公司治理与大股东的掏空和支持
|
摘要
在全球经济一体化进程日益加快的今天,资本市场的发展对一国经济增长发挥着越来越重要的作用。大量研究表明：对投资者,特别是中小投资者权益的保护是资本市场长期健康发展的基石。因为它不但影响金融市场的稳定和发展,而且会通过影响金融市场最终对实体经济产生重要影响(Beck et.al,2000)。2008年爆发的美国金融海啸对全球资本市场和各国实体经济的巨大冲击,充分印证了上述观点。
在新兴市场乃至世界上大部分国家中,资本市场中的投资者保护问题主要体现为上市公司大股东及其利益代言人与中小股东之间的利益冲突与协调问题,即第二代公司治理问题,“掏空(Tunneling)"和“支持(Propping)"等概念则是对第二代公司治理问题的经典描述。而我国作为新兴市场经济国家,上市公司大股东行为与公司治理问题成为我国学者亟待解释和解决的新问题。
“掏空”和“支持”等概念的提出,带动了国内外大量的理论和实证研究,为理解公司治理和投资者保护提供了丰富的视角和证据。在这些研究中,有两个相互联系的问题显得尤其重要。一是如何衡量或发现大股东的“掏空”或“支持”行为,从而合理把握投资者利益的保护程度；二是什么因素激励或制约着大股东的“掏空”或“支持”行为,从而导致不同程度的投资者利益保护。
到目前为止,虽然已有大量文献对公司治理和投资者保护问题进行了深入研究,但遗憾的是,仍然鲜有文献同时结合这两个问题进行深入、系统地研究。有鉴于此,本文尝试运用我国上市公司2002-2008年的大样本数据,以上市公司普遍存在的关联交易为突破口,通过考察关联交易与上市公司业绩、利润转移、交易成本和盈余质量等不同方面经济后果的经验关系,完整地刻画关联交易背后大股东的“掏空”和“支持”动机。在此基础上,结合我国上市公司特殊的宏观制度环境和微观治理特征,对大股东的“掏空”和“支持”动机和后果进行系统地解释和分析。
本文的主要结论是：第一,大股东及上市公司联营企业是我国上市公司关联交易的主要对象,并且主导了关联交易的经济后果；第二,股权集中度、股权制衡度和地区市场化进程等内外治理因素是影响关联交易形成的重要因素；第三,关联交易对上市公司同时具有“掏空”和“支持”效应,从而表现出复杂的经济后果。体现在,关联交易一方面有助于降低各种交易成本,显著促进公司会计业绩,另一方面却成为大股东等关联方从上市公司转移利润的重要途径,并且,关联交易在提升会计业绩的同时也无法带来相应的市场评价；第四,政府控制、股权集中和制衡、独立董事、审计委员会和地区市场化进程等内外部治理因素及其相互作用,在不同程度上显著影响了关联交易的“掏空”或支持效应；第五,总的来说,在影响关联交易的形成及其经济后果的发挥问题上,内部治理结构与外部治理环境之间存在相互替代关系。
本文研究的贡献在于：第一,与以往分析侧重于从内部治理结构研究大股东动机不同,本文同时从内部治理结构和外部治理环境的双重视角出发研究大股东的“掏空”和支持动机,并且考察了内外治理因素在影响大股东动机方面的相互作用机制,从而进一步丰富了有关公司治理和投资者保护的国内外研究成果；第二,本文以关联交易为研究对象,分别从公司业绩、转移定价、交易成本和盈余质量四个不同的方面和层次去描述关联交易的经济后果,从而更直接有效地考察大股东的“掏空”和“支持”动机,弥补以往文献对大股东“掏空”和“支持”的刻画过于简单或者片面以及过于间接的缺陷；第三,本文的研究为新兴市场国家企业集团和公司治理的研究提供了有意义的国际比较参考；第四,本文的理论和实证研究结论,将为我国有关部门就完善企业集团内部运作、规范上市公司关联交易行为、保护中小投资者利益等问题提供有意义的参考。
Today, with the process of global economic integration increasingly accelerating, the development of capital market is playing an increasingly important role on a country's economic growth.A large number of studies have shown that the protect of investors, especially medium and small investors, is the basic of healthy development of the capital market. Because it affects not only the stability and development of financial markets, but also by influencing the financial markets and ultimately have a major impact on the real economy (Beck et.al,2000).The huge impact on the global capital markets and the real economy of U.S.financial tsunami outbroke in 2008 fully confirms this view.
In emerging markets, even the most countries of the world, the protection of investors in capital markets mainly reflected the conflicts of interest and coordination issues between major shareholders,or their spokesmen, and small shareholders of listed companies, which is named the second generation of corporate governance issues.The concepts of "Tunneling" and "Propping" is the classic description of problem of corporate governance.
The proposed concepts of "Tunneling" and "Propping" led to a large number of theoretical and empirical research in the home and abroad, and provided a wealth of perspectives and evidence to understand corporate governance and investor protection. In these studies,there are two interrelated issues are particularly important. The first is how to measure or discover "Tunneling" or "Propping" of large shareholders; Second, what factors motivate or constrain the major shareholders'"Tunneling" and "Propping", resulting in varying degrees of protection of the interests of investors.
So far, there is extensive literature conducted on corporate governance and investor protection issues in-depth, but unfortunately, there is still little literature combined with these two issues in deep and systematic study. For this reason, this paper attempts to use a large sample of listed companies in China 2002-2008,by looking at related party transactions with the performance of listed companies, profit transfers, transaction costs and earnings quality, these different aspects of the economic consequences of the empirical relationship, to completely characterize the major shareholders' motive of On this basis, combined with the special micro-macro-institutional environment and governance characteristics of China's listed companies, this paper will interpret and analyze the motives and consequences of the major shareholders'"Tunneling" and "Propping" systematically.
The main conclusions of this paper are:first, the largest shareholder and its affiliated companies are the main target of related-party transactions of listed companies in China, and those connected transactions dominated the economic consequences;second, equity concentration, degree of equity and regional balance of market-oriented and other internal and external governance are major factors in the formation of related-party transactions;third, related party transactions of listed companies also have "Tunneling" or "Propping" effects,demonstrate the complexity of the economic consequences, which embodied in that a variety of related-party transactions on the one hand helped to reduce transaction costs and significantly promote the company's accounting performance, on the other hand had become an important way for major shareholders to transfer profits from listed companies.At the same time,related-party transactions can't bring a corresponding market evaluation even if improve the performance of accounting; Fourth, the government-controlled, equity concentration and checks and balances, independent directors, the Audit Committee and regional mercerization process of internal and external governance factors and their interactions, show a significant impact on the effects of "Tunneling" or "Propping" of the related-party transactions in varying degrees;fifth, generally speaking, the internal governance structure and the external governance environment appears to be an alternative relationship in the process that affect the performance of formation and economic consequences of related-party transactions.
