中国公用事业价格规制改革研究
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摘要
中国目前正处于从计划经济向市场经济体制转型的过程中,而西方理论界关于公用事业价格理论具有发达市场经济国家特有的背景,缺乏在计划经济体制向市场经济体制转轨下的理论体系。本文研究经济转轨时期我国公用事业价格改革问题,对转轨国家公用事业价格理论的探索具有一定的理论意义。
我国公用事业的价格形成基本上延续计划经济条件下的政府定价模式;同时,由于私人产品价格已由市场形成,受其影响,我国公用事业的价格形成机制中也掺入了某些市场经济的成分。但我国公用事业的价格运行态势仍然存在一些问题。首先,从价格规制模式上,基本属于国家定价的价格形成模式,国家高度垄断经营、垄断定价。由于这些产品涉及人们基本的生活需求,消费带有一定的福利性,国家从关心人们生活的角度出发,制定的价格水平往往偏低,导致一些容易实现收益原则的公用产品费用弥补不足,如自来水、城市公共交通、民用煤气、垃圾或污染处理等。过低的价格一方面加重了企业亏损,严重的影响了这些行业的发展;另一方面又导致消费过渡,资源浪费严重,环境日益恶化,城市交通拥挤不堪等。其次,公用事业价格的制定方法缺乏科学性,原则上按社会平均成本定价,但实际执行时按个别企业定价,公用事业定价基础缺乏科学性,不符合定价原理。而且,目前实行企业上报成本,政府审核制定或批准价格,就给企业造成了利用垄断地位虚报成本的机会,成本缺乏约束机制。再次,公用事业价格结构不合理。单一制的定价方法,使定价缺乏灵活性,或差价标准不合理。最后,有关公用事业价格方面的法律和监督机制不完善。说明我国还没有找到在市场经济下管理公用事业价格的理想模式,所以研究它有一定的现实意义。
本文的研究思路是在对公用产品特性分析的基础上,从公用事业价格形成的机制入手,对我国公用事业价格规制现状和存在问题的原因进行分析,针对问题提出改革现有定价方法的不足之处,调整价格水平,改善价格结构,引入激励性价格规制,在非自然垄断业务上放松规制、引入竞争机制,加强价格监督和立法工作等建议。
本文的基本框架和主要内容如下:
首先,在绪论中阐述了论文问题的提出、选题的意义、研究方法和主要内容。论文正文分七章:
第一章是公用事业价格规制的理论基础。介绍了公用事业、公用产品、价格规制的基本概念,国内外公用事业价格规制理论的演变、发展和现状。
第二章是公用事业的特性和定价方法。介绍了公用事业的特性;公用事业价格形成的三种模式:政府直接规制定价、政府间接规制定价、放松规制由市场形成,具体有哪些定价方法及优缺点。
第三章介绍了公用事业价格的形成机制。先从理论上分析了政府价格规制的必要性和政府失灵,并在价格形成的一般模型的基础上进行变量改动,用模型分析了政府规制条件下,价格制定如何实现社会福利最大化,资源配置最优,对政府、企业、消费者三者之间的博弈进行分析,从而从价格机理上描述了公用事业价格的形成过程。
第四章提出了我国公用事业价格规制的现状和存在的问题。从价格形成方式、定价办法、价格水平、价格结构、价格监督机制和法律等方面介绍了价格规制的现状。并指出我国公用事业价格规制当中存在的问题:公用事业的生产经营效率低下,甚至亏损经营;价格水平不合理;价格结构单一或差价不合理;定价方法不科学;价格规制法律法规和监督机制不完善。
第五章从政府价格规制的有限性、定价方法选择的困境、公用产品价格的特殊性等不同角度对我国公用事业价格规制中存在的问题进行原因分析。
第六章介绍了国外公用事业价格改革的成功经验。有美国、英国、法国、日本等国家,涉及的公用产品有自来水、电力、电信等,对他们的价格形成目标、原则、具体措施进行分析和借鉴。
第七章提出了我国公用事业价格规制改革的目标、原则和方法。在促进社会合理分配;促进企业提高效率;保证企业正常经营;实现资源合理配置;实现社会福利最大化;节约能源,实现社会可持续发展的目标下,遵循受益原则、效率与公平的统一补偿成本、合理收益原则、考虑消费者的消费需求和付费意愿原则,设计合理的规制制度和改革定价方法,推行激励性价格规制制度和放松规制、引入竞争机制,实行差别化定价,加强价格监管和立法工作。
本文的创新点如下:
1.在对公用事业价格形成机制的理论分析方法上:利用政府追求社会福利最大化目标函数、厂商追求利润最大化目标函数、消费者追求效用最大化目标函数建立政府、企业、消费者三者价格动态博弈模型。对公用产品政府进行规制的必要性进行分析论述,对公用产品价格形成机制进行剖析,为后面的实际问题的论述打下了坚实的理论基础。
2.在对我国公用事业价格规制存在问题的原因分析上:分别从政府价格规制的有限性、定价方法选择的困境、公用产品价格的特殊性等不同角度进行原因分析,力图找到根本的制度设计方面等深层次的原因,并运用了大量的实际数据来说明。
3.在公用事业价格规制对策方面:提出适合于我国公用产品价格规制改革意见和有具体实践操作意义的方法,例如在自然垄断业务上实行以区域间竞争为主,辅之以绩效标杆为辅的综合性激励性价格规制方法,在价格结构上提出了具体的差别化标准。
本文的不足之处:
我国公用事业价格改革一直以来都存在许多困惑,牵涉的因素也比较复杂,加之本人的水平有限,所以对公用事业价格形成的根本原因的剖析深度不够,这有待于我日后更加努力去探究。
China is currently in the process of transition from a planned economy system to a market economic system. Western theories on the Public Utilities price theory has the unique background of developed market economies that lacking the theoretical system of transition from planned economic system to market economic system. This paper studies the problems in the period of economic transformation of Chinese Public Utilities’price reform .It is certainly theoretically significant for the transition countries to explore the theory of Public Utilities prices.
The pricing of Chinese Public Utilities continues the government pricing model which built in the conditions of planned economy. Affected by the pricing of private goods which formed by the market in the same time, some market ingredients were mixed into the price formation mechanism of Chinese Public Utilities, but there are some problems in price function of Chinese utilities good. Firstly, the pricing formation model is national pricing in the price regulation model. The country manages highly and monopolistically. Public Utilities sector is the important basic industries and utilities in the national economy, the price of these Public Utilities are determined by state in generally. As