土地出让收益，公共品供给及对城市增长影响研究
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摘要
中国的城市化发展规模和增长速度是举世瞩目的,无论是三亿多人口从农村向城市的转移,还是年均超过1%的城市化速度,中国用了不到三十年时间完成了发达国家需一百年才能实现的城市化进程。与其他国家相比,中国城市化进程中最重要的一个特点就是政府主导,地方政府的政策不仅对城市化决策制定具有决定性的影响,而且政府还通过参与到城市建设中直接拉动城市化进程。以“经营城市”为代表的城市运营理念和“土地财政”为主体的财政基础在很大程度上被认为是1994年分税制改革后地方政府推动经济增长和城市化的主要动力。然而相对于在宏观制度层面对地方政府土地财政活动的大量规范分析和经验提炼研究相比,从区域差异视角关注政府相关土地财政活动的研究还有待进一步深入,考虑到各地区面临着不同的自然禀赋、经济发展水平以及由此产生的异质性,中国的地方政府在获取土地出让收益、用于公共品投入的实践中并不必然遵循同质化的发展路径,而很可能是一系列政策意图考量后的差异化选择,但是目前从区域差异关注土地出让金和相关公共品投入的实证研究尚显缺乏,许多规范分析的结论缺乏足够的经验证据支持。
中国城市土地制度赋予了地方政府实现土地资产开发和市场化运作的现实条件,而财政制度和政治制度为地方政府主导城市经济发展提供了制度保障和双重激励,通过推动房地产市场发展获得以出让金为主的土地出让收益,然后投入到公共基础设施建设、公共产品供给从而促进地方经济增长和城市增长,成为了现行制度背景下地方政府不约而同的选择目标。然而之前的研究过多在政府财政行为和公共品偏好一致的强假设下分析问题,却忽视了以下现实情境的影响：一方面地方政府面临着相同的制度背景,财政分权和考核体系将所有地方政府置于同样的晋升激励系统中；另一方面,各地区面临不同的自然禀赋和经济发展水平,地方政府在土地出让收益的目标选择、公共品投入方向及结构上具有相当大的自主权,那么在制度约束和个体差异条件下,不同的政府获取土地出让收益和实现公共品财政投入时很可能不是千篇一律的,而有可能在过程和结果中存在很多差别。因此加强在区域层面识别政府获取土地出让收益和公共品投入的整体差异分析是十分必要的。而当把目光从对政府在不同区域土地财政活动的过程关注转移到对实际结果关注时,经营城市实践模式中实现的各种城市特征要素产出或结果,对城市增长会产生怎样的影响也是一个值得深入探讨的问题。
相对于该领域大量的宏观制度层面规范分析和经验提炼,从区域或城市层面关注土地出让收益获取和公共品投入选择的差异分析还有待深入挖掘,深入理解相关问题又对识别不同地方政府土地财政活动的政策目标和选择思路具有重要的研究价值,因此本文希望提出相对独立但逻辑上却有联系的三组细分问题来进一步拓展：(1)政府在土地出让收益获取中体现出怎样的区域差异?(2)地方政府把土地出让金用于公共品投入的实践中体现了怎样的结构和区域差异?(3)在政府土地财政运作模式下,房价水平和公共品产出水平对城市增长会产生怎样的影响?