This paper maybe provides the following potential contributions:first, differently from that the previous analysis focused on the motives of major shareholders from the internal governance structure, this article study on the motivation of "Tunneling" or "Propping" of major shareholders from both the internal governance structure and the external governance environment, and look at the internal and external governance factors in affecting the mechanism of interaction between shareholders of motivation, which further enriched the corporate governance and investor protection of the domestic and foreign research results; second, this paper focuses on the research of the related-party transactions, describes the economic consequences of related-party transactions, examines "Tunneling" or "Propping" of major shareholders in four different aspects and levels directly and effectively, the performance of the company, transfer pricing, transaction costs, and earnings quality, which can make up for defects the literature of substantial shareholders is too simple or one-sided portrayal, too indirect; third, this paper provides a meaningful international comparison reference for studies of state-owned enterprises in emerging markets and corporate governance research group;Fourth, theoretical and empirical research findings of this paper will provide a meaningful reference to improve the enterprise group of China's relevant departments on internal operations, standardize the listed companies related transactions, and protect the interests of small and medium investors.
在新兴市场乃至世界上大部分国家中,资本市场中的投资者保护问题主要体现为上市公司大股东及其利益代言人与中小股东之间的利益冲突与协调问题,即第二代公司治理问题,“掏空(Tunneling)"和“支持(Propping)"等概念则是对第二代公司治理问题的经典描述。而我国作为新兴市场经济国家,上市公司大股东行为与公司治理问题成为我国学者亟待解释和解决的新问题。
“掏空”和“支持”等概念的提出,带动了国内外大量的理论和实证研究,为理解公司治理和投资者保护提供了丰富的视角和证据。在这些研究中,有两个相互联系的问题显得尤其重要。一是如何衡量或发现大股东的“掏空”或“支持”行为,从而合理把握投资者利益的保护程度；二是什么因素激励或制约着大股东的“掏空”或“支持”行为,从而导致不同程度的投资者利益保护。
到目前为止,虽然已有大量文献对公司治理和投资者保护问题进行了深入研究,但遗憾的是,仍然鲜有文献同时结合这两个问题进行深入、系统地研究。有鉴于此,本文尝试运用我国上市公司2002-2008年的大样本数据,以上市公司普遍存在的关联交易为突破口,通过考察关联交易与上市公司业绩、利润转移、交易成本和盈余质量等不同方面经济后果的经验关系,完整地刻画关联交易背后大股东的“掏空”和“支持”动机。在此基础上,结合我国上市公司特殊的宏观制度环境和微观治理特征,对大股东的“掏空”和“支持”动机和后果进行系统地解释和分析。
本文的主要结论是：第一,大股东及上市公司联营企业是我国上市公司关联交易的主要对象,并且主导了关联交易的经济后果；第二,股权集中度、股权制衡度和地区市场化进程等内外治理因素是影响关联交易形成的重要因素；第三,关联交易对上市公司同时具有“掏空”和“支持”效应,从而表现出复杂的经济后果。体现在,关联交易一方面有助于降低各种交易成本,显著促进公司会计业绩,另一方面却成为大股东等关联方从上市公司转移利润的重要途径,并且,关联交易在提升会计业绩的同时也无法带来相应的市场评价；第四,政府控制、股权集中和制衡、独立董事、审计委员会和地区市场化进程等内外部治理因素及其相互作用,在不同程度上显著影响了关联交易的“掏空”或支持效应；第五,总的来说,在影响关联交易的形成及其经济后果的发挥问题上,内部治理结构与外部治理环境之间存在相互替代关系。
本文研究的贡献在于：第一,与以往分析侧重于从内部治理结构研究大股东动机不同,本文同时从内部治理结构和外部治理环境的双重视角出发研究大股东的“掏空”和支持动机,并且考察了内外治理因素在影响大股东动机方面的相互作用机制,从而进一步丰富了有关公司治理和投资者保护的国内外研究成果；第二,本文以关联交易为研究对象,分别从公司业绩、转移定价、交易成本和盈余质量四个不同的方面和层次去描述关联交易的经济后果,从而更直接有效地考察大股东的“掏空”和“支持”动机,弥补以往文献对大股东“掏空”和“支持”的刻画过于简单或者片面以及过于间接的缺陷；第三,本文的研究为新兴市场国家企业集团和公司治理的研究提供了有意义的国际比较参考；第四,本文的理论和实证研究结论,将为我国有关部门就完善企业集团内部运作、规范上市公司关联交易行为、保护中小投资者利益等问题提供有意义的参考。
Today, with the process of global economic integration increasingly accelerating, the development of capital market is playing an increasingly important role on a country's economic growth.A large number of studies have shown that the protect of investors, especially medium and small investors, is the basic of healthy development of the capital market. Because it affects not only the stability and development of financial markets, but also by influencing the financial markets and ultimately have a major impact on the real economy (Beck et.al,2000).The huge impact on the global capital markets and the real economy of U.S.financial tsunami outbroke in 2008 fully confirms this view.
In emerging markets, even the most countries of the world, the protection of investors in capital markets mainly reflected the conflicts of interest and coordination issues between major shareholders,or their spokesmen, and small shareholders of listed companies, which is named the second generation of corporate governance issues.The concepts of "Tunneling" and "Propping" is the classic description of problem of corporate governance.
The proposed concepts of "Tunneling" and "Propping" led to a large number of theoretical and empirical research in the home and abroad, and provided a wealth of perspectives and evidence to understand corporate governance and investor protection. In these studies,there are two interrelated issues are particularly important. The first is how to measure or discover "Tunneling" or "Propping" of large shareholders; Second, what factors motivate or constrain the major shareholders'"Tunneling" and "Propping", resulting in varying degrees of protection of the interests of investors.
So far, there is extensive literature conducted on corporate governance and investor protection issues in-depth, but unfortunately, there is still little literature combined with these two issues in deep and systematic study. For this reason, this paper attempts to use a large sample of listed companies in China 2002-2008,by looking at related party transactions with the performance of listed companies, profit transfers, transaction costs and earnings quality, these different aspects of the economic consequences of the empirical relationship, to completely characterize the major shareholders' motive of On this basis, combined with the special micro-macro-institutional environment and governance characteristics of China's listed companies, this paper will interpret and analyze the motives and consequences of the major shareholders'"Tunneling" and "Propping" systematically.
The main conclusions of this paper are:first, the largest shareholder and its affiliated companies are the main target of related-party transactions of listed companies in China, and those connected transactions dominated the economic consequences;second, equity concentration, degree of equity and regional balance of market-oriented and other internal and external governance are major factors in the formation of related-party transactions;third, related party transactions of listed companies also have "Tunneling" or "Propping" effects,demonstrate the complexity of the economic consequences, which embodied in that a variety of related-party transactions on the one hand helped to reduce transaction costs and significantly promote the company's accounting performance, on the other hand had become an important way for major shareholders to transfer profits from listed companies.At the same time,related-party transactions can't bring a corresponding market evaluation even if improve the performance of accounting; Fourth, the government-controlled, equity concentration and checks and balances, independent directors, the Audit Committee and regional mercerization process of internal and external governance factors and their interactions, show a significant impact on the effects of "Tunneling" or "Propping" of the related-party transactions in varying degrees;fifth, generally speaking, the internal governance structure and the external governance environment appears to be an alternative relationship in the process that affect the performance of formation and economic consequences of related-party transactions.
