双边市场框架下零售通道费的生成机理与定价机制研究
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摘要
所谓“通道费”一般是指供应商为使其产品能够在零售商的货架上首次获得展示权或者能够在零售商的备货中首次占有一席之地而一次性付给零售商的一笔作为交换条件的费用。
零售商与供应商之间因通道费问题产生的纠纷由来已久。在零售商看来,由于零售市场的竞争日趋激烈,零售店铺要吸引顾客、维护市场地位,就必须在维持低毛利的条件下加大促销和服务的力度,这就大大增加了零售商的成本负担,为了获取正常的利润,有必要以通道费的形式向供应商索取经济补偿；但是,在供应商看来,通道费的存在不尽合理。他们认为,零售商收取通道费不仅仅是抵补先期付出的促销、服务成本,而更多地是已经将通道费作为直接的利润来源,是零售商滥用市场优势地位压榨供应商利润的手段。据调查,大卖场所收取的通道费己占到供应商总销售额的8%-25%,最高可达35%。我国零售上市公司的年报显示,部分大型零售商若扣除通道费收入,其经营将处于微利甚至亏损状态。有的大零售商通道费占主营业务收人的比例高达200%以上。2003年,家乐福超市公司与上海炒货行业协会在通道费谈判中爆发激烈对峙,上海炒货行业协会宣布10家会员企业集体“暂停”向家乐福的34家大卖场供货。该事件虽然最后通过双方的庭外和解而平息,但却使全社会第一次将目光聚焦在零售业的巨额通道费上。
那么通道费是合理的吗?通道费真的是零售商无理剥夺供应商利润的手段吗?通道费对消费者的利益又有何影响呢?这些问题的回答需要对通道费现象进行理论上的研究。
实际上通道费在世界范围内的出现可上溯至20世纪80年代。现有研究大多认为通道费是在20世纪80年代美国市场上新产品爆发式增长的背景下出现的。面对每年数以千计要求进店上架的新产品,超市因货架空间有限而只能选择其中的10%甚至更少进入他们的货架。为有效利用货架资源,超市就要求制造商必须事先缴纳高额的通道费才能获得新产品上架的权利。很快,收取通道费的做法在零售业被广泛效仿,直至成为世界范围内的准行业惯例。学术界对通道费问题早有研究,但这些研究至今未有定论。“效率学派”认为,通道费作为零售商与供应商之间的一种“风险转移”和“成本共担”机制,有利于提高新产品上市、分销的效率,通道费具有“信号指示”的作用,便于零售商提高对新产品的“筛选”效率。“市场势力”学派则认为,收取通道费是零售商运用市场势力对供应商进行价格或促销歧视的一种手段,会妨害市场竞争,抬高商品零售价格。多年来两大学派的观点都未得到后续研究的有力证实,理论界关于通道费合理性及经济影响的争论仍在继续。理论研究进展的缓慢导致对通道费的规制缺少足够的依据,因此实践中各国政府对通道费的规制就都只是有限的规制,零供矛盾仍时有发生。
为从新的角度研究通道费问题,本文尝试将这一问题置于双边市场理论的研究框架之下。双边市场理论是近年来开始兴起的专门分析平台型产业的理论工具。该理论着眼于经济现实中这样一个有趣的现象：经济活动中有些市场交易必须在某个交易平台上进行,交易平台通过一定的价格策略向交易双方提供产品或服务,并努力促成他们在交易平台上实现交易,具有此种特征的市场就是双边市场。在一个双边市场中,分处于平台两边的用户之间具有高度互动性,A边用户的参与会对B边用户的效用产生影响。在平台对双边用户总服务价格不变时,平台上实现的交易额受到双边用户之间价格结构的影响。这与单边市场中仅考虑买方、卖方两个主体的情况是截然不同的。双边市场理论视现代大型零售业为具有平台特征的产业,零售商充当为消费者和供应商提供服务的交易平台。在双边市场理论框架下,通道费恰恰被看作是零售平台向双边用户倾斜定价的手段,即通过通道费的收取,零售平台实现了对消费者一边制定低价、对供应商一边制定高价的价格策略。双边市场理论将通道费看作平台倾斜的价格结构中的一部分,并在通道费价格决定机制的探讨中,增加了对消费者与供应商之间互动行为的考察,从而构建了更加系统化、动态化的理论框架。与其他理论相比,双边市场理论应该更适于对日益大型化、连锁化、信息化的零售业做出深入的理论分析。