以对这三组问题的分析解答为主线,本研究的主要内容与结论包括：
(1)从省级层面展开对土地收益获取区域差异的分析研究,采用多元统计技术的聚类分析和相关文献参考识别了中国存在着四种获取土地出让收益构成的差异区域,分别是：
特大都市区：以北京、上海为代表；
沿海发达区：以广东、天津、江苏、浙江、福建、海南、山东为代表
中部发展区：以山西、内蒙、黑龙江、吉林、辽宁、安徽、河南、重庆、湖北、湖南、河北为代表
西部后起区：以宁夏、江西、广西、四川、云南、贵州、西藏、陕西、甘肃、青海、新疆为代表
政府的财政意图和政策目标决定了政府追求土地出让收益方式的结构差异,不同地方政府土地出让收益获取过程中体现了不同的选择思路和侧重方向。
特大都市区：该地区政府主要目标是获得高额的土地出让金,因此为了土地出让价格维持在较高水平需要控制土地的出让规模,导致了政府在土地出让过程中减少出让规模的选择。
沿海发达区：该地区政府主要目标是获取不断增长的房地产和建筑税收收入,追求建设规模带来的税收收入则需要加大土地的出让数量,因此地方政府在此激励下通过扩大土地出让规模来实现税收收入增长,同时上期土地出让规模也会影响当期土地出让数量的决策制定。
中部发展区：该地区同时追求土地出让金及房地产和建筑业税收收入,然而,抬高土地价格水平和扩大房地产建筑规模对土地出让有着相反的影响,前者需要抑制土地出让规模,后者需要扩大土地出让规模,因此,该地区政府的土地出让数量是综合考虑上述目标所进行的选择。
西部后起区：引资竞争态势使该地区不具维持高地价来压低土地出让规模的条件,因此地方政府主要目标是获得建筑业和房地产业的税收收入,追求建设规模扩张带来的税收收入导致了土地出让的加大,产生了政府追求土地出让扩张的选择。
(2)地方政府土地出让金扩张对公共品供给产生了促进作用,但是存在着显著的结构性和区域性差异。在结构方面,全国层面的计量分析结果表明,土地出让金的确显著的促进了人均基础建设支出和人均教科文卫社保支出水平,实证结果并没有支持以往财政投入只向基础设施建设倾斜的研究观点。土地出让金有可能在一定程度上弥补了预算内收支缺口,填补了预算内公共支出的不足,使得财政对公共品投入增加,而这一增加无论是对市政建设工程为代表的基础设施类公共品,还是教科文卫社保为代表的公共服务类公共品,都是起到了积极有效的促进作用。在区域层面具体体现为：
特大都市区：土地出让金更多的体现为“重服务轻基建”,地方政府有意识得将土地出让金向公共服务类公共品投入倾斜,而不是用来加大对基础设施建设的资金投入。
沿海发达区：沿海发达区的土地出让金表现出对基础建设类和公共服务类公共品投入同步提升的趋势,虽然基础建设投入仍受青睐,但是本区域所处阶段特征促使了公共服务类公共品在政府公共品投入中地位稳定上升。
中部发展区：从整体层面上土地出让金对两类公共品支出都有促进,但是考虑到具体省份差异后,土地出让金展现出明显的向基础设施类倾斜趋势,而与公共服务类的投入关系不显著。
西部后起区：土地出让金展现出向基础设施类倾斜趋势,但是影响程度弱于中部发展区；土地出让金对公共服务类公共品投入基本上没有影响,该地区的土地出让对公共品投入存在明显的结构扭曲。
(3)公共品产出和房价水平分别以集聚力和分散力的作用方向对城市增长产生重要影响。通过采用Gleaser模型对中国263个地级城市研究发现,在城市空间扩张层面,以房地产价格水平为代表的土地要素价格的提升对城市增长起到了负向分散作用,公共品产出对城市空间延伸产生了有效影响,教育、医疗卫生、交通和基础设施是城区拓展的有效推动力,文化设施和通讯类公共品会制约城市空间拓展,在城市非空间增长方面,房地产价格的上升显著抑制了人口在城市的集聚态势,和城市经济水平增长显著性不明显；城市道路、通讯设施、文化、教育和卫生医疗的改善会显著降低人口增速,交通类公共品的增加则可以较大程度提高城市入口的增长态势。公共品产出对经济发展的促进表现并不理想。
目前土地财政模式下的城市增长进程中明显存在经济增长和人口增长的背离,导致了人口和经济增长的不协调性发展,这种现实下城市增长并没有实现理性增长的最优化状态。
(4)以钱江新城为代表的案例研究呈现出沿海发达地区地方政府土地经营行为的典型思路。通过对新城管委会在土地出让收益获取过程中分析各种经营手段,建设投入资金流向和城市增长具体内容,发现在土地出让收益获取、公共品投入和城市增长上该案例都能较好的支持了之前实证研究中关于沿海发达区的相关结论。
本研究的学术价值和创新点主要集中在以下四点：
(1)对地方政府获取土地出让收益的区域差异研究表明了土地出让收益构成的类群差异,并发现了不同类群下政府土地出让的选择侧重,丰富了中国情境下土地财政差异化实现的相关理论。
(2)本文对研究区域公共投入决策的结构和区域差异提供了一个新颖的视角,聚焦于土地出让金这一新财源对公共品投入额影响上,通过实证分析,发现地方政府在采用土地出让金实现公共品支出的实践中存在结构和区域差异,为相关研究提供了可靠的经验证据。
(3)本文为公共品产出和房价水平影响城市增长的研究提供了一个中国情境下的分析框架,指出了在分析中国城市增长影响因素时房价和公共品共同纳入模型的必要性和必然性,为相关的理论和实证研究提供了中国情景研究的匹配思路。
(4)本文对完善GLeaser模型在中国的应用有一定贡献,本文通过城市建成区面积来表征城市增长,建立了人口和GDP作用的联立方程,得到了更符合中国现实环境的改进后的GLeaser城市增长模型,改善了模型与中国城市增长情景之间的匹配性。
此外,本文具有一定的现实意义,对理解土地出让收益获取方式、公共品投入与区域特征的密切联系,综合把握公共品和房价水平对城市增长的共同影响,发现土地出让金对预算内收入的“挤出效应”和“转移效应”等方面具有一定的启示作用。
Recent30years has witnessed the rapid urbanization and development of China.During the urbanization process, more than300million people have migrated from rural places to cities with an annual average urbanization rate ofmore than1%.
