银行卡市场价格机制与策略研究
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摘要
随着我国银行卡市场的快速发展,市场机制的建立与完善成为迫在眉睫的瓶颈问题。其中,价格机制的完善又成为关键,它决定了银行卡市场参与主体的利益分配,对于银行卡市场的健康、有序、良性发展具有重要意义。银行卡市场的各个经济主体之间有着存续性的物质联系,商户与持卡人、发卡行一起并称为信用卡的“三要素”。特约商户与持卡人是两个相互牵制的因素。对于银行而言,持卡人的数量以及人群素质直接关系到特约商户的交易量;而对于持卡人而言,银行能否发展一些符合他们需要的特约商户又直接影响到了他们的用卡积极性。特约商户和发卡行在结为共同发展客户群的联盟阵线时,又为争夺手续费比率成为竞争对手,这种特殊关系要求必须制定合理的价格机制,来保障商户和持卡人的利益,促进市场的平衡发展,任何一方退出都将导致整个信用卡市场的萎缩乃至消失。然而,国内外研究显示,目前有关银行卡市场定价机制与策略的文献大多将银行卡作为商业银行中间业务的一个特例,在论述中国银行卡定价机制与策略的相关论文中只是进行一般性描述,很少对其专门研究。立足中国国情和市场特点,采取问题导向研究方法对中国银行卡定价机制与策略的专题性研究几乎没有。基于上述原因,本文希望在这方面作一定的探索和尝试。
本文通过讨论银行卡双市场特征,将双市场理论应用于转接市场银行卡组织与商户的竞争博弈分析中,将基于网络外部性的需求方规模经济纳入ATM网络定价策略体系,对我国现行的POS交易费率机制与信用透支利率机制的现状与缺陷进行了剖析,并就市场竞争以及产品与客户差异化对银行卡市场定价策略的影响进行了深入探讨。
针对我国银行卡市场的价格管制和固定利率,对我国现行的POS交易费率机制与信用透支利率杌制的现状与缺陷进行了剖析,提出了差别化定价将是我国银行卡定价策略未来的发展趋势。
为了进一步分析我国银行卡市场可运用的定价策略与方法,本文接下来分别对市场竞争以及产品与客户差异化对银行卡市场定价策略的影响进行了研究。首先,在比较“8:1:1分润模式”与“7:1:X分润机制”差异的基础上,对我国转接市场银行卡组织与商户的竞争进行了博弈分析。考虑了商户利润率的高低、商户拒绝刷卡损失率的大小、商户折扣率高低以及刷卡消费规模对商户受理银行卡支付方式选择的影响。
接着,文章对我国现行的信用卡信用透支利率机制进行了剖析,针对我国银行卡透支定价的现状与不足,提出了我国银行卡透支定价的发展策略。同时,在KMV风险模型的基础上,构建了我国信用卡透支利率激励惩罚模型。
在最后部分,通过对银行卡市场主体的利益与博弈,本文提出基于不同的市场战略,银行卡组织应选择适合自己的市场模式和定价策略:对于市场占有率不高的机构可采用扩张型的银行卡定价;对于已有一定规模并且客户贡献水平不一的机构可采用差异定价策略。同时,论文对ATM在联网通兑情形下的竞争定价进行了探讨,考虑了发卡行之间ATM市场占有率的差异对他们服务收费差异的影响,以及ATM市场处于弱势的发卡行如何调整相应的竞争价格来获取市场。然后,论文进一步讨论了银行卡差异化定价策略,考虑了产品服务质量差异、成本构成差异以及客户特点差异对银行卡价格制定的影响。
Along with the fast development of the industry of bankcard, it becomes extremely urgent bottleneck problem to establish and perfect market machine-made. In which, perfecting pricing machine-made is the key because it decides the benefit distribution of main bodies that have participated in the market of credit card, and it also has important sense for the healthy ,orderly and well development of market for bankcard.
There are survive and perish material relations among the every economy principal part of bank card. Merchant, cardholder and issuer are called together "3 essential factors" of bankcard. Merchant and cardholder are two containing factors for each other. For bank, the quantity as well as quantity of cardholders directly influences the volume of trade of merchant; And for cardholder, whether banks can develop much merchant that accord with their demands directly affected them use card actively. When merchant and issuer become alliance to develop customer crowds in concert, they have to become competitors to fight for merchant discount. The special relation requires establishing reasonable pricing mechanism in order to ensure the benefit of merchant and cardholder, and to promote market balanced developing. Any quit of economy principal part will lead the market of bankcard to atrophy and even disappear. However, domestic and international research shows that, in the present, the documents of market pricing mechanism and strategy mostly look the bankcard as a special case of commercial bank intermediate business, and there are few fruits in the field of problem-oriented research. This dissertation tries to narrow the gap in this field.
