农产品营销中农户合作行为实证研究
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摘要
农户作为我国农业生产经营中一个重要而基本的单元,其能否顺利进入市场,直接关系到我国农业的市场化、国际化进程。实践证明,农户与其它经济主体联合进入市场的农产品营销合作行为,是农户顺利进入市场的有效选择。因此,探明农户营销合作行为的内在机理,把握农户营销合作行为的影响因素,寻求有效引导农户合作、帮助农户顺利进入市场的路径,无疑具有十分重要的意义。
本文以农产品营销中农户合作行为为研究对象,以江西省农户的调查数据为依托,采用规范与实证研究相结合的方法,按照“为什么合作、怎样合作”的思路来展开研究:
首先,对已有的相关成果和研究理论进行回顾和梳理,据此构建出农产品营销中农户合作行为的理论分析模型,为本文提供一个逻辑推理框架;
第二,从节约交易费用、顺应环境变化等需要出发,对农产品营销中农户合作行为产生的动因进行理论和实际的求证,回答农户“为什么合作”;
第三,利用对江西省1085户农户调查的有效样本,采用统计分析、计量模型检验等方法工具,实证分析农户合作意愿、合作伙伴、合作方式及履约选择的影响因素,揭示农户合作的内在机理,回答农户“怎样合作”;
最后,在上述研究基础之上,从我国“小规模、分散化”农户的基本特征之实际出发,围绕引导农户适度规模经营、培育各类农产品营销主体、科学设计农产品销售合约等方面,提出系列的有效引导农户合作营销的对策建议。
本文的主要研究结论如下:
(1)农产品营销中农户实施合作营销,其根本动因主要源于两方面的需要。一是节约交易费用的需要。单个农户进入市场进行交易,其交易费用非常高昂,合作营销可以降低农户的交易费用;二是顺应环境变化的需要。农户自身力量的弱小,使其感觉到单靠个人的力量难以适应经济全球化、科学技术进步和消费者需求不断变化等环境的变化,合作营销可以帮助农户增强适应环境变化的能力。
(2)合作意愿是成功实施合作的前提,要有效引导农户合作,首先必须提高农户的合作意愿。目前,农户的营销合作意愿比较强烈,但不同农户的合作意愿不一致,实证结果表明,农户的合作意愿是多因素综合影响的结果,生产经营规模、专用设施投入、生产集中度、价格波动、销售难度、政府支持及距离市场远近对农户合作意愿有显著正向影响;生产不同农产品的农户,其合作意愿不同,家禽养殖户合作意愿最强,其次是果农和水产养殖户,合作意愿最弱的是菜农和粮农;户主的风险态度对农户的合作意愿有显著负向影响。
(3)农产品营销合作中,各有一定比例的农户分别选择了与贩运户、龙头企业、合作组织或协会以及专业批发市场合作,呈现出多样性特征。实证结果表明,不同特征的农户选择结果各异,并有其内在规律性。比如,生产经营规模大的农户更愿意选择龙头企业和合作组织或协会合作,而生产经营规模小的农户却更愿意选择贩运户合作;果农更愿意选择合作组织合作,而家禽养殖户则更愿意与龙头企业合作。为此,要使得农户合作成功,就必须大力发展各类农产品营销主体,让不同特征的农户都能有合适的合作伙伴。
(4)农产品营销合作中,农户签订口头协议的比例(58.8%)高于签订书面合同的比例(41.2%),这一结果与理想还存在一定差距,各级政府还要加强引导,使得更多的农户签订正规的书面合同。具体而言,不同农户最终的选择结果存在差异性,实证结果表明,农户选择何种合同形式不仅与农户户主特征、生产经营特征、农产品类型及所处的环境有关,还与合作伙伴类型有关。为此,要引导农户签订正规的书面合同,就必须从多维度有效控制住这些影响因素。
(5)履约是农户营销合作成功之关键,是合作能否继续之保证。然而,调查显示,只有38.3%的农户履行了合约,如此低的履约率严重影响了农产品营销合作的发展。但是,实证结果表明,不同农户的履约行为不一样,农户履约与否不仅与农户户主特征、生产经营特征、农产品类型、所处的环境以及合作伙伴类型有关,还与合同条款有关。显然,要提高农户的履约率,也必须从多维度有效控制住上述影响因素。
基于上述研究结论,本文提出了若干对策建议:(1)充分尊重农民自己的选择;(2)逐步引导农户适度规模经营;(3)大力培育各类农产品营销主体;(4)激发农户专用设施的投资热情;(5)因地制宜提高农产品生产集中度;(6)科学设计农产品销售合约。此外,各级政府应在政策上给予支持、具体操作上给予指导;加大农村人力资本投资;稳定农产品价格。龙头企业等农产品营销主体应加强自身的信誉建设。
本文的主要创新点:
(1)研究思路与视角上的创新。本文把农产品营销中农户合作行为视为过程,以“为什么要合作、怎样合作”为逻辑主线,创新性地构建了农产品营销中农户合作行为分析模型,从微观层面上系统地揭示了农户营销合作行为的内在机理。这不仅避免落入已有研究的巢臼,而且拓展了农户营销合作行为研究的范围,这在同类研究中尚未发现。因而,本文为农产品营销中农户合作行为研究提供了新的思路与视角。
(2)研究方法运用上的创新。多元Logistic模型是解释经济生活中人们的多项离散选择问题的最好模型之一,但运用该模型对农户合作伙伴选择的影响因素进行实证研究的文献尚未发现。本文运用该方法所得结论基本与实际情况相吻合,也符合经济学理论分析结论。可见,本文采用的分析方法具有一定的科学性,为农产品营销中农户合作行为研究导入了新的分析手段。
(3)研究结论上的创新。一是,从理论上阐述和揭示的农产品营销中农户合作行为与交易主体、交易客体、交易环境等的关系,具有内在性和动态性,企图违背这一规律性的农户行为是不理性的;二是,从实证上对农户合作意愿、合作伙伴、合作方式及履约选择的影响因素分别进行计量检验与实证分析,所总结出的结论,较好地回答了农户“怎样合作”的问题。
Fanner household is an important and basic unit in agricultural production and management of our country. Whether farmer households could go smoothly into market concerns directly the process of internationalization of our country. The practice shows farmer households' co-marketing behavior of agricultural products-cooperating with other economic subjects-is an effective choice for them to go smoothly into market. Therefore, it is undoubtedly of great significance to ascertain the inherent mechanism of farmer households' cooperative behavior, master its influential factors and seek the ways to effectively guide them to cooperate and help them go smoothly into market