This paper maybe provides the following potential contributions:first, differently from that the previous analysis focused on the motives of major shareholders from the internal governance structure, this article study on the motivation of "Tunneling" or "Propping" of major shareholders from both the internal governance structure and the external governance environment, and look at the internal and external governance factors in affecting the mechanism of interaction between shareholders of motivation, which further enriched the corporate governance and investor protection of the domestic and foreign research results; second, this paper focuses on the research of the related-party transactions, describes the economic consequences of related-party transactions, examines "Tunneling" or "Propping" of major shareholders in four different aspects and levels directly and effectively, the performance of the company, transfer pricing, transaction costs, and earnings quality, which can make up for defects the literature of substantial shareholders is too simple or one-sided portrayal, too indirect; third, this paper provides a meaningful international comparison reference for studies of state-owned enterprises in emerging markets and corporate governance research group;Fourth, theoretical and empirical research findings of this paper will provide a meaningful reference to improve the enterprise group of China's relevant departments on internal operations, standardize the listed companies related transactions, and protect the interests of small and medium investors.
引文
4 共享收益是Denis and Mcconell(2003)提出的概念。
5 Jenson and Mecling (1976)和Morck(1998)均提出了两种效应。
6 数据来源：《人民日报海外版》2003年10月13日第1版的相关报道。
7 例如,在国有股减持的实践中,国有股定价过高会引起流通股股东不满；国有股定价过低,则会引发关于国有资产流失的争论。
8 杨德明等(2007)则发现证监会推动投资者关系的努力并未收到预期效果。这是因为上市公司所推动的投资者关系主要目的是为了满足大股东的融资需求,而一旦融资成功,上市公司则对投资者不大理睬。
9 《关于上市公司股权分置改革的指导意见》中强调“尊重市场规律,就是要坚持市场化的决策机制和价格形成机制,完善改革的推动机制,通过政策扶持和市场引导,形成上市公司改革的持续稳定动力”
[1]Benkel,M.,P.MatherandA.Ramsay, The Assoeiation between Corporation Governaneeand EamingsManagement:theRoleoflndePendentDireetors,CorPorateownership&Control, 2006,14:65-75.
[2]Becker,C.,M.DeFond,J.Jiambalvo and K.Subramanayam. The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management.Contemporary Accounting Research 1998.15:1-24.
[3]Jensen and Meckling,Theory if the Firm:Managemerial Behavior,Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics,1976:P305-360.
[4]Berly,A.,G.Means.The Modern Corporation and Private Property.Mc-Millan,New York, 1932.
[5]Hart,Oliver D and John Moore, Property rights and the nature of the firm,Journal of Political Economy 98.1990,1119-1158
[6]La Porta, R.,F. Loptz-de-silanes, and A.Shleifer, Corporate Ownership around the World, Journal of Finance.1999,54,471-517.
[7]Holderness,Clifford G. A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control.Economic Policy Review,2003,1:51-63.
[8]Aharony.Joseph, C-W Jevons Lee and T.J Wong.Financial packing of IPO firms in China, Journal of Accounting Research,,2000,38,103-126.
[9]Aharony.Joseph, Jiwei Wang and Hongqi Yuan.Tunneling as an Incentive for Earnings Management during the IPO Process in China, Working Paper.2006.
[10]Claessens,Stijn.and Joseph P.H.Fan,2003,Corporate Governance in Asia:A Survey, International Review of Finance,3(2),71-103.
[11]La Porta,R.,Lopez-de-Silance,F.,Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R. Law and Finance.Journal of Political Economy,1998,106:1113-1155.
[12]La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-De-Silanes,A.Shleifer and R.W.Vishny. Corporate Ownership Around the World.The Journal of Finance,1999,54:471-517.
[13]La Porta,R.,Lopez-de-Silance,F.,Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance.Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:3-28.
[14]La Porta,R.,Lopez-de-Silance,F.,Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation.Journal of Finance,2002,57:1147-1170.
[15]Fama,E.F.,1998,Market efficiency, long-term returns and behavioral finance, Journal of Financial Economics 49:283-306.
[16]Johnson, S.,R. La Porta, F. Lopez-De-Silanes and A. Shleifer, Tunneling, The American Economic Review.2000,90(2),22-27
[17]Baek, J.,J.Kang, and I. Lee.Business Groups and Tunneling:Evidence from Private ecurities Offerings by Korean Chaebols, The Journal of Finance 61,,2006,2415-2449.
[18]Berger, P. and E. Ofek. Diversification's Effect on Firm Value,Journal of Financial Economics 37:1995,39-65.
[19]Hong Harrison and Stein, A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum Trading and Overreaction in Asset Markets, journal of Finance,1999:2143-2184
[20]Wang.D.C.,Founding Family Ownership and Earnings Quality,Journal of Accounting Research.44.2006,619-656.
[21]Shleifer, A.,and Vishny, R.. Large shareholders and corporate control,Journal of Political Economy 94..1986,461-88.
[22]上海证券(联合)课题组.上海证券交易所研究中心.中国治理报告2003[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2003.
[23]Friedman E, Johnson S,andMitton T. Propping and tunneling. Journal of Comparative Economics,2003.31:732-750
[24]Khanna, T., and Yishay.,Yafeh.2007, Business Groups in Emerging Markets:Paragons or Parasites? Journal of Economic Literature,Vol.XLV(June):331-372.
[25]Klein, B.,Crawford, R., and Alchian, A.,1978,Vertical integration, a ppopriable rents and the competitive contracting process, Journal of Law and Economics,21:297-326.
[26]Fisman, R. and T. Khanna.Facilitating development:the role of business groups.Working paper, Columbia University-Columbia Business School and Harvard University Competition & Strategy Unit.1998.
[27]Jian, M.,and T. J.Wong. Propping through Related Party Transactions.Review of Accounting Studies.15:1(2010):70-105.
[28]Yohanes E.Riyanto and Linda A.Toolsema,Tunneling and propping:A justification for pyramidal ownership,Journal of Banking & Finance,Volume 32, Issue 10, October 2008,Pages 2178-2187.
[29]Williamson, Oliver E.,1975,Markets and Hierarchies:analysis and antitrust implication, New York:Free Press.
[30]Williamson, Oliver E.,1985,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York:Free Press.
[31]Williamson Oliver E.,1991.Comparative economics organization:the analysis of discrete structural alternatives, Administrative Science Quarterly,Vol.36(June):269-296.
[32]侯晓.大股东对上市公司掏空与支持的经济学分析.中南财经政法大学学报,2006年第5期,120-125
[33]Claessens,Stijn.and Joseph P.H. Fan,2003,Corporate Governance in Asia:A Survey, International Review of Finance,3(2),71-103.
[34]Claessens,Stijn.,Simeon Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan, and Larry H.P. Lang,2003,"The Benefits and Costs of Internal Markets:Evidence from Asia's Financial Crisis", Working Paper.
[35]Khanna, Naveen, and Tice, Sheri.,2001,The Bright Side of Internal Capital Markets, Journal of Finance,Vol.52:1489-1531.