Govemment-orienting is the most striking feature of China's urbanization.Local government dominants the decision-making of urbanization-related policy making, and often involves directly into the urban construction process.What's more, after the tax sharing reform in1994."managing city" and "land finance"gradually become the driving force of city's economic growth. Previous researches mostly focus on the macro ievel and rely on standardization analyses, which lack sufficient data support.Relatively less research use the province-level data to examine the difference among local governments'land finance. However, taking into consideration the diversity of resource endowment and economic development level, it is necessary to consider the heterogeneity of local government's behavior of obtaining land revenue and providing public goods supply.
China's land system allows local government to operate land supply through market mechanism.On the other hand, the fiscal system and political institution guarantee local government's dominant position in the urbanization and stimulate institutional guarantee and dual incentives, land transfer revenues from the real estate market development, and then investment in public infrastructure, provide public goods to promote local economic growth and urban growth, has become the coincide choice under the background of local government targets. However the study in government financial behavior and public goods preferences consistent strong assumptions analysis problem, and neglect the influence of the realistic situation, on the one hand, the local government is faced with the same system background, system of fiscal decentralization and the inspection will be all put in the same promotion incentive system of local government; On the other hand, faced with different levels of natural endowments and economic development, local governments in land transfer revenue target selection, the direction of public expenditure structure has a considerable autonomy, so under the condition of institutional constraint and individual differences, different government land transfer income and realize public spending is probably not the same, instead there is difference in processes and results. Therefore study at the regional level identification of government land transfer income and how to carry out overall public spending variance analysis are very necessary. When focus on the government treasury activities from different area, the city management practice patterns implemented in a variety of city characteristic elements, what kind of impact on urban growth will also a problem worthy to be discussed.
Relative to the normative analysis and experience in the aspect of macro system, analysis focused on how to obtain land revenue and the choice of public goods spending from the region or city level remains rare, issues related to identify different land finance options of local government policy objectives have important research value, so this article wants to put forward relatively independent but logically linked segmentation questiones to further expand:
(1) What are the regional differences for government iand transfer revenue?
(2)What are the structure and the regional difference for local government land transfer income to realize in practice of public goods spending embodies?
(3) What kind of joint impact will be produced from the housing price and public goods in urban growth under the government land finance operation mode?
On the analysis of the three questions. the main content and conclusion of this study included:
(1) The provincial level on land revenue for the analysis and research of the regional differences, using multivariate statistical techniques of cluster analysis and qualitative reference literature identified in China, there are four areas for land transfer revenue structure differences:
Super-large metropolitan area:represented by Beijing and Shanghai;
Coastal developed area:Guangdong, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Hainan, Shandong;
Moderate developing area:Shanxi. Neimenggu, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning. Anhui, Henan,Chongqing, Hubei, Hunan, Hebei;
Western backward areas:Ningxia. Jiangxi, Guangxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Tibet, Shaanxi. Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang.
The government's fiscal intention and policy objectives determine the way of government land transfer revenue structural differences, the different obtained local government land transfer revenue reflect the choice and focus on their direction.
Super-large metropolitan area:the area government's main goal is to secure high land sales revenue, so in order to sustain high land price need to control the supply of land quantity, the higher land prices will lead to further government deliberately depress land supply.