The thesis regards farmer households' cooperative behavior in marketing of agricultural products as the research object, bases itself on the investigation data to farmer households of Jiangxi Province, adopts the methods of canonical and positive research and shows the research through the train of thought of why farmer households cooperate and how they cooperate:
First of all, the thesis looks back on and combs the past relative achievements and research theories. Based on this, it sets up theoretical analysis model of farmer households' co-marketing behavior so as to provide a logical reasoning framework for the research of the thesis.
Second, starting from the needs such as saving exchange cost and going with environmental change, the thesis, in theory and practice, probes into the reasons for farmer households' cooperative behavior and responds to farmer households the problem of why they cooperate.
Third, according to the effective samples of 1085 investigated farmer households in Jiangxi Province, the thesis adopts the methods such as statistical analysis and metrological model check to positively analyze the influential factors on farmer households' cooperative willingness, cooperative partners, cooperative ways and fulfillment behavior, reveals the inherent mechanism of farmer households' cooperation and responds to them the problem of how they cooperate.
Finally, based on the above research, starting from fanner households' basic feature of small scale and decentralization in our country, by centering on guiding farmer households to conduct proper scale management, cultivating various marketing subjects, devising scientifically sale contracts and so on, the thesis puts forward a series of suggestions and strategies to effectively guide their co-marketing.
The main conclusions of the thesis are as follows:
1. The basic reason for which farmer households implement co-marketing of agricultural product results from two needs. One is the need to save exchange cost. The exchange cost is very high if a single fanner household makes a deal in the market, but co-marketing can reduce the exchange cost. The other is the need to go with the environmental changes. Farmer households' own strength is so weak that they feel they are difficult to adapt to the environmental changes such as economic globalization, advance of science and technology and constantly-changing demands of consumers, but co-marketing can help them strengthen the ability to adapt to the environmental changes.
