关联交易与公司价值关系研究
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摘要
随着企业集团的不断涌现和市场经济的逐步深化,关联交易不论在规模上还是在种类上都在持续增长,关联交易对公司价值的影响也越来越大。关联交易可以降低交易成本、优化资产结构、提高市场竞争力,但是也出现关联交易被控股股东利用直接或间接侵害公司利益、损害中小投资者的利益,甚至掏空公司的现象,影响了资本市场资源配置作用的发挥,进而影响到资本市场及社会经济的持续发展。因此,深入研究关联交易对公司价值的影响是非常必要的。
本文在回顾国内外相关研究文献的基础上,首先运用交易成本、协同理论、内部资本市场、资产专用性和委托代理理论对关联交易与公司价值的关系进行了规范分析,分析表明关联交易具有减少交易成本、实现协同效应、降低资本成本、促进专用性资产投资的积极作用,同时还存在被内部人和控股股东利用、成为侵害公司利益的工具的可能性;其次,选取我国沪深上市公司2004—2006年的关联交易数据,从超额关联交易的角度,按照购买或者销售、提供或者接受的不同,把关联交易分为十种类型,再采用独立样本T检验、相关分析和回归分析的研究方法,对关联交易与公司价值的关系做了实证分析。
研究发现,不同的最终控制人的超额关联购买商品、超额关联销售商品和超额提供关联担保或抵押存在显著性差异,而是否存在控股股东的公司的超额关联购买商品、超额关联销售商品和超额接受关联担保或抵押存在显著性差异;各个关联交易类型对公司价值的影响是不同的,其中超额关联购买商品、超额关联提供劳务、超额关联接受劳务、超额关联接受资金对公司价值存在支持效应,而超额关联提供资金和超额提供关联担保或抵押对公司价值存在侵害效应,超额关联销售商品和超额接受关联担保或抵押与公司价值呈现倒U型的关系。最后,本文提出了建议:(1)加强和完善信息披露制度;(2)积极推进整体上市;(3)大力培育机构投资者;(4)鼓励第二至第五大股东增持股票,提高公司的股权制衡度。
With the Emergence of more and more group corporation and the constant development of market economy, related party transactions had been increasing on the scale and the type, playing more important role for affecting the corporate value. Related party transactions could reduce transaction cost, optimize the property structure, enhance market competitiveness, but controlling shareholder use related party transactions to infringe upon corporate value, harming interest of medium and Small -sized investors, and tunneling behavior. These behaviors effect market economy resource allocation and sustainable development of capital market and social economy. Therefore, it is important to further study influence of related party transactions.
Based on domestic and abroad relevant literatures reviewed, this paper applied the normative analysis method to study the relationship between related party transactions and corporate value in terms of transaction costs theory, coordination theory, internal capital market theory, asset specificity and principal-agent theory . Analysis results demonstrated that related party transactions could reduce transaction cost, realize coordinated effect, minimize capital cost, promote investment of specific asset, but related party transactions would be used by insider controller and controlling shareholder to encroach company's interests. Consequently, the related party transactions was classified into ten types which was accorded to the differences between purchasing (supplying) and selling (accepting), from the view of excess related party transactions, by choosing the data of listed companies of China from 2004 to 2006. Finally, this paper applied the methods of independent-samples T-test, Pearson correlation analysis and regression analysis to the study of the relationship between related party transactions and corporate value.
The results of research revealed that: there are significant differences on excess related party purchasing (selling) commodity and excess supplying related party guarantee between different ultimate owners; there are significant differences on excess related party purchasing (selling) commodity and excess accepting related party guarantee between having controlling shareholder and having not controlling shareholder; there are supportive effects of excess related purchasing commodity ,excess accepting related party service and excess accepting related party capital on corporate value; there are harming effects of excess supplying related party capital and excess supplying related party guarantee on corporate value, there is an inverted U-shaped relation between excess selling related party commodity and excess accepting related party guarantee. Finally, the suggestions was provided as follows:(l)enhancing and perfecting the information revealing system;(2)promote actively the holistic listing;(3)develop strongly the institutional investors;(4)encouraging the shareholder from second to fifth to increase of investment funds ownership, increasing the equity restriction ratio.
