农业巨灾保险运行机制研究
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摘要
近年来自然气候变化剧烈导致自然灾害的频率和强度增加,人口的大量聚集和经济活动的迅速增长,导致巨灾损失不断加重。由于农业及农业巨灾风险具有高度的相关性和复杂性,导致农业巨灾的破坏性更大。频发的农业巨灾不仅大量摧毁了农业基础设施,破坏了生态环境,也大大地削弱了社会经济可持续发展能力,正成为经济快速发展和社会稳定的巨大阻碍。由于缺乏巨灾保险保障,中国主要依靠政府主导的财政救灾和灾后重建。在政府财力比较有限的情况下,不仅财政压力非常大,而且财政补偿的效率也很难保证。由于对农业巨灾风险和保险的认识不足,以及缺乏有效的运行机制和财政支持,导致农业巨灾保险长期缺失,保险手段分散农业巨灾风险的能力十分有限。虽然建立农业巨灾保险制度的现实需要日益突出,但农业巨灾保险相关理论研究和实践探索非常滞后。因此,加快建立农业巨灾保险制度,提高保险在农业巨灾风险管理和整个灾害救助体系中的作用,成为迫切需要解决的现实问题和重要课题。农业巨灾保险运行机制是农业巨灾保险制度建设的重要内容,因此在加快农业巨灾保险制度的建设过程中,探索运行机制的建立健全是非常重要的环节。
本研究着眼于保险分散农业巨灾风险的现实使命,以政策性保险为定位,以推动农业巨灾保险运行为目的,以健全完善运行机制为重点,通过理论与实证分析,探索基于中国现实国情基础上的农业巨灾保险运行机制。
研究的主要内容：本研究以建立有效的农业巨灾保险运行机制为目标,主要采取规范研究与实证研究结合,采用比较分析、实证调查、期望效用和联盟博弈等方法研究农业巨灾保险运作机理。以农业巨灾保险是准公共产品为切入点,确立运作农业巨灾保险的定位。研究农业巨灾保险的可保性和供求状况,分析当前中国农业巨灾保险的运行现状、存在问题以及造成农业巨灾保险供需失衡的根源。研究农业巨灾保险各利益主体间的博弈行为与运作机理,分析保险主体参与的合作方式、条件。寻找农业巨灾保险运行应满足的基础条件,探索构造运作机制和有效途径,为解决农业巨灾保险运行困境提供条件和保障。
研究的主要结论：农业巨灾保险是具有双重正外部效应的准公共产品,发展农业巨灾保险会产生多重复合效应。中国农业巨灾保险的发展正处于重视阶段,农业巨灾保险可保条件和时机逐渐成熟具备可保性。农业巨灾保险客观存在外部效应和供给主体缺失、需求主体不足的市场失灵等问题,导致其长期供需失衡,而推动保险运行的有效机制非常欠缺和滞后。政府作为掌控和配置公共资源的主体,在农业巨灾保险运行中应发挥积极作用,目前政府在巨灾运行中“错位”与“缺位”并存,需要转换角色和位置。采取政府诱导的多方合作是农业巨灾保险主体参与的优化选择,实证调查表明政府财政补贴等诱导激励机制将极大提高农户的保险需求意愿。此外,诱导符合中国农村发展水平的农业巨灾保险合作组织作为第四方主体参与保险运行,可减低农户小农经营过度分散导致的逆向选择和道德风险,大大推动农业巨灾保险运行。农业巨灾保险的运行必须满足系列条件,政府与市场的公私伙伴合作机制,既能发挥政府机制的诱导优势,又能发挥市场机制的效率优势,共同合作能为保险运行提供有效的基础条件和保障。
论文的创新点：(1)深度揭示农业巨灾保险的多重复合效应。通过深度分析揭示了农业巨灾保险的多重正外部效应：风险分散效应、金融乘数效应和社会保障效应等。(2)基于多方保险主体博弈分析提出合作保险模式。借鉴相关理论和国外实践,对保险利益主体的博弈行为和运作机理进行逻辑推导、实证调查和优化分析得出：作为准公共产品的农业巨灾保险适合采取政府、农业巨灾保险合作组织、保险公司和农户等主体共同合作的保险模式。(3)构造了政府诱导的公私伙伴合作机制。基于中国现实国情构造了发挥政府机制诱导优势和市场机制效率优势相结合的政府与市场伙伴合作机制,共同为保险运行提供条件和解决途径,以实现农业巨灾保险的供给和需求由非均衡向均衡发展。
In recent years, dramatic natural climate change leads to increased frequency and intensity of natural disasters, gathering a large number of rapidly growing population and economic activity, resulting in catastrophic losses increasing. As agriculture and agricultural catastrophe risk is highly relevant and complex, leading to a devastating agricultural catastrophe. Frequent agricultural catastrophe not only a large number of agricultural infrastructure destroyed, damage to the environment, but also greatly weakened the capacity for sustainable social and economic development, is becoming a huge obstacle rapid economic development and social stability. Due to the lack of catastrophe insurance, China mainly relies on government-led financial relief and reconstruction. In the case of limited government financial resources, not only financial pressure is very large, and the efficiency of financial compensation is also difficult to ensure. Due to lack of agricultural catastrophe risk and insurance awareness, and