中国农村小额信贷机构贷款定价研究
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摘要
在农村信贷市场中,农民融资难、农村贷款难、农业发展难以得到有效的资金支持,是困扰地方发展的一个重要问题。20世纪70年代兴起的小额信贷以及全球小额信贷的蓬勃发展,为解决农村金融市场的困境带来了曙光。至今,小额信贷已经为全球数以亿计的穷人发放了贷款,影响面达到5亿多人。但是,在有效扩大农村金融服务覆盖面的同时,小额信贷机构贷款定价问题引起了越来越多的关注。贫困客户大多面临着高于银行贷款的利率。同时,在商业化的背景下,部分小额信贷机构从贫困客户手中获得大量的利润,这引起了较大范围的指责。
随着我国利率市场化改革进程的推进,金融机构贷款利率浮动区间不断放宽。继2004年1月1日扩大贷款利率浮动区间之后,中国人民银行从2004年10月29日起上调金融机构存贷款基准利率,并进一步放宽人民币贷款利率浮动区间。对金融机构(不含城乡信用社)的贷款利率原则上不再设定上限,贷款利率下浮幅度不变,贷款利率下限仍为基准利率的0.9倍。对金融竞争环境尚不完善的农村信用社,贷款利率仍实行上限管理,最高上浮系数为贷款基准利率的2.3倍,贷款利率下浮幅度不变。而小额贷款公司,最高上浮系数为贷款基准利率的4倍。在中国利率市场化政策不断推进的同时,小额信贷机构利率定价工作也已经取得一定进展,也存在一定的技术、管理难题。在此背景下,深入把握小额信贷利率定价的原理以及理论逻辑,分析评估小额信贷利率定价的实践进展,具有重要的理论与现实意义。
本论文分为八章,具体研究内容如下:
第一章,导论。从小额信贷机构贷款定价的国际背景与我国的实践需求出发,确立了论文的研究主题。在此基础上,通过国内外研究综述,明确了论文的研究思路、研究内容以及研究方法,对于论文的可能创新之处做了说明。
第二章,小额信贷机构贷款利率定价的理论基础。小额信贷机构既要考虑客户的负担能力,又要考虑弥补成本所必须的利润水平,在贷款定价之中综合权衡。本章界定了小额信贷机构贷款利率的基本概念,给出了小额信贷机构贷款利率的几种计算公式,归纳了小额信贷机构贷款利率期限的几种理论,提出了小额信贷利率的几个基本认识。
第三章,小额信贷机构贷款定价的测定。在本章中,对小额信贷机构的成本结构、有效利率的影响因素以及有效利率的计算进行了明确。通过数值测算,本章对不同影响因素对小额信贷机构有效利率的效果进行了演示,从另一个角度证明了小额信贷机构尽管面临利率上限约束,但是完全可以通过多元化的方法绕开限制。在消费者保护缺失以及金融知识欠缺的背景下,小额信贷机构的贷款利率定价远远超出我们的想象。
第四章,农村小额信贷机构贷款定价模板选择。在本章中,逐个探讨目前利率定价改革中可以采用的几个模板,主要介绍各自的定价方法、流程、监督、组织构架等方面内容,为小额信贷机构贷款利率定价树立基本的模式。
第五章,小额信贷机构贷款定价中的激励效应:逆向选择问题。本章分析了西部农村信用社利率定价对于借贷双方的激励效应。建立了逆向选择模型,分析了个人责任以及连带责任合同下的最优利率以及贷款条件。论文提出如下主要结论:(1)在不完全信息背景下,农信社发放个人信用贷款面临更强的约束条件,信贷投入不足的问题会在一定程度上必然存在。(2)在担保贷款与连带责任贷款合同中,存在着对于优质借款人实行优惠利率的空间。如果农信社普遍上浮利率,则借款人利率反应偏高的状况将会比较普遍。利用陕西省延安市与汉中市的调研资料,检验了上述命题。
第六章,小额信贷机构贷款定价中的激励效应:道德风险问题。在本章中,我们试图考虑道德风险对小额信贷机构贷款定价问题的影响。具体而言,本章试图修正Conning(1996)的有关模型,对道德风险背景下的贷款利率定价问题进行研究,考虑不同贷款技术选择对于道德风险的影响,以及在不同技术背景下的最优贷款定价区间。
第七章,小额信贷机构贷款定价的经验研究:陕西省农信社调研。理论研究以及国际实践认为,差别化定价有助于解决农村信贷配给问题。本章通过对陕西省范围内的农村信贷市场展开调查,试图对2004年以来农村信用社利率定价改革的执行状况进行了解,对于政策绩效进行评估,从中找出利率定价改革推行中的经验以及问题,并对完善下一步的利率定价政策提出建议。调研结果表明,农信社经营的客观条件以及农村信贷市场的垄断性,造成利率定价无助于改善信贷投入。提出了完善农信社利率定价内部条件,建立竞争性农村金融市场等建议,以期改善农村信贷市场效率。
第八章,农村小额信贷机构贷款定价改革的政策建议。本章提出推进农村小额信贷机构贷款定价改革的政策建议:鼓励竞争,发挥市场作用来提升效率;推进消费者保护;推进消费者教育,提高理财能力;加强对利率浮动政策执行情况进行指导和监测;建立农村信用担保体系;规范并引导民间金融有序发展。
In rural credit market, the difficulties of farmer and rural financing as well as the scarce financial support to agricultural develppment are crucial issues bothing regional development. Microfinance with rapid global development offers hopes for the dissolve of difficulties in rural credit market. Neverthness, loan pricing of microfinance institutions has been causing more and more attentions while they have greatly widen the coverage of rural finance. The poor mostly encounter higher interest rates than that of banks. Meanwhile, large amount of profit, from the poor customers, of some microfinance institutions have faced widely accusation.
