巨灾保险的慈善风险问题与公平效率均衡
|
摘要
最近几十年来,自然灾害的发生频率和强度都在以惊人的速度递增着。从1998年的长江等流域的大洪水,到2008年初的南方雪灾,到2008年“5 12”汶川大地震,再到最近中国西南五省百年一遇的特大旱灾,肆虐的自然灾害给中国带来了巨大的经济损失以及精神伤害。与巨大的经济损失形成反差的是,一些国家的巨灾保险市场的极度萎缩。面对潜在的巨灾风险,人们总是倾向于等待政府的救济援助以及慈善捐赠,而不愿意自己购买巨灾保险以转移风险。
由于政府在灾后的无偿援助以及慈善捐赠,造成了人们的依赖心理。这样,政府的事后免费救济带来了“慈善风险”(Charity Hazard),加重了政府的经济负担。本文在第三章系统分析了慈善风险的成因,利用一个博弈模型阐述了政府的灾后救济对个体防灾工程投资的影响,然后首次尝试用状态空间图分析政府的救济力度是如何影响个体的投保行为,我们发现政府的灾后救济力度越大,个体的保险需求越低,带来更大的慈善风险,并对政府的巨灾救济机制提出了一些建议。
鉴于慈善风险的存在,如何化解此类风险?在本文的第四章,我们考虑了强制性巨灾保险的模式,人人都得投保,但是到底是实行一致保费还是差异保费?本文选择的是差异保费的形式,但是尝试了一种税收-补贴机制,即对低风险地区的保险合同征收一定的税收,以此来补贴高风险地区的保险合同。我们发现这样的保险模式比一致保费的模式占优,这个模式阐述了如何实施差异保费,并采用税收-补贴机制来刺激高风险地区更积极地投资防灾工程。进一步地,政府也给高风险地区一定的防灾补贴,更好地刺激个体防灾减灾,实现更好的帕累托改进。
The last decades have witnessed the huge worldwide increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters. From the worst flooding along Yangzi River in 1998 in a century, to the snow disaster in the south of China in the beginning of 2008, to 5.12 Wenchuan earthquake in the same year, and to the recent months’especially big drought in the south west of China, these raged natural disasters have brought huge economic loss as well as mental injury to Chinese people. Compared to the huge loss, however, the catastrophe insurance market in some countries is very small. In face of the potential risks, people are always ready to receive governmental aid or charity donation for free without purchasing insurance against natural disasters.
Due to the free financial assistance and charity donation, people will solely rely on governmental support. Governmental relief reduces the demand for insurance cover and motivation for mitigation measures. As a result, charity hazard emerges, which increase the economic burden of government. In the third chapter, we analyze charity hazard systematically. By using a game model, we illustrate how the ex post governmental assistance influence people’s investing will in mitigation measures; and then we use state-space graph to analyze how the level of financial relief reduce people’s demand for insurance. We find that the individual is better off by solely relying on governmental support in a certain level of governmental aid. The higher level of governmental aid, the graver the charity hazard. We also propose some suggestions for governmental relief mechanism.
Because of the existence of charity hazard, how to reduce it? In the fourth chapter, we characterize the equity-efficiency trade-off faced by the policymakers under imperfect information about individual prevention costs. It is shown that a competitive insurance market with actuarial rate making and compensatory tax-subsidy transfers is likely to dominate regulated uniform insurance pricing rules. That is to tax insurance contracts in a low-risk area and subsidize insurance contracts in a high-risk area. The model illustrates how targeted tax cuts on insurance contracts can improve the incentives to prevention while compensating individuals with high prevention costs. Furthermore, if the government gives some subsidies to those who live in high risky areas for mitigation program, a better Pareto improvement has come into being.