the lack of effective operational mechanism and financial support, leading to a long-term lack of agricultural catastrophe insurance, the insurance means the ability to disperse agricultural catastrophe risk is very limited. Although the establishment of agricultural catastrophe insurance system needs a reality increasingly prominent, but the agricultural catastrophe insurance-related theory and practice is lagging behind. Therefore, accelerating the establishment of agricultural catastrophe insurance system, enhance the role of insurance in the agricultural catastrophe risk management and the entire disaster relief system has become reality and the urgent need to address an important issue. Agricultural catastrophe insurance operation mechanism is an important agricultural catastrophe insurance system, thus speeding up the construction of agricultural catastrophe insurance system in the process, to explore the establishment of a sound operational mechanism is a very important part.
This study focuses dispersed agricultural catastrophe risk insurance realistic mission to locate insurance policy in order to promote agricultural catastrophe insurance run for the purpose to improve and perfect the operational mechanism, focusing on theoretical and empirical analysis, exploration based on the actual situation in China agricultural catastrophe insurance on the basis of the operating mechanism,
The main contents of the study:The study to establish an effective mechanism for the operation of agricultural catastrophe insurance goal, the main use of standardized combination of research and empirical research, the use of comparative analysis, empirical investigation, expected utility function and other methods to analyze agricultural League Game catastrophe insurance operations mechanism. Agricultural catastrophe insurance is a quasi-public goods as a starting point to establish operational positioning agricultural catastrophe insurance. Research agricultural catastrophe insurance insurability and supply and demand situation analyze the current status of China's agricultural catastrophe insurance run, problems and root causes of the imbalance between supply and demand of agricultural catastrophe insurance. Game Behavior Research and operation mechanism between various stakeholders agricultural catastrophe insurance, the insurance body involved in the analysis of cooperation, conditions. Looking basic conditions for agricultural catastrophe insurance operation should meet to explore effective ways to structure and operational mechanism for addressing the plight of the agricultural catastrophe insurance operation conditions and provide protection.