[36]Khanna, T,2000, Business groups and social welfare in emerging markets:Existing evidence and unanswered questions, European Economic Review 44,748-761.
[37]Khanna, T. and K. Palepu,1997,Why focused strategy may be wrong in emerging markets,Harvard Business Review 75(4),41-51.
[38]Khanna, T and K. Palepu,1999, Policy Shocks, Market Intermediaries, and Corporate Strategy:The Evolution of Business Groups in Chile and India,Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Volume 8(2) Summer,271-310.
[39]Khanna. T and K. Palepu,2000, Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An analysisof diversified Indian business groups, The Journal of Finance 55 (2),867-892.
[40]Khanna, T,and J.W. Rivkin,2001,Estimating the Performance Effects of Groups in Emerging Markets, Strategic Management Journal, Vol.22:45-74.
[41]陈晓,王琨.关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革——来自我国资本市场的实证证据.经济研究，2005.第4期
[42]辛清泉,郑国坚,杨德明.企业集团、政府控制与投资效率.金融研究,2007.第10期.25-42.
[43]贺建刚，刘峰.大股东控制、利益输送与投资者保护——基于上市公司资产收购关联交易的实证研究.中国会计与财务,2005.第7卷第3期.71-89.
[44]洪剑峭,方军雄.关联交易和会计盈余的价值相关性.中国会计评论,2005.第3卷第1期,55-78.
[45]佟岩,程小可.关联交易利益流向与中国上市公司盈余质量.管理世界.2007年第11期,127-139.
[46]Claessens S,Djankov S,Fan J, and Lang L. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings. The Journal of Finance, Vol.NO.6..December:2002.2741-2771
[47]Johnson S,La Porta R, Lopze-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A.Tunneling. American Economic Review, May,2000.90 (2):22-27
[48]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据.会计研究,2004.第12期.
[49]刘峰,贺建刚,魏明海.控制权、业绩与利益输送——基于五粮液的案例研究.管理世界，2004.第8期.
[50]Claessens, S.,J.Fan, and L. Lang,2006,The Benefits and Costs of Group Affiliation: Evidence from East Asia, Emerging Market Review 7,1-26.
[51]李增泉,政府控股与公司治理的有效性——一项基于中国证券市场的实证研究.经济科学出版社.2005.23-42.
[52]孙铮,刘凤委,汪辉.债务、公司治理与会计稳健性.中国会计与财务,2005..第7卷第2期.
[53]夏立军,方轶强..政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据.经济研究,2005第5期.31-45.
[54]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据.会计研究,2004.第12期.42-54.
[55]陈信元,陈冬华,朱凯.2004.股权结构与公司业绩：文献回顾与未来研究方向.中国会计与财务.第6卷第4期.22-40.
[56]罗党论,唐清泉.大股东利益输送与投资者保护——一个分析框架.管理科学,2005年第18期,75-79.
[57]罗党论.现金股利与上市公司第一大股东的利益输送行为研究.财会月刊.2005,10：18-19.
[58]夏立军,陈信元.市场化进程、国企改革策略与公司治理结构的内生决定.经济研究,2007年第7期,82-95.
[59]雷光勇,刘慧龙.大股东控制、融资规模与盈余操纵程度.管理世界,2006年第1期,129-137.
[60]Grossman Sanford J and Oliver D.Hart,1986, The costs and benefits of ownership:a theory of vertical and lateral intergration, Journal of Political Economiy,94,691-719.
[61]张维迎.企业理论与中国企业改革.北京：北京大学出版社,1998,23-26.
[62]Lins, K.,and Servaes, H..Is Corporate Diversification Beneficial in Merging Markets. Financial Management.2002,5-31.
[63]Bae, K. H.,and S.W. Jeong.The Value-relevance of Accounting Information, Ownership Structure, and Business Group Affiliation:Evidence from Korean Business Groups, Working Paper, Korea University.2002,6-44.
[64]Friedman E, Johnson S,andMitton T. Propp ing and tunneling. Journal of Comparative Economics,2003.31:732-750
[65]Jian,M.,and T.J.Wong.Earnings Management and Tunneling through Related Party Transactions:Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups, Working Paper.2005,4-6.
[66]唐宗明,蒋位.中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证分析.经济研究,2002年第4期,44-51.
[67]谭劲松,郑国坚.大股东利益输送和企业透明度：以“青岛海尔”为例.工作论文.中山大学.2004.
[68]陈信元,陈冬华,时旭.公司治理与现金股利：基于佛山照明的案例研究.管理世界.2003,08：118-128.
[69]罗福凯.战略财务管理：青岛海洋大学出版社,2000：22-24.
[70]蒋东升.内部人控制与公司的股利政策——基于宇通客车的案例分析.管理世界,2009 年第4期,177-179.
[71]周县华,吕长江.股权分置改革、高股利分配与投资者利益保护——基于驰宏锌锗的案例研究.会计研究,2008年第8期,59-68
[72]张文龙,李峰,郭泽光.现金股利——控制还是掠夺?.管理世界,2009年第3期,176-177.
[73]张鸣,郭思永.大股东控制下的定向增发和财富转移———来自中国上市公司的经验证据.会计研究,2009年第5期,78-86.
[74]郝项超,梁琪.最终控制人质押损害公司价值么?.会计研究,2009年第7期,57-65.
[75]Yohanes E. Riyanto and Linda A. Toolsema, Tunneling and propping:A justification for pyramidal ownership,Journal of Banking & Finance,Volume 32, Issue 10, October 2008, Pages 2178-2187.
[76]Stein, Jeremy C. Internal Capital Market and the Competition for Corporate Resources,Journal of Finance,1997,52,111-133.
[77]郑国坚,曹雪妮,柳建华.集团控制是否损害上市公司业绩?——最终控制人和市场化进程的双重视角.《中国工业经济》,2010年第3期,57-78.
[78]郑国坚.基于效率观和掏空观的关联交易与盈余质量关系研究.会计研究,2009年第10期,66-83.
[79]郑国坚,魏明海.控股股东内部市场的形成机制研究.中山大学学报(社会科学版),2009年第5期,90-107.
[80]郑国坚,魏明海,孔东明.大股东内部市场与上市公司价值：基于效率观点和掏空观点的实证检验.中国会计与财务研究,2007年第9卷第4期,25-43.
[81]郑国坚,魏明海.公共治理、公司治理与大股东的内部市场：基于我国上市公司的实证研究.中大管理研究,2007年第2期,55-76.
[82]郑国坚,魏明海.我国上市公司股权结构的内生性：从控股股东的内部资本市场得到的证据.中国会计评论,2006年第4卷第2期,43-62.
[83]谭劲松,郑国坚,彭松.地方政府公共治理与国有控股上市公司控制权转移—1996-2004年深圳市属上市公司重组案例研究.管理世界,2009年第10期,24-39.
[84]柳建华,魏明海,郑国坚.大股东控制下的关联投资：“效率促进”抑或“资源转移”.管理世界》.2008年第3期,58-71.
[85]Donaldson, Gordon. Managing Corporate Wealth. Praeger Publisher. New York,1984.
[86]Fama, E. F., and Harvey Babiak.,Dividend Policy:An Empirical Analysis, Journal of American Statistical Association,63,December 1968:1321-1361.
