基于情景感知的移动商务产业链的博弈分析
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摘要
基于情景感知的移动商务产业链各成员间的竞争冲突、利益分配、以及激励机制问题是将来的一个研究重点。本文主要运用博弈论与信息经济学的原理和方法,对以上问题进行研究探讨,目的在于从整体上提高情景感知业务产业链的运作效率。
本文的主要创新点包括:
(1)本文以迈克尔·波特的竞争理论来对情景感知移动商务产业链中的竞争-对抗行为进行分析,设计出产业链内企业竞争力战略关系图,而后再运用非合作对策理论来对这些行为进行理论和方法上的分析,为不同的企业提供相应的决策依据,从而在整体上提高基于情景感知的移动商务产业链的运作效率。
(2)本文在该产业链体系内,利用多人合作对策理论以及运筹学的相关理论,对情景感知业务产业链中的利益分配问题进行了分析,并设计一套较为合理、有效的基于分配问题的协调机制。
(3)本文基于委托-代理理论的特点,设计了运营商与SP之间的激励机制模型,并对该模型进行分析后得到,作为核心企业的运营商引入最佳激励机制,不仅可以提高SP运营情景感知业务的努力水平,而且可使自己获得新增期望收益,从而整个产业链的期望收益加大,使产业链的运作得到优化。
It has been regarded as a core topic, to research a solution of the problems on competition conflict, benefit allotment and incentive mechanism between mobile commerce industrial chain partners based on context awareness. This dissertation makes a detailed research with the theories and methods of Game Theory and Informational Economics purposes that the operation efificiency of industrial chain can be totally increased.
This below is the main innovative points for this paper.
(1) This paper analyzes enterprises competition strategy relation based on Context Awareness Mobile Commerce Industrial Chain, according to the competition theory of Michael Baud. It also takes a theoretical and methodological analysis on the behaviors in respects of symmetric information and asymmetric information to give evidence on decision-making of different enterprises for Context Awareness services, and to improve the total efficiency of the running of Mobile Commerce Industrial Chain based on Context Awareness.
(2) This paper analyzes and describes the characteristics and targets of the alliance between partners in mobile commerce industrial chain based on context awareness. Based on this analysis, it designs a comparably perfect harmonizing mechanism to meet the requirement of mutual benefit and mutual profit in negotiation between partners.
(3) Based on the theory and methods of principal-agent suggested in Informational Economics, this paper proposes a designing principle of incentive mechanism between SP and mobile operators. And based on this principle and method of principal-agent and Dynamic Game Theory, it proposes a designing policy for incentive mechanism of one operator against two SP Providers. And it presents evidence that this incentive mechanism can increase the endeavor level of dealer and total expected benefit in mobile commerce industrial chain based on context awareness.
本文的主要创新点包括:
(1)本文以迈克尔·波特的竞争理论来对情景感知移动商务产业链中的竞争-对抗行为进行分析,设计出产业链内企业竞争力战略关系图,而后再运用非合作对策理论来对这些行为进行理论和方法上的分析,为不同的企业提供相应的决策依据,从而在整体上提高基于情景感知的移动商务产业链的运作效率。
(2)本文在该产业链体系内,利用多人合作对策理论以及运筹学的相关理论,对情景感知业务产业链中的利益分配问题进行了分析,并设计一套较为合理、有效的基于分配问题的协调机制。
(3)本文基于委托-代理理论的特点,设计了运营商与SP之间的激励机制模型,并对该模型进行分析后得到,作为核心企业的运营商引入最佳激励机制,不仅可以提高SP运营情景感知业务的努力水平,而且可使自己获得新增期望收益,从而整个产业链的期望收益加大,使产业链的运作得到优化。
It has been regarded as a core topic, to research a solution of the problems on competition conflict, benefit allotment and incentive mechanism between mobile commerce industrial chain partners based on context awareness. This dissertation makes a detailed research with the theories and methods of Game Theory and Informational Economics purposes that the operation efificiency of industrial chain can be totally increased.
This below is the main innovative points for this paper.
(1) This paper analyzes enterprises competition strategy relation based on Context Awareness Mobile Commerce Industrial Chain, according to the competition theory of Michael Baud. It also takes a theoretical and methodological analysis on the behaviors in respects of symmetric information and asymmetric information to give evidence on decision-making of different enterprises for Context Awareness services, and to improve the total efficiency of the running of Mobile Commerce Industrial Chain based on Context Awareness.
(2) This paper analyzes and describes the characteristics and targets of the alliance between partners in mobile commerce industrial chain based on context awareness. Based on this analysis, it designs a comparably perfect harmonizing mechanism to meet the requirement of mutual benefit and mutual profit in negotiation between partners.
(3) Based on the theory and methods of principal-agent suggested in Informational Economics, this paper proposes a designing principle of incentive mechanism between SP and mobile operators. And based on this principle and method of principal-agent and Dynamic Game Theory, it proposes a designing policy for incentive mechanism of one operator against two SP Providers. And it presents evidence that this incentive mechanism can increase the endeavor level of dealer and total expected benefit in mobile commerce industrial chain based on context awareness.
引文
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