中国巨灾风险融资机制设计研究
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摘要
近年来,伴随着全球气候变暖、自然环境恶化、城市化进程的加快、世界人口和财富的迅速增长,巨灾事件发生的频率和造成的损失都呈现出明显的上升趋势。根据慕尼黑再保险公司提供的数据显示,从1980年—2012年的33年间,全球巨灾事件数量增加了1.5倍左右；巨灾事件带来的人员伤亡及经济损失的记录不断被刷新。
中国幅员辽阔,是世界上受自然灾害影响最严重的少数国家之一,全球主要自然灾害种类在我国均有分布。进入2000年以来,我国进入新的灾害多发期,自然灾害、极端气候事件频次增加,特重大自然灾害接连发生,给中国社会发展带来了严重的影响。2012年,各类自然灾害共造成2.9亿人次受灾,1338人死亡,1109万人次紧急转移安置；直接经济损失4185.5亿元。
面对严重的巨灾风险和巨灾损失,我国的灾前巨灾风险融资机制并未起到应有的作用,究其原因在于巨灾风险融资具有的准公共物品属性。对我国面临的灾前巨灾融资缺位这一困境,可以通过公私伙伴合作的方式予以解决。公私伙伴合作(Public-Private Partnership, PPP)是指政府通过与一个或多个私营企业建立伙伴合作关系,提供政府公共服务或创建、运营私营企业。公私伙伴合作关系在国外提供公共服务方面取得了巨大的成功,目前国内在公共基础设施、医疗、教育等领域也积累了一定的实践经验,具备在巨灾风险融资领域发挥作用的现实条件。
另一方面,针对中国巨灾风险融资的研究,特别是从公私伙伴合作视角研究巨灾风险融资机制的在国内还不多见。因此,从公私伙伴合作视角开展对我国巨灾风险融资机制的构建研究具有重要的学术理论价值。
但是如何将公私伙伴合作与现实中的巨灾风险融资手段连接起来,构建符合中国现实的巨灾风险融资机制,有效解决我国目前巨灾风险融资缺位这一难题,在理论上和实践的前进道路上都充满了障碍。为此本文从巨灾风险、巨灾风险融资及公私伙伴合作的概念解析出发,以巨灾风险的市场化融资和政府融资、以及公私合作关系中政府、私人部门风险分担为研究重点,采用定性与定量相结合、实证与案例分析方法、比较研究等方法,在公私伙伴合作视角下,立足于基础理论和实践经验两个层面,对巨灾风险融资机制进行系统深入的探讨,并提出了构建我国融资机制的理论框架和细节。
本文的具体研究内容如下：
一、导论。概括了本文的选题背景和研究的理论与实践意义,所使用的研究方法和研究内容。回顾了巨灾风险融资相关的理论文献,并对其进行述评,结合已有文献和本文的研究成果提出了本文研究的创新和不足。
二、对巨灾风险融资机制进行一般性理论分析。在总结国内外的主要观点,并对相关研究对象进行评析的基础上,提出作者本人对巨灾风险、巨灾风险融资的理解和认识；回顾了本文研究运用的主要理论基础及相关研究工具；运用福利经济学对巨灾风险融资进行分析,从帕累托最优标准,分析了保险与事后融资的效率,并在事后效率视角的基础上,探讨了保险市场的作用。
三、公私伙伴合作与巨灾风险融资。从公私伙伴合作的概念及实践进展出发,分析了公私伙伴合作在实践中广泛运用背后的推动力。结合公共物品、准公共物品、外部性的基本理论观点,探讨了巨灾风险融资的准公共物品属性,并对作为准公共物品的巨灾风险融资的供给主体和供给方式进行了分析。对公私伙伴合作模式在我国轨道交通建设和开展大病保险领域中的应用进行简要的介绍及评价。
四、巨灾风险的市场化融资。分别对巨灾风险的保险市场和资本市场融资机制进行了分析。分析了巨灾风险的保险融资原理,巨灾风险可保性的理论观点,并依此为基础,探讨导致巨灾保险市场失灵的主要原因。分析了保险市场上的创新活动,并指出市场创新对扩展巨灾风险的可保性边界带来的市场效率的改进。分析了巨灾风险的资本市场融资原理和工具,较全面比较了各种资本市场融资工具的优势与不足。重点分析了巨灾债券这一主要的资本市场融资工具,对巨灾债券的溢价进行了考察解释。结合最新市场数据,分析评价巨灾风险市场化融资的现状,并对其未来发展趋势进行了展望。
五、巨灾风险的政府融资。本部分内容从经济学中政府干预经济的一般原理出发,并结合巨灾风险的不可保性理论观点,分析了巨灾风险政府融资的理论基础。归纳了巨灾风险政府融资采取的主要方式及各自的特点,对美国洪水保险计划进行了深度分析,总结其成功经验和启示。建立模型,从理论上分析对政府救济持不同预期的民众,对政府建立公共保险计划、开展灾后救济二者间进行策略选择时的影响,详细探讨了政府可选的最优策略。
六、公私伙伴合作融资中风险的分担。通过建立公私伙伴合作关系下的政府与私人保险公司间博弈模型,分析了政府比私人保险公司更有信息优势情况下,政府与私人保险公司在该博弈过程中的风险分担和策略选择。并对实现博弈均衡进行了推导和证明。以案例的方式对国际上公私伙伴合作模式运行的巨灾风险融资计划进行了分析。
七、基于公私伙伴合作的融资机制设计。分析了我国现行巨灾风险融资存在的不足,以及我国当前巨灾风险融资面临的资金缺口；结合前文研究成果基础上,提出构建一个多风险分担层次的巨灾风险融资机制的基本框架；最后对融资机制设计的总体目标和发展思路给出了政策建议,探讨了巨灾保险基金设计中涉及的巨灾保险基金设立目的、初始资本来源、承保风险及承保对象选择等细节问题；对巨灾保险基金的运行模式进行了探讨。
通过上述内容的研究,本文在巨灾风险融资研究上取得了如下进展和创新。
一、从公私伙伴合作视角对巨灾风险融资进行系统的研究
有效应对巨灾风险带来的威胁是世界各国发展面临的重大难题。巨灾风险融资是巨灾风险管理的重要环节。公私伙伴合作在提供社会公共产品和服务方面取得了显著成绩,本文将公共伙伴合作理论与巨灾风险融资结合起来,从一个全新的视角探讨巨灾风险融资的解决方案。