a result of these products involves the basic needs of life for the people, the consuming of these Public Utilities is welfare, so the prices is low in general which reduced by the people’s live care by state. The expenses of some public goods such as groundwater, water supply, urban public transport, and civilian gas, treatment of garbage and pollution couldn’t compensated by the income. On the one hand, the lower price of these Public Utilities impact on the development of these industries. On the other hand, lower price impact consumption and serious waste of resources. The bad outcome such as environmental degradation and overcrowded of urban transport will appear.
Secondly, the pricing way formulation of Public Utilities lacks scientific methods. The Public Utilities princing way should base on the social average cast in principle. But it’s based on some single corporations in face. The pricing foundation lacks scientific method. It did not fit the pricing theory. The cast of public utilities is submitted by the corporations, and government audits, constitutes or agrees of the price of public utilities
Thirdly, the price structure of public utilities is unreasonable. Single pricing way make the pricing way lacking flexible. Or the differential pricing is unfared.
In the last, the laws and supervise frameworks on the pricing are incomplete. So it is pointed out that the ideal model of public utilities pricing regulation in the market economy is not found. And the research in this paper is significative.
The research way of this paper is based ong the characteristic analysis of public utilities. Then the actuality and ill sticking point of price regulation of public utilities will be analyzed. The way will be found to reform the shortage of pricing rule, adjust the price level, improve the price configuration.The incentive regulation will import to the price control of government. It is advised that the competition mechanism will be imported to the industries or areas of unnatural monopoly, and reinforcing the price supervise and legislation.
The origin of paper, the meaning of the paper, the study ways, the basic framework and main contents of the paper are introduced firstly.
Text of the paper chapters divided into seven chapters.
The theoretical basis of the Public Utilities price is introduced in the first chapter. In this chapter, the definitions of public utilities, products of public utilities, price regulation are introduced. The evolvement, development and actuality of national and abroad publice utilities price are studied.
The characteristic and pricing ways of public utilities are introduced in Chapter II. That are speciality of public utilities, the three pricing model public utilities: government directly price regulation, government indirectly price regulation, government without price regulation, and the advantages and disadvantages of all price ways.
The price formation mechanism of public utilities is introduced in Chapter III. The necessary of government price regulation and government failure are studied in theory. The variables of price formation general model are changed. A model is used to analyze how achieve the maximization of social welfare and the optimal allocation of resources by prices determining in the background of with government regulation. The gambling between government, corporations and consumers is studied. So the pricing mechanisms of price formation process of public utilities are described.