2. Cooperative willingness is the premise to successfully implement cooperation, so in order to effectively guide farmer households to cooperate, their cooperative willingness should be enhanced. Presently, their willingness of co-marketing is relatively strong, but different farmer households have different cooperative willingness. The positive result shows their willingness to cooperate results from comprehensive influences of various factors. Production and management scale, special facilities input, production centralizing degree, price fluctuation, sale difficulty, government support and distance to the market have notable positive influences on their cooperative willingness. Farmer households who produce different agricultural products have different cooperative willingness. Those who raise poultry have the strongest cooperative willingness; the next are those households who grow fruits and raise aquatic products, and those who grow vegetables and grain have the weakest cooperative willingness. Yet the risk attitude of farmer households has a notable negative influence on their cooperative willingness.
3. In co-marketing of agricultural products, a certain proportion of farmer households choose respectively to cooperate with mongers, leading enterprises, cooperative organizations or associations and professional wholesale markets, which takes on the feature of diversity. The positive result shows different farmer households have different choices, but there is inherent regularity. For example, those with large-scale management are more willing to cooperate with leading enterprises and cooperative organizations or associations, but those with small-scale management are more willing to cooperate with mongers. Those who grow fruits are more willing to cooperate with cooperative organizations, but those who raise poultry are more willing to cooperate with leading enterprises. Therefore, if farmer households are to cooperate successfully, various marketing subjects should be greatly developed so that farmer households with different features can have proper cooperative partners.
4. In co-marketing of agricultural products, farmer households sign oral contracts in a higher proportion(58.8%) than written ones(41.2%). There is still a certain gap between this result and the ideal state. Governments at all levels should strengthen its guide so that more farmer households sign regular written contracts. Concretely speaking, the final choices of different farmer households are different. The positive result shows what cooperative ways farmer households choose is not only relative to the feature of farmer householders, the feature of management, the type of agricultural products and the environment around, but also relative to the type of cooperative partners. Therefore, in order to guide farmer households to sign regular written contracts, the above influential factors should be controlled effectively from a multidimensional angle.
5. The fulfillment of contract is the key to successful cooperation and the assurance of further cooperation in co-marketing. However, the investigation shows only 38.3% of farmer households fulfill their contracts. The low fulfillment rate of contracts greatly influences the development of co-marketing of agricultural products. However, the positive result shows different farmer households have different fulfillment behaviors. Whether farmer households fulfill their contracts is not only relative to the feature of farmer householders, the feature of management, the type of agricultural products, the environment around and the type of cooperative partners, but also relative to the provisions of contracts. Obviously, in order to improve the fulfillment rate of farmer households, the above influential factors should also be controlled effectively from a multidimensional angle.
Based on the above conclusions, the thesis puts forward some strategies and suggestions:
1. Fully respect farmer households' own choice.
2. Gradually guide farmer households to manage on a proper scale.
3. Greatly cultivate various marketing subjects of agricultural products.
4. Arouse farmer households' passion for special facilities input
5. Enhance production centralizing degree in the light of local conditions.
6. Scientifically devise sale contract of agricultural products.
In addition, governments at all levels should give supports in policy, give instructions in concrete operation, increase capital investment of rural man power and stabilize the prices of agricultural products. At the same time, marketing subjects like leading enterprises should strengthen their own credits.
The main original views of the thesis are as follows:
1. The originality in research train of thought and research angle of view. The thesis regards farmer households' co-marketing behavior as the process, follows the logic of why they cooperate and how they cooperate, originally sets up the analysis model of their co-marketing behavior and systematically reveals the inherent mechanism of their co-marketing behavior at a microcosmic level, which hasn't appeared in the same kind of research. It not only avoids the stereotype of the past research, but also enlarges the research scope of farmer households' co-marketing behavior. Therefore, the thesis provides a new train of thought and a new angle of view for the research of farmer households' co-marketing behavior.
2. The originality in application of research method. M-logistic model is one of the best model to explain the problem of people's multi-dispersion choice in economic life, but there is still no literature to apply this model to positively research the influential factors on farmer households' choice of cooperative partners. The conclusions of the thesis drawn by applying this method tally with the real conditions and also accord with the analysis conclusions of economic theories, so it can be said the analysis method the thesis adopts is scientific and it provides a new analysis means for the research of farmer households' co-marketing behavior.
