands:Springer,2006, p.193.
⑤Read, S. "Monism:The One True Logic." in A Logical Approach to Philosophy, D. Devidi and T. Kenyon (eds.), Netherlands:Springer,2006, p.209.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.231加星号的地方表示存在元逻辑竞争。
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.228.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.229.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.231.
①Haack. S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.228.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.226.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.231.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.231.
①Jacquette, D. "Introduction:Philosophy of Logic Today." In Philosophy of logic, Dale Jacquette(ed.), Amsterdam:Elsevier B.V.,2007, pp.5-6.
②Heather M. and Rossiter, N. "Logical Monism:The Global Identity of Applicable Logic." In Essays on the Foundations of Mathematics and Logic, G. Sica(ed.), Monza, Italy:Polimetrica International Scientific Publisher, pp.39-52.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.25.
①蒯因的整体知识观来源于法国著名的科学史家、哲学家迪昂(Pierre Duhem).一般称为“迪昂—蒯因论题”。可参见：陈波.蒯因哲学研究[M].北京：生活·读书·新知三联书店,1998,pp.165-166.
②Quine, W. V. O. From a Logical Point of View. Second edition, revised, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.41.
③Quine, W. V. O. From a Logical Point of View. Second edition, revised, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.42.
④Quine, W. V. O. From a Logical Point of View. Second edition, revised, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.43.
⑤Quine, W. V. O. From a Logical Point of View. Second edition, revised, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, pp.42-43.
⑥Quine,W. V. O. From a Logical Point of View. Second edition, revised, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.45.
②Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of Logic. Second edition, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1986, p.100.
③Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of Logic. Second edition, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1986, p.100.
③陈波.蒯因哲学研究[M].北京：生活·读书·新知三联书店,1998,p.217.
①Putnam, H. Philosophy of Logic. New York:Routledge, first edition in 1971, new edition in 2010, p.76在本文中,相关引文均指新版。中译文亦可参见：普特南.逻辑哲学[A].普特南文选[C].李真编译.北京：社会科学文献出版社,2009,p.94.该中译文包括了普特南的《逻辑哲学》这本小册子(仅76页)的全部内容。
②Putnam, H. "Vagueness and Alternative Logic." In Realism and Reason:Philosophical Papers, vol.3, London: Cambridge University Press,1983, pp.271-273.
③Putnam, H. "The Logic of Quantum Mechanics." In Mathematics, Matter and Method:Philosophical Papers, vol.1, second edition, London:Cambridge University Press,1979, pp.180-184.
④Putnam, H. "The Logic of Quantum Mechanics." In Mathematics, Matter and Method:Philosophical Papers, vol.1, second edition, London:Cambridge University Press,1979, p.174.
⑤Putnam, H. "The Logic of Quantum Mechanics." In Mathematics, Matter and Method:Philosophical Papers, vol.1, second edition, London:Cambridge University Press,1979, p.184.
①Putnam, H. "The Logic of Quantum Mechanics." In Mathematics, Matter and Method:Philosophical Papers, vol.1, second edition, London:Cambridge University Press,1979, p.190.
②Putnam, H. "The Logic of Quantum Mechanics." In Mathematics, Matter and Method:Philosophical Papers, vol.1, second edition, London:Cambridge University Press,1979, p.196.
③Putnam, H. "There Is at Least One A Priori Truth." In Realism and Reason:Philosophical Papers, vol.3, London:Cambridge University Press,1983, p.98.
④Putnam, H. "There Is at Least One A Priori Truth." In Realism and Reason:Philosophical Papers, vol.3, London:Cambridge University Press,1983, p.100.
⑤Putnam, H. "There Is at Least One A Priori Truth." In Realism and Reason:Philosophical Papers, vol.3, London:Cambridge University Press,1983, p.99.
②Putnam, H. "There Is at Least One A Priori Truth." In Realism and Reason:Philosophical Papers, vol.3, London:Cambridge University Press,1983, p.111.
③Putnam, H. "There Is at Least One A priori Truth." In Realism and Reason:Philosophical Papers, vol.3, London:Cambridge University Press,1983, p.113.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.26.