With the development of market-based interest rate reform, the floating zone of interest rates of financial organizations. After the floating zone of interest rates has been wideened since January 1st of 2004, The People’s Bank of China wided it further whileas raising the level of deposit reserves from 29 Ocotober. The super limits of financial organizations except rural and urban credit unions have been given up, while the floor level remained 90 percent of base interest. Interest upper limitation as high as 2.3 times of base rate still been put into rural credit cooperatives because of the defect of financal competiveness. And for microfinance loan companies, the upper limit can be as high as 4 times of the base. Seven chapters are included in this theses, and the content of each chapter are seen bolow.
Chapter 1: introduction. Based on international background and practical demand of loan pricing of microfinance institutions, this chapter offers the research theme. The clue of research thought, research content and research methods are determined after review of literatures home and abroad. The possible innovation of this thesis are also prompted.
Chapter 2: fundmental of loan pricing theories of microfinance institutions. Microfinance institutions should trade off in loan pricing, either considering the burden ability of customer, or thinking over the necessary profit level to compensate costs. In this chapter, basic conceptions of loan pricing of microfinance inatitutions are defined, several formuals offered, theories on interest time limitations given, basic ideas proposed.
Chapter 3: Loan pricing caculations of microfinance institutions. In this chapter, such issues as cost structure of microfinance institutions, influencing factors and calculation of effective intereat are declared. This chapter, through value simulation, offers a performance demonstration of effective factors to interests. From another perspective, it proves that microfiance institutions can waive the interest limitation policy although such policy have been put. Loan pricing of microfinance institutions is far from our thinking especially under the background of scarcity of consumer protection and financial literacy.
Chapter 4: Selection of loan pricing samples of rural microfinance institutions. Several samples for interest reform are discussed in this chapter. It mainly introduces method, sequence, supervise and organizations of such samples, which aimes to offer same models for microfinance institutions.
Chapter 5: Incentive effect during loan pricing of microfinance institutions: adverse selection model. This paper analyzes the incentive effect of borrower and lender when the Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) implement the reform of interest rates pricing in West China. Based on an adverse selection model, this paper analyzes the optimal interests and lending conditions under individual & joint liability contract. The main propositions are offered as followings: i. Under the circumstance of imperfect information, RCCs encounter stronger constraints when offering individual credit loans and the defect of credit input should certainly exist to some extent. ii. The space of preferential interest rate is possible for super borrower under the guarantee & joint liability loan contracts. If the interest rates are raised globally by RCC, the borrowers will certainly reflect over higher interest burden. This paper tests these propositions through the case study of Baoji City and Hanzhong City in Shaanxi Province. A serial of public policy recommendation are suggested, such as perfecting creditworthiness of farmer households, advocating market growth of guarantee, enhancing cultivation of interest rates management talents, in the hope of promoting the efficiency of rural credit market.
Chapter 6: Incentive effect during loan pricing of microfinance institutions: moral hazard model. In this chapter, we try to demonsrate the effect of moral hazard to loan pricing of microfinance institutions. Precisely, we study loan pricing under moral hazard under moral hazard, through a modification of Conning(1996) model. The effect of different loan techniques to moral hazard and the optimal zone for loan pricing are discused.
Chapter 7: policy recommodations for government during China’s Urbanization. Differentiated interest rate pricing can solve credit rationing according to theoretical reserch and international practice. This report investigates rural credit market in Shaanxi Province in order to analyze the following problems: i. the implementation of Interest Rates Pricing Reform of Rural Credit Cooperatives(RCC) since 2004; ii. the performance of Interest Rates Pricing Reform; iii. the experience and weakness of the reform; iv.the policy implication of perfecting the reform. The result is that interest pricing reform cannot improve credit input because of the objective conditions of RCC operation and the monopoly of rural credit market. A serial of public policy recommendation are suggested, such as perfecting the internal conditions of rural interest reform, constructing a competitive rural credit market, in the hope of promoting the efficiency of rural credit market.
Chapter 8: Policy recomadations for loan pricing reform of microfinance insttutions in rural China. Such policy recomadations are proposed as the followings: i. Improving efficiency through market funcation based on competitions; ii. Implementing consumer protection; iii. Improcing financial literacy through consumer education; iv. Enhencing direction and supervision on implentation of interest floating policy; v. Setting rural credit collateral system; vi. Regulating and directing the sound development of informal finance.