Coastal developed area:In this area government's main goal is to obtain the tax revenue from the growth of the real estate and construction, the pursuit of the construction scale of tax revenue need to increase the transfer of land, so by expanding under the incentives of local government land supply, extravagance and scale of urban construction to realize the tax revenue growth, at the same time the formation of the area of land supply of the previous period will also affect the current supply decision-making.
Moderate developing area:pursuing land transfer revenue and tax income at the same time in this area, real estate and construction industry and keeping land price level had the opposite direction to expand the scale of land transfer, the former need to restrain land transfer scale, the latter need to expand land transfer scale, the actual land transfer scale was the comprehensive consideration of the above choice of target implementation.
Western backward areas:the capital competition to the region do not meet the condition to maintain high land prices with depressing land supply, so the local government's main goal is to achieve the construction and real estate tax revenue, the pursuit of tax revenue expansion of construction scale led to the increase of the quantity of land supply, produce the land transfer expansion.
(2) Local government land revenue expansion has promoting effect on the public goods supply, but there are significant structural and regional differences.Analysis results show that the land revenue significantly promoted the infrastructure spending per capita and per capita general expenditure level of public service, and did not support past point of view of fiscal spending only prefer infrastructure construction. Land transfer income may. to some extent make up the gap for the budget revenue and expenditure, to fill the deficiency of the public expenditure budget, expenditures led increase for municipal infrastructure construction project as a representative type of public goods, or general education, medical care and social security represented by the type of public goods, public services had played a positive role in promoting the public investment. At the regional level concrete manifestation is:
Super-large metropolitan area:land revenue preferred public service more than infrastructure construction, local government use more part of the land transfer income to the public service, rather than to increase capital input to the infrastructure construction.
Coastal developed area:the coastal developed area land revenue shows spending on public services and public infrastructure synchronous ascending trend, although government infrastructure spending is still popular, but the area of phase characteristics prompted public service steady rise in government spending on public goods.
Moderate developing area:the overall level of land transfer income has to promote the two types of public goods spending, but after considering the specific differences between provinces, infrastructure class show obvious inclination trend, while no significant relationship with the public service spending.
Western backward areas:land transfer income showes the infrastructure tilt trend, but the influence degree is weak to moderate developing area; Basically, land transfer income has no impact on the public service spending, and there is a clear structural distortion from land transfer income for public spending.
(3) The level of public goods and housing prices respectively have important influence on urban growth in the role of agglomeration and dispersion forces direction. By Gleaser model study of285cities in China, in the urban spatial expansion, the land price, represented by real estate prices has played a negative effect on growth of cities, the public goods supply has effective influence on the urban space extension, education, health care, transport and infrastructure is the driving force for the city development effectively, cultural facilities and communications public goods will restrict the urban space development, in the aspect of urban no spatial growth, real estate prices significantly depressed the increase of population in urban agglomeration, and whose effect on economic growth is not obvious according to the significant levels; Urban roads, communication facilities.culture, education and health care will significantly reduce the population growth expansion, increase traffic supply can improve the urban population growth. Public goods supply for the promotion of economic development is not ideal enough.
Current mode of urban growth lead to the incongruity development of population and economic growth, the reality of urban growth didn't realize the rational growth of optimization.
(4) Qianjiang new city as a representative case study presents the local government land management behavior and choices in the coastal developed areas. Through analysis from the process of land revenue for various management, construction investment flow analysis and specific content analysis of urban growth established by the new city management committee, we found better support of the empirical research conclusion in generating revenue, public goods supply and urban growth.
The academic value of this study and the innovation points mainly concentrated in the following four points:
(1) Obtain the regional difference of land transfer revenue to local government research manifest the differences of land transfer revenue groups, found the choice of government land transfer under different area condition, enriched the related theory of Chinese differentiation of land finance.
(2) In this paper, the research of the structure of regional public expenditure investment decisions and regional differences provide a novel perspective, focusing on the new land transfer revenue impact on the public goods supply, local government land transfer income used in the implementation of public goods spending practice reflects the structure and the regional difference through the empirical analysis, provides the reliable empirical evidence.
(3) This study helps to provide public goods and housing prices affect urban growth research analysis framework based on China situation. The analysis showed the need and necessity of house prices and public goods together to effect the China's urban growth, provide the study of Chinese scene matching for the relevant theoretical and empirical research to.