The main conclusions of the study:agricultural catastrophe insurance is a dual positive external effects of quasi-public goods, the development of agricultural catastrophe insurance will have multiple complex effects. Development of China's agricultural catastrophe insurance is in emphasis stage, agricultural catastrophe insurance insurable mature with the conditions and timing of insurability. Agricultural catastrophe insurance objective externalities and market failures, lack of insurance supply and demand main body underpowered and other reasons, led to its long-term supply and demand imbalances, and an effective mechanism for promoting the insurance run very lacking and lagging. Government control and configuration as the main public resources in agriculture catastrophe insurance operation should play an active role in the operation of the current government in catastrophe "misplaced" and "absence" co-exist, the need to convert the role and position. Multilateral cooperation to take government-induced body involved in agricultural catastrophe insurance selection and optimization, empirical investigation shows that government subsidies and other incentives to induce insurance needs will greatly enhance the wishes of farmers. In addition, the induction realistic agricultural catastrophe insurance cooperative organizations in rural development in China, as the main parties involved in the insurance run fourth, smallholder fanners can reduce adverse selection and moral hazard operations caused excessive fragmentation, greatly promote agricultural catastrophe insurance operation. Agricultural catastrophe insurance run series of conditions must be met, public-private partnership between government and market mechanisms, both to play the advantages of government-induced mechanisms, but also the advantages of market mechanisms to achieve efficiency of resource allocation, collaboration can be provided for agricultural catastrophe insurance operation Effective basic conditions and protection.
Dissertation are:(1) reveals the depth of the composite effect of multiple agricultural catastrophe insurance. Risk diversification effect, the multiplier effect of the financial and social security, and other effects:reveals the multiple positive externalities of agricultural catastrophe insurance through in-depth analysis.(2) based on multi-game analysis raised the subject of insurance co-insurance model. Learn the theory and practice abroad, game conduct and operation of the mechanism of insurance stakeholders logical inference, empirical investigation and optimization of results:As a quasi-public agricultural catastrophe insurance products suitable to take the government, agricultural catastrophe insurance cooperatives, insurance fanners and other insurance companies and the main mode of joint cooperation.(3) construct a public-private partnership mechanisms for government-induced. Based on the actual situation in China is constructed mechanism to induce the government to play a partnership between government and market mechanisms and market mechanisms efficiency advantages of combining together to provide the conditions and solutions for the insurance run, can effectively promote agricultural catastrophe insurance from non-equilibrium of supply and demand to balanced development.
本研究着眼于保险分散农业巨灾风险的现实使命,以政策性保险为定位,以推动农业巨灾保险运行为目的,以健全完善运行机制为重点,通过理论与实证分析,探索基于中国现实国情基础上的农业巨灾保险运行机制。
研究的主要内容：本研究以建立有效的农业巨灾保险运行机制为目标,主要采取规范研究与实证研究结合,采用比较分析、实证调查、期望效用和联盟博弈等方法研究农业巨灾保险运作机理。以农业巨灾保险是准公共产品为切入点,确立运作农业巨灾保险的定位。研究农业巨灾保险的可保性和供求状况,分析当前中国农业巨灾保险的运行现状、存在问题以及造成农业巨灾保险供需失衡的根源。研究农业巨灾保险各利益主体间的博弈行为与运作机理,分析保险主体参与的合作方式、条件。寻找农业巨灾保险运行应满足的基础条件,探索构造运作机制和有效途径,为解决农业巨灾保险运行困境提供条件和保障。
研究的主要结论：农业巨灾保险是具有双重正外部效应的准公共产品,发展农业巨灾保险会产生多重复合效应。中国农业巨灾保险的发展正处于重视阶段,农业巨灾保险可保条件和时机逐渐成熟具备可保性。农业巨灾保险客观存在外部效应和供给主体缺失、需求主体不足的市场失灵等问题,导致其长期供需失衡,而推动保险运行的有效机制非常欠缺和滞后。政府作为掌控和配置公共资源的主体,在农业巨灾保险运行中应发挥积极作用,目前政府在巨灾运行中“错位”与“缺位”并存,需要转换角色和位置。采取政府诱导的多方合作是农业巨灾保险主体参与的优化选择,实证调查表明政府财政补贴等诱导激励机制将极大提高农户的保险需求意愿。此外,诱导符合中国农村发展水平的农业巨灾保险合作组织作为第四方主体参与保险运行,可减低农户小农经营过度分散导致的逆向选择和道德风险,大大推动农业巨灾保险运行。农业巨灾保险的运行必须满足系列条件,政府与市场的公私伙伴合作机制,既能发挥政府机制的诱导优势,又能发挥市场机制的效率优势,共同合作能为保险运行提供有效的基础条件和保障。