③康德.逻辑学讲义[M].许景行译.北京：商务印书馆,1991,pp.11-12.
①Peirce, C. S. Collected Papers. C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, and A. Burks(eds.), Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1931-1958,5.387以后简称[CP],数字“5.387”表示第5卷第387段。
②康德.逻辑学讲义[M].许景行译.北京：商务印书馆,1991,p.6.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.238.
①哈克暂时保留了大前提1。它涉及到形式与内容之间的区分及其相互关系。结合下文将看到,要反驳康德论题,不仅要反驳小前提和大前提2,而且必须进一步反驳大前提1。另外,康德逻辑绝对主义论题非常复杂,后面的逻辑真理的分析性也是康德逻辑绝对主义的一个重要组成部分。为了行文方便,我们分开论述。
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.238.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.238.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.238.
②需要指出的是,哈克把康德看作强心理主义的代表有失公允。因为康德曾明确地提出要区分心理学和逻辑(即业里士多德逻辑,他称之为“一般的逻辑”,又译作“普通逻辑”。但要注意的是,国内所谓的“普通逻辑”通常用来指一门课程而非某种逻辑理论),区分思维的形式和内容。不过,“思维规律”确实容易 引起误解,并目康德所谓的“先验逻辑”是不是现代意义上的“逻辑”,这也是值得商榷的。因此,问题的关键并不在于逻辑是否是思维的形式(大前提2),而在于思维的形式是否就是先验有效的(大前提1)。
①具体内容可参见：Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.239.
②颜中军.试论弗雷格的反心理主义逻辑观[J].自然辩证法研究,2008(8),pp.6-10.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.240.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.240.
⑤Dewey, J. Experience and Nature. Chicago:Open Court,1929, p.196.
⑥Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.241.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.241.
②康德.逻辑学讲义[M].许景行译.北京：商务印书馆,1991,pp.2-3.
③康德.逻辑学讲义[M].许景行译.北京：商务印书馆,1991,p.45.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.28.
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.241-242.
⑥Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.29.
①Frege, G. The Foundations of Arithmetic. Translated by J. L. Austin, Oxford:Blackwell,1950, p.234.
②Pepper, S. World Hypotheses. Berkeley and Los Angeles:University of California Press,1961, p.24.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics.Cambridgt:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.236.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.236.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.214.
①实际上,逻辑的可修正性应该作为“两个教条”中论证的前提而非结论。请参见：Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambirdge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.237.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.233.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.234.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.234.
苏珊·哈克.证据与探究[M].陈波等译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2004,p.225.
①Quine, W. V. O. From a Logical Point of View. Second edition, revised, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1980, p.42.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.35-36.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.36,“在水上重修木筏”是认识论中的一个重要隐喻。哈克借此意指：就在现有逻辑的基础上修改逻辑本身,而无需推倒重来或借助现有逻辑之外的任何东西。
②Popper, K. R. "A Realist View of Physics, Logic and History." In Physics, Logic and History, W. Yourgrau and A. D. Breck eds. New York:Plenum Press,1970, p.18.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.37.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.37乍看起来,哈克与蒯因的观点几乎一样,很容易让人想起蒯因的“最小代价原则”。
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.38.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.39.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.39.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.40.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.40.
②休谟用的是“演证(demonstration)一词,不过从他的论述来看,这个词大致相当于“演绎”
③陈波.一个与归纳问题类似的演绎问题——演绎的证成[J].中国社会科学,2005(2),p.86.
④Haack, S. "The Justification of Deduction." Mind,1976(85), p.112.
①Haack, S. "The Justification of Deduction." Mind,1976(85), p.114.
②Haack, S. "The Justification of Deduction." Mind,1976(85), p.113.
①Haack, S. "The Justification of Deduction." Mind,1976(85). p.117.
②Haack, S. "The Justification of Deduction." Mind,1976(85), p.118.
③Haack, S. "The Justification of Deduction." Mind,1976(85), p.118.
①苏珊·哈克.证据与探究[M].陈波等译.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2004,p.227.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.232.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.232.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.237.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.152.