[87]周中胜.治理环境、政府干预与大股东的利益输送.山西财经大学学报,2007年第4期,62-70.
[88]樊纲,王小鲁.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2000(2001,2002)年度报告：2001(2003,2004).经济科学出版社.
[89]刘凤委,张人骥,崔磊磊.地区市场化进程、市场分割与公司关联交易行为.财经研究.2007年第6期,43-54.
[90]Demsetz. H.and K.Lehn. The Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences, Journal of Political Economics.1985,93,1155-1177.
[91]Morck, R., and Nakamura, M.. Been There, Done That:The History of Corporate Ownership in Japan, Working paper.2004.
[92]Shleifer, A.,and Vishny, R.. Politicians and firms, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 1994,995-1025.
[93]Shleifer, A.and R. Vishny.A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance 52, 1997,737-783.
[94]Shleifer, A.,and Vishny, R. The grabbing hand:government pathologies and their cures, Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press.1998.
[95]杜莹,刘立国.股权结构与公司治理效率：中国上市公司的实证分析.管理世界.2002年第11期,124-133
[96]汪辉.上市公司债务融资、公司治理与市场价值.经济研究.2003年第8期,28-36.
[97]王克敏,陈井勇.股权结构、投资者保护与公司绩效.管理世界,2004年第7期,127-134.
[98]刘芍佳,孙霈,刘乃全.终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效.经济研究.2003年第4期,51-63.
[99]洪剑鞘,薛皓.股权制衡如何影响经营性应计的可靠性——关联交易的视角.管理世界.2009年第1期,153-161.
[100]申明浩.治理结构对家族股东隧道行为的影响分析.经济研究,2008年第6期,135-144.
[101]佟岩,王化成.关联交易、控制权收益与盈余质量.会计研究,2007年第4期,75-83.
[102]Brennan, M. J., Taxes, Market Valuation, and Corporate Financial Policy, National Taxes Journal,1970:417-427.
[103]Debondt and Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?, Journal of Finance, 1985:193-805.
[104]屈文洲,许年行,关家雄等.市场化、政府干预与股票流动性溢价的分配.经济研究.2008年第4期,132-146.
[105]徐睁,权衡.中国转型经济及其政治经济学意义.学术月刊.2003,第3期.44-49.
[106]Khanna, T. and K. Palepu. Why focused strategy may be wrong in emerging markets,Harvard Business Review 75(4),1997,41-51.
[107]樊纲,王小鲁.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2000(2001,2002)年度报告.经济科学出版社.2001(2003,2004)
[108]Johnson, S.,R. La Porta, F. Lopez-De-Silanes and A.Shleifer, Tunneling,The American Economic Review 90(2),2000.22-27.
[109]姚俊,吕源,蓝海林.转轨时期企业集团多元化、结构与绩效的实证研究.北京：经济科学出版社.2005.
[110]郑国坚.企业集团内部市场：效率与“掏空”——基于我国上市公司的实证研究.[博士学位论文]广州：中山大学管理学院.2008.
[111]谭劲松.独立董事与公司治理——基于我国上市公司的研究.北京：中国财政经济出版社.2003.
[112]王国生.转型时期地方政府面临的制度环境及其市场地位分析.南京社会科学(经济学研究).1999.第11期.36-58.
[113]王红领，李稻葵,雷鼎鸣.政府为什么会放弃国有企业的产权.经济研究.2001.第8期.43-7
[114]王全斌.关于我国市场化进程的研究.经济研究参考.2003.第1期.58-64.
[115]Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan, Ferreting out Tunneling:An Application to Indian Business Groups, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, February,2002:121-148
[116]王珺.政企关系演变的实证逻辑——我国政企分开的三阶段假说.经济研究.1999.第11期.22-46.
[117]吴林军.中国经济市场化进程测度研究综述.经济纵横.2003.第9期.52-56.
[118]夏立军.政府干预与市场失灵——上市公司之会计师事务所选择研究.[博士学位论文.]上海财经大学2006.
[119]杨瑞龙.国有企业治理结构创新的经济学分析.中国人民大学出版社.2001.
[120]姚俊,吕源,蓝海林.转轨时期企业集团多元化、结构与绩效的实证研究.北京：经济科学出版社.2005.
[121]张曙光.中国转轨中的制度结构与变迁.经济科学出版社.2005.
[122]中国集团公司促进会.母子公司关系研究——企业集团的组织结构和管理控制.中国财政经济出版社.2004.
[123]李东平.大股东控制、盈余管理与上市公司业绩滑坡.中国财政经济出版社.2005
[124]冯根福,韩冰,闫冰.中国上市公司股权集中度变动的实证分析.经济研究,2002.第8期,55-78.
[125]李智.中国现代企业集团.中国商业出版社.1994.256-267.
[126]Alchian, A.and Demsetz,Harold.Production,information cost and economice organization, American Economic Riview,62,1972,777-95.
[127]Stein, Jeremy C.,1997,Internal Capital Market and the Competition for Corporate Resources,Journal of Finance,52,111-133.
[128]刘峰.制度安排与会计信息质量.会计研究.2001.第7期.33-57.
[129]田利辉.国有股权对上市公司绩效影响的U型曲线和政府股东两手论.经济研究.2005第10期.55-87.
[130]王兵.独立董事监督了吗——基于中国上市公司盈余质量的视角.金融研究.2007第1期.79-93.
[131]Hong Harrison and Stein, A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum Trading and Overreaction in Asset Markets, journal of Finance,1999:2143-2184
[132]Jagedeesh and Leahman, Evidence of Predictable Behavior of Security Returns, Journal of Finance,1990:881-898
[133]Jagedeesh and Titman, Returns to Buy the Winners and Sell the Losers:Implications for Stock Market Efficiency, Journal of Finance,1993:65-91
[134]Jensen and Meckling,Theory if the Firm:Managemerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics,1976:P305-360.
[135]郑国坚.基于效率观和掏空观的关联交易与盈余质量关系研究.会计研究.2009年第10期.68-76.
[136]Stijn Claessens,Simeon Djankov, Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics,58 (2000) 81-112.
[137]Thailer, R.H.and Shefrin H.M..An economic theory of self-control,Journal of Political Economics,1981,89,392-407.
[138]Wolfenzon,Daniel.A Theory of Pyramidal Structure. Harvard University. Cambridge, Mass
[139]Xia, L.,Y. Fang,Government control, institutional environment and firm value:Evidence form the Chinese securities market,Economic Research,2005,5,40-51(in Chinese).
[140]陈冬华.地方政府、公司治理与企业绩效.[博士学位论文].上海：上海财经大学.2002.
[141]Hart,Oliver.D,Firms,Contracts and Financial Structure,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1995.
[142]Hart,Oliver D and John Moore.Property rights and the nature of the firm,Journal of Political Economy 98.1990.1119-1158.
[143]Williamson, Oliver E..The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York:Free Press. 1985.
[144]Williamson Oliver E..Comparative economics organization:the analysis of discrete structural alternatives, Administrative Science.Quarterly,Vol.36 (June),1991:269-296.