论文的创新点：(1)深度揭示农业巨灾保险的多重复合效应。通过深度分析揭示了农业巨灾保险的多重正外部效应：风险分散效应、金融乘数效应和社会保障效应等。(2)基于多方保险主体博弈分析提出合作保险模式。借鉴相关理论和国外实践,对保险利益主体的博弈行为和运作机理进行逻辑推导、实证调查和优化分析得出：作为准公共产品的农业巨灾保险适合采取政府、农业巨灾保险合作组织、保险公司和农户等主体共同合作的保险模式。(3)构造了政府诱导的公私伙伴合作机制。基于中国现实国情构造了发挥政府机制诱导优势和市场机制效率优势相结合的政府与市场伙伴合作机制,共同为保险运行提供条件和解决途径,以实现农业巨灾保险的供给和需求由非均衡向均衡发展。
In recent years, dramatic natural climate change leads to increased frequency and intensity of natural disasters, gathering a large number of rapidly growing population and economic activity, resulting in catastrophic losses increasing. As agriculture and agricultural catastrophe risk is highly relevant and complex, leading to a devastating agricultural catastrophe. Frequent agricultural catastrophe not only a large number of agricultural infrastructure destroyed, damage to the environment, but also greatly weakened the capacity for sustainable social and economic development, is becoming a huge obstacle rapid economic development and social stability. Due to the lack of catastrophe insurance, China mainly relies on government-led financial relief and reconstruction. In the case of limited government financial resources, not only financial pressure is very large, and the efficiency of financial compensation is also difficult to ensure. Due to lack of agricultural catastrophe risk and insurance awareness, and the lack of effective operational mechanism and financial support, leading to a long-term lack of agricultural catastrophe insurance, the insurance means the ability to disperse agricultural catastrophe risk is very limited. Although the establishment of agricultural catastrophe insurance system needs a reality increasingly prominent, but the agricultural catastrophe insurance-related theory and practice is lagging behind. Therefore, accelerating the establishment of agricultural catastrophe insurance system, enhance the role of insurance in the agricultural catastrophe risk management and the entire disaster relief system has become reality and the urgent need to address an important issue. Agricultural catastrophe insurance operation mechanism is an important agricultural catastrophe insurance system, thus speeding up the construction of agricultural catastrophe insurance system in the process, to explore the establishment of a sound operational mechanism is a very important part.
This study focuses dispersed agricultural catastrophe risk insurance realistic mission to locate insurance policy in order to promote agricultural catastrophe insurance run for the purpose to improve and perfect the operational mechanism, focusing on theoretical and empirical analysis, exploration based on the actual situation in China agricultural catastrophe insurance on the basis of the operating mechanism,
The main contents of the study:The study to establish an effective mechanism for the operation of agricultural catastrophe insurance goal, the main use of standardized combination of research and empirical research, the use of comparative analysis, empirical investigation, expected utility function and other methods to analyze agricultural League Game catastrophe insurance operations mechanism. Agricultural catastrophe insurance is a quasi-public goods as a starting point to establish operational positioning agricultural catastrophe insurance. Research agricultural catastrophe insurance insurability and supply and demand situation analyze the current status of China's agricultural catastrophe insurance run, problems and root causes of the imbalance between supply and demand of agricultural catastrophe insurance. Game Behavior Research and operation mechanism between various stakeholders agricultural catastrophe insurance, the insurance body involved in the analysis of cooperation, conditions. Looking basic conditions for agricultural catastrophe insurance operation should meet to explore effective ways to structure and operational mechanism for addressing the plight of the agricultural catastrophe insurance operation conditions and provide protection.