由于政府在灾后的无偿援助以及慈善捐赠,造成了人们的依赖心理。这样,政府的事后免费救济带来了“慈善风险”(Charity Hazard),加重了政府的经济负担。本文在第三章系统分析了慈善风险的成因,利用一个博弈模型阐述了政府的灾后救济对个体防灾工程投资的影响,然后首次尝试用状态空间图分析政府的救济力度是如何影响个体的投保行为,我们发现政府的灾后救济力度越大,个体的保险需求越低,带来更大的慈善风险,并对政府的巨灾救济机制提出了一些建议。
鉴于慈善风险的存在,如何化解此类风险?在本文的第四章,我们考虑了强制性巨灾保险的模式,人人都得投保,但是到底是实行一致保费还是差异保费?本文选择的是差异保费的形式,但是尝试了一种税收-补贴机制,即对低风险地区的保险合同征收一定的税收,以此来补贴高风险地区的保险合同。我们发现这样的保险模式比一致保费的模式占优,这个模式阐述了如何实施差异保费,并采用税收-补贴机制来刺激高风险地区更积极地投资防灾工程。进一步地,政府也给高风险地区一定的防灾补贴,更好地刺激个体防灾减灾,实现更好的帕累托改进。
The last decades have witnessed the huge worldwide increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters. From the worst flooding along Yangzi River in 1998 in a century, to the snow disaster in the south of China in the beginning of 2008, to 5.12 Wenchuan earthquake in the same year, and to the recent months’especially big drought in the south west of China, these raged natural disasters have brought huge economic loss as well as mental injury to Chinese people. Compared to the huge loss, however, the catastrophe insurance market in some countries is very small. In face of the potential risks, people are always ready to receive governmental aid or charity donation for free without purchasing insurance against natural disasters.
Due to the free financial assistance and charity donation, people will solely rely on governmental support. Governmental relief reduces the demand for insurance cover and motivation for mitigation measures. As a result, charity hazard emerges, which increase the economic burden of government. In the third chapter, we analyze charity hazard systematically. By using a game model, we illustrate how the ex post governmental assistance influence people’s investing will in mitigation measures; and then we use state-space graph to analyze how the level of financial relief reduce people’s demand for insurance. We find that the individual is better off by solely relying on governmental support in a certain level of governmental aid. The higher level of governmental aid, the graver the charity hazard. We also propose some suggestions for governmental relief mechanism.
Because of the existence of charity hazard, how to reduce it? In the fourth chapter, we characterize the equity-efficiency trade-off faced by the policymakers under imperfect information about individual prevention costs. It is shown that a competitive insurance market with actuarial rate making and compensatory tax-subsidy transfers is likely to dominate regulated uniform insurance pricing rules. That is to tax insurance contracts in a low-risk area and subsidize insurance contracts in a high-risk area. The model illustrates how targeted tax cuts on insurance contracts can improve the incentives to prevention while compensating individuals with high prevention costs. Furthermore, if the government gives some subsidies to those who live in high risky areas for mitigation program, a better Pareto improvement has come into being.
引文
[1]张琴、陈柳钦,我国巨灾风险管理模式的设计及其运作金融发展研究[J],2009年05期,69-73
[2] Guy Carpenter, The world catastrophe reinsurance market[J], Report, Guy Carpenter & Company Inc. 2005
[3] Graff, Antonia, Die Versicherung von Elementarrisiken im Rahmen der verbundenen Hausratund der verbundenen Wohngebaudeversicherung Working Paper[J], University of Regensburg, Germany,1999