①哈克在《变异逻辑》中几乎把“修正”和“变异”视为同义词,可以互换。但在《逻辑哲学》中，逻辑“修改”的含义更为宽泛,不仅仅指“变异”,而且还包括其他六种类型。具体分析请参看第五章“逻辑修正的表现形式”。
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.41.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.41.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.41.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.42.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.1.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.1阿克曼早在1967年就注意到了这一点,请参见：Ackerman, R. An Introduction to Many-Valued Logics. London:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1967, p.15.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.2.
②Brouwer, L. E. J. "Historical Background, Principles and Methods of Intuitionism." South African Journal of Science,1952(49), pp.139-146.
③Putnam, H. "The logic of Quantum Mechanics." In Mathematics, Matter and Method:Philosophical Papers, vol.1, second edition, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1979, pp.174-197.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.3.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.3.
③以下分类和定义参看：Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.4.
④根据蒯因的解释,词汇的本质出现是指以下情况：如果替换该语词就会导致语句的真值发生改变。可参考：Quine, W. V.O. Mathematical Logic. New York:Norton,1940, p.2.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.5.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.5.
②Quine, W. V. O. The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. New York:Random House, Inc.,1966, p.105.
③Quine, W. V. O. The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. New York:Random House, Inc.,1966, p.113.
④Quine, W. V. O. Word and Object. Cambridge:MIT,1960, p.59.
①Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of Logic. Second edition, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1986, p.81.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.8.
③Putnam, H. "The Analytic and the Synthetic." In Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers, vol.2, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1975, pp.50-51.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.9.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.9.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.9-10.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.10.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.10.
⑤即有可能不成立,强调其“可能性”
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.11.
②Putnam, H. "The Logic of Quantum Mechanics." In Mathematics, Matter and Method, Philosophical Papers, vol.1, Second Edition, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1979, p.189.
③关于联结词的“核心”意义的详细说明,请参见：Putnam, H. "Three-Valued Logic." Philosophical Studies,1957(8), pp.73-80.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.12.
⑤Prior, A. N. "The Runabout Inference-Ticket", Analysis,1960(21), pp.38-39; "Conjunction and Contonktion Revisited." Analysis,1964(24), pp.191-195; Reprinted in Contemporary Philosophical Logic, edited by Irving M. Copi and James A. Gould, New York:ST. Martin's Press,1978, pp.37-38, pp.49-53.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.13斯蒂文森和贝尔纳普对普赖尔的批评请参见：Stenvenson, J. T. "Roundabout the Runabout Inference-Ticket." Belnap, N. D. "Tonk, Plonk and Plink." All of them in Contemporary Philosophical Logic, edited by Irving M. Copi and James A. Gould, New York:ST. Martin's Press,1978, pp.39-43, pp.44-48.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.13.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambirdge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.230.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.14.
②Quine, W. V. O. The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. New York:Random House, Inc.,1966, p.102.
①Quine, W. V. O. Word and Object. Cambridge:MIT,1960, p.27此处译文参考了北京大学陈波教授所做的翻译。请参见：陈波.逻辑哲学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2005,pp.17-18。
②Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of Logic. Second Edition, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1986, p.81.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.16.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.17.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.18.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.18.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.21.
①Quine, W. V. O. Pilosophy of Logic. Second edition, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1986, p.83.
②该文最初发表于1969年,后以“量子力学的逻辑”为题收录于《普特南哲学论文选集》第一卷。请参见：Putnam, H. "The Logic of Quantum Mechanics." In Mathematics, Matter and Method:Philosophical Papers, vol.1, second edition, London:Cambridge university press,1979, pp.174-197.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.21.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.22.
④Quine, W. V. O. The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. New York:Random House, Inc.,1966, p.102.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.23.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.21.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.23.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.23.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.152.
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.153.
⑥Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.153-155.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.156.
②请参见：Burgess, J. P. Philosophical Logic. Princeton:Princeton University Press,2009, pp.vii-viii.
③具体内容请参见：Aberdein A., and Read, S. "The Philosophy of Alternative Logics." in The Development of Modern Logic, edited by Leila Haaparanta, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2009, pp.613-723.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.42.
Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.42.
Haack, S. Deviant Logic. Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.43.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.44.