The main conclusions of the study:agricultural catastrophe insurance is a dual positive external effects of quasi-public goods, the development of agricultural catastrophe insurance will have multiple complex effects. Development of China's agricultural catastrophe insurance is in emphasis stage, agricultural catastrophe insurance insurable mature with the conditions and timing of insurability. Agricultural catastrophe insurance objective externalities and market failures, lack of insurance supply and demand main body underpowered and other reasons, led to its long-term supply and demand imbalances, and an effective mechanism for promoting the insurance run very lacking and lagging. Government control and configuration as the main public resources in agriculture catastrophe insurance operation should play an active role in the operation of the current government in catastrophe "misplaced" and "absence" co-exist, the need to convert the role and position. Multilateral cooperation to take government-induced body involved in agricultural catastrophe insurance selection and optimization, empirical investigation shows that government subsidies and other incentives to induce insurance needs will greatly enhance the wishes of farmers. In addition, the induction realistic agricultural catastrophe insurance cooperative organizations in rural development in China, as the main parties involved in the insurance run fourth, smallholder fanners can reduce adverse selection and moral hazard operations caused excessive fragmentation, greatly promote agricultural catastrophe insurance operation. Agricultural catastrophe insurance run series of conditions must be met, public-private partnership between government and market mechanisms, both to play the advantages of government-induced mechanisms, but also the advantages of market mechanisms to achieve efficiency of resource allocation, collaboration can be provided for agricultural catastrophe insurance operation Effective basic conditions and protection.
Dissertation are:(1) reveals the depth of the composite effect of multiple agricultural catastrophe insurance. Risk diversification effect, the multiplier effect of the financial and social security, and other effects:reveals the multiple positive externalities of agricultural catastrophe insurance through in-depth analysis.(2) based on multi-game analysis raised the subject of insurance co-insurance model. Learn the theory and practice abroad, game conduct and operation of the mechanism of insurance stakeholders logical inference, empirical investigation and optimization of results:As a quasi-public agricultural catastrophe insurance products suitable to take the government, agricultural catastrophe insurance cooperatives, insurance fanners and other insurance companies and the main mode of joint cooperation.(3) construct a public-private partnership mechanisms for government-induced. Based on the actual situation in China is constructed mechanism to induce the government to play a partnership between government and market mechanisms and market mechanisms efficiency advantages of combining together to provide the conditions and solutions for the insurance run, can effectively promote agricultural catastrophe insurance from non-equilibrium of supply and demand to balanced development.
引文
① 数据来源：严琼芳,吴猛猛《我国农村居民家庭财产现状与结构分析》,中南民族大学学报,2013(3)
② 资料来源：James M.Buchanan, "An Economic Theory of Clubs", Economica, New Series, Volume32, lsue125(Feb.,1965), pp1-14
③ 资料来源：魏华林,林宝清：《保险学》(第二版),北京,高等教育出版社,2006,P：293
④ 资料来源：魏华林,林宝清：《保险学》(第二版),北京,高等教育出版社,2006,P：414
⑤ 数据来源：张轶骁.《2012年保险专业中介机构共2532家减少了22家》,新京报,2013.3.6
⑥ 数据来源：《2013年我国农业保险承保面积突破10亿亩》,新华网,2014.1.21
⑦ 资料来源：《2010年我国区域经济形势分析及2011年对策建议》,中国经济时报,2010.5.12.
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⑨ 资料来源：王珊珊.《安徽完成天气指数保险首例赔付》.中国保险报.2011.5.16.
⑩ 数据来源：张旭升.《中国巨灾风险暴露与巨灾保险赔付不对称实证》.求索.2010.3.p51
(?) 资料来源：冯文丽.《政策性农业保险补贴规模可以有多大?》.中国保险报.2012.2.9
(?) 来源：陈运来.《推进农业保险的福利化转型》.人民日报.2012.5.10
(?) 来源：工商总局.《2014年2月全国市场主体发展报告：全国市场主体数量稳步增长》.中国工商报.2014.3.12
(?) 来源：董峻.《全国家庭农场达87.7万个》.新华网2013.6.4
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