(4) In this paper, the correction of Gleaser models applied in China has a certain contribution, in this paper, by constructing urban area as characterization form of urban growth, put population and GDP in the same simultaneous equation, we set a more appropriate Chinese reality environment improvement of Gleaser urban growth model, and promote the matching effect of empirical analysis of the model and China's urban growth scenarios.
In addition, this paper has a certain practical significance for understanding of the close ties between public goods supply, land transfer income access and the regional characteristics, evaluation the combined impact of public goods and housing prices for urban growth, and we also discussed the certain enlightenment function of "crowding out" and "transfer effect" for land financial income.
中国城市土地制度赋予了地方政府实现土地资产开发和市场化运作的现实条件,而财政制度和政治制度为地方政府主导城市经济发展提供了制度保障和双重激励,通过推动房地产市场发展获得以出让金为主的土地出让收益,然后投入到公共基础设施建设、公共产品供给从而促进地方经济增长和城市增长,成为了现行制度背景下地方政府不约而同的选择目标。然而之前的研究过多在政府财政行为和公共品偏好一致的强假设下分析问题,却忽视了以下现实情境的影响：一方面地方政府面临着相同的制度背景,财政分权和考核体系将所有地方政府置于同样的晋升激励系统中；另一方面,各地区面临不同的自然禀赋和经济发展水平,地方政府在土地出让收益的目标选择、公共品投入方向及结构上具有相当大的自主权,那么在制度约束和个体差异条件下,不同的政府获取土地出让收益和实现公共品财政投入时很可能不是千篇一律的,而有可能在过程和结果中存在很多差别。因此加强在区域层面识别政府获取土地出让收益和公共品投入的整体差异分析是十分必要的。而当把目光从对政府在不同区域土地财政活动的过程关注转移到对实际结果关注时,经营城市实践模式中实现的各种城市特征要素产出或结果,对城市增长会产生怎样的影响也是一个值得深入探讨的问题。
相对于该领域大量的宏观制度层面规范分析和经验提炼,从区域或城市层面关注土地出让收益获取和公共品投入选择的差异分析还有待深入挖掘,深入理解相关问题又对识别不同地方政府土地财政活动的政策目标和选择思路具有重要的研究价值,因此本文希望提出相对独立但逻辑上却有联系的三组细分问题来进一步拓展：(1)政府在土地出让收益获取中体现出怎样的区域差异?(2)地方政府把土地出让金用于公共品投入的实践中体现了怎样的结构和区域差异?(3)在政府土地财政运作模式下,房价水平和公共品产出水平对城市增长会产生怎样的影响?
以对这三组问题的分析解答为主线,本研究的主要内容与结论包括：
(1)从省级层面展开对土地收益获取区域差异的分析研究,采用多元统计技术的聚类分析和相关文献参考识别了中国存在着四种获取土地出让收益构成的差异区域,分别是：
特大都市区：以北京、上海为代表；
沿海发达区：以广东、天津、江苏、浙江、福建、海南、山东为代表
中部发展区：以山西、内蒙、黑龙江、吉林、辽宁、安徽、河南、重庆、湖北、湖南、河北为代表
西部后起区：以宁夏、江西、广西、四川、云南、贵州、西藏、陕西、甘肃、青海、新疆为代表
政府的财政意图和政策目标决定了政府追求土地出让收益方式的结构差异,不同地方政府土地出让收益获取过程中体现了不同的选择思路和侧重方向。
特大都市区：该地区政府主要目标是获得高额的土地出让金,因此为了土地出让价格维持在较高水平需要控制土地的出让规模,导致了政府在土地出让过程中减少出让规模的选择。
沿海发达区：该地区政府主要目标是获取不断增长的房地产和建筑税收收入,追求建设规模带来的税收收入则需要加大土地的出让数量,因此地方政府在此激励下通过扩大土地出让规模来实现税收收入增长,同时上期土地出让规模也会影响当期土地出让数量的决策制定。