②哈克注意到,尽管这个反驳意见大体上是可取的,但它自身也存在某些缺陷。例如,到底什么样的东西才称得上是“题材中立的”,不同的学者可能持有不同的意见。另外,对于同一个非形式论证,并不存在唯一正确的刻画。参见：Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.45.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.167.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.166.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.46.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.46.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.46.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.46.
⑧Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.109.
④请参见：Pap, A. Elements of Analytic Philosophy. London:Macmillan,1949, p.116亦可参见：Black, M. "Reasoning With Loose Concepts." Dialogue,1963(2), p.10.
①[CP15.446
②[CP15.506
③[CP15.506
④Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.110.
⑤Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.110.
⑥Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.110.
⑦Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.111.
⑧Alston, W. P. Philosophy of Language. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:Prentice-Hall, Inc.1964, p.88.
①Quine, W. V. O. Word and Object. Cambridge:MIT,1960, p.128.
②例如,魏斯曼(F. Waismann)提出了“开放语境”的动态语言观。基本思想是：适用于目前情境的谓词,如果情境发生变化,也许变得不再适用了。例如,是否应该把一个相关的猫科动物称为“猫”,如果它突然长至12英尺高?这与类型(1a)相似。但它考虑情境转换,因此不属于哈克的分类。参见：Waismann, F. "Verifiability." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplement,1945(19). p.123.
③Alston, W. P. Philosophy of Language. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:Prentice-Hall, Inc.1964, p.96.
①Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.114.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.164.
③Dummett, M. "Wang's Paradox." Synthese,1975(30), pp.301-324.
④在文献中“模糊逻辑”(fuzzy logic)通常有两种含义：一种是广义的,泛指所有关于模糊性问题的逻辑；另一种是狭义的,专指基于模糊集之上的逻辑。
④Zadeh, L. A. "Fuzzy Languages and Their Relation to Human Intelligence." Proceedings of the International Conference, Man and Computer, S. Karger,1972.
⑤Zadeh, L. A. "Fuzzy Logic and Approximate Reasoning." Synthese,1975(30), p.407.
⑥Zadeh, L. A., and Bellman, R. E. Local and Fuzzy Logic, Memorandum ERL-M584, Electrocnics Research Laboratory. Berkeley:University of California,1976, p.64.
①Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.ⅹⅱ除了扎德的模糊逻辑之外,她还把“逻辑迈侬主义”(logical Meingonianism)、“辩证逻辑”(原文为dialethic logic,在某些文献中也用dialectic logic)、女性主义逻辑(feminist logic)视为当代逻辑极端主义的代表。例如,她认为,与扎德试图用模糊性取代精确性一样,辩证逻辑不仅承认和容忍矛盾,而且还试图反映矛盾本身。发展辩证逻辑的一个主要动机是解决语义悖论,但是它所提出的方案很可能“比疾病本身更糟糕”。参见：Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.ⅹⅲ-ⅹⅵ.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.167.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.168.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.167.
⑤Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.115.
⑥Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.116.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.163.
②Russell, B. "Vagueness." Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology,1923(1), pp.88-89.
③Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.117.
④Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.117.
⑤Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.118.
⑤哈克在《逻辑哲学》中把特意“误导形式策略”改称为“新奇的释意策略”,以免别人把她的立场混同于罗素的立场。因为罗素主张每一个句子都有唯一正确的逻辑形式,而哈克明确反对这一点。请参见:Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.153.
①请参见：Quine, W. V. O. Word and Object. Cambridge:MIT,1960类似的观点还可参见:Alston, W. P. Philosophy of Language. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:Prentice-Hall,1964, p.86.
②Russell, B. "Vaguness." Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology,1923(1), pp.84-92.
③Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.119.
④Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.124.
⑤Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.ⅹⅰ-ⅹⅱ.
① Hacck, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.124-125.
②亚里士多德.亚里士多德全集第一卷[M].苗力田主编,秦典华译,北京：中国人民大学出版社,1990,pp.57-61.在本文的讨论中,将来偶然命题仅限于将来偶然单称命题。
③ Lukasiewicz, J. "Philosophical Remarks on Many-Valued Systems of Propositional Logic." in Polish Logic 1920-1939, ed. by S. McCall, Oxford:Clarendon Press,1967, p.53.