[4] Mark J. Browne, Robert E. Hoyt, The Demand for Flood Insurance: Empirical Evidence[J], Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2000, 20:3; 291-306
[5] Lewis, T., Nickerson, D., Self-insurance against natural disasters[J], Journal of Environmental Economics and Management16, 1989, 209-223
[6] Coate, S.. Altruism, the Samaritan’s dilemma, and government transfer policy[J],American Economic Review , 1995, 85 (1), 46–57
[7]李翼彪,从汶川大地震看巨灾保险和巨灾债券[J],浙江金融,2009年第6期,50-51
[8] Paul A. Raschky, Hannelore Weck-Hannemann, Charity hazard—A real hazard to natural disaster insurance? Environmental Hazards 7 (2007) 321–329
[9] Kelly, M., Kleffner, A.E., Optimal loss mitigation and contract design[J], Journal of Risk and Insurance 2003, 70(1), 53-72
[10] Kim, B.J. Schlesinger, H., Adverse selection in an insurance with government-guaranteed subsistence levels[J], Journal of Risk and Insurance 2005, 72 (1), 61-75
[11] Kunreuther, H.C., et. al., Disaster Insurance Protection: Public Policy Lessons[J], 1978, Wiley, New York
[12] Asseldonk, M., Meuwissen, M., Huirne, R., Belief in Disaster Relief and the Demand for a Public-Private Insurance Program[J], Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 2002, Volume 24, Issue 1Pp. 196-207
[13] Paul A. Raschky, Manijeh Schwindt, Aid, Catastrophes and the Samaritan’s Dilemma, Working Paper[J], April 15, 2008
[14] Paul. A. Raschky, Institutions and the losses from natural disasters, Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences[J], July 1,2008, 8, 627–634
[15] Arrow, K., Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care[J], American Economic Review, 1963, 53(5): 941-973
[16] Crocker, K.J. and A. Snow, The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry, Journal of Political Economy[J], 1986, 94(2):321-344
[17] Pierre Picard, Natural Disaster Insurance And The Equity-efficiency Trade-Off[J], The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2008, Vol. 75, No.1, 17-38
[18]关颖哲,浅析我国巨灾保险体系的构建[J],黑龙江对外经贸,2009年第5期,112-113
[19]石颖,我国巨灾保险发展现状[J],沿海企业与科技,2007年第04期,38-40
[20]雷星晖、苏涛永,我国农业自然灾害保险市场分析及其合理模式[J],自然灾害学报2006.12,Vol.15,No. 6,138-140
[21]潘席龙、陈龙、王艺浩,中国巨灾补偿基金制度研究[J],中国经济与管理科学,2009年第8期,3-7
[22]石兴,自然灾害风险可保性研究[J],保险研究,2008年第2期,49-54
[23]李炳圭、薛万里,我国商业保险公司经营地震巨灾保险的可行性探讨[J],保险职业学院学报,1996年第05期,29-33
[24]杨宝华,政府在巨灾保险体系中的角色定位与作用机制[J],上海保险,2008年第2期,24-27
[25]张雪梅、郭志仪,国外巨灾保险发展模式比较及对我国的启示[J],现代经济探讨,2008年07期,83-87
[26]柴化敏,国外巨灾保险体系及其对我国的启示[J],金融教学与研究,2008年第3期,76-78
[27]吕志勇、张良,我国巨灾风险损失的保险补偿机制研究[J],山东财经学院学报,2008年第四期,40-42
[28]王昕、黄琦忠,从汶川地震看我国巨灾保险制度[J],当代经济,2009年第6期,39-40
[29]梅广清、沈荣芳、张显东,基于委托—代理理论的自然灾害保险模型[J],运筹与管理,1998年12月,第七卷第四期,39-40
[30]梅广清、张垦、沈荣芳等,自然灾害保险的委托—代理模型[J],自然灾害学报,1999年5月,8卷2期,43-47
[31]张志明,保险公司巨灾保险风险证券化初探[J],东北财经大学学报,2006.05,60-63
[32]贾晓琴,浅谈巨灾保险证券化在我国的应用[J],北方经贸,2007年第03期,80-81
[33]马莉,巨灾债券与巨灾保险风险分散[J],广东金融学院学报,2008年1月,89-94
[34]王绍曾、苏航、唐璜等,巨灾保险证券化初探[J],金融管理,2009年第04期,12-12
[35]庆玲,对完善我国巨灾保险立法的思考[J],四川行政学院学报2008年第5期,50-53
[36] Jaffee, D., Russell, T., Markets under stress: the case of extreme event insurance[J], In: Arnot, R., Greenwald, B., Kanbur R., Nalebuff, B.(Eds.) Economics of an imperfect world. MIT press, Cambridge, MA, 2003, pp. 35-52.