二、进一步丰富我国巨灾风险融资理论研究内容
尽管近5年以来,巨灾风险管理相关理论研究得到我国学术界的高度重视,但由于研究起点较低,发展慢,相关研究还存在空白地带和不足之处,特别是政府在巨灾风险融资中的角色定位和作用,商业保险公司在巨灾风险融资中自身优势的发挥,政府与商业企业在巨灾风险融资中发挥作用的边界等方面,还需进一步充实和完善。本文从巨灾风险融资及公私伙伴合作的基本理论出发,系统分析了各融资方式的具体工具、融资规模和成本效率等方面的内容,对我国巨灾风险融资机制的设计提出了政策建议,丰富了我国巨灾风险融资理论的研究内容。
三、从福利经济学视角,对巨灾风险的灾前、灾后融资效率进行分析
本文在期望效用理论框架下,放宽了博尔奇定理及萨缪尔森风险分散理论的假设条件,运用福利经济学的分析方法,分析了巨灾保险的引入对跨期资源配置效率可能带来的影响。对灾害发生存在不确定性条件下,根据不同的效率定义标准,考察了巨灾保险在各自情形下的作用。
四、深入探讨了政府救济对最优巨灾保险的影响
由于巨灾风险融资具有的正外部性及准公共物品特性,在考察分析巨灾风险融资中,面临的不是政府是否应该干预这一问题,而是政府应该如何更好的介入到巨灾风险融资机制中,以保证政府采取的介入方式,不会过度扭曲巨灾风险市场化融资的有效性。为科学分析政府干预巨灾风险融资可能出现对社会公众的负面激励,本文详细探讨了政府通过巨灾风险灾后融资开展救济与灾前的保费补贴开支的不同形式下,对不同风险认知的社会公众带来的差异性影响,以及政府自身的成本控制问题。为政府介入巨灾风险融资决策提供了理论依据。
当然,从巨灾风险融资的国际实践来看,构建一个可负担、高效和可持续的巨灾风险融资机制是各国面临的重大挑战,涉及一国面临的自然灾害严重程度、经济发展水平、社会的风险意识、保险市场与资本市场发展水平、政府职能发挥等一系列因素。由于作者掌握的资料、数据的局限以及我国市场化的巨灾融资经验缺乏,本文提出的融资机制的政策建议主要是基于理论探讨而构建,实证支撑相对较弱,需要今后持续追踪研究,以使我国巨灾融资理论进一步完善。
In recent years, along with global warming, natural environmental degradation, urbanization, the rapid growth of the world population and wealth, the frequency of catastrophic events and the damage caused has emerged a clear upward trend. According to data provided by Munich Reinsurance Company show that from1980to2012, increasing the number of global catastrophe events about1.5times; recorded casualties and economic losses caused by catastrophic events constantly being refreshed.
China is one of the few countries that natural disasters occur most frequently and in various types. Serious natural disasters take place almost every year, causing enormous losses. Rapid onset hazardl events can result in substantial human and economic costs. Since the beginning of2000, China has entered a new disaster-prone period, natural disasters, increased frequency of extreme weather events, especially serious natural disasters have occurred, China's social development has brought serious impact. In2012, natural disasters caused1,338people killed, about290million people were affected, and over11,090,000were resettled emergently; direct economic loss of418.55billion CNY.