中部发展区：该地区同时追求土地出让金及房地产和建筑业税收收入,然而,抬高土地价格水平和扩大房地产建筑规模对土地出让有着相反的影响,前者需要抑制土地出让规模,后者需要扩大土地出让规模,因此,该地区政府的土地出让数量是综合考虑上述目标所进行的选择。
西部后起区：引资竞争态势使该地区不具维持高地价来压低土地出让规模的条件,因此地方政府主要目标是获得建筑业和房地产业的税收收入,追求建设规模扩张带来的税收收入导致了土地出让的加大,产生了政府追求土地出让扩张的选择。
(2)地方政府土地出让金扩张对公共品供给产生了促进作用,但是存在着显著的结构性和区域性差异。在结构方面,全国层面的计量分析结果表明,土地出让金的确显著的促进了人均基础建设支出和人均教科文卫社保支出水平,实证结果并没有支持以往财政投入只向基础设施建设倾斜的研究观点。土地出让金有可能在一定程度上弥补了预算内收支缺口,填补了预算内公共支出的不足,使得财政对公共品投入增加,而这一增加无论是对市政建设工程为代表的基础设施类公共品,还是教科文卫社保为代表的公共服务类公共品,都是起到了积极有效的促进作用。在区域层面具体体现为：
特大都市区：土地出让金更多的体现为“重服务轻基建”,地方政府有意识得将土地出让金向公共服务类公共品投入倾斜,而不是用来加大对基础设施建设的资金投入。
沿海发达区：沿海发达区的土地出让金表现出对基础建设类和公共服务类公共品投入同步提升的趋势,虽然基础建设投入仍受青睐,但是本区域所处阶段特征促使了公共服务类公共品在政府公共品投入中地位稳定上升。
中部发展区：从整体层面上土地出让金对两类公共品支出都有促进,但是考虑到具体省份差异后,土地出让金展现出明显的向基础设施类倾斜趋势,而与公共服务类的投入关系不显著。
西部后起区：土地出让金展现出向基础设施类倾斜趋势,但是影响程度弱于中部发展区；土地出让金对公共服务类公共品投入基本上没有影响,该地区的土地出让对公共品投入存在明显的结构扭曲。
(3)公共品产出和房价水平分别以集聚力和分散力的作用方向对城市增长产生重要影响。通过采用Gleaser模型对中国263个地级城市研究发现,在城市空间扩张层面,以房地产价格水平为代表的土地要素价格的提升对城市增长起到了负向分散作用,公共品产出对城市空间延伸产生了有效影响,教育、医疗卫生、交通和基础设施是城区拓展的有效推动力,文化设施和通讯类公共品会制约城市空间拓展,在城市非空间增长方面,房地产价格的上升显著抑制了人口在城市的集聚态势,和城市经济水平增长显著性不明显；城市道路、通讯设施、文化、教育和卫生医疗的改善会显著降低人口增速,交通类公共品的增加则可以较大程度提高城市入口的增长态势。公共品产出对经济发展的促进表现并不理想。
目前土地财政模式下的城市增长进程中明显存在经济增长和人口增长的背离,导致了人口和经济增长的不协调性发展,这种现实下城市增长并没有实现理性增长的最优化状态。
(4)以钱江新城为代表的案例研究呈现出沿海发达地区地方政府土地经营行为的典型思路。通过对新城管委会在土地出让收益获取过程中分析各种经营手段,建设投入资金流向和城市增长具体内容,发现在土地出让收益获取、公共品投入和城市增长上该案例都能较好的支持了之前实证研究中关于沿海发达区的相关结论。
本研究的学术价值和创新点主要集中在以下四点：
(1)对地方政府获取土地出让收益的区域差异研究表明了土地出让收益构成的类群差异,并发现了不同类群下政府土地出让的选择侧重,丰富了中国情境下土地财政差异化实现的相关理论。
(2)本文对研究区域公共投入决策的结构和区域差异提供了一个新颖的视角,聚焦于土地出让金这一新财源对公共品投入额影响上,通过实证分析,发现地方政府在采用土地出让金实现公共品支出的实践中存在结构和区域差异,为相关研究提供了可靠的经验证据。
(3)本文为公共品产出和房价水平影响城市增长的研究提供了一个中国情境下的分析框架,指出了在分析中国城市增长影响因素时房价和公共品共同纳入模型的必要性和必然性,为相关的理论和实证研究提供了中国情景研究的匹配思路。
(4)本文对完善GLeaser模型在中国的应用有一定贡献,本文通过城市建成区面积来表征城市增长,建立了人口和GDP作用的联立方程,得到了更符合中国现实环境的改进后的GLeaser城市增长模型,改善了模型与中国城市增长情景之间的匹配性。
此外,本文具有一定的现实意义,对理解土地出让收益获取方式、公共品投入与区域特征的密切联系,综合把握公共品和房价水平对城市增长的共同影响,发现土地出让金对预算内收入的“挤出效应”和“转移效应”等方面具有一定的启示作用。
Recent30years has witnessed the rapid urbanization and development of China.During the urbanization process, more than300million people have migrated from rural places to cities with an annual average urbanization rate ofmore than1%.