②亚里士多德.亚里士多德全集第一卷[M].苗力田主编,秦典华译,北京：中国人民大学出版社,1990,p.58.
③亚里士多德.亚里士多德全集第一卷[M].苗力田主编,秦典华译,北京：中国人民大学出版社,1990,p.59.
④亚里士多德.亚里士多德全集第一卷[M].苗力田主编,秦典华译,北京：中国人民大学出版社,1990,p.58.
①亚里士多德.亚里士多德全集第一卷[M].苗力田主编,秦典华译,北京:中国人民大学出版社,1990,pp.59-60.
②亚里士多德.亚里士多德全集第一卷[M].苗力田主编,秦典华译,北京：中国人民大学出版社,1990,p.60.
③亚里士多德.亚里士多德全集第一卷[M].苗力田主编,秦典华译,北京：中国人民大学出版社,1990,p.61.
④亚里士多德.亚里士多德全集第一卷[M].苗力田主编,秦典华译,北京：中国人民大学出版社,1990,p.60.
⑤亚里士多德.亚里士多德全集第一卷[M].苗力田主编,秦典华译,北京:中国人民大学出版社,1990,p.61.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.74.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.78.
②Lukasiewicz, J. "Philosophical Remarks on Many-Valued Systems of Propositional Logic." in Polish Logic 1920-1939, ed. by S. McCall, Oxford:Clarendon Press,1967, p.53.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.257-258.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.84-85.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.85笔者注意到,哈克的某些表述是不一致的或不严谨的。例如在《逻辑哲学》中,她竟然说：“多值逻辑像经典逻辑一样,都是真值函项的”。紧接其后,在分析克利尼(S. C. Kleene)的三值矩阵时,她又指出：“当然,这需要一个非真值函项的逻辑”。参见：Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.215-216.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.87.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.87.
⑤Prior, A. N. "Three-valued Logic and Future Contingents." Philosophical Quarterly,1953(3), pp.317-326.
⑥Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.88.
①Lukasiewicz, J. Aristotle s Syllogistic. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1957, pp.166-167.
②Lukasiewicz, J. Aristotle's Syllogistic. Oxford:Clarendon Press,1957, pp.166-169.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.89.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.89-90.
⑤van Fraassen, B. C. "Singular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps, and Free Logic". Journal of Philosophy,1966(63), pp.481-495.
⑥Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.85-86.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.90.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.90.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.211.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.210-213.
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.215.
⑥本节大部分内容已经公开发表,请参见：颜中军.论直觉主义逻辑对经典逻辑的挑战[J].湘潭大学学报(哲社版),2011(3),pp.125-128.
⑥Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.91.
⑦保罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆,2003,p.93.
② van Dalen, D. "Intuitionistic Logic." in Handbook of Philosophical Logic (2nd Edition), vol.5, edited by Dov M. Gabby and F. Guenthner, Netherlands:Kluwer Academic Publishers,2002, p.3.
⑧冯棉.经典逻辑与直觉主义逻辑[M].上海：上海人民出版社.1989.p.50.
④ van Dalen, D. "Intuitionistic Logic." in Handbook of Philosophical Logic (2nd Edition), vol.5, edited by Dov M. Gabby and F. Guenthner, Netherlands:Kluwer Academic Publishers,2002, pp.4-5.
① Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.91.
② Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.92.
③ Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of Logic. Second edition, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1986, p.88.
④ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.93.
⑤ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.93.
①在本文中,“┠c”表示经典命题逻辑中的定理,其中下标“C”代表经典逻辑(classical propositional logic)类似地在后文中,下标“I”表示直觉主义命题逻辑(intuitional propositional logic)。
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.98.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.98.
① Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.99.
② Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.99-100
③ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.101.
④ Brouwer, L. E. J. "Historical Background, Principles and Methods of Intuitionism." South African Journal of Science,1952(49), pp.139-146.
⑤转引自：Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.95.
⑥ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.94.