Facing the serious catastrophe risk and catastrophe losses, our ex-ante catastrophe risk financing mechanisms did not play its due role, the reason lies with the catastrophe risk financing has the characteristics of quasi-public goods. Facing this dilemma for the absence of catastrophe risk financing can be resolved by way of public-private partnership. Public-private partnerships is a government service or private business venture which is funded and operated through a partnership of government and one or more private sector companies. Public-private partnerships have achieved great success in the provision of public services abroad, and also accumulated some experience in the field of domestic public infrastructure, health, education, hence Public-private partnerships can played an important role in the field of catastrophe risk financing.
However, there is few materials of catastrophe risk financing in domestic academic field especially from the perspective of Public-private partnerships, Therefore it is valuable in academic and practical field to develop the study of catastrophe risk financing from the perspective of public-private partnerships.
But how public-private partnerships and the instruments of catastrophe risk financing linked to construct catastrophe risk financing mechanism in line with China's reality, advance in theory and practice on the road is full of obstacles. Thus, this thesis selects catastrophe risk financing as the research object, in the perspective of Public-private partnerships, using empirical analysis, normative analysis, case studies, comparative study, quantitative studies as the main methods, to explore the related issues of catastrophe risk financing from the academic and practical view. The main content of this thesis is arranged as follows:
1. Introduction. In this part, the author summarizes the background and significance of this thesis, methods and main content. After reviewing the literature of catastrophe risk financing and related issues, the author proposes the innovation and lack of the study.
2. The General Theoretical Analysis of Catastrophe Risk Financing Mechanisms. In summing up the main points at home and abroad, and related subjects on the basis of critical analysis, the article defines the concepts of catastrophe risk, catastrophe risk financing. review of the main theoretical basis of this study and related research using tools; use of welfare economics of catastrophe risk financing analyzed from Pareto optimality criteria, analyze the efficiency of insurance and post-financing, and on the basis of ex post efficiency perspective, discusses the role of the insurance market.