随着我国利率市场化改革进程的推进,金融机构贷款利率浮动区间不断放宽。继2004年1月1日扩大贷款利率浮动区间之后,中国人民银行从2004年10月29日起上调金融机构存贷款基准利率,并进一步放宽人民币贷款利率浮动区间。对金融机构(不含城乡信用社)的贷款利率原则上不再设定上限,贷款利率下浮幅度不变,贷款利率下限仍为基准利率的0.9倍。对金融竞争环境尚不完善的农村信用社,贷款利率仍实行上限管理,最高上浮系数为贷款基准利率的2.3倍,贷款利率下浮幅度不变。而小额贷款公司,最高上浮系数为贷款基准利率的4倍。在中国利率市场化政策不断推进的同时,小额信贷机构利率定价工作也已经取得一定进展,也存在一定的技术、管理难题。在此背景下,深入把握小额信贷利率定价的原理以及理论逻辑,分析评估小额信贷利率定价的实践进展,具有重要的理论与现实意义。
本论文分为八章,具体研究内容如下:
第一章,导论。从小额信贷机构贷款定价的国际背景与我国的实践需求出发,确立了论文的研究主题。在此基础上,通过国内外研究综述,明确了论文的研究思路、研究内容以及研究方法,对于论文的可能创新之处做了说明。
第二章,小额信贷机构贷款利率定价的理论基础。小额信贷机构既要考虑客户的负担能力,又要考虑弥补成本所必须的利润水平,在贷款定价之中综合权衡。本章界定了小额信贷机构贷款利率的基本概念,给出了小额信贷机构贷款利率的几种计算公式,归纳了小额信贷机构贷款利率期限的几种理论,提出了小额信贷利率的几个基本认识。
第三章,小额信贷机构贷款定价的测定。在本章中,对小额信贷机构的成本结构、有效利率的影响因素以及有效利率的计算进行了明确。通过数值测算,本章对不同影响因素对小额信贷机构有效利率的效果进行了演示,从另一个角度证明了小额信贷机构尽管面临利率上限约束,但是完全可以通过多元化的方法绕开限制。在消费者保护缺失以及金融知识欠缺的背景下,小额信贷机构的贷款利率定价远远超出我们的想象。
第四章,农村小额信贷机构贷款定价模板选择。在本章中,逐个探讨目前利率定价改革中可以采用的几个模板,主要介绍各自的定价方法、流程、监督、组织构架等方面内容,为小额信贷机构贷款利率定价树立基本的模式。
第五章,小额信贷机构贷款定价中的激励效应:逆向选择问题。本章分析了西部农村信用社利率定价对于借贷双方的激励效应。建立了逆向选择模型,分析了个人责任以及连带责任合同下的最优利率以及贷款条件。论文提出如下主要结论:(1)在不完全信息背景下,农信社发放个人信用贷款面临更强的约束条件,信贷投入不足的问题会在一定程度上必然存在。(2)在担保贷款与连带责任贷款合同中,存在着对于优质借款人实行优惠利率的空间。如果农信社普遍上浮利率,则借款人利率反应偏高的状况将会比较普遍。利用陕西省延安市与汉中市的调研资料,检验了上述命题。
第六章,小额信贷机构贷款定价中的激励效应:道德风险问题。在本章中,我们试图考虑道德风险对小额信贷机构贷款定价问题的影响。具体而言,本章试图修正Conning(1996)的有关模型,对道德风险背景下的贷款利率定价问题进行研究,考虑不同贷款技术选择对于道德风险的影响,以及在不同技术背景下的最优贷款定价区间。
第七章,小额信贷机构贷款定价的经验研究:陕西省农信社调研。理论研究以及国际实践认为,差别化定价有助于解决农村信贷配给问题。本章通过对陕西省范围内的农村信贷市场展开调查,试图对2004年以来农村信用社利率定价改革的执行状况进行了解,对于政策绩效进行评估,从中找出利率定价改革推行中的经验以及问题,并对完善下一步的利率定价政策提出建议。调研结果表明,农信社经营的客观条件以及农村信贷市场的垄断性,造成利率定价无助于改善信贷投入。提出了完善农信社利率定价内部条件,建立竞争性农村金融市场等建议,以期改善农村信贷市场效率。
第八章,农村小额信贷机构贷款定价改革的政策建议。本章提出推进农村小额信贷机构贷款定价改革的政策建议:鼓励竞争,发挥市场作用来提升效率;推进消费者保护;推进消费者教育,提高理财能力;加强对利率浮动政策执行情况进行指导和监测;建立农村信用担保体系;规范并引导民间金融有序发展。
In rural credit market, the difficulties of farmer and rural financing as well as the scarce financial support to agricultural develppment are crucial issues bothing regional development. Microfinance with rapid global development offers hopes for the dissolve of difficulties in rural credit market. Neverthness, loan pricing of microfinance institutions has been causing more and more attentions while they have greatly widen the coverage of rural finance. The poor mostly encounter higher interest rates than that of banks. Meanwhile, large amount of profit, from the poor customers, of some microfinance institutions have faced widely accusation.
With the development of market-based interest rate reform, the floating zone of interest rates of financial organizations. After the floating zone of interest rates has been wideened since January 1st of 2004, The People’s Bank of China wided it further whileas raising the level of deposit reserves from 29 Ocotober. The super limits of financial organizations except rural and urban credit unions have been given up, while the floor level remained 90 percent of base interest. Interest upper limitation as high as 2.3 times of base rate still been put into rural credit cooperatives because of the defect of financal competiveness. And for microfinance loan companies, the upper limit can be as high as 4 times of the base. Seven chapters are included in this theses, and the content of each chapter are seen bolow.