Discussing the two-side market characteristics of the bankcard, applying two-side market theories in the competitive game analyses between bankcard organization and merchant in switch market, and the demand scale economy of network externality is used in the ATM network pricing system, This paper try to dissect the present situation and questions of the mechanism of POS discount and interest rate of overdraw. In addition, the effect of the market competition and the differentiation of customer and product on the pricing strategy of the bankcard is also explored.
In the light of the price control and fixed interest rate, this dissertation provide that, in the future, the differential pricing will be the tendency of bankcard pricing strategy of our country based on analysis on the present situation and questions of the mechanism of POS discount and interest rate of overdraw.
In order to more intensively explore the pricing strategy and method of bankcard market of our country, the game analyze is used in the competition between bankcard organization and merchant in switch market based the comparison between the share profit model of "8:1:1" and "7:1:1". The effect of the relative superiority or inferiority of the rate of profit and discount of merchant, the degree of seniority of the loss rate due to refusing bankcard by merchants and the pursue scale by bankcard settlement on the merchants' choice of means of payment are explored. At the same time, this dissertation continues to discuss the competitive pricing with universal-usage in chapter five. The effect of the differentiation degree of the rate of market posses of ATM among different issuers on the difference of service fee, and the inferiority issuer how to adjust the competitive price to gain the more market are explored. Then, this dissertation more intensively studies the differential pricing strategy of bankcard in the sixth chapter. The effect of the differential degree of product service, cost constitutes and customers' characteristic on pricing of bankcard is explored.
Working in concert with the third, fourth, fifth and sixth chapter, the seventh chapter provides that bankcard organization should choose the appropriate pricing strategy matched itself market strategy: bankcard organizations that are not the superiority should take the expand bankcard pricing; those have certain market scale while vary in contribute of customers could adopt the differential pricing strategy. At the end, this dissertation combines the KNV risk model with the profitability of cardholder, and builds an encouraging and punishing model of interest rate of overdraw.
本文通过讨论银行卡双市场特征,将双市场理论应用于转接市场银行卡组织与商户的竞争博弈分析中,将基于网络外部性的需求方规模经济纳入ATM网络定价策略体系,对我国现行的POS交易费率机制与信用透支利率机制的现状与缺陷进行了剖析,并就市场竞争以及产品与客户差异化对银行卡市场定价策略的影响进行了深入探讨。
针对我国银行卡市场的价格管制和固定利率,对我国现行的POS交易费率机制与信用透支利率杌制的现状与缺陷进行了剖析,提出了差别化定价将是我国银行卡定价策略未来的发展趋势。
为了进一步分析我国银行卡市场可运用的定价策略与方法,本文接下来分别对市场竞争以及产品与客户差异化对银行卡市场定价策略的影响进行了研究。首先,在比较“8:1:1分润模式”与“7:1:X分润机制”差异的基础上,对我国转接市场银行卡组织与商户的竞争进行了博弈分析。考虑了商户利润率的高低、商户拒绝刷卡损失率的大小、商户折扣率高低以及刷卡消费规模对商户受理银行卡支付方式选择的影响。
接着,文章对我国现行的信用卡信用透支利率机制进行了剖析,针对我国银行卡透支定价的现状与不足,提出了我国银行卡透支定价的发展策略。同时,在KMV风险模型的基础上,构建了我国信用卡透支利率激励惩罚模型。
在最后部分,通过对银行卡市场主体的利益与博弈,本文提出基于不同的市场战略,银行卡组织应选择适合自己的市场模式和定价策略:对于市场占有率不高的机构可采用扩张型的银行卡定价;对于已有一定规模并且客户贡献水平不一的机构可采用差异定价策略。同时,论文对ATM在联网通兑情形下的竞争定价进行了探讨,考虑了发卡行之间ATM市场占有率的差异对他们服务收费差异的影响,以及ATM市场处于弱势的发卡行如何调整相应的竞争价格来获取市场。然后,论文进一步讨论了银行卡差异化定价策略,考虑了产品服务质量差异、成本构成差异以及客户特点差异对银行卡价格制定的影响。
Along with the fast development of the industry of bankcard, it becomes extremely urgent bottleneck problem to establish and perfect market machine-made. In which, perfecting pricing machine-made is the key because it decides the benefit distribution of main bodies that have participated in the market of credit card, and it also has important sense for the healthy ,orderly and well development of market for bankcard.