The actuality and existent problems of price regulation of Chinese public utilities are introduced in Chapter IV. The actuality of price regulation are studied from the aspects of price formation way, price means, price level, price structure, price supervise mechanism and laws. It is pointed out that the existent problems of price regulation include low level efficiency of the production and management of public utilities, unreasonable price level, single price structure or unreasonable differential pricing, unscientific of pricing way, faulty price law and supervise mechanism, etc.
In ChapterV, The causations of Chinese price regulation of public utilities are analyzed from the aspects of finity of government price regulation, puzzledom of price way selecting and specialness of public utilities price, etc.
The abroad successful experience of public goods is introduced in Chapter VI. The abroad countries include United States, Britain, France, Japan and other. The public utilities include water supply, electric power, telecom, etc. Analyzing and studying the pricing object, the pricing principle, the pricing way.
Then goal, principle and means of Chinese public utilities price regulation will be making in chapter VII. The price regulation targets are boosting reasonable deployment, improving corporation efficiency, ensuring corporation normal management, deploying resource reasonably, maximizing social welfare, saving energy sources and developing continual. Some rules such as benefiting, unifying of efficiency and fare, compensating cost, benefiting reasonably, the cost demand of consumer and paying voluntarily will take into account. Then the reasonable regulation system and reform price way will be designed. The incentive regulation should be extended. Some regulation should be released. The competition mechanism should be imported. The pricing way of utilities products should be differential pricing. Reinforce the price supervisee and legislation.
The innovations in the paper include:
1. In the theoretical analyse of public utilities price mechanism, thr dynamic gambling model between governments, corporations and consumes is building by using the model is based on the target function of government persuing the maximal social welfare, corporation persuing the maximal profit and consumes persuing the maximal avail. The necessary and price formation mechanism of public utilities price regulation are analyzed. It is useful for follow practice analyse.
2. In the caused analyzed of the exist problems of Chinese public utilities price regulation, it’s based on the finity of government price regulation, the puzzledom of price way selection and the special of public utilities price. The deep level causes of system design are searched and great deals of data are used.
3. In the means of public utlity price regulation, The reform advices and concrete exercisable means of Chinese public utilities price regulation reform are pointed out. Such as in the natural monololization operation, it is pointed out that the district competition is the primary way and colligation incentive price regulation is assistant way. The differential standard is pointed out in the price structure.
The shortage in the paper is:
There are mang baffle in Chinese public utilities price reform, the correlative problems are complex, the auther’s theory level is limited, so it is not very deeply in the fundamental causation analyzing of public utilithy price formation. It need the deeply research in future.