[145]高雷,宋顺林.关联交易-线下项目与盈余管理------来自中国上市公司的经验证据.中国会计评论.2008,1：61-78.
[146]林云.我国企业集团形成中的市场作用与政府作用.中国工业经济.1998.第6期.36-39.
[147]江妍.大股东支持行为市场效应的实证研究.财会通讯.2009.第3期.34-39.
[148]刘峰,贺建刚.股权结构与大股东利益实现方式的选择—中国资本市场利益输送的初步研究.中国会计评论,2002年第2期第一期,141-158.
5 Jenson and Mecling (1976)和Morck(1998)均提出了两种效应。
6 数据来源：《人民日报海外版》2003年10月13日第1版的相关报道。
7 例如,在国有股减持的实践中,国有股定价过高会引起流通股股东不满；国有股定价过低,则会引发关于国有资产流失的争论。
8 杨德明等(2007)则发现证监会推动投资者关系的努力并未收到预期效果。这是因为上市公司所推动的投资者关系主要目的是为了满足大股东的融资需求,而一旦融资成功,上市公司则对投资者不大理睬。
9 《关于上市公司股权分置改革的指导意见》中强调“尊重市场规律,就是要坚持市场化的决策机制和价格形成机制,完善改革的推动机制,通过政策扶持和市场引导,形成上市公司改革的持续稳定动力”
[1]Benkel,M.,P.MatherandA.Ramsay, The Assoeiation between Corporation Governaneeand EamingsManagement:theRoleoflndePendentDireetors,CorPorateownership&Control, 2006,14:65-75.
[2]Becker,C.,M.DeFond,J.Jiambalvo and K.Subramanayam. The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management.Contemporary Accounting Research 1998.15:1-24.
[3]Jensen and Meckling,Theory if the Firm:Managemerial Behavior,Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics,1976:P305-360.
[4]Berly,A.,G.Means.The Modern Corporation and Private Property.Mc-Millan,New York, 1932.
[5]Hart,Oliver D and John Moore, Property rights and the nature of the firm,Journal of Political Economy 98.1990,1119-1158
[6]La Porta, R.,F. Loptz-de-silanes, and A.Shleifer, Corporate Ownership around the World, Journal of Finance.1999,54,471-517.
[7]Holderness,Clifford G. A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control.Economic Policy Review,2003,1:51-63.
[8]Aharony.Joseph, C-W Jevons Lee and T.J Wong.Financial packing of IPO firms in China, Journal of Accounting Research,,2000,38,103-126.
[9]Aharony.Joseph, Jiwei Wang and Hongqi Yuan.Tunneling as an Incentive for Earnings Management during the IPO Process in China, Working Paper.2006.
[10]Claessens,Stijn.and Joseph P.H.Fan,2003,Corporate Governance in Asia:A Survey, International Review of Finance,3(2),71-103.
[11]La Porta,R.,Lopez-de-Silance,F.,Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R. Law and Finance.Journal of Political Economy,1998,106:1113-1155.
[12]La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-De-Silanes,A.Shleifer and R.W.Vishny. Corporate Ownership Around the World.The Journal of Finance,1999,54:471-517.
[13]La Porta,R.,Lopez-de-Silance,F.,Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance.Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:3-28.
[14]La Porta,R.,Lopez-de-Silance,F.,Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation.Journal of Finance,2002,57:1147-1170.
[15]Fama,E.F.,1998,Market efficiency, long-term returns and behavioral finance, Journal of Financial Economics 49:283-306.
[16]Johnson, S.,R. La Porta, F. Lopez-De-Silanes and A. Shleifer, Tunneling, The American Economic Review.2000,90(2),22-27
[17]Baek, J.,J.Kang, and I. Lee.Business Groups and Tunneling:Evidence from Private ecurities Offerings by Korean Chaebols, The Journal of Finance 61,,2006,2415-2449.
[18]Berger, P. and E. Ofek. Diversification's Effect on Firm Value,Journal of Financial Economics 37:1995,39-65.
[19]Hong Harrison and Stein, A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum Trading and Overreaction in Asset Markets, journal of Finance,1999:2143-2184
[20]Wang.D.C.,Founding Family Ownership and Earnings Quality,Journal of Accounting Research.44.2006,619-656.
[21]Shleifer, A.,and Vishny, R.. Large shareholders and corporate control,Journal of Political Economy 94..1986,461-88.
[22]上海证券(联合)课题组.上海证券交易所研究中心.中国治理报告2003[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2003.
[23]Friedman E, Johnson S,andMitton T. Propping and tunneling. Journal of Comparative Economics,2003.31:732-750
[24]Khanna, T., and Yishay.,Yafeh.2007, Business Groups in Emerging Markets:Paragons or Parasites? Journal of Economic Literature,Vol.XLV(June):331-372.
[25]Klein, B.,Crawford, R., and Alchian, A.,1978,Vertical integration, a ppopriable rents and the competitive contracting process, Journal of Law and Economics,21:297-326.
[26]Fisman, R. and T. Khanna.Facilitating development:the role of business groups.Working paper, Columbia University-Columbia Business School and Harvard University Competition & Strategy Unit.1998.
[27]Jian, M.,and T. J.Wong. Propping through Related Party Transactions.Review of Accounting Studies.15:1(2010):70-105.
[28]Yohanes E.Riyanto and Linda A.Toolsema,Tunneling and propping:A justification for pyramidal ownership,Journal of Banking & Finance,Volume 32, Issue 10, October 2008,Pages 2178-2187.
[29]Williamson, Oliver E.,1975,Markets and Hierarchies:analysis and antitrust implication, New York:Free Press.
[30]Williamson, Oliver E.,1985,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York:Free Press.
[31]Williamson Oliver E.,1991.Comparative economics organization:the analysis of discrete structural alternatives, Administrative Science Quarterly,Vol.36(June):269-296.
[32]侯晓.大股东对上市公司掏空与支持的经济学分析.中南财经政法大学学报,2006年第5期,120-125
[33]Claessens,Stijn.and Joseph P.H. Fan,2003,Corporate Governance in Asia:A Survey, International Review of Finance,3(2),71-103.
[34]Claessens,Stijn.,Simeon Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan, and Larry H.P. Lang,2003,"The Benefits and Costs of Internal Markets:Evidence from Asia's Financial Crisis", Working Paper.
[35]Khanna, Naveen, and Tice, Sheri.,2001,The Bright Side of Internal Capital Markets, Journal of Finance,Vol.52:1489-1531.
[36]Khanna, T,2000, Business groups and social welfare in emerging markets:Existing evidence and unanswered questions, European Economic Review 44,748-761.
[37]Khanna, T. and K. Palepu,1997,Why focused strategy may be wrong in emerging markets,Harvard Business Review 75(4),41-51.
[38]Khanna, T and K. Palepu,1999, Policy Shocks, Market Intermediaries, and Corporate Strategy:The Evolution of Business Groups in Chile and India,Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Volume 8(2) Summer,271-310.
[39]Khanna. T and K. Palepu,2000, Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An analysisof diversified Indian business groups, The Journal of Finance 55 (2),867-892.