There are survive and perish material relations among the every economy principal part of bank card. Merchant, cardholder and issuer are called together "3 essential factors" of bankcard. Merchant and cardholder are two containing factors for each other. For bank, the quantity as well as quantity of cardholders directly influences the volume of trade of merchant; And for cardholder, whether banks can develop much merchant that accord with their demands directly affected them use card actively. When merchant and issuer become alliance to develop customer crowds in concert, they have to become competitors to fight for merchant discount. The special relation requires establishing reasonable pricing mechanism in order to ensure the benefit of merchant and cardholder, and to promote market balanced developing. Any quit of economy principal part will lead the market of bankcard to atrophy and even disappear. However, domestic and international research shows that, in the present, the documents of market pricing mechanism and strategy mostly look the bankcard as a special case of commercial bank intermediate business, and there are few fruits in the field of problem-oriented research. This dissertation tries to narrow the gap in this field.
Discussing the two-side market characteristics of the bankcard, applying two-side market theories in the competitive game analyses between bankcard organization and merchant in switch market, and the demand scale economy of network externality is used in the ATM network pricing system, This paper try to dissect the present situation and questions of the mechanism of POS discount and interest rate of overdraw. In addition, the effect of the market competition and the differentiation of customer and product on the pricing strategy of the bankcard is also explored.
In the light of the price control and fixed interest rate, this dissertation provide that, in the future, the differential pricing will be the tendency of bankcard pricing strategy of our country based on analysis on the present situation and questions of the mechanism of POS discount and interest rate of overdraw.
In order to more intensively explore the pricing strategy and method of bankcard market of our country, the game analyze is used in the competition between bankcard organization and merchant in switch market based the comparison between the share profit model of "8:1:1" and "7:1:1". The effect of the relative superiority or inferiority of the rate of profit and discount of merchant, the degree of seniority of the loss rate due to refusing bankcard by merchants and the pursue scale by bankcard settlement on the merchants' choice of means of payment are explored. At the same time, this dissertation continues to discuss the competitive pricing with universal-usage in chapter five. The effect of the differentiation degree of the rate of market posses of ATM among different issuers on the difference of service fee, and the inferiority issuer how to adjust the competitive price to gain the more market are explored. Then, this dissertation more intensively studies the differential pricing strategy of bankcard in the sixth chapter. The effect of the differential degree of product service, cost constitutes and customers' characteristic on pricing of bankcard is explored.
Working in concert with the third, fourth, fifth and sixth chapter, the seventh chapter provides that bankcard organization should choose the appropriate pricing strategy matched itself market strategy: bankcard organizations that are not the superiority should take the expand bankcard pricing; those have certain market scale while vary in contribute of customers could adopt the differential pricing strategy. At the end, this dissertation combines the KNV risk model with the profitability of cardholder, and builds an encouraging and punishing model of interest rate of overdraw.
引文
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86 《2003年中国银行卡产业回顾与展望》,中国银联研究资讯第21期
87 赵军、余彦君:商场刷卡消费遇阻刷卡费率谁说了算,《晶报》2004年5月18日
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91 王琼、陈金贤.信用风险定价方法与模型研究.现代财经.2002、4
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95 陈燕玲.论利率市场化后的贷款定价模式选择[J].安徽大学学报.2002,26(3)
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101 张红舸、夏佳南.KMV信用风险度量模型在我国的适应性研究.经济论坛2006、11
102 陈显忠.美国银行商业贷款的定价思路介绍.纽约金融2007、1-5
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112 蒋嵘涛、詹和平.金融共生理论对发展我国银行卡市场的启示。投资研究。2004、9
113 薪酬调查:外企员工收入有多高?www.cnxuexi.oom,2005-07-16
114 《2003年中国银行卡产业回顾与展望》,中国银联研究资讯第21期
115 赵军、余彦君:商场刷卡消费遇阻刷卡费率谁说了算,《晶报》2004年5月18日
116 《本报相关报道受关注,全国连锁企业平均利润率仅为0.92%连锁协会支持商家“拒刷”》,北京现代商报,第577期2004年06月07日
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118 周琼、庄毓敏.中国银行卡产业的市场结构与价格行为研究.当代经济科学2005、7
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120 Baunol.W.J.,1997:"On the Proper Cost Tests for Natural Monopoly in aMultiproduct Industry",American Economic Review 67:809-822.
121 《日本信用卡市场考察情况报告》,中国建设银行信用卡中心内部资料,2004-06-30
122 王立平、康晓娟.对银行卡收费合理性急定价策略的探讨.广州市财贸管理干部学院.2004、3
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