3. Public-Private Partnership and Catastrophe Risk Financing. Progress from concept and practice of public-private partnerships, analyzes the driving force behind the widespread use of public-private partnerships. Combination of public goods, the basic theoretical perspectives quasi-public goods, externalities, and discusses the properties of quasi-public goods of catastrophe risk financing, and as a way of supplying the main supply and quasi-public goods catastrophe risk financing analyzed. Manner in case of catastrophe risk financing plan to run the international public-private partnership model is analyzed and summarized its various financing inspiration behind the success of the operation.
4. Market-Based Catastrophe Risk Financing. Respectively for catastrophe risk financing in insurance and capital markets were analyzed. Analysis the principle of catastrophe risk financing in insurance market, insurability of catastrophe risk, and so as a basis to discuss the main reason that lead the catastrophe insurance market failures Analysis of innovation activities on the insurance market, and pointed to the expansion of market innovation catastrophe risk insurability boundary to bring market efficiency improvements. Analysis of the principles and tools of catastrophe risk financing in capital market, comprehensive comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of various capital markets instruments. Analyzes the catastrophe bonds as major financing instrument of capital market. and the premium of catastrophe bonds were investigated to explain. Combined with the latest market data, analyze market status assessment of catastrophe risk financing, and the prospects for its future development trend.
5. Catastrophe Risk Financing by Government. This part start from the general principles of economics from government intervention in the economy, combined with the uninsurability of catastrophe risk, analyzes the theoretical basis of catastrophe risk financing by government. Summarizes the main ways of financing catastrophe risk taken by the government and their characteristics, explores the U.S. flood insurance program. theoretical analysis on government relief under different expectations of the people.
6. Risk Sharing Between Insurers And State-Backed Catastrophe Insurance Fund. Through the establishment of a game model between private insurance companies and State-backed Catastrophe Insurance Fund, explores the risk of government and private insurance companies to share and how can get the equilibrium of the game. Analysis of catastrophe risk financing cases.
7. Financing Mechanism Design Based On Public-Private Partnership. Analyzes the shortcomings of our system of catastrophe risk financing, as well as our current funding gap faced catastrophe risk financing; followed by the establishment of inter-governmental and private insurance companies game model of public-private partnerships. Based on previous research this paper proposes to build a multi-level risk sharing basic framework of catastrophe risk financing overall objectives and the development of ideas
By studying the contents of the above article on catastrophe risk financing the research has made the following progress and innovation:
Respond effectively to the threat of catastrophic risks posed significant challenges facing the countries in the world. Catastrophe risk financing is an important part of risk management. Public-private partnerships in the provision of public goods and services has made remarkable achievements, this article study catastrophe risk financing based on Public-private partnerships, from a new perspective to explore solutions for catastrophe risk financing.
Despite nearly five years, the relevant theory of catastrophe risk management has been highly valued in academia, because of the lower starting point for research, development is slow, there are blank areas related research and inadequacies, particularly, the role of government and commercial enterprises, such as borders, need to further strengthen and improve. In this paper, the basic theory of catastrophe risk financing and public-private partnerships departure, the system analyzes the content of specific tools, financing scale and cost efficiencies, and other aspects of the financing, the design of our catastrophe risk financing mechanisms put forward policy recommendations, rich the contents of catastrophe risk financing theory.
Based on the expected utility theory framework to relax the assumption in the Theorem of risk diversification development by Borch and Samuelson, analyze the introduction of catastrophe insurance for intertemporal allocation of resource efficiency based on welfare economics. The presence of uncertainty in disaster conditions, depending on the efficiency of the standard definition, examines the role of catastrophe insurance in their respective situations.
Due to positive externalities and public goods characteristics of catastrophe risk financing, For the scientific analysis of catastrophe risk financing government intervention may be negative incentives for the public, the paper discusses in detail the disaster relief catastrophe risk financing and the different forms of pre-disaster premium subsidies for different risk perception bring the public impact of differences, as well as the government's own cost control.