[37]张维迎,博弈论与信息经济学[M],上海人民出版社,2004,1-245
[38]李晓杰,我国巨灾保险发展问题的博弈分析[J],企业家天地:理论版,2007年第11期,91-92
[39]李晓杰,基于博弈分析的我国巨灾保险模式研究[J],湖南大学硕士论文,2007,16-17
[40] Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., Tversky, A., Judgment under Uncertainty[J], Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982
[41]李海棠,论巨灾保险的需求与供给[J],保险职业学院学报(双月刊),2009年4月,第23卷第2期,45-48
[42] Rothschild, M. and J. E. Stiglitz, 1976, Equilibrium in competitive insurancemarkets: The economics of markets with imperfect information[J], Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 629-650
[43]程振源,保险市场非对称信息问题研究[M],人民出版社,2007年8月第一版,1-45
[44] Howard Kunreuther, Incentives for mitigation investment and more effective risk management: the need for public-private partnerships[J], Journal of Hazardous Materials 86(2001) 171-185
[45] Howard Kunreuther, Disaster Insurance: A Tool For Hazard Mitigation[J], Journal of risk and insurance (pre-1986), Jun 1974; 41, 2
[46] Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Losses through Insurance[J], Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1996,12:171-187
瑞士再保险:http://www.swissre.com/
中国民政部:http://www.mca.gov.cn/
中国保监会:http://www.circ.gov.cn/
[2] Guy Carpenter, The world catastrophe reinsurance market[J], Report, Guy Carpenter & Company Inc. 2005
[3] Graff, Antonia, Die Versicherung von Elementarrisiken im Rahmen der verbundenen Hausratund der verbundenen Wohngebaudeversicherung Working Paper[J], University of Regensburg, Germany,1999
[4] Mark J. Browne, Robert E. Hoyt, The Demand for Flood Insurance: Empirical Evidence[J], Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2000, 20:3; 291-306
[5] Lewis, T., Nickerson, D., Self-insurance against natural disasters[J], Journal of Environmental Economics and Management16, 1989, 209-223
[6] Coate, S.. Altruism, the Samaritan’s dilemma, and government transfer policy[J],American Economic Review , 1995, 85 (1), 46–57
[7]李翼彪,从汶川大地震看巨灾保险和巨灾债券[J],浙江金融,2009年第6期,50-51
[8] Paul A. Raschky, Hannelore Weck-Hannemann, Charity hazard—A real hazard to natural disaster insurance? Environmental Hazards 7 (2007) 321–329
[9] Kelly, M., Kleffner, A.E., Optimal loss mitigation and contract design[J], Journal of Risk and Insurance 2003, 70(1), 53-72
[10] Kim, B.J. Schlesinger, H., Adverse selection in an insurance with government-guaranteed subsistence levels[J], Journal of Risk and Insurance 2005, 72 (1), 61-75
[11] Kunreuther, H.C., et. al., Disaster Insurance Protection: Public Policy Lessons[J], 1978, Wiley, New York
[12] Asseldonk, M., Meuwissen, M., Huirne, R., Belief in Disaster Relief and the Demand for a Public-Private Insurance Program[J], Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 2002, Volume 24, Issue 1Pp. 196-207
[13] Paul A. Raschky, Manijeh Schwindt, Aid, Catastrophes and the Samaritan’s Dilemma, Working Paper[J], April 15, 2008