Govemment-orienting is the most striking feature of China's urbanization.Local government dominants the decision-making of urbanization-related policy making, and often involves directly into the urban construction process.What's more, after the tax sharing reform in1994."managing city" and "land finance"gradually become the driving force of city's economic growth. Previous researches mostly focus on the macro ievel and rely on standardization analyses, which lack sufficient data support.Relatively less research use the province-level data to examine the difference among local governments'land finance. However, taking into consideration the diversity of resource endowment and economic development level, it is necessary to consider the heterogeneity of local government's behavior of obtaining land revenue and providing public goods supply.
China's land system allows local government to operate land supply through market mechanism.On the other hand, the fiscal system and political institution guarantee local government's dominant position in the urbanization and stimulate institutional guarantee and dual incentives, land transfer revenues from the real estate market development, and then investment in public infrastructure, provide public goods to promote local economic growth and urban growth, has become the coincide choice under the background of local government targets. However the study in government financial behavior and public goods preferences consistent strong assumptions analysis problem, and neglect the influence of the realistic situation, on the one hand, the local government is faced with the same system background, system of fiscal decentralization and the inspection will be all put in the same promotion incentive system of local government; On the other hand, faced with different levels of natural endowments and economic development, local governments in land transfer revenue target selection, the direction of public expenditure structure has a considerable autonomy, so under the condition of institutional constraint and individual differences, different government land transfer income and realize public spending is probably not the same, instead there is difference in processes and results. Therefore study at the regional level identification of government land transfer income and how to carry out overall public spending variance analysis are very necessary. When focus on the government treasury activities from different area, the city management practice patterns implemented in a variety of city characteristic elements, what kind of impact on urban growth will also a problem worthy to be discussed.
Relative to the normative analysis and experience in the aspect of macro system, analysis focused on how to obtain land revenue and the choice of public goods spending from the region or city level remains rare, issues related to identify different land finance options of local government policy objectives have important research value, so this article wants to put forward relatively independent but logically linked segmentation questiones to further expand:
(1) What are the regional differences for government iand transfer revenue?
(2)What are the structure and the regional difference for local government land transfer income to realize in practice of public goods spending embodies?
(3) What kind of joint impact will be produced from the housing price and public goods in urban growth under the government land finance operation mode?
On the analysis of the three questions. the main content and conclusion of this study included:
(1) The provincial level on land revenue for the analysis and research of the regional differences, using multivariate statistical techniques of cluster analysis and qualitative reference literature identified in China, there are four areas for land transfer revenue structure differences:
Super-large metropolitan area:represented by Beijing and Shanghai;
Coastal developed area:Guangdong, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Hainan, Shandong;
Moderate developing area:Shanxi. Neimenggu, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning. Anhui, Henan,Chongqing, Hubei, Hunan, Hebei;
Western backward areas:Ningxia. Jiangxi, Guangxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Tibet, Shaanxi. Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang.
The government's fiscal intention and policy objectives determine the way of government land transfer revenue structural differences, the different obtained local government land transfer revenue reflect the choice and focus on their direction.
Super-large metropolitan area:the area government's main goal is to secure high land sales revenue, so in order to sustain high land price need to control the supply of land quantity, the higher land prices will lead to further government deliberately depress land supply.
Coastal developed area:In this area government's main goal is to obtain the tax revenue from the growth of the real estate and construction, the pursuit of the construction scale of tax revenue need to increase the transfer of land, so by expanding under the incentives of local government land supply, extravagance and scale of urban construction to realize the tax revenue growth, at the same time the formation of the area of land supply of the previous period will also affect the current supply decision-making.
Moderate developing area:pursuing land transfer revenue and tax income at the same time in this area, real estate and construction industry and keeping land price level had the opposite direction to expand the scale of land transfer, the former need to restrain land transfer scale, the latter need to expand land transfer scale, the actual land transfer scale was the comprehensive consideration of the above choice of target implementation.