[40]Khanna, T,and J.W. Rivkin,2001,Estimating the Performance Effects of Groups in Emerging Markets, Strategic Management Journal, Vol.22:45-74.
[41]陈晓,王琨.关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革——来自我国资本市场的实证证据.经济研究，2005.第4期
[42]辛清泉,郑国坚,杨德明.企业集团、政府控制与投资效率.金融研究,2007.第10期.25-42.
[43]贺建刚，刘峰.大股东控制、利益输送与投资者保护——基于上市公司资产收购关联交易的实证研究.中国会计与财务,2005.第7卷第3期.71-89.
[44]洪剑峭,方军雄.关联交易和会计盈余的价值相关性.中国会计评论,2005.第3卷第1期,55-78.
[45]佟岩,程小可.关联交易利益流向与中国上市公司盈余质量.管理世界.2007年第11期,127-139.
[46]Claessens S,Djankov S,Fan J, and Lang L. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings. The Journal of Finance, Vol.NO.6..December:2002.2741-2771
[47]Johnson S,La Porta R, Lopze-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A.Tunneling. American Economic Review, May,2000.90 (2):22-27
[48]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据.会计研究,2004.第12期.
[49]刘峰,贺建刚,魏明海.控制权、业绩与利益输送——基于五粮液的案例研究.管理世界，2004.第8期.
[50]Claessens, S.,J.Fan, and L. Lang,2006,The Benefits and Costs of Group Affiliation: Evidence from East Asia, Emerging Market Review 7,1-26.
[51]李增泉,政府控股与公司治理的有效性——一项基于中国证券市场的实证研究.经济科学出版社.2005.23-42.
[52]孙铮,刘凤委,汪辉.债务、公司治理与会计稳健性.中国会计与财务,2005..第7卷第2期.
[53]夏立军,方轶强..政府控制、治理环境与公司价值——来自中国证券市场的经验证据.经济研究,2005第5期.31-45.
[54]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据.会计研究,2004.第12期.42-54.
[55]陈信元,陈冬华,朱凯.2004.股权结构与公司业绩：文献回顾与未来研究方向.中国会计与财务.第6卷第4期.22-40.
[56]罗党论,唐清泉.大股东利益输送与投资者保护——一个分析框架.管理科学,2005年第18期,75-79.
[57]罗党论.现金股利与上市公司第一大股东的利益输送行为研究.财会月刊.2005,10：18-19.
[58]夏立军,陈信元.市场化进程、国企改革策略与公司治理结构的内生决定.经济研究,2007年第7期,82-95.
[59]雷光勇,刘慧龙.大股东控制、融资规模与盈余操纵程度.管理世界,2006年第1期,129-137.
[60]Grossman Sanford J and Oliver D.Hart,1986, The costs and benefits of ownership:a theory of vertical and lateral intergration, Journal of Political Economiy,94,691-719.
[61]张维迎.企业理论与中国企业改革.北京：北京大学出版社,1998,23-26.
[62]Lins, K.,and Servaes, H..Is Corporate Diversification Beneficial in Merging Markets. Financial Management.2002,5-31.
[63]Bae, K. H.,and S.W. Jeong.The Value-relevance of Accounting Information, Ownership Structure, and Business Group Affiliation:Evidence from Korean Business Groups, Working Paper, Korea University.2002,6-44.
[64]Friedman E, Johnson S,andMitton T. Propp ing and tunneling. Journal of Comparative Economics,2003.31:732-750
[65]Jian,M.,and T.J.Wong.Earnings Management and Tunneling through Related Party Transactions:Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups, Working Paper.2005,4-6.
[66]唐宗明,蒋位.中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证分析.经济研究,2002年第4期,44-51.
[67]谭劲松,郑国坚.大股东利益输送和企业透明度：以“青岛海尔”为例.工作论文.中山大学.2004.
[68]陈信元,陈冬华,时旭.公司治理与现金股利：基于佛山照明的案例研究.管理世界.2003,08：118-128.
[69]罗福凯.战略财务管理：青岛海洋大学出版社,2000：22-24.
[70]蒋东升.内部人控制与公司的股利政策——基于宇通客车的案例分析.管理世界,2009 年第4期,177-179.
[71]周县华,吕长江.股权分置改革、高股利分配与投资者利益保护——基于驰宏锌锗的案例研究.会计研究,2008年第8期,59-68
[72]张文龙,李峰,郭泽光.现金股利——控制还是掠夺?.管理世界,2009年第3期,176-177.
[73]张鸣,郭思永.大股东控制下的定向增发和财富转移———来自中国上市公司的经验证据.会计研究,2009年第5期,78-86.
[74]郝项超,梁琪.最终控制人质押损害公司价值么?.会计研究,2009年第7期,57-65.
[75]Yohanes E. Riyanto and Linda A. Toolsema, Tunneling and propping:A justification for pyramidal ownership,Journal of Banking & Finance,Volume 32, Issue 10, October 2008, Pages 2178-2187.
[76]Stein, Jeremy C. Internal Capital Market and the Competition for Corporate Resources,Journal of Finance,1997,52,111-133.
[77]郑国坚,曹雪妮,柳建华.集团控制是否损害上市公司业绩?——最终控制人和市场化进程的双重视角.《中国工业经济》,2010年第3期,57-78.
[78]郑国坚.基于效率观和掏空观的关联交易与盈余质量关系研究.会计研究,2009年第10期,66-83.
[79]郑国坚,魏明海.控股股东内部市场的形成机制研究.中山大学学报(社会科学版),2009年第5期,90-107.
[80]郑国坚,魏明海,孔东明.大股东内部市场与上市公司价值：基于效率观点和掏空观点的实证检验.中国会计与财务研究,2007年第9卷第4期,25-43.
[81]郑国坚,魏明海.公共治理、公司治理与大股东的内部市场：基于我国上市公司的实证研究.中大管理研究,2007年第2期,55-76.
[82]郑国坚,魏明海.我国上市公司股权结构的内生性：从控股股东的内部资本市场得到的证据.中国会计评论,2006年第4卷第2期,43-62.
[83]谭劲松,郑国坚,彭松.地方政府公共治理与国有控股上市公司控制权转移—1996-2004年深圳市属上市公司重组案例研究.管理世界,2009年第10期,24-39.
[84]柳建华,魏明海,郑国坚.大股东控制下的关联投资：“效率促进”抑或“资源转移”.管理世界》.2008年第3期,58-71.
[85]Donaldson, Gordon. Managing Corporate Wealth. Praeger Publisher. New York,1984.
[86]Fama, E. F., and Harvey Babiak.,Dividend Policy:An Empirical Analysis, Journal of American Statistical Association,63,December 1968:1321-1361.
[87]周中胜.治理环境、政府干预与大股东的利益输送.山西财经大学学报,2007年第4期,62-70.
[88]樊纲,王小鲁.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2000(2001,2002)年度报告：2001(2003,2004).经济科学出版社.
[89]刘凤委,张人骥,崔磊磊.地区市场化进程、市场分割与公司关联交易行为.财经研究.2007年第6期,43-54.
[90]Demsetz. H.and K.Lehn. The Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences, Journal of Political Economics.1985,93,1155-1177.