双边市场理论为通道费研究提供了新的角度和更为有效的研究工具。本文在双边市场框架下对通道费的生成机理、价值来源、定价机制及规制办法做了系统的研究和论述。在现有研究的基础上,本文首先梳理了通道费的定义和范围问题。综合目前的定义,本为给出了自己的通道费定义：供应商为使自己的商品获得进入零售店铺展示和销售的机会而在商品批发价格以外支付给零售商的各种费用。该定义强调：(1)所支付的费用必须在商品批发价格之外；(2)供应商支付费用的目的是为了占有或维持零售货架使用权及零售商对供应商产品的优待。本文认为这样的定义方式有助于将研究对象聚焦在真正的通道费上,避免研究对象的混淆。接下来本文通过一个准历史研究,考察了20世纪80年代美国市场上通道费产生的过程、条件和诱因。通过对历史资料的引证,并结合其他文献分析,本文认为新产品的大爆发仅是通道费出现的条件,更根本的原因是零售业自身所发生的变化——由于条码扫描、POS机、数据库等技术的应用,现代大型连锁零售商已经与传统百货店、杂货店有很大不同,他们能大量收集零售数据,掌握大量市场信息,对市场变化做出精准、快速的反应,这就已经具有了平台企业的特性。本文认为零售商走向平台化是通道费出现并持续存在下来的真正原因。接着本文借助于对中国上市公司数据的研究试图对效率理论或市场势力理论的观点做出验证。实证研究的结论显示,通道费非但没有对制造商的利润产生负影响,反倒表现出对制造商利润的正向贡献。显然,这个结论更倾向于支持效率理论而不是市场势力理论。但由于我们无法直接测量通道费,而是用其他利润率指标替代,这可能造成研究结论的不可靠。接下来,根据实证研究结论,我们提出通道费价值来源的假说。既然通道费没有制造价格上涨以侵占消费者的利益,同时也没有侵占供应商的利润,再考虑到双边市场理论对通道费的新解释,本文提出了“通道费价值是来自平台创造的网络外部性收益”的观点,即“网络外部性剩余假说”。在本文的第五部分,我们在现有双边市场定价模型的基础上,用类似的环境设定和变量提取方法构建了理论分析模型,分三种市场情态分析了零售平台谋求自身利润最大化条件下双边价格的形成。模型分析使我们观察到与通道费水平有关的各变量是如何发挥作用的,这些变量包括双边用户的需求价格弹性、交叉网络外部性系数、用户的数量和归属特性等。最后本文讨论了应如何对通道费加以适当规制的问题。本文认为现有基于“市场优势地位滥用”或“市场支配地位”的规制措施并不完全适用于通道费规制,这些理论依据都不适合描述双边市场的特殊情况。本文从零售业作为双边市场的平台企业这一点出发,提出了一系列基于双边市场特性的规制建议。
本文的创新之处体现在以下三个方面：
首先,本文在双边市场理论框架下对通道费的产生原因作出了新的解释。现有理论在解释通道费产生的原因时大多聚焦于20世纪80年代美国日用消费品市场的新产品大爆发,认为新产品集中大量涌向零售商有限的货架空间是引发零售商竞价收取高额通道费的直接原因。但这个观点并不能解释当新产品热潮逐渐冷却以后,为何通道费机制却保留了下来。况且,在通道费实践中,收费的对象早己超越了“新产品”的范围。这说明通道费的生成可能另有原因。受双边市场理论的启发,本文认为零售商在20世纪80年代实现了两个大的转变,一是经营规模的扩大化、连锁化；二是经营手段的电子化、信息化(条码扫描和数据库系统)。这两个大的转变使零售商一跃从传统零售商变成了现代化的“零售平台”。以双边市场的标准来看,现代大型零售商已经具有明显的平台属性,其面对的市场已经不是传统的单边市场,而是更加复杂和联动的双边市场,而通道费很可能就是作为双边市场中平台企业的倾斜价格结构而出现的。因此本文提出了“平台化零售商的出现是通道费产生的根本原因”这个理论假说。
其次,本文将定量数据分析与理论分析相结合,提出关于通道费价值来源的“网络外部性剩余假说”。通道费的价值来源问题一直是个谜团。但从逻辑上讲,不外乎两大来源：要么来自对消费者涨价带来的收入,要么来自对供应商利润的剥夺。本文首先对这两个来源做了考察,结论是,通道费既不是来自对消费者的涨价,也不是来自对供应商利润的单纯剥夺。对中国上市公司的财务数据分析表明,通道费非但没有对供应商的利润产生负面影响,反倒在一定的滞后期内对其产生了正面的影响。那么通道费的价值来源究竟在哪里呢?借助于双边市场理论,本文提出了关于通道费价值来源的“网络外部性剩余假说”,即认为通道费只能来源于零售平台为供应商创造的交叉网络外部性的剩余。
最后,本文基于现代零售商的双边市场特性提出通道费规制的新思路。国内外经济学、管理学界,法学界,以及政策制定部门、贸易协会等,对通道费规制的问题关注己久,已经形成了一些各具特色的规制办法。但这些规制基本都是从“商业贿赂”、“市场优势地位滥用”、“市场支配地位”等角度进行的规制,也并非专门针对通道费的规制。现有规制依据大都限于以传统的单边市场或纵向结构的角度来考察、判定零售业的状况。本文认为双边市场分析能更贴切地对当代零售业作出描摹。从双边市场理论的角度,通道费不再是简单的买方垄断行为,而是平台的合理定价行为,由此对现有规制思路给出了新的补充。
Slotting allowances or slotting fees is a lump-sum payment which is paid by suppliers to persuade retailers initializing introduction of a new product, and give the product an opportunity to be stored and displayed on retailers' shelves.