Chapter 1: introduction. Based on international background and practical demand of loan pricing of microfinance institutions, this chapter offers the research theme. The clue of research thought, research content and research methods are determined after review of literatures home and abroad. The possible innovation of this thesis are also prompted.
Chapter 2: fundmental of loan pricing theories of microfinance institutions. Microfinance institutions should trade off in loan pricing, either considering the burden ability of customer, or thinking over the necessary profit level to compensate costs. In this chapter, basic conceptions of loan pricing of microfinance inatitutions are defined, several formuals offered, theories on interest time limitations given, basic ideas proposed.
Chapter 3: Loan pricing caculations of microfinance institutions. In this chapter, such issues as cost structure of microfinance institutions, influencing factors and calculation of effective intereat are declared. This chapter, through value simulation, offers a performance demonstration of effective factors to interests. From another perspective, it proves that microfiance institutions can waive the interest limitation policy although such policy have been put. Loan pricing of microfinance institutions is far from our thinking especially under the background of scarcity of consumer protection and financial literacy.
Chapter 4: Selection of loan pricing samples of rural microfinance institutions. Several samples for interest reform are discussed in this chapter. It mainly introduces method, sequence, supervise and organizations of such samples, which aimes to offer same models for microfinance institutions.
Chapter 5: Incentive effect during loan pricing of microfinance institutions: adverse selection model. This paper analyzes the incentive effect of borrower and lender when the Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) implement the reform of interest rates pricing in West China. Based on an adverse selection model, this paper analyzes the optimal interests and lending conditions under individual & joint liability contract. The main propositions are offered as followings: i. Under the circumstance of imperfect information, RCCs encounter stronger constraints when offering individual credit loans and the defect of credit input should certainly exist to some extent. ii. The space of preferential interest rate is possible for super borrower under the guarantee & joint liability loan contracts. If the interest rates are raised globally by RCC, the borrowers will certainly reflect over higher interest burden. This paper tests these propositions through the case study of Baoji City and Hanzhong City in Shaanxi Province. A serial of public policy recommendation are suggested, such as perfecting creditworthiness of farmer households, advocating market growth of guarantee, enhancing cultivation of interest rates management talents, in the hope of promoting the efficiency of rural credit market.
Chapter 6: Incentive effect during loan pricing of microfinance institutions: moral hazard model. In this chapter, we try to demonsrate the effect of moral hazard to loan pricing of microfinance institutions. Precisely, we study loan pricing under moral hazard under moral hazard, through a modification of Conning(1996) model. The effect of different loan techniques to moral hazard and the optimal zone for loan pricing are discused.
Chapter 7: policy recommodations for government during China’s Urbanization. Differentiated interest rate pricing can solve credit rationing according to theoretical reserch and international practice. This report investigates rural credit market in Shaanxi Province in order to analyze the following problems: i. the implementation of Interest Rates Pricing Reform of Rural Credit Cooperatives(RCC) since 2004; ii. the performance of Interest Rates Pricing Reform; iii. the experience and weakness of the reform; iv.the policy implication of perfecting the reform. The result is that interest pricing reform cannot improve credit input because of the objective conditions of RCC operation and the monopoly of rural credit market. A serial of public policy recommendation are suggested, such as perfecting the internal conditions of rural interest reform, constructing a competitive rural credit market, in the hope of promoting the efficiency of rural credit market.
Chapter 8: Policy recomadations for loan pricing reform of microfinance insttutions in rural China. Such policy recomadations are proposed as the followings: i. Improving efficiency through market funcation based on competitions; ii. Implementing consumer protection; iii. Improcing financial literacy through consumer education; iv. Enhencing direction and supervision on implentation of interest floating policy; v. Setting rural credit collateral system; vi. Regulating and directing the sound development of informal finance.
引文
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杜朝运,范玲玲,毕柳. 2009.我国小额信贷利率问题的实证研究.农业经济问题, (5): 33-37
杜晓山.2004.中国农村小额信贷的实践尝试.中国农村经济, (8): 12-19
杜晓山等. 2005.中国小额信贷十年.北京:社会科学文献出版社
杜晓山,孙若梅.1997.农村小额信贷:国际经验与国内扶贫社试点.财贸经济, (9): 11-15
冯开. 2010.小额信贷的合理利率——基于河南某县调查的需求分析.金融经济, (10): 55-56
冯素萍,肖诗顺. 2008.基于商业性可持续发展视角的农村信用社农户小额信贷定价问题探讨.农村经济与科技, (1): 75-76
黄衙玺. 2010.我国小额贷款公司高利率可行性探析.金卡工程(经济与法), (8): 303
黄祖辉,刘西川,程恩江. 2009.贫困地区农户正规信贷市场低参与程度的经验解释.经济研究, (4): 116-128
焦瑾璞,杨骏. 2006.小额信贷和农村金融.北京:中国金融出版社
刘贵生.2008.非充分竞争条件下农村信用社利率定价研究——基于陕西省农村金融市场11710份问卷调查.西部金融, (2): 20-28
刘民权,徐忠. 2003.农村信用社改革和政府的职能.经济学季刊,2(3): 555-572
吕家进. 2009.小额信贷利率定价理论及邮储银行实践.银行家, (2): 47-49
茅于轼. 2007.为什么小额贷款必须是高利率的?农村金融研究, (3): 61
茅于轼. 2006.兴办小额贷款的几点经验.农村金融研究, (2): 41-42.