Western backward areas:the capital competition to the region do not meet the condition to maintain high land prices with depressing land supply, so the local government's main goal is to achieve the construction and real estate tax revenue, the pursuit of tax revenue expansion of construction scale led to the increase of the quantity of land supply, produce the land transfer expansion.
(2) Local government land revenue expansion has promoting effect on the public goods supply, but there are significant structural and regional differences.Analysis results show that the land revenue significantly promoted the infrastructure spending per capita and per capita general expenditure level of public service, and did not support past point of view of fiscal spending only prefer infrastructure construction. Land transfer income may. to some extent make up the gap for the budget revenue and expenditure, to fill the deficiency of the public expenditure budget, expenditures led increase for municipal infrastructure construction project as a representative type of public goods, or general education, medical care and social security represented by the type of public goods, public services had played a positive role in promoting the public investment. At the regional level concrete manifestation is:
Super-large metropolitan area:land revenue preferred public service more than infrastructure construction, local government use more part of the land transfer income to the public service, rather than to increase capital input to the infrastructure construction.
Coastal developed area:the coastal developed area land revenue shows spending on public services and public infrastructure synchronous ascending trend, although government infrastructure spending is still popular, but the area of phase characteristics prompted public service steady rise in government spending on public goods.
Moderate developing area:the overall level of land transfer income has to promote the two types of public goods spending, but after considering the specific differences between provinces, infrastructure class show obvious inclination trend, while no significant relationship with the public service spending.
Western backward areas:land transfer income showes the infrastructure tilt trend, but the influence degree is weak to moderate developing area; Basically, land transfer income has no impact on the public service spending, and there is a clear structural distortion from land transfer income for public spending.
(3) The level of public goods and housing prices respectively have important influence on urban growth in the role of agglomeration and dispersion forces direction. By Gleaser model study of285cities in China, in the urban spatial expansion, the land price, represented by real estate prices has played a negative effect on growth of cities, the public goods supply has effective influence on the urban space extension, education, health care, transport and infrastructure is the driving force for the city development effectively, cultural facilities and communications public goods will restrict the urban space development, in the aspect of urban no spatial growth, real estate prices significantly depressed the increase of population in urban agglomeration, and whose effect on economic growth is not obvious according to the significant levels; Urban roads, communication facilities.culture, education and health care will significantly reduce the population growth expansion, increase traffic supply can improve the urban population growth. Public goods supply for the promotion of economic development is not ideal enough.
Current mode of urban growth lead to the incongruity development of population and economic growth, the reality of urban growth didn't realize the rational growth of optimization.
(4) Qianjiang new city as a representative case study presents the local government land management behavior and choices in the coastal developed areas. Through analysis from the process of land revenue for various management, construction investment flow analysis and specific content analysis of urban growth established by the new city management committee, we found better support of the empirical research conclusion in generating revenue, public goods supply and urban growth.
The academic value of this study and the innovation points mainly concentrated in the following four points:
(1) Obtain the regional difference of land transfer revenue to local government research manifest the differences of land transfer revenue groups, found the choice of government land transfer under different area condition, enriched the related theory of Chinese differentiation of land finance.
(2) In this paper, the research of the structure of regional public expenditure investment decisions and regional differences provide a novel perspective, focusing on the new land transfer revenue impact on the public goods supply, local government land transfer income used in the implementation of public goods spending practice reflects the structure and the regional difference through the empirical analysis, provides the reliable empirical evidence.
(3) This study helps to provide public goods and housing prices affect urban growth research analysis framework based on China situation. The analysis showed the need and necessity of house prices and public goods together to effect the China's urban growth, provide the study of Chinese scene matching for the relevant theoretical and empirical research to.
(4) In this paper, the correction of Gleaser models applied in China has a certain contribution, in this paper, by constructing urban area as characterization form of urban growth, put population and GDP in the same simultaneous equation, we set a more appropriate Chinese reality environment improvement of Gleaser urban growth model, and promote the matching effect of empirical analysis of the model and China's urban growth scenarios.
In addition, this paper has a certain practical significance for understanding of the close ties between public goods supply, land transfer income access and the regional characteristics, evaluation the combined impact of public goods and housing prices for urban growth, and we also discussed the certain enlightenment function of "crowding out" and "transfer effect" for land financial income.
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