3. The originality in research conclusions. Firstly, the relation the thesis illustrates and reveals in theory between fanner households' co-marketing behavior and exchange subjects, exchange objects and exchange environment is of inherence and dynamic characteristic. Those farmer households who try to violate this regularity are irrational. Secondly, the thesis makes a metrological check and positive analysis to the influential factors on the cooperative willingness, cooperative partners, cooperative ways and fulfillment behavior of farmer households. The conclusions of the thesis respond well the problem of how farmer households cooperate.
本文以农产品营销中农户合作行为为研究对象,以江西省农户的调查数据为依托,采用规范与实证研究相结合的方法,按照“为什么合作、怎样合作”的思路来展开研究:
首先,对已有的相关成果和研究理论进行回顾和梳理,据此构建出农产品营销中农户合作行为的理论分析模型,为本文提供一个逻辑推理框架;
第二,从节约交易费用、顺应环境变化等需要出发,对农产品营销中农户合作行为产生的动因进行理论和实际的求证,回答农户“为什么合作”;
第三,利用对江西省1085户农户调查的有效样本,采用统计分析、计量模型检验等方法工具,实证分析农户合作意愿、合作伙伴、合作方式及履约选择的影响因素,揭示农户合作的内在机理,回答农户“怎样合作”;
最后,在上述研究基础之上,从我国“小规模、分散化”农户的基本特征之实际出发,围绕引导农户适度规模经营、培育各类农产品营销主体、科学设计农产品销售合约等方面,提出系列的有效引导农户合作营销的对策建议。
本文的主要研究结论如下:
(1)农产品营销中农户实施合作营销,其根本动因主要源于两方面的需要。一是节约交易费用的需要。单个农户进入市场进行交易,其交易费用非常高昂,合作营销可以降低农户的交易费用;二是顺应环境变化的需要。农户自身力量的弱小,使其感觉到单靠个人的力量难以适应经济全球化、科学技术进步和消费者需求不断变化等环境的变化,合作营销可以帮助农户增强适应环境变化的能力。
(2)合作意愿是成功实施合作的前提,要有效引导农户合作,首先必须提高农户的合作意愿。目前,农户的营销合作意愿比较强烈,但不同农户的合作意愿不一致,实证结果表明,农户的合作意愿是多因素综合影响的结果,生产经营规模、专用设施投入、生产集中度、价格波动、销售难度、政府支持及距离市场远近对农户合作意愿有显著正向影响;生产不同农产品的农户,其合作意愿不同,家禽养殖户合作意愿最强,其次是果农和水产养殖户,合作意愿最弱的是菜农和粮农;户主的风险态度对农户的合作意愿有显著负向影响。
(3)农产品营销合作中,各有一定比例的农户分别选择了与贩运户、龙头企业、合作组织或协会以及专业批发市场合作,呈现出多样性特征。实证结果表明,不同特征的农户选择结果各异,并有其内在规律性。比如,生产经营规模大的农户更愿意选择龙头企业和合作组织或协会合作,而生产经营规模小的农户却更愿意选择贩运户合作;果农更愿意选择合作组织合作,而家禽养殖户则更愿意与龙头企业合作。为此,要使得农户合作成功,就必须大力发展各类农产品营销主体,让不同特征的农户都能有合适的合作伙伴。
(4)农产品营销合作中,农户签订口头协议的比例(58.8%)高于签订书面合同的比例(41.2%),这一结果与理想还存在一定差距,各级政府还要加强引导,使得更多的农户签订正规的书面合同。具体而言,不同农户最终的选择结果存在差异性,实证结果表明,农户选择何种合同形式不仅与农户户主特征、生产经营特征、农产品类型及所处的环境有关,还与合作伙伴类型有关。为此,要引导农户签订正规的书面合同,就必须从多维度有效控制住这些影响因素。
(5)履约是农户营销合作成功之关键,是合作能否继续之保证。然而,调查显示,只有38.3%的农户履行了合约,如此低的履约率严重影响了农产品营销合作的发展。但是,实证结果表明,不同农户的履约行为不一样,农户履约与否不仅与农户户主特征、生产经营特征、农产品类型、所处的环境以及合作伙伴类型有关,还与合同条款有关。显然,要提高农户的履约率,也必须从多维度有效控制住上述影响因素。
基于上述研究结论,本文提出了若干对策建议:(1)充分尊重农民自己的选择;(2)逐步引导农户适度规模经营;(3)大力培育各类农产品营销主体;(4)激发农户专用设施的投资热情;(5)因地制宜提高农产品生产集中度;(6)科学设计农产品销售合约。此外,各级政府应在政策上给予支持、具体操作上给予指导;加大农村人力资本投资;稳定农产品价格。龙头企业等农产品营销主体应加强自身的信誉建设。
本文的主要创新点:
(1)研究思路与视角上的创新。本文把农产品营销中农户合作行为视为过程,以“为什么要合作、怎样合作”为逻辑主线,创新性地构建了农产品营销中农户合作行为分析模型,从微观层面上系统地揭示了农户营销合作行为的内在机理。这不仅避免落入已有研究的巢臼,而且拓展了农户营销合作行为研究的范围,这在同类研究中尚未发现。因而,本文为农产品营销中农户合作行为研究提供了新的思路与视角。
(2)研究方法运用上的创新。多元Logistic模型是解释经济生活中人们的多项离散选择问题的最好模型之一,但运用该模型对农户合作伙伴选择的影响因素进行实证研究的文献尚未发现。本文运用该方法所得结论基本与实际情况相吻合,也符合经济学理论分析结论。可见,本文采用的分析方法具有一定的科学性,为农产品营销中农户合作行为研究导入了新的分析手段。
(3)研究结论上的创新。一是,从理论上阐述和揭示的农产品营销中农户合作行为与交易主体、交易客体、交易环境等的关系,具有内在性和动态性,企图违背这一规律性的农户行为是不理性的;二是,从实证上对农户合作意愿、合作伙伴、合作方式及履约选择的影响因素分别进行计量检验与实证分析,所总结出的结论,较好地回答了农户“怎样合作”的问题。
Fanner household is an important and basic unit in agricultural production and management of our country. Whether farmer households could go smoothly into market concerns directly the process of internationalization of our country. The practice shows farmer households' co-marketing behavior of agricultural products-cooperating with other economic subjects-is an effective choice for them to go smoothly into market. Therefore, it is undoubtedly of great significance to ascertain the inherent mechanism of farmer households' cooperative behavior, master its influential factors and seek the ways to effectively guide them to cooperate and help them go smoothly into market