齐春宇. 2008.小额信贷、高利率成因及其缓解.改革, (10): 71-75
任达,郭小卉. 2009.我国农户小额信用贷款利率浅析.现代物业(中旬刊), 8(12): 38-40
汤敏. 2003.从国外经验看我国当前农村信用社小额信贷的发展问题.中国审计, (8): 82-83
王卓. 2007.农村小额信贷利率需求弹性.中国农村经济, (6): 62-70
吴丹.2009.“利”与“义”的调和——农村小额信贷市场化利率的选择与政府角色的定位.知识经济, (2): 8-9
伍虹儒,陈向东.2010.可持续经营下村镇银行信贷利率实证研究.北京航空航天大学学报(社会科学版), (1): 61-63
谢平,徐忠,沈明高.2003.农村信用社改革绩效评价.金融研究, (1): 23-29
颜志杰.2006.农户小额贷款的利率选择.现代金融, (2): 12-13
易伯明. 2010.小额信贷利率定价市场化问题探析.金融经济, (4): 26-28
于露.2009.可持续性小额信贷利率设定的探析.江西金融职工大学学报, (2): 40-42
喻国华. 2005.谈农户小额信贷.经营与管理, (7): 32-33
约纳森?莫达奇. 1998.关于小额信贷的可持续性问题.中国农村经济, (8): 33-36
曾姝,黄建林. 2008.中国商业化小额信贷的利率机制及实践.价格月刊, (6): 47-50
张改清,陈凯.2003.中国小额信贷的利率探析.商业研究, (16): 107-109
张雪春. 2006.政府定位与农村信用社改革.金融研究, (6): 109-116
赵峦,孙文凯. 2010.农信社改革对改善金融支农的政策效应评估——基于全国农户调查面板数据的倍差法分析.金融研究, (3): 194-206
周明. 2009.小额信贷利率市场化探讨.现代商贸工业, (21): 145-146
Ahlin, C. and R.M. Townsend.2007. Using Repayment Data to Test across Models of Joint Liability Lending. The Economic Journal, 117(517): F11-F51
Ashta, A. 2009. Interest Rate Ethics: An Aspect of Social Performance in Microfinance, in E-MFP conference. Luxembourg
Bank, I.-A.D. 2000.Summary Tables. Inter-American Development Bank: Washington, DC
Bank, W, ed. 1983.Limitations of Cheap Credit in Promoting Rural Development. World Bank: Washington, DC
Bessis, J. 2002. Risk Management in Banking. 2nd Edition. Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons, Inc
Cairns, A.J.G. 2004.Interest Rate Models: An Introduction. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press
Castello, C, K. Stearns, and R.P. Christen.1991.Exposing Interest Rates: Their True Significance to Microentrepreneurs and Credit Programs. Cambridge, Mass.: ACCIóN International
Chiang, A.C. 1984.Fundamental Methods of Mathematical Economics, 3rd Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc
Christen, R.P, et al. 1995.Maximizing the Outreach of Microenterprise Finance: An Analysis of Successful Microfinance Programs. USAID Program and Operations Assessment Report, no. 10: Washington, DC
Conning, J. 1996. Group Lending, Moral Hazard, and the Creation of Social Collateral. Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector, University of Maryland at College Park, Working Paper No. 195
Duval, A. 2004. The Impact of Interest Rate Ceilings on Microfinance. CGAP Donor Information Resource Centre, Donor Brief No. 18
Fama, E.F. and M. Miller.1972. The Theory of Finance. Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press
Fama, E.F. 1976.Foundations of Finance: Portfolio Decisions and Securities Prices. New York: Basic Books
Freixas, X. and J.-C. Rochet.1997. Microeconomics of Banking, 1st Edition. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT Press
Ghatak, M. and T.W. Guinnane. 1999.The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice. Journal of Development Economics, 60(1): 195-228
Ghatak, M. 1999. Group lending, Local Information and Peer Selection. Journal of Development Economics, 60(1): 27-50
Ghatak, M. 2000. Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect. The Economic Journal, 110(465): 601-631
Gibbons, R. 1992. A Primer in Game Theory. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press
Gonzalez, A. 2010. Analyzing Microcredit Interest Rates: A Review of the Methodology Proposed byMohammed Yunus. Microfinance Information Exchange, Inc.: Washington, D.C
Harper, M. 1998. Profit for the Poor: Cases in Microfinance. London: Intermediate Technology Publications
He, G., et al. 2009. China Microfinance Industry Assessment Report. China Association of Microfinance: Beijing
Helms, B. and X. Reille.2004. Interest Rate Ceilings and Microfinance: The Story So Far. CGAP Occasional Paper 9: Washington, D.C
Hoken, H. 2006.Effects of Rural Financial Infrastructures on Household Saving Decisions in Rural China. CCER working paper, No. E2006014: Beijing
Hossain, M. and C.P. Diaz.1999. Reaching the Poor with Effective Microcredit: Evaluation of a Grameen Bank Replication in the Philippines. Paper presented at the International Workshop on Assessing the Impact of Agricultural Research on Poverty Alleviation, International Center for Tropical Agriculture, Cali, Columbia, 14–16 September 1999
Khandker, S.R. 1998. Fighting Poverty with Microcredit: Experience in Bangladesh. Washington D. C.: The World Bank
Kneiding, C. and R. Rosenberg.2008.Variations in Microcredit Interest Rates. CGAP Brief: Washington, D.C