There have been dissensions between retailers and suppliers because of the existence of slotting allowances. In retailers'position, they have to gain the payment from suppliers to cover the increasing cost, which is really necessary to attract more consumers or enhancing services in order to survive the competing with rivals. Because, they can't cover the huge cost by increasing revenue from consumers. But in the opposite position, the suppliers say that, rather than to cover the promotion cost, most of the fees is transferred to the retailers'net profits. Retailers are using slotting allowances as a pressing tool to absorb the suppliers'profits. According to some statistics, the rate of slotting allowances in sales revenue of retailers is8%up to25%, and the highest can reach35%. The financial reports of some Chinese listed retailing companies show that, their profits would be tiny or even negative without the income from slotting allowances. The rate of slotting allowances in revenue from main operation can be up to more than200%. Carrefour, a French retailer, encountered furious revolt of some suppliers because the suppliers considered the level of slotting allowances far more beyond justice. The suppliers,10food manufacturers from a food industry union in Shanghai City, stopped supplying to the34shops of Carrefour. Despite the final settlement, the well-known accident raised a lot of attention to retailers'slotting allowances nationwide for the first time.
Are slotting allowances injustice? Did the fees rob the suppliers? What are the influences to consumers'welfare? All the answers depend on deep researching on slotting allowances.
Actually, the first sight of slotting allowances can be cast back to1980's, when too many new products burst out to supermarkets' shelves. Burst out of new products is considered the direct reason of the creation of slotting allowances in many literatures. Because of