⑦ Heyting, A. Intuitionism:An Introduction. Amsterdan:North-Holland, first edition 1956, second revised edtion 1966, third edition 1971, p.106本文相关引文均指1971版。
①Kolmogorov, A. N. "On the Principle of Excluded Middle." Reprinted in From Frege to Godel:A Source Book in Mathematical Logic,1879-1931, ed. by J. van Heijenhoort,1967, Cambridge:Harvard University Press, p.421.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.103.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.103.
④达米特坦承,他的观点与直觉主义者本身存在某些不符,但他自信其论证是相当有力的。请参考：保罗·贝罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆,2003,p.125.
⑤保罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆,2003,PP.113-114.
⑥保罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆.2003,p.114.
⑦保罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆,2003,PP.114-115.
①保罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆,2003,p.116.
②保罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆,2003,p.124.
③保罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆,2003,p.126.
④ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.104.
⑤ Dummett, M. "Wang's paradox." Synthese,1975(30), p.301.
⑥ Dummett, M. "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics." The Philosophical Review, Vol.68, No.3 (Jul., 1959), p.347.
⑦ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.105-106.
① Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.106.
② Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.106.
③ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.107.
④ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.107.
⑤ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.108.
⑤例如,他说：“毕竟,这些考虑不仅应用于数学,也应用于其他所有领域：虽然它们已经确切表明关于思想和实体的实在论观点存在某些错误,但这并不意味着在数学之外的极端主观理念论。”请参见：Dummett, M. "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. " The Philosophical Review,1959(68), p.348.
①例如,当形式主义者提到直觉主义逻辑已经形式化了时,海廷回答说：“我很抱歉,使你失望。逻辑并不是我的立足点。”请参见：保罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆,2003,p.82.
②保罗·贝纳塞拉夫,希拉里·普特南.数学哲学[M].朱水林等译,北京：商务印书馆,2003,pp.82-83.
③Heyting, A. Intuitionism:An Introduction. Amsterdam:North-Holland Publishing Company,1956, p.116.
④哥德尔变换的具体步骤及相关定理证明可参见：冯棉.直觉主义逻辑与经典逻辑[M].上海：上海人民出版社,1989,pp.212-218.特别是定义4.7.2、命题4.7.4、定义4.7.4以及命题4.7.9。
⑤Fitting, M. C. Intuitionistic Logic, Model Theory and Forcing. Amsterdam:North-Holland,1969, p.43.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.97.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.108.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.108.
④本节内容已公开发表,请参见：颜中军.从相干逻辑看逻辑的可修正性[J].毕节学院学报,2011(3),pp.44-48.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.ⅹⅳ.
①冯棉.相干逻辑研究[M].上海：华东师范大学出版社,2010,p.1.
①冯棉.相干逻辑研究[M].上海：华东师范大学出版社,2010,pp.38-39.
②冯棉.相干逻辑研究[M].上海：华东师范大学出版社,2010,pp.28-29.
①可参见：冯棉.相干逻辑研究[M].上海：华东师范大学出版社,2010,p131.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.201.
②冯棉.相干逻辑研究[M].上海：华东师范大学出版社,2010,pp.28-29.
④Dunn, M., and Restall, G. "Relevance Logic." In Handbook of Philosophical Logic (second edition), vol.6, Dov M. Gabbay and F. Guenthner(eds.), Netherlands:Kluwer Academic Publishers,2002, p.30.
①Anderson, A. R., and Belnap, N. D. "Modalities in Ackermann's 'Rigorous Implication'." Journal of symbolic logic,1959(24), pp.107-111.
②Anderson, A. R., and Belnap, N. D. "Enthymemes." Journal of philosophy,1961(58), pp.713-723.
③Meyer, R. K. "E and S4." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic,1970(11), pp.181-199. Meyer, R. K. "Intuitionism, Entailment, Negation." in Truth, Syntax and Modality, H. Leblanc(ed.), Amsterdam:North Holland, 1973, pp.168-198.
④Meyer, R. K. "Intuitionism, Entailment, Negation." In Truth, Syntax and Modality, H. Leblanc(ed.), Amsterdam:North Holland,1973, pp.168-198.
⑤冯棉.相干逻辑研究[M].上海：华东师范大学出版社,2010,p.9.