本文在回顾国内外相关研究文献的基础上,首先运用交易成本、协同理论、内部资本市场、资产专用性和委托代理理论对关联交易与公司价值的关系进行了规范分析,分析表明关联交易具有减少交易成本、实现协同效应、降低资本成本、促进专用性资产投资的积极作用,同时还存在被内部人和控股股东利用、成为侵害公司利益的工具的可能性;其次,选取我国沪深上市公司2004—2006年的关联交易数据,从超额关联交易的角度,按照购买或者销售、提供或者接受的不同,把关联交易分为十种类型,再采用独立样本T检验、相关分析和回归分析的研究方法,对关联交易与公司价值的关系做了实证分析。
研究发现,不同的最终控制人的超额关联购买商品、超额关联销售商品和超额提供关联担保或抵押存在显著性差异,而是否存在控股股东的公司的超额关联购买商品、超额关联销售商品和超额接受关联担保或抵押存在显著性差异;各个关联交易类型对公司价值的影响是不同的,其中超额关联购买商品、超额关联提供劳务、超额关联接受劳务、超额关联接受资金对公司价值存在支持效应,而超额关联提供资金和超额提供关联担保或抵押对公司价值存在侵害效应,超额关联销售商品和超额接受关联担保或抵押与公司价值呈现倒U型的关系。最后,本文提出了建议:(1)加强和完善信息披露制度;(2)积极推进整体上市;(3)大力培育机构投资者;(4)鼓励第二至第五大股东增持股票,提高公司的股权制衡度。
With the Emergence of more and more group corporation and the constant development of market economy, related party transactions had been increasing on the scale and the type, playing more important role for affecting the corporate value. Related party transactions could reduce transaction cost, optimize the property structure, enhance market competitiveness, but controlling shareholder use related party transactions to infringe upon corporate value, harming interest of medium and Small -sized investors, and tunneling behavior. These behaviors effect market economy resource allocation and sustainable development of capital market and social economy. Therefore, it is important to further study influence of related party transactions.
Based on domestic and abroad relevant literatures reviewed, this paper applied the normative analysis method to study the relationship between related party transactions and corporate value in terms of transaction costs theory, coordination theory, internal capital market theory, asset specificity and principal-agent theory . Analysis results demonstrated that related party transactions could reduce transaction cost, realize coordinated effect, minimize capital cost, promote investment of specific asset, but related party transactions would be used by insider controller and controlling shareholder to encroach company's interests. Consequently, the related party transactions was classified into ten types which was accorded to the differences between purchasing (supplying) and selling (accepting), from the view of excess related party transactions, by choosing the data of listed companies of China from 2004 to 2006. Finally, this paper applied the methods of independent-samples T-test, Pearson correlation analysis and regression analysis to the study of the relationship between related party transactions and corporate value.
The results of research revealed that: there are significant differences on excess related party purchasing (selling) commodity and excess supplying related party guarantee between different ultimate owners; there are significant differences on excess related party purchasing (selling) commodity and excess accepting related party guarantee between having controlling shareholder and having not controlling shareholder; there are supportive effects of excess related purchasing commodity ,excess accepting related party service and excess accepting related party capital on corporate value; there are harming effects of excess supplying related party capital and excess supplying related party guarantee on corporate value, there is an inverted U-shaped relation between excess selling related party commodity and excess accepting related party guarantee. Finally, the suggestions was provided as follows:(l)enhancing and perfecting the information revealing system;(2)promote actively the holistic listing;(3)develop strongly the institutional investors;(4)encouraging the shareholder from second to fifth to increase of investment funds ownership, increasing the equity restriction ratio.