我国公用事业的价格形成基本上延续计划经济条件下的政府定价模式;同时,由于私人产品价格已由市场形成,受其影响,我国公用事业的价格形成机制中也掺入了某些市场经济的成分。但我国公用事业的价格运行态势仍然存在一些问题。首先,从价格规制模式上,基本属于国家定价的价格形成模式,国家高度垄断经营、垄断定价。由于这些产品涉及人们基本的生活需求,消费带有一定的福利性,国家从关心人们生活的角度出发,制定的价格水平往往偏低,导致一些容易实现收益原则的公用产品费用弥补不足,如自来水、城市公共交通、民用煤气、垃圾或污染处理等。过低的价格一方面加重了企业亏损,严重的影响了这些行业的发展;另一方面又导致消费过渡,资源浪费严重,环境日益恶化,城市交通拥挤不堪等。其次,公用事业价格的制定方法缺乏科学性,原则上按社会平均成本定价,但实际执行时按个别企业定价,公用事业定价基础缺乏科学性,不符合定价原理。而且,目前实行企业上报成本,政府审核制定或批准价格,就给企业造成了利用垄断地位虚报成本的机会,成本缺乏约束机制。再次,公用事业价格结构不合理。单一制的定价方法,使定价缺乏灵活性,或差价标准不合理。最后,有关公用事业价格方面的法律和监督机制不完善。说明我国还没有找到在市场经济下管理公用事业价格的理想模式,所以研究它有一定的现实意义。
本文的研究思路是在对公用产品特性分析的基础上,从公用事业价格形成的机制入手,对我国公用事业价格规制现状和存在问题的原因进行分析,针对问题提出改革现有定价方法的不足之处,调整价格水平,改善价格结构,引入激励性价格规制,在非自然垄断业务上放松规制、引入竞争机制,加强价格监督和立法工作等建议。
本文的基本框架和主要内容如下:
首先,在绪论中阐述了论文问题的提出、选题的意义、研究方法和主要内容。论文正文分七章:
第一章是公用事业价格规制的理论基础。介绍了公用事业、公用产品、价格规制的基本概念,国内外公用事业价格规制理论的演变、发展和现状。
第二章是公用事业的特性和定价方法。介绍了公用事业的特性;公用事业价格形成的三种模式:政府直接规制定价、政府间接规制定价、放松规制由市场形成,具体有哪些定价方法及优缺点。
第三章介绍了公用事业价格的形成机制。先从理论上分析了政府价格规制的必要性和政府失灵,并在价格形成的一般模型的基础上进行变量改动,用模型分析了政府规制条件下,价格制定如何实现社会福利最大化,资源配置最优,对政府、企业、消费者三者之间的博弈进行分析,从而从价格机理上描述了公用事业价格的形成过程。
第四章提出了我国公用事业价格规制的现状和存在的问题。从价格形成方式、定价办法、价格水平、价格结构、价格监督机制和法律等方面介绍了价格规制的现状。并指出我国公用事业价格规制当中存在的问题:公用事业的生产经营效率低下,甚至亏损经营;价格水平不合理;价格结构单一或差价不合理;定价方法不科学;价格规制法律法规和监督机制不完善。
第五章从政府价格规制的有限性、定价方法选择的困境、公用产品价格的特殊性等不同角度对我国公用事业价格规制中存在的问题进行原因分析。
第六章介绍了国外公用事业价格改革的成功经验。有美国、英国、法国、日本等国家,涉及的公用产品有自来水、电力、电信等,对他们的价格形成目标、原则、具体措施进行分析和借鉴。
第七章提出了我国公用事业价格规制改革的目标、原则和方法。在促进社会合理分配;促进企业提高效率;保证企业正常经营;实现资源合理配置;实现社会福利最大化;节约能源,实现社会可持续发展的目标下,遵循受益原则、效率与公平的统一补偿成本、合理收益原则、考虑消费者的消费需求和付费意愿原则,设计合理的规制制度和改革定价方法,推行激励性价格规制制度和放松规制、引入竞争机制,实行差别化定价,加强价格监管和立法工作。
本文的创新点如下:
1.在对公用事业价格形成机制的理论分析方法上:利用政府追求社会福利最大化目标函数、厂商追求利润最大化目标函数、消费者追求效用最大化目标函数建立政府、企业、消费者三者价格动态博弈模型。对公用产品政府进行规制的必要性进行分析论述,对公用产品价格形成机制进行剖析,为后面的实际问题的论述打下了坚实的理论基础。
2.在对我国公用事业价格规制存在问题的原因分析上:分别从政府价格规制的有限性、定价方法选择的困境、公用产品价格的特殊性等不同角度进行原因分析,力图找到根本的制度设计方面等深层次的原因,并运用了大量的实际数据来说明。
3.在公用事业价格规制对策方面:提出适合于我国公用产品价格规制改革意见和有具体实践操作意义的方法,例如在自然垄断业务上实行以区域间竞争为主,辅之以绩效标杆为辅的综合性激励性价格规制方法,在价格结构上提出了具体的差别化标准。
本文的不足之处:
我国公用事业价格改革一直以来都存在许多困惑,牵涉的因素也比较复杂,加之本人的水平有限,所以对公用事业价格形成的根本原因的剖析深度不够,这有待于我日后更加努力去探究。
China is currently in the process of transition from a planned economy system to a market economic system. Western theories on the Public Utilities price theory has the unique background of developed market economies that lacking the theoretical system of transition from planned economic system to market economic system. This paper studies the problems in the period of economic transformation of Chinese Public Utilities’price reform .It is certainly theoretically significant for the transition countries to explore the theory of Public Utilities prices.
The pricing of Chinese Public Utilities continues the government pricing model which built in the conditions of planned economy. Affected by the pricing of private goods which formed by the market in the same time, some market ingredients were mixed into the price formation mechanism of Chinese Public Utilities, but there are some problems in price function of Chinese utilities good. Firstly, the pricing formation model is national pricing in the price regulation model. The country manages highly and monopolistically. Public Utilities sector is the important basic industries and utilities in the national economy, the price of these Public Utilities are determined by state in generally. As a result of these products involves the basic needs of life for the people, the consuming of these Public Utilities is welfare, so the prices is low in general which reduced by the people’s live care by state. The expenses of some public goods such as groundwater, water supply, urban public transport, and civilian gas, treatment of garbage and pollution couldn’t compensated by the income. On the one hand, the lower price of these Public Utilities impact on the development of these industries. On the other hand, lower price impact consumption and serious waste of resources. The bad outcome such as environmental degradation and overcrowded of urban transport will appear.