Of course, it's a difficult issues to build an affordable, efficient and sustainable catastrophe risk financing around the world. Due to the available information, catastrophe risk financing empirical data limitations, the policy recommendations proposed financing mechanism is built on the theory discussed, empirical support is relatively weak, deeply study is needed to make the theory of catastrophe risk financing more perfect.
中国幅员辽阔,是世界上受自然灾害影响最严重的少数国家之一,全球主要自然灾害种类在我国均有分布。进入2000年以来,我国进入新的灾害多发期,自然灾害、极端气候事件频次增加,特重大自然灾害接连发生,给中国社会发展带来了严重的影响。2012年,各类自然灾害共造成2.9亿人次受灾,1338人死亡,1109万人次紧急转移安置；直接经济损失4185.5亿元。
面对严重的巨灾风险和巨灾损失,我国的灾前巨灾风险融资机制并未起到应有的作用,究其原因在于巨灾风险融资具有的准公共物品属性。对我国面临的灾前巨灾融资缺位这一困境,可以通过公私伙伴合作的方式予以解决。公私伙伴合作(Public-Private Partnership, PPP)是指政府通过与一个或多个私营企业建立伙伴合作关系,提供政府公共服务或创建、运营私营企业。公私伙伴合作关系在国外提供公共服务方面取得了巨大的成功,目前国内在公共基础设施、医疗、教育等领域也积累了一定的实践经验,具备在巨灾风险融资领域发挥作用的现实条件。
另一方面,针对中国巨灾风险融资的研究,特别是从公私伙伴合作视角研究巨灾风险融资机制的在国内还不多见。因此,从公私伙伴合作视角开展对我国巨灾风险融资机制的构建研究具有重要的学术理论价值。
但是如何将公私伙伴合作与现实中的巨灾风险融资手段连接起来,构建符合中国现实的巨灾风险融资机制,有效解决我国目前巨灾风险融资缺位这一难题,在理论上和实践的前进道路上都充满了障碍。为此本文从巨灾风险、巨灾风险融资及公私伙伴合作的概念解析出发,以巨灾风险的市场化融资和政府融资、以及公私合作关系中政府、私人部门风险分担为研究重点,采用定性与定量相结合、实证与案例分析方法、比较研究等方法,在公私伙伴合作视角下,立足于基础理论和实践经验两个层面,对巨灾风险融资机制进行系统深入的探讨,并提出了构建我国融资机制的理论框架和细节。
本文的具体研究内容如下：
一、导论。概括了本文的选题背景和研究的理论与实践意义,所使用的研究方法和研究内容。回顾了巨灾风险融资相关的理论文献,并对其进行述评,结合已有文献和本文的研究成果提出了本文研究的创新和不足。
二、对巨灾风险融资机制进行一般性理论分析。在总结国内外的主要观点,并对相关研究对象进行评析的基础上,提出作者本人对巨灾风险、巨灾风险融资的理解和认识；回顾了本文研究运用的主要理论基础及相关研究工具；运用福利经济学对巨灾风险融资进行分析,从帕累托最优标准,分析了保险与事后融资的效率,并在事后效率视角的基础上,探讨了保险市场的作用。
三、公私伙伴合作与巨灾风险融资。从公私伙伴合作的概念及实践进展出发,分析了公私伙伴合作在实践中广泛运用背后的推动力。结合公共物品、准公共物品、外部性的基本理论观点,探讨了巨灾风险融资的准公共物品属性,并对作为准公共物品的巨灾风险融资的供给主体和供给方式进行了分析。对公私伙伴合作模式在我国轨道交通建设和开展大病保险领域中的应用进行简要的介绍及评价。
四、巨灾风险的市场化融资。分别对巨灾风险的保险市场和资本市场融资机制进行了分析。分析了巨灾风险的保险融资原理,巨灾风险可保性的理论观点,并依此为基础,探讨导致巨灾保险市场失灵的主要原因。分析了保险市场上的创新活动,并指出市场创新对扩展巨灾风险的可保性边界带来的市场效率的改进。分析了巨灾风险的资本市场融资原理和工具,较全面比较了各种资本市场融资工具的优势与不足。重点分析了巨灾债券这一主要的资本市场融资工具,对巨灾债券的溢价进行了考察解释。结合最新市场数据,分析评价巨灾风险市场化融资的现状,并对其未来发展趋势进行了展望。