① Anderson, A. R. "Some Open Problems Concerning the System E of Entailment." Acta Philosophica Fennica, 1963(16), pp.7-18.
② Anderson, A. R., Belnap, N. D., and Dunn, J. M. Entailment:The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, vol.Ⅱ, Princeton:Princeton University Press,1992, pp.332-375.
③ Dunn M., and Restall, G. "Relevance Logic." In Handbook of Philosophical Logic (second edition), vol.6, Dov
M. Gabbay and F. Guenthner(eds.), Netherlands:Kluwer Academic Publishers,2002, pp.86-98.
①弗雷格.逻辑[A].弗雷格哲学论著选辑[C].王路译,北京：商务印书馆,1994,p.179.
②Haack, S. "The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth." Midwest Studies in Philosophy,2008(ⅩⅩⅩⅡ), p.20.
①例如,当人们满怀虔敬之情说“真理引导我们前进”时,此处的“真理”通常被当作某种神秘的力量。请参见：Haack, S. "The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth." Midwest Studies in Philosophy,2008 (ⅩⅩⅩⅡ), p.21.
②Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." in Putting Philosophy to Work, New York:
① Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.46.
② Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.46.
③ Haack, S. "The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth." Midwest Studies in Philosophy,2008 (ⅩⅩⅫ), p.24.
④ Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.46.
⑤ Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.47.
① Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.49.
② Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.50.
③ Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.50.
④ Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.51.
⑤ Ramsey, F. P. "The Foundations of Mathematics." In The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays, ed.by R. B. Braithwaite, London:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1931, pp.1-61.
① Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.51.
②哈克和罗蒂的观点针锋相对。她几乎在任何场合下都极力反对罗蒂,视为论敌,并且言辞之间带有明显的不屑和轻蔑。这在学术界已经造成很大的影响。令人遗憾的是,罗蒂从未做出正面回应。本来期待一场精彩的双边论战,结果变成了哈克的单独宣战。Rorty, R. Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1992, p.32.
③ Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, pp.52-53.
④ [CP12.138,5.211。
⑤ Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.44.
① Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.54.
② Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.55.
③ Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.55.
① Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.56.
② Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.56.
③ Haack, S. "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." In Putting Philosophy to Work, New York: Prometheus Books,2008, p.57.
④ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.243.
①Zadeh, L. A. "Fuzzy Sets." Information and Control,1965(8), pp.338-353.
②Zadeh, L. A. "Fuzzy Logic and Approximate Reasoning." Synthese,1975(30), pp.407-428.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.244.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.245.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.245.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.245.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.245.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.246.
④Unger, P. Ignorance. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1975, pp.47-91, pp.272-319.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.247.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p,248.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.248.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.248.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.249.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.249.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, pp.250-251.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.251.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.251.
④Bradley, F. H. Essays on Truth and Reality. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1914, p.252.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.252.
⑥Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.252.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.253.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.253.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.254.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.254.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.254.
① Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.256.
② Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.256.
③ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.257.
④ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.258. "Mly" 即副词的简写。因为在英语中,副词通常带有后缀“ly”
⑤笔者曾就真理观请教于哈克教授。她回信说,她并不赞同实用主义真理观,不管是何种形式的实用主义。 她开始比较赞同拉姆齐的观点,正如正文所示的那样；但后来觉得塔斯基的真理论更好些。
①本节部分内容已公开发表,请参见：颜中军.殊型句与真值承担者[J].大理学院学报,2010(9),pp.10-12.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.74.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.74-75.
④Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.75.
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.75-76.
⑥Haack, R. J., and Haack, S. "Token-Sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, vol.79,1970. p.41.
①Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.76-77.
②Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.79.
③Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1978, p.80.
① Strawson, P. F. "On Referring." Mind, vol.59, No.235 (Jul.,1950), pp.326-329.
② Strawson, P. F. Introduction to Logical Thoery. London:Methuen,1952, p.4.
③ Haack, R. J., and Haack, S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.43.
④ Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.43.
⑤ Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, pp.43-44.
⑥ Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.80.
⑦ Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.80.
⑧ Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.81.
①Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.47.
②Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.47.
① Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, pp.48-49.
② Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.50.
③ Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.51.
①Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.51.
②Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.52.
③Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.57.