Secondly, the pricing way formulation of Public Utilities lacks scientific methods. The Public Utilities princing way should base on the social average cast in principle. But it’s based on some single corporations in face. The pricing foundation lacks scientific method. It did not fit the pricing theory. The cast of public utilities is submitted by the corporations, and government audits, constitutes or agrees of the price of public utilities
Thirdly, the price structure of public utilities is unreasonable. Single pricing way make the pricing way lacking flexible. Or the differential pricing is unfared.
In the last, the laws and supervise frameworks on the pricing are incomplete. So it is pointed out that the ideal model of public utilities pricing regulation in the market economy is not found. And the research in this paper is significative.
The research way of this paper is based ong the characteristic analysis of public utilities. Then the actuality and ill sticking point of price regulation of public utilities will be analyzed. The way will be found to reform the shortage of pricing rule, adjust the price level, improve the price configuration.The incentive regulation will import to the price control of government. It is advised that the competition mechanism will be imported to the industries or areas of unnatural monopoly, and reinforcing the price supervise and legislation.
The origin of paper, the meaning of the paper, the study ways, the basic framework and main contents of the paper are introduced firstly.
Text of the paper chapters divided into seven chapters.
The theoretical basis of the Public Utilities price is introduced in the first chapter. In this chapter, the definitions of public utilities, products of public utilities, price regulation are introduced. The evolvement, development and actuality of national and abroad publice utilities price are studied.
The characteristic and pricing ways of public utilities are introduced in Chapter II. That are speciality of public utilities, the three pricing model public utilities: government directly price regulation, government indirectly price regulation, government without price regulation, and the advantages and disadvantages of all price ways.
The price formation mechanism of public utilities is introduced in Chapter III. The necessary of government price regulation and government failure are studied in theory. The variables of price formation general model are changed. A model is used to analyze how achieve the maximization of social welfare and the optimal allocation of resources by prices determining in the background of with government regulation. The gambling between government, corporations and consumers is studied. So the pricing mechanisms of price formation process of public utilities are described.
The actuality and existent problems of price regulation of Chinese public utilities are introduced in Chapter IV. The actuality of price regulation are studied from the aspects of price formation way, price means, price level, price structure, price supervise mechanism and laws. It is pointed out that the existent problems of price regulation include low level efficiency of the production and management of public utilities, unreasonable price level, single price structure or unreasonable differential pricing, unscientific of pricing way, faulty price law and supervise mechanism, etc.
In ChapterV, The causations of Chinese price regulation of public utilities are analyzed from the aspects of finity of government price regulation, puzzledom of price way selecting and specialness of public utilities price, etc.
The abroad successful experience of public goods is introduced in Chapter VI. The abroad countries include United States, Britain, France, Japan and other. The public utilities include water supply, electric power, telecom, etc. Analyzing and studying the pricing object, the pricing principle, the pricing way.
Then goal, principle and means of Chinese public utilities price regulation will be making in chapter VII. The price regulation targets are boosting reasonable deployment, improving corporation efficiency, ensuring corporation normal management, deploying resource reasonably, maximizing social welfare, saving energy sources and developing continual. Some rules such as benefiting, unifying of efficiency and fare, compensating cost, benefiting reasonably, the cost demand of consumer and paying voluntarily will take into account. Then the reasonable regulation system and reform price way will be designed. The incentive regulation should be extended. Some regulation should be released. The competition mechanism should be imported. The pricing way of utilities products should be differential pricing. Reinforce the price supervisee and legislation.
The innovations in the paper include:
1. In the theoretical analyse of public utilities price mechanism, thr dynamic gambling model between governments, corporations and consumes is building by using the model is based on the target function of government persuing the maximal social welfare, corporation persuing the maximal profit and consumes persuing the maximal avail. The necessary and price formation mechanism of public utilities price regulation are analyzed. It is useful for follow practice analyse.
2. In the caused analyzed of the exist problems of Chinese public utilities price regulation, it’s based on the finity of government price regulation, the puzzledom of price way selection and the special of public utilities price. The deep level causes of system design are searched and great deals of data are used.
3. In the means of public utlity price regulation, The reform advices and concrete exercisable means of Chinese public utilities price regulation reform are pointed out. Such as in the natural monololization operation, it is pointed out that the district competition is the primary way and colligation incentive price regulation is assistant way. The differential standard is pointed out in the price structure.
The shortage in the paper is:
There are mang baffle in Chinese public utilities price reform, the correlative problems are complex, the auther’s theory level is limited, so it is not very deeply in the fundamental causation analyzing of public utilithy price formation. It need the deeply research in future.
引文
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