The thesis regards farmer households' cooperative behavior in marketing of agricultural products as the research object, bases itself on the investigation data to farmer households of Jiangxi Province, adopts the methods of canonical and positive research and shows the research through the train of thought of why farmer households cooperate and how they cooperate:
First of all, the thesis looks back on and combs the past relative achievements and research theories. Based on this, it sets up theoretical analysis model of farmer households' co-marketing behavior so as to provide a logical reasoning framework for the research of the thesis.
Second, starting from the needs such as saving exchange cost and going with environmental change, the thesis, in theory and practice, probes into the reasons for farmer households' cooperative behavior and responds to farmer households the problem of why they cooperate.
Third, according to the effective samples of 1085 investigated farmer households in Jiangxi Province, the thesis adopts the methods such as statistical analysis and metrological model check to positively analyze the influential factors on farmer households' cooperative willingness, cooperative partners, cooperative ways and fulfillment behavior, reveals the inherent mechanism of farmer households' cooperation and responds to them the problem of how they cooperate.
Finally, based on the above research, starting from fanner households' basic feature of small scale and decentralization in our country, by centering on guiding farmer households to conduct proper scale management, cultivating various marketing subjects, devising scientifically sale contracts and so on, the thesis puts forward a series of suggestions and strategies to effectively guide their co-marketing.
The main conclusions of the thesis are as follows:
1. The basic reason for which farmer households implement co-marketing of agricultural product results from two needs. One is the need to save exchange cost. The exchange cost is very high if a single fanner household makes a deal in the market, but co-marketing can reduce the exchange cost. The other is the need to go with the environmental changes. Farmer households' own strength is so weak that they feel they are difficult to adapt to the environmental changes such as economic globalization, advance of science and technology and constantly-changing demands of consumers, but co-marketing can help them strengthen the ability to adapt to the environmental changes.
2. Cooperative willingness is the premise to successfully implement cooperation, so in order to effectively guide farmer households to cooperate, their cooperative willingness should be enhanced. Presently, their willingness of co-marketing is relatively strong, but different farmer households have different cooperative willingness. The positive result shows their willingness to cooperate results from comprehensive influences of various factors. Production and management scale, special facilities input, production centralizing degree, price fluctuation, sale difficulty, government support and distance to the market have notable positive influences on their cooperative willingness. Farmer households who produce different agricultural products have different cooperative willingness. Those who raise poultry have the strongest cooperative willingness; the next are those households who grow fruits and raise aquatic products, and those who grow vegetables and grain have the weakest cooperative willingness. Yet the risk attitude of farmer households has a notable negative influence on their cooperative willingness.