④Haack, R. J., and Haack. S. "Token-sentence, Translation and Truth-Value." Mind, Vol.79,1970, p.57.
⑤Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.82.
①例如,她注意到,戴维森纲领的失败恰好说明了塔斯基把自己的真理语义学严格限制在形式语言范围之内实属明智之举。具体内容可以参考下一节的相关论述。
② Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.82.
③ Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, pp.82-83.
④ Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.84.
⑤ Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.85.
① Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.83.
② Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.84.
③ Popper, K. R. "Truth, Rationality and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge." In Conjectures and Refutations, New York:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1963, pp.224-226.
④ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.324.
⑤ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.324.
① Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976),p.324.
② Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), pp.324-325.
③ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.325.
④ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), pp.325-326.
⑤参见：Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul., 1976), p.326.
① Haack, S. Putting Philosophy to Work. Amherst, New York:Prometheus Books,2008, p.227.
② Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), pp.326-327.
③ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.327.
④ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.327.
⑤ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.327.
① Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.115.
② Popper, K. R."Truth, Rationality and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge." In Conjectures and Refutations, New York:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1963, p.225.
③ Popper, K. R."Truth, Rationality and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge." In Conjectures and Refutations, New York:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1963, p.225.
④ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.328.
⑤ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.328.
⑥ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.330.
⑦ Tarski, A. "The Semantic Conception of Truth." In Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. by H. Feigl and W. Sellars, New York:Appleton-Century Crofts,1949, p.71.
①Haack, S. "is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.331.
②Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.331.
③Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.332.
④Popper, K. R."Truth, Rationality, and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge." In Conjectures and Refutations, New York:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1963, p.225.
⑤Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.332.
⑥Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), pp.332-333.
① Popper, K. R. "Truth, Rationality and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge." In Conjectures and Refutations, New York:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1963, pp.233-234.
② Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.334.
③ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), p.334.
④ Haack, S. "Is it True What They Say About Tarski?" Philosophy, Vol.51, No.197(Jul.,1976), pp.335-336.
① Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.47.
② Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.48.
③ Strawson, P. F. "On Referring." Mind,1950(59), pp.320-344.
④ Lewy, C. "How Are the Calculuses of Logic and Mathematics Applicable to Reality?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplement,1946(20), pp.30-39.
⑤ Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.50.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.50.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.51.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.53.
④Russell, B. "On Denoting." Mind,14,1905, pp.479-493.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.54.
②Russell, B. "Review of McColl." Mind,15,1906, pp.255-260.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.54.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.55.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.55.
⑥Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.55.
Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.57.
Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.57.
Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.58.
Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.58.
① Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.59.
② Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.59.
③请参见：Kleene, S. C. Introduction to Metamathematics. Amsterdam:North-Holland,1952.
③ Haack. S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.60.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.60.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.61.
③Prior, A. N. "Many-Valued Logic and Modal Systems:An Intuitive Approch." Philosophical Review,1955(64), pp.626-630.
④Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.61.
⑤Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.63.
⑥Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of Logic. Second edition, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1986, p.84.
①Putnam, H. "Three-Valued Logic." Philosophical Studies,1957(8), p.74.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.65.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.65.
④具体证明过程请参见：Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.67-68.
⑤Tarski, A. "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages." In Logic, Semantics and Metamathematics, translated by J. H. Woodger, Oxford:Oxford University Press,1956, pp.152-178.
⑥Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.68.
⑦Putnam, H. "Three-Valued Logic." Philosophical Studies,1957(8), pp.73-80.
①Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.69.
②Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.70.
③Haack, S. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1996, p.71.
①康德.纯粹理性批判[M].邓晓芒译.北京：人民出版社.2004,p.131.
①康德.纯粹理性批判[M].邓晓芒译.北京：人民出版社,2004,p.55.
②裴顿(H. J. Paton)康德的经验形而上学：《纯粹理性批判》上半部注释[M].韦卓民译.武汉：华中师范大学出版社,2009,pp.199-200.
③康德.逻辑学讲义[M].许景行译.北京：商务印书馆,1991,p.5.
①Putnam, H. Philosophy of Logic. New York:Routledge, first edition 1971, new edition 2010, p.76.
① Haack, S. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978, p.242.
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