引文
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[3]证监会.中国上市公司治理准则.2002.
[4]证监会.关于规范上市公司与关联方资金往来及上市公司对外担保若干问题的通知.2003.
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[6]证监会.关于加强社会公众股股东权益保护的若干规定.2004.
[7]证监会.关于提高上市公司质量的意见.2005.
[8]美国注册会计师协会.审计准则第6号——关联方交易.1975
[9]FASB.SFAS57——Related Party Disclosures
[10]财政部:企业会计准则第36号——关联方披露.2006.
[11]Coase,R.H.The Nature of the Firm.Eeonomica,1937.4:386-405.
[12]Fisman,R.and Khanna,T..Facilitating development:the role of business groups.working paper,Columbia University.1998.
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[14]Chang,S.,& Hong,J.Economic performance of group-affiliated companies in Korea:Intragroup resource sharing and internal business transactions.Academy of Management Journal,2000.43:429-449.
[15]金德环.证券市场基本问题研究.上海:上海财经大学出版社,1998.
[16]卞江生.上市公司关联交易法律问题研究[D].中国人民大学博士论文,2001.
[17]D.Wolfenzon.A theory of pyramidal ownership.Unpublished working paper.Harvard University Press.1999.
[18]Johnson,S.,La Porta,R.,Lopez-De-Silanes,F.and Shleifer,A.,2000,Tunneling,The American Economic Review,90(2),22-27.
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[20]Michael C.,Jensen & William H.Meckling.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.Journal of Financial Economics,V61.3,Issue4,1976:305-360.
[21]Barclay,M.J.and Holderness,C..Private benefits from control of public corporations,Journal of Financial Economics 1989,25(2):371-395.
[22]Burkart,Mike& Gromb,Denis..Large shareholders,monitoring,and the value of the firm.Quarterly Journal of Economics,1997,Aug,Vol.I 12,Issue3:693-728.
[23]Ming Jian and T.J.Wong..Earning Management and Tunneling through Related Party Transactions Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups.EFA Annual Conference Paper,2003.
[24]Mark Kohlbeck & Brian Mayhew.Agency Costs,Contracting,and Related Party Transactions.Working Paper.Dec,2004.
[25]Elizabeth A.Gordon,Elaine Henry,Darius Paliaa,Related Party Transactions:Associations with Corporate Governance and Firm Value.First Draft:December 2003,Current Draft:August,2004.
[26]徐兆宏.论上市公司关联交易.财经研究,1999,05:53-59.
[27]原红旗.从中期报告看关联交易:现实问题与理性思考.会计研究,1998,04:1-6.
[28]李维安,栗祖盛.上市公司治理与关联交易的规范问题.现代会计,2000,03:21-24.
[29]管强.关联交易内幕.北京:中华工商联合出版社,2003.
[30]温烨.关联企业及其交易行为法律问题研究[D].中国人民大学博士论文,2003.
[31]李德冠.公司监理机制对于关系人交易影响之研究.私立辅仁大学金融研究所硕士论文,2001.
[32]叶银华,柯承恩,李德冠.公司监理机制对于关系人交易的影响.辅仁大学金融研究所工作论文,2002.
[33]余明桂,夏新平.控股股东、代理问题与关联交易:对中国上市公司的实证研究.南开管理评论,2004,06:33-38.
[34]黄秀姿.自愿设立独立董事、关联交易与公司价值关联性之研究:代理理论vs讯号发射理论.大叶大学硕士学位论文.2005.
[35]孟焰,张秀梅.上市公司关联方交易盈余管理与关联方利益转移关系研究.会计研究,2006.04:37-43.
[36]王力军.金字塔控制、关联交易与公司价值—基于我国民营上市公司的实证研究.证券市场导报,2006,02:18-24.
[37]Jian,M.and T.J.Wong.Propping and Tunneling through Related Party Transactions.working paper,2007.
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