[14] Paul. A. Raschky, Institutions and the losses from natural disasters, Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences[J], July 1,2008, 8, 627–634
[15] Arrow, K., Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care[J], American Economic Review, 1963, 53(5): 941-973
[16] Crocker, K.J. and A. Snow, The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry, Journal of Political Economy[J], 1986, 94(2):321-344
[17] Pierre Picard, Natural Disaster Insurance And The Equity-efficiency Trade-Off[J], The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2008, Vol. 75, No.1, 17-38
[18]关颖哲,浅析我国巨灾保险体系的构建[J],黑龙江对外经贸,2009年第5期,112-113
[19]石颖,我国巨灾保险发展现状[J],沿海企业与科技,2007年第04期,38-40
[20]雷星晖、苏涛永,我国农业自然灾害保险市场分析及其合理模式[J],自然灾害学报2006.12,Vol.15,No. 6,138-140
[21]潘席龙、陈龙、王艺浩,中国巨灾补偿基金制度研究[J],中国经济与管理科学,2009年第8期,3-7
[22]石兴,自然灾害风险可保性研究[J],保险研究,2008年第2期,49-54
[23]李炳圭、薛万里,我国商业保险公司经营地震巨灾保险的可行性探讨[J],保险职业学院学报,1996年第05期,29-33
[24]杨宝华,政府在巨灾保险体系中的角色定位与作用机制[J],上海保险,2008年第2期,24-27
[25]张雪梅、郭志仪,国外巨灾保险发展模式比较及对我国的启示[J],现代经济探讨,2008年07期,83-87
[26]柴化敏,国外巨灾保险体系及其对我国的启示[J],金融教学与研究,2008年第3期,76-78
[27]吕志勇、张良,我国巨灾风险损失的保险补偿机制研究[J],山东财经学院学报,2008年第四期,40-42
[28]王昕、黄琦忠,从汶川地震看我国巨灾保险制度[J],当代经济,2009年第6期,39-40
[29]梅广清、沈荣芳、张显东,基于委托—代理理论的自然灾害保险模型[J],运筹与管理,1998年12月,第七卷第四期,39-40
[30]梅广清、张垦、沈荣芳等,自然灾害保险的委托—代理模型[J],自然灾害学报,1999年5月,8卷2期,43-47
[31]张志明,保险公司巨灾保险风险证券化初探[J],东北财经大学学报,2006.05,60-63
[32]贾晓琴,浅谈巨灾保险证券化在我国的应用[J],北方经贸,2007年第03期,80-81
[33]马莉,巨灾债券与巨灾保险风险分散[J],广东金融学院学报,2008年1月,89-94
[34]王绍曾、苏航、唐璜等,巨灾保险证券化初探[J],金融管理,2009年第04期,12-12
[35]庆玲,对完善我国巨灾保险立法的思考[J],四川行政学院学报2008年第5期,50-53
[36] Jaffee, D., Russell, T., Markets under stress: the case of extreme event insurance[J], In: Arnot, R., Greenwald, B., Kanbur R., Nalebuff, B.(Eds.) Economics of an imperfect world. MIT press, Cambridge, MA, 2003, pp. 35-52.
[37]张维迎,博弈论与信息经济学[M],上海人民出版社,2004,1-245
[38]李晓杰,我国巨灾保险发展问题的博弈分析[J],企业家天地:理论版,2007年第11期,91-92
[39]李晓杰,基于博弈分析的我国巨灾保险模式研究[J],湖南大学硕士论文,2007,16-17
[40] Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., Tversky, A., Judgment under Uncertainty[J], Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982
[41]李海棠,论巨灾保险的需求与供给[J],保险职业学院学报(双月刊),2009年4月,第23卷第2期,45-48
[42] Rothschild, M. and J. E. Stiglitz, 1976, Equilibrium in competitive insurancemarkets: The economics of markets with imperfect information[J], Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 629-650
[43]程振源,保险市场非对称信息问题研究[M],人民出版社,2007年8月第一版,1-45
[44] Howard Kunreuther, Incentives for mitigation investment and more effective risk management: the need for public-private partnerships[J], Journal of Hazardous Materials 86(2001) 171-185
[45] Howard Kunreuther, Disaster Insurance: A Tool For Hazard Mitigation[J], Journal of risk and insurance (pre-1986), Jun 1974; 41, 2
[46] Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Losses through Insurance[J], Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1996,12:171-187
瑞士再保险:http://www.swissre.com/
中国民政部:http://www.mca.gov.cn/
中国保监会:http://www.circ.gov.cn/