Laffont, J.-J. and P. Rey.2003. Moral Hazard, Collusion and Group Lending. Institut d'économie Industrielle (IDEI),IDEI Working Papers No.122: Toulouse
Laffont, J.-J. and T. N’Guessan.2000. Group Lending with Adverse Selection. European Economic Review, 44(4-6): 773—784
Laffont, J.-J. 2003. Collusion and Group Lending with Adverse Selection. Journal of Development Economics, 70(2): 329-348
Ledgerwood, J. 1998. Microfinance Handbook: An Institutional and Financial Perspective. Washington, D. C.: The World Bank
Lewis, J.C. 2008.Microloan Sharks. Stanford Social Innovation Review
Littlefield, E, J. Morduch, and S. Hashemi. 2004. Is Microfinance an Effective Strategy to Reach the Millennium Development Goals? CGAP Focus Note, no. 24: Washington, DC
Mallick, D. 2009. Microfinance and Moneylender Interest Rate: Evidence from Bangladesh. Deakin University MPRA Paper No. 17800
McKinnon, R.I. 1973.Money and Capital in Economic Development. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution
Morduch, J. 1997. The Microfinance Sustainability: A Consistent Framework and New Evidence on the Grameen Bank. Harvard University Department of Economics, Draft
Osborne, M.J. and A. Rubinstein. 1994. A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT Press
Porteous, D. 2006. Competition and Microcredit Interest Rates. CGAP Focus Note No 33.: Washington, D.C
Robinson, M.S. 2002.The Microfinance Revolution: Lessons from Indonesia. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank
Robinson, M.S. 2001.The Microfinance Revolution: Sustainable Finance for the Poor. Washington, D. C.:The World Bank
Rosenberg, R., A. Gonzalez, and S. Narain.2009. The New Moneylenders: Are the Poor Being Exploited by High Microcredit Interest Rates? CGAP: Washington, D.C
Rosenberg, R., A. Gonzalez, and S. Narain. 2009.The New Moneylenders: Are the Poor Being Exploited by High Microcredit Interest Rates ? CGAP Occasional Paper 15: Washington, D.C
Rosenberg, R. 2002.Microcredit Interest Rates. CGAP Occasional Paper No. 1: Washington, D.C Rosenberger, W. 2003.Risk-Adjusted Lending Conditions: An Option Pricing Approach. Chichester, England: John Wiley and Sons, Inc
Shaw, E.S. 1973. Financial Deepening in Economic Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Shy, O. 1995.Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press Stephens, B. 2004.Depth of Outreach and Financial Self-Sufficiency. The Microfinance Information eXchange,The MIX Data Brief 1, no. 1: Washington, DC
Stiglitz, J.E. and A. Weiss.1981. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. The American Economic Review, 71(3): 393-410
Thomas, L.C. 2009. Consumer Credit Models: Pricing, Profit, and Portfolios. New York: Oxford University Press
W.Adams, D, D.H. Graham, and J.D.V. Pischke, eds. 1984. Undermining Development with Cheap Credit. Westview Press: Boulder, Colo
Waton, A. 1998. Conflicts of Interest: Reform of the Rural Credit Cooperatives in China. Moct-Most, (8): 23-40
Wright, D.L. and D.A.H. Alamgir.2004.Microcredit Interest Rates in Bangladesh: Capping Versus Competition.Paper produced for the Donors’Local Consultative Group on Finance. Final Draft: 26th March 2004
Yaron, J. 1992.Successful Rural Finance Institutions. World Bank Discussion Paper No 150: Washington D.C
Yunus, M. and K. Weber.2007.Creating a World without Poverty: Social Business and the Future of Capitalism, 1st Edition. New York: Public Affairs
蔡海斌,胡波.2008.西藏农牧区小额信贷利率问题研究——以阿里为例.西南金融, (9): 24-26
曹辛欣.2007.小额信贷的利率分析.黑龙江对外经贸, (5): 99-101
陈浪南,谢清河. 2002.我国小额信贷研究.农业经济问题, (3): 35-40
程晓敏. 2008.我国农村小额信贷利率市场化探析.企业家天地下半月刊(理论版), (6): 247-248
邓金炉. 2008.农村小额信贷利率探析.中国商界(下半月), (9): 18-19
丁洲锋,孙习祥,聂鸣.2006.小额信贷支农探讨.宏观经济研究, (1): 50-52,58
杜朝运,范玲玲,毕柳. 2009.我国小额信贷利率问题的实证研究.农业经济问题, (5): 33-37
杜晓山.2004.中国农村小额信贷的实践尝试.中国农村经济, (8): 12-19
杜晓山等. 2005.中国小额信贷十年.北京:社会科学文献出版社
杜晓山,孙若梅.1997.农村小额信贷:国际经验与国内扶贫社试点.财贸经济, (9): 11-15
冯开. 2010.小额信贷的合理利率——基于河南某县调查的需求分析.金融经济, (10): 55-56
冯素萍,肖诗顺. 2008.基于商业性可持续发展视角的农村信用社农户小额信贷定价问题探讨.农村经济与科技, (1): 75-76
黄衙玺. 2010.我国小额贷款公司高利率可行性探析.金卡工程(经济与法), (8): 303
黄祖辉,刘西川,程恩江. 2009.贫困地区农户正规信贷市场低参与程度的经验解释.经济研究, (4): 116-128
焦瑾璞,杨骏. 2006.小额信贷和农村金融.北京:中国金融出版社
刘贵生.2008.非充分竞争条件下农村信用社利率定价研究——基于陕西省农村金融市场11710份问卷调查.西部金融, (2): 20-28
刘民权,徐忠. 2003.农村信用社改革和政府的职能.经济学季刊,2(3): 555-572
吕家进. 2009.小额信贷利率定价理论及邮储银行实践.银行家, (2): 47-49
茅于轼. 2007.为什么小额贷款必须是高利率的?农村金融研究, (3): 61
茅于轼. 2006.兴办小额贷款的几点经验.农村金融研究, (2): 41-42.