五、巨灾风险的政府融资。本部分内容从经济学中政府干预经济的一般原理出发,并结合巨灾风险的不可保性理论观点,分析了巨灾风险政府融资的理论基础。归纳了巨灾风险政府融资采取的主要方式及各自的特点,对美国洪水保险计划进行了深度分析,总结其成功经验和启示。建立模型,从理论上分析对政府救济持不同预期的民众,对政府建立公共保险计划、开展灾后救济二者间进行策略选择时的影响,详细探讨了政府可选的最优策略。
六、公私伙伴合作融资中风险的分担。通过建立公私伙伴合作关系下的政府与私人保险公司间博弈模型,分析了政府比私人保险公司更有信息优势情况下,政府与私人保险公司在该博弈过程中的风险分担和策略选择。并对实现博弈均衡进行了推导和证明。以案例的方式对国际上公私伙伴合作模式运行的巨灾风险融资计划进行了分析。
七、基于公私伙伴合作的融资机制设计。分析了我国现行巨灾风险融资存在的不足,以及我国当前巨灾风险融资面临的资金缺口；结合前文研究成果基础上,提出构建一个多风险分担层次的巨灾风险融资机制的基本框架；最后对融资机制设计的总体目标和发展思路给出了政策建议,探讨了巨灾保险基金设计中涉及的巨灾保险基金设立目的、初始资本来源、承保风险及承保对象选择等细节问题；对巨灾保险基金的运行模式进行了探讨。
通过上述内容的研究,本文在巨灾风险融资研究上取得了如下进展和创新。
一、从公私伙伴合作视角对巨灾风险融资进行系统的研究
有效应对巨灾风险带来的威胁是世界各国发展面临的重大难题。巨灾风险融资是巨灾风险管理的重要环节。公私伙伴合作在提供社会公共产品和服务方面取得了显著成绩,本文将公共伙伴合作理论与巨灾风险融资结合起来,从一个全新的视角探讨巨灾风险融资的解决方案。
二、进一步丰富我国巨灾风险融资理论研究内容
尽管近5年以来,巨灾风险管理相关理论研究得到我国学术界的高度重视,但由于研究起点较低,发展慢,相关研究还存在空白地带和不足之处,特别是政府在巨灾风险融资中的角色定位和作用,商业保险公司在巨灾风险融资中自身优势的发挥,政府与商业企业在巨灾风险融资中发挥作用的边界等方面,还需进一步充实和完善。本文从巨灾风险融资及公私伙伴合作的基本理论出发,系统分析了各融资方式的具体工具、融资规模和成本效率等方面的内容,对我国巨灾风险融资机制的设计提出了政策建议,丰富了我国巨灾风险融资理论的研究内容。
三、从福利经济学视角,对巨灾风险的灾前、灾后融资效率进行分析
本文在期望效用理论框架下,放宽了博尔奇定理及萨缪尔森风险分散理论的假设条件,运用福利经济学的分析方法,分析了巨灾保险的引入对跨期资源配置效率可能带来的影响。对灾害发生存在不确定性条件下,根据不同的效率定义标准,考察了巨灾保险在各自情形下的作用。
四、深入探讨了政府救济对最优巨灾保险的影响
由于巨灾风险融资具有的正外部性及准公共物品特性,在考察分析巨灾风险融资中,面临的不是政府是否应该干预这一问题,而是政府应该如何更好的介入到巨灾风险融资机制中,以保证政府采取的介入方式,不会过度扭曲巨灾风险市场化融资的有效性。为科学分析政府干预巨灾风险融资可能出现对社会公众的负面激励,本文详细探讨了政府通过巨灾风险灾后融资开展救济与灾前的保费补贴开支的不同形式下,对不同风险认知的社会公众带来的差异性影响,以及政府自身的成本控制问题。为政府介入巨灾风险融资决策提供了理论依据。
当然,从巨灾风险融资的国际实践来看,构建一个可负担、高效和可持续的巨灾风险融资机制是各国面临的重大挑战,涉及一国面临的自然灾害严重程度、经济发展水平、社会的风险意识、保险市场与资本市场发展水平、政府职能发挥等一系列因素。由于作者掌握的资料、数据的局限以及我国市场化的巨灾融资经验缺乏,本文提出的融资机制的政策建议主要是基于理论探讨而构建,实证支撑相对较弱,需要今后持续追踪研究,以使我国巨灾融资理论进一步完善。
In recent years, along with global warming, natural environmental degradation, urbanization, the rapid growth of the world population and wealth, the frequency of catastrophic events and the damage caused has emerged a clear upward trend. According to data provided by Munich Reinsurance Company show that from1980to2012, increasing the number of global catastrophe events about1.5times; recorded casualties and economic losses caused by catastrophic events constantly being refreshed.