[91]Morck, R., and Nakamura, M.. Been There, Done That:The History of Corporate Ownership in Japan, Working paper.2004.
[92]Shleifer, A.,and Vishny, R.. Politicians and firms, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 1994,995-1025.
[93]Shleifer, A.and R. Vishny.A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance 52, 1997,737-783.
[94]Shleifer, A.,and Vishny, R. The grabbing hand:government pathologies and their cures, Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press.1998.
[95]杜莹,刘立国.股权结构与公司治理效率：中国上市公司的实证分析.管理世界.2002年第11期,124-133
[96]汪辉.上市公司债务融资、公司治理与市场价值.经济研究.2003年第8期,28-36.
[97]王克敏,陈井勇.股权结构、投资者保护与公司绩效.管理世界,2004年第7期,127-134.
[98]刘芍佳,孙霈,刘乃全.终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效.经济研究.2003年第4期,51-63.
[99]洪剑鞘,薛皓.股权制衡如何影响经营性应计的可靠性——关联交易的视角.管理世界.2009年第1期,153-161.
[100]申明浩.治理结构对家族股东隧道行为的影响分析.经济研究,2008年第6期,135-144.
[101]佟岩,王化成.关联交易、控制权收益与盈余质量.会计研究,2007年第4期,75-83.
[102]Brennan, M. J., Taxes, Market Valuation, and Corporate Financial Policy, National Taxes Journal,1970:417-427.
[103]Debondt and Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?, Journal of Finance, 1985:193-805.
[104]屈文洲,许年行,关家雄等.市场化、政府干预与股票流动性溢价的分配.经济研究.2008年第4期,132-146.
[105]徐睁,权衡.中国转型经济及其政治经济学意义.学术月刊.2003,第3期.44-49.
[106]Khanna, T. and K. Palepu. Why focused strategy may be wrong in emerging markets,Harvard Business Review 75(4),1997,41-51.
[107]樊纲,王小鲁.中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2000(2001,2002)年度报告.经济科学出版社.2001(2003,2004)
[108]Johnson, S.,R. La Porta, F. Lopez-De-Silanes and A.Shleifer, Tunneling,The American Economic Review 90(2),2000.22-27.
[109]姚俊,吕源,蓝海林.转轨时期企业集团多元化、结构与绩效的实证研究.北京：经济科学出版社.2005.
[110]郑国坚.企业集团内部市场：效率与“掏空”——基于我国上市公司的实证研究.[博士学位论文]广州：中山大学管理学院.2008.
[111]谭劲松.独立董事与公司治理——基于我国上市公司的研究.北京：中国财政经济出版社.2003.
[112]王国生.转型时期地方政府面临的制度环境及其市场地位分析.南京社会科学(经济学研究).1999.第11期.36-58.
[113]王红领，李稻葵,雷鼎鸣.政府为什么会放弃国有企业的产权.经济研究.2001.第8期.43-7
[114]王全斌.关于我国市场化进程的研究.经济研究参考.2003.第1期.58-64.
[115]Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan, Ferreting out Tunneling:An Application to Indian Business Groups, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, February,2002:121-148
[116]王珺.政企关系演变的实证逻辑——我国政企分开的三阶段假说.经济研究.1999.第11期.22-46.
[117]吴林军.中国经济市场化进程测度研究综述.经济纵横.2003.第9期.52-56.
[118]夏立军.政府干预与市场失灵——上市公司之会计师事务所选择研究.[博士学位论文.]上海财经大学2006.
[119]杨瑞龙.国有企业治理结构创新的经济学分析.中国人民大学出版社.2001.
[120]姚俊,吕源,蓝海林.转轨时期企业集团多元化、结构与绩效的实证研究.北京：经济科学出版社.2005.
[121]张曙光.中国转轨中的制度结构与变迁.经济科学出版社.2005.
[122]中国集团公司促进会.母子公司关系研究——企业集团的组织结构和管理控制.中国财政经济出版社.2004.
[123]李东平.大股东控制、盈余管理与上市公司业绩滑坡.中国财政经济出版社.2005
[124]冯根福,韩冰,闫冰.中国上市公司股权集中度变动的实证分析.经济研究,2002.第8期,55-78.
[125]李智.中国现代企业集团.中国商业出版社.1994.256-267.
[126]Alchian, A.and Demsetz,Harold.Production,information cost and economice organization, American Economic Riview,62,1972,777-95.
[127]Stein, Jeremy C.,1997,Internal Capital Market and the Competition for Corporate Resources,Journal of Finance,52,111-133.
[128]刘峰.制度安排与会计信息质量.会计研究.2001.第7期.33-57.
[129]田利辉.国有股权对上市公司绩效影响的U型曲线和政府股东两手论.经济研究.2005第10期.55-87.
[130]王兵.独立董事监督了吗——基于中国上市公司盈余质量的视角.金融研究.2007第1期.79-93.
[131]Hong Harrison and Stein, A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum Trading and Overreaction in Asset Markets, journal of Finance,1999:2143-2184
[132]Jagedeesh and Leahman, Evidence of Predictable Behavior of Security Returns, Journal of Finance,1990:881-898
[133]Jagedeesh and Titman, Returns to Buy the Winners and Sell the Losers:Implications for Stock Market Efficiency, Journal of Finance,1993:65-91
[134]Jensen and Meckling,Theory if the Firm:Managemerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics,1976:P305-360.
[135]郑国坚.基于效率观和掏空观的关联交易与盈余质量关系研究.会计研究.2009年第10期.68-76.
[136]Stijn Claessens,Simeon Djankov, Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics,58 (2000) 81-112.
[137]Thailer, R.H.and Shefrin H.M..An economic theory of self-control,Journal of Political Economics,1981,89,392-407.
[138]Wolfenzon,Daniel.A Theory of Pyramidal Structure. Harvard University. Cambridge, Mass
[139]Xia, L.,Y. Fang,Government control, institutional environment and firm value:Evidence form the Chinese securities market,Economic Research,2005,5,40-51(in Chinese).
[140]陈冬华.地方政府、公司治理与企业绩效.[博士学位论文].上海：上海财经大学.2002.
[141]Hart,Oliver.D,Firms,Contracts and Financial Structure,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1995.
[142]Hart,Oliver D and John Moore.Property rights and the nature of the firm,Journal of Political Economy 98.1990.1119-1158.
[143]Williamson, Oliver E..The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York:Free Press. 1985.
[144]Williamson Oliver E..Comparative economics organization:the analysis of discrete structural alternatives, Administrative Science.Quarterly,Vol.36 (June),1991:269-296.
[145]高雷,宋顺林.关联交易-线下项目与盈余管理------来自中国上市公司的经验证据.中国会计评论.2008,1：61-78.
[146]林云.我国企业集团形成中的市场作用与政府作用.中国工业经济.1998.第6期.36-39.
[147]江妍.大股东支持行为市场效应的实证研究.财会通讯.2009.第3期.34-39.
[148]刘峰,贺建刚.股权结构与大股东利益实现方式的选择—中国资本市场利益输送的初步研究.中国会计评论,2002年第2期第一期,141-158.