齐春宇. 2008.小额信贷、高利率成因及其缓解.改革, (10): 71-75
任达,郭小卉. 2009.我国农户小额信用贷款利率浅析.现代物业(中旬刊), 8(12): 38-40
汤敏. 2003.从国外经验看我国当前农村信用社小额信贷的发展问题.中国审计, (8): 82-83
王卓. 2007.农村小额信贷利率需求弹性.中国农村经济, (6): 62-70
吴丹.2009.“利”与“义”的调和——农村小额信贷市场化利率的选择与政府角色的定位.知识经济, (2): 8-9
伍虹儒,陈向东.2010.可持续经营下村镇银行信贷利率实证研究.北京航空航天大学学报(社会科学版), (1): 61-63
谢平,徐忠,沈明高.2003.农村信用社改革绩效评价.金融研究, (1): 23-29
颜志杰.2006.农户小额贷款的利率选择.现代金融, (2): 12-13
易伯明. 2010.小额信贷利率定价市场化问题探析.金融经济, (4): 26-28
于露.2009.可持续性小额信贷利率设定的探析.江西金融职工大学学报, (2): 40-42
喻国华. 2005.谈农户小额信贷.经营与管理, (7): 32-33
约纳森?莫达奇. 1998.关于小额信贷的可持续性问题.中国农村经济, (8): 33-36
曾姝,黄建林. 2008.中国商业化小额信贷的利率机制及实践.价格月刊, (6): 47-50
张改清,陈凯.2003.中国小额信贷的利率探析.商业研究, (16): 107-109
张雪春. 2006.政府定位与农村信用社改革.金融研究, (6): 109-116
赵峦,孙文凯. 2010.农信社改革对改善金融支农的政策效应评估——基于全国农户调查面板数据的倍差法分析.金融研究, (3): 194-206
周明. 2009.小额信贷利率市场化探讨.现代商贸工业, (21): 145-146
Ahlin, C. and R.M. Townsend.2007. Using Repayment Data to Test across Models of Joint Liability Lending. The Economic Journal, 117(517): F11-F51
Ashta, A. 2009. Interest Rate Ethics: An Aspect of Social Performance in Microfinance, in E-MFP conference. Luxembourg
Bank, I.-A.D. 2000.Summary Tables. Inter-American Development Bank: Washington, DC
Bank, W, ed. 1983.Limitations of Cheap Credit in Promoting Rural Development. World Bank: Washington, DC
Bessis, J. 2002. Risk Management in Banking. 2nd Edition. Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons, Inc
Cairns, A.J.G. 2004.Interest Rate Models: An Introduction. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press
Castello, C, K. Stearns, and R.P. Christen.1991.Exposing Interest Rates: Their True Significance to Microentrepreneurs and Credit Programs. Cambridge, Mass.: ACCIóN International
Chiang, A.C. 1984.Fundamental Methods of Mathematical Economics, 3rd Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc
Christen, R.P, et al. 1995.Maximizing the Outreach of Microenterprise Finance: An Analysis of Successful Microfinance Programs. USAID Program and Operations Assessment Report, no. 10: Washington, DC
Conning, J. 1996. Group Lending, Moral Hazard, and the Creation of Social Collateral. Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector, University of Maryland at College Park, Working Paper No. 195
Duval, A. 2004. The Impact of Interest Rate Ceilings on Microfinance. CGAP Donor Information Resource Centre, Donor Brief No. 18
Fama, E.F. and M. Miller.1972. The Theory of Finance. Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press
Fama, E.F. 1976.Foundations of Finance: Portfolio Decisions and Securities Prices. New York: Basic Books
Freixas, X. and J.-C. Rochet.1997. Microeconomics of Banking, 1st Edition. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT Press
Ghatak, M. and T.W. Guinnane. 1999.The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice. Journal of Development Economics, 60(1): 195-228
Ghatak, M. 1999. Group lending, Local Information and Peer Selection. Journal of Development Economics, 60(1): 27-50
Ghatak, M. 2000. Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect. The Economic Journal, 110(465): 601-631
Gibbons, R. 1992. A Primer in Game Theory. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press
Gonzalez, A. 2010. Analyzing Microcredit Interest Rates: A Review of the Methodology Proposed byMohammed Yunus. Microfinance Information Exchange, Inc.: Washington, D.C
Harper, M. 1998. Profit for the Poor: Cases in Microfinance. London: Intermediate Technology Publications
He, G., et al. 2009. China Microfinance Industry Assessment Report. China Association of Microfinance: Beijing
Helms, B. and X. Reille.2004. Interest Rate Ceilings and Microfinance: The Story So Far. CGAP Occasional Paper 9: Washington, D.C
Hoken, H. 2006.Effects of Rural Financial Infrastructures on Household Saving Decisions in Rural China. CCER working paper, No. E2006014: Beijing