China is one of the few countries that natural disasters occur most frequently and in various types. Serious natural disasters take place almost every year, causing enormous losses. Rapid onset hazardl events can result in substantial human and economic costs. Since the beginning of2000, China has entered a new disaster-prone period, natural disasters, increased frequency of extreme weather events, especially serious natural disasters have occurred, China's social development has brought serious impact. In2012, natural disasters caused1,338people killed, about290million people were affected, and over11,090,000were resettled emergently; direct economic loss of418.55billion CNY.
Facing the serious catastrophe risk and catastrophe losses, our ex-ante catastrophe risk financing mechanisms did not play its due role, the reason lies with the catastrophe risk financing has the characteristics of quasi-public goods. Facing this dilemma for the absence of catastrophe risk financing can be resolved by way of public-private partnership. Public-private partnerships is a government service or private business venture which is funded and operated through a partnership of government and one or more private sector companies. Public-private partnerships have achieved great success in the provision of public services abroad, and also accumulated some experience in the field of domestic public infrastructure, health, education, hence Public-private partnerships can played an important role in the field of catastrophe risk financing.
However, there is few materials of catastrophe risk financing in domestic academic field especially from the perspective of Public-private partnerships, Therefore it is valuable in academic and practical field to develop the study of catastrophe risk financing from the perspective of public-private partnerships.
But how public-private partnerships and the instruments of catastrophe risk financing linked to construct catastrophe risk financing mechanism in line with China's reality, advance in theory and practice on the road is full of obstacles. Thus, this thesis selects catastrophe risk financing as the research object, in the perspective of Public-private partnerships, using empirical analysis, normative analysis, case studies, comparative study, quantitative studies as the main methods, to explore the related issues of catastrophe risk financing from the academic and practical view. The main content of this thesis is arranged as follows:
1. Introduction. In this part, the author summarizes the background and significance of this thesis, methods and main content. After reviewing the literature of catastrophe risk financing and related issues, the author proposes the innovation and lack of the study.
2. The General Theoretical Analysis of Catastrophe Risk Financing Mechanisms. In summing up the main points at home and abroad, and related subjects on the basis of critical analysis, the article defines the concepts of catastrophe risk, catastrophe risk financing. review of the main theoretical basis of this study and related research using tools; use of welfare economics of catastrophe risk financing analyzed from Pareto optimality criteria, analyze the efficiency of insurance and post-financing, and on the basis of ex post efficiency perspective, discusses the role of the insurance market.
3. Public-Private Partnership and Catastrophe Risk Financing. Progress from concept and practice of public-private partnerships, analyzes the driving force behind the widespread use of public-private partnerships. Combination of public goods, the basic theoretical perspectives quasi-public goods, externalities, and discusses the properties of quasi-public goods of catastrophe risk financing, and as a way of supplying the main supply and quasi-public goods catastrophe risk financing analyzed. Manner in case of catastrophe risk financing plan to run the international public-private partnership model is analyzed and summarized its various financing inspiration behind the success of the operation.