3. In co-marketing of agricultural products, a certain proportion of farmer households choose respectively to cooperate with mongers, leading enterprises, cooperative organizations or associations and professional wholesale markets, which takes on the feature of diversity. The positive result shows different farmer households have different choices, but there is inherent regularity. For example, those with large-scale management are more willing to cooperate with leading enterprises and cooperative organizations or associations, but those with small-scale management are more willing to cooperate with mongers. Those who grow fruits are more willing to cooperate with cooperative organizations, but those who raise poultry are more willing to cooperate with leading enterprises. Therefore, if farmer households are to cooperate successfully, various marketing subjects should be greatly developed so that farmer households with different features can have proper cooperative partners.
4. In co-marketing of agricultural products, farmer households sign oral contracts in a higher proportion(58.8%) than written ones(41.2%). There is still a certain gap between this result and the ideal state. Governments at all levels should strengthen its guide so that more farmer households sign regular written contracts. Concretely speaking, the final choices of different farmer households are different. The positive result shows what cooperative ways farmer households choose is not only relative to the feature of farmer householders, the feature of management, the type of agricultural products and the environment around, but also relative to the type of cooperative partners. Therefore, in order to guide farmer households to sign regular written contracts, the above influential factors should be controlled effectively from a multidimensional angle.
5. The fulfillment of contract is the key to successful cooperation and the assurance of further cooperation in co-marketing. However, the investigation shows only 38.3% of farmer households fulfill their contracts. The low fulfillment rate of contracts greatly influences the development of co-marketing of agricultural products. However, the positive result shows different farmer households have different fulfillment behaviors. Whether farmer households fulfill their contracts is not only relative to the feature of farmer householders, the feature of management, the type of agricultural products, the environment around and the type of cooperative partners, but also relative to the provisions of contracts. Obviously, in order to improve the fulfillment rate of farmer households, the above influential factors should also be controlled effectively from a multidimensional angle.
Based on the above conclusions, the thesis puts forward some strategies and suggestions:
1. Fully respect farmer households' own choice.
2. Gradually guide farmer households to manage on a proper scale.
3. Greatly cultivate various marketing subjects of agricultural products.
4. Arouse farmer households' passion for special facilities input
5. Enhance production centralizing degree in the light of local conditions.
6. Scientifically devise sale contract of agricultural products.
In addition, governments at all levels should give supports in policy, give instructions in concrete operation, increase capital investment of rural man power and stabilize the prices of agricultural products. At the same time, marketing subjects like leading enterprises should strengthen their own credits.
The main original views of the thesis are as follows:
1. The originality in research train of thought and research angle of view. The thesis regards farmer households' co-marketing behavior as the process, follows the logic of why they cooperate and how they cooperate, originally sets up the analysis model of their co-marketing behavior and systematically reveals the inherent mechanism of their co-marketing behavior at a microcosmic level, which hasn't appeared in the same kind of research. It not only avoids the stereotype of the past research, but also enlarges the research scope of farmer households' co-marketing behavior. Therefore, the thesis provides a new train of thought and a new angle of view for the research of farmer households' co-marketing behavior.
2. The originality in application of research method. M-logistic model is one of the best model to explain the problem of people's multi-dispersion choice in economic life, but there is still no literature to apply this model to positively research the influential factors on farmer households' choice of cooperative partners. The conclusions of the thesis drawn by applying this method tally with the real conditions and also accord with the analysis conclusions of economic theories, so it can be said the analysis method the thesis adopts is scientific and it provides a new analysis means for the research of farmer households' co-marketing behavior.
3. The originality in research conclusions. Firstly, the relation the thesis illustrates and reveals in theory between fanner households' co-marketing behavior and exchange subjects, exchange objects and exchange environment is of inherence and dynamic characteristic. Those farmer households who try to violate this regularity are irrational. Secondly, the thesis makes a metrological check and positive analysis to the influential factors on the cooperative willingness, cooperative partners, cooperative ways and fulfillment behavior of farmer households. The conclusions of the thesis respond well the problem of how farmer households cooperate.
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