Hossain, M. and C.P. Diaz.1999. Reaching the Poor with Effective Microcredit: Evaluation of a Grameen Bank Replication in the Philippines. Paper presented at the International Workshop on Assessing the Impact of Agricultural Research on Poverty Alleviation, International Center for Tropical Agriculture, Cali, Columbia, 14–16 September 1999
Khandker, S.R. 1998. Fighting Poverty with Microcredit: Experience in Bangladesh. Washington D. C.: The World Bank
Kneiding, C. and R. Rosenberg.2008.Variations in Microcredit Interest Rates. CGAP Brief: Washington, D.C
Laffont, J.-J. and P. Rey.2003. Moral Hazard, Collusion and Group Lending. Institut d'économie Industrielle (IDEI),IDEI Working Papers No.122: Toulouse
Laffont, J.-J. and T. N’Guessan.2000. Group Lending with Adverse Selection. European Economic Review, 44(4-6): 773—784
Laffont, J.-J. 2003. Collusion and Group Lending with Adverse Selection. Journal of Development Economics, 70(2): 329-348
Ledgerwood, J. 1998. Microfinance Handbook: An Institutional and Financial Perspective. Washington, D. C.: The World Bank
Lewis, J.C. 2008.Microloan Sharks. Stanford Social Innovation Review
Littlefield, E, J. Morduch, and S. Hashemi. 2004. Is Microfinance an Effective Strategy to Reach the Millennium Development Goals? CGAP Focus Note, no. 24: Washington, DC
Mallick, D. 2009. Microfinance and Moneylender Interest Rate: Evidence from Bangladesh. Deakin University MPRA Paper No. 17800
McKinnon, R.I. 1973.Money and Capital in Economic Development. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution
Morduch, J. 1997. The Microfinance Sustainability: A Consistent Framework and New Evidence on the Grameen Bank. Harvard University Department of Economics, Draft
Osborne, M.J. and A. Rubinstein. 1994. A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT Press
Porteous, D. 2006. Competition and Microcredit Interest Rates. CGAP Focus Note No 33.: Washington, D.C
Robinson, M.S. 2002.The Microfinance Revolution: Lessons from Indonesia. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank
Robinson, M.S. 2001.The Microfinance Revolution: Sustainable Finance for the Poor. Washington, D. C.:The World Bank
Rosenberg, R., A. Gonzalez, and S. Narain.2009. The New Moneylenders: Are the Poor Being Exploited by High Microcredit Interest Rates? CGAP: Washington, D.C
Rosenberg, R., A. Gonzalez, and S. Narain. 2009.The New Moneylenders: Are the Poor Being Exploited by High Microcredit Interest Rates ? CGAP Occasional Paper 15: Washington, D.C
Rosenberg, R. 2002.Microcredit Interest Rates. CGAP Occasional Paper No. 1: Washington, D.C Rosenberger, W. 2003.Risk-Adjusted Lending Conditions: An Option Pricing Approach. Chichester, England: John Wiley and Sons, Inc
Shaw, E.S. 1973. Financial Deepening in Economic Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Shy, O. 1995.Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press Stephens, B. 2004.Depth of Outreach and Financial Self-Sufficiency. The Microfinance Information eXchange,The MIX Data Brief 1, no. 1: Washington, DC
Stiglitz, J.E. and A. Weiss.1981. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. The American Economic Review, 71(3): 393-410
Thomas, L.C. 2009. Consumer Credit Models: Pricing, Profit, and Portfolios. New York: Oxford University Press
W.Adams, D, D.H. Graham, and J.D.V. Pischke, eds. 1984. Undermining Development with Cheap Credit. Westview Press: Boulder, Colo
Waton, A. 1998. Conflicts of Interest: Reform of the Rural Credit Cooperatives in China. Moct-Most, (8): 23-40
Wright, D.L. and D.A.H. Alamgir.2004.Microcredit Interest Rates in Bangladesh: Capping Versus Competition.Paper produced for the Donors’Local Consultative Group on Finance. Final Draft: 26th March 2004
Yaron, J. 1992.Successful Rural Finance Institutions. World Bank Discussion Paper No 150: Washington D.C
Yunus, M. and K. Weber.2007.Creating a World without Poverty: Social Business and the Future of Capitalism, 1st Edition. New York: Public Affairs