4. Market-Based Catastrophe Risk Financing. Respectively for catastrophe risk financing in insurance and capital markets were analyzed. Analysis the principle of catastrophe risk financing in insurance market, insurability of catastrophe risk, and so as a basis to discuss the main reason that lead the catastrophe insurance market failures Analysis of innovation activities on the insurance market, and pointed to the expansion of market innovation catastrophe risk insurability boundary to bring market efficiency improvements. Analysis of the principles and tools of catastrophe risk financing in capital market, comprehensive comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of various capital markets instruments. Analyzes the catastrophe bonds as major financing instrument of capital market. and the premium of catastrophe bonds were investigated to explain. Combined with the latest market data, analyze market status assessment of catastrophe risk financing, and the prospects for its future development trend.
5. Catastrophe Risk Financing by Government. This part start from the general principles of economics from government intervention in the economy, combined with the uninsurability of catastrophe risk, analyzes the theoretical basis of catastrophe risk financing by government. Summarizes the main ways of financing catastrophe risk taken by the government and their characteristics, explores the U.S. flood insurance program. theoretical analysis on government relief under different expectations of the people.
6. Risk Sharing Between Insurers And State-Backed Catastrophe Insurance Fund. Through the establishment of a game model between private insurance companies and State-backed Catastrophe Insurance Fund, explores the risk of government and private insurance companies to share and how can get the equilibrium of the game. Analysis of catastrophe risk financing cases.
7. Financing Mechanism Design Based On Public-Private Partnership. Analyzes the shortcomings of our system of catastrophe risk financing, as well as our current funding gap faced catastrophe risk financing; followed by the establishment of inter-governmental and private insurance companies game model of public-private partnerships. Based on previous research this paper proposes to build a multi-level risk sharing basic framework of catastrophe risk financing overall objectives and the development of ideas
By studying the contents of the above article on catastrophe risk financing the research has made the following progress and innovation:
Respond effectively to the threat of catastrophic risks posed significant challenges facing the countries in the world. Catastrophe risk financing is an important part of risk management. Public-private partnerships in the provision of public goods and services has made remarkable achievements, this article study catastrophe risk financing based on Public-private partnerships, from a new perspective to explore solutions for catastrophe risk financing.
Despite nearly five years, the relevant theory of catastrophe risk management has been highly valued in academia, because of the lower starting point for research, development is slow, there are blank areas related research and inadequacies, particularly, the role of government and commercial enterprises, such as borders, need to further strengthen and improve. In this paper, the basic theory of catastrophe risk financing and public-private partnerships departure, the system analyzes the content of specific tools, financing scale and cost efficiencies, and other aspects of the financing, the design of our catastrophe risk financing mechanisms put forward policy recommendations, rich the contents of catastrophe risk financing theory.
Based on the expected utility theory framework to relax the assumption in the Theorem of risk diversification development by Borch and Samuelson, analyze the introduction of catastrophe insurance for intertemporal allocation of resource efficiency based on welfare economics. The presence of uncertainty in disaster conditions, depending on the efficiency of the standard definition, examines the role of catastrophe insurance in their respective situations.
Due to positive externalities and public goods characteristics of catastrophe risk financing, For the scientific analysis of catastrophe risk financing government intervention may be negative incentives for the public, the paper discusses in detail the disaster relief catastrophe risk financing and the different forms of pre-disaster premium subsidies for different risk perception bring the public impact of differences, as well as the government's own cost control.
Of course, it's a difficult issues to build an affordable, efficient and sustainable catastrophe risk financing around the world. Due to the available information, catastrophe risk financing empirical data limitations, the policy recommendations proposed financing mechanism is built on the theory discussed, empirical support is relatively weak, deeply study is needed to make the theory of catastrophe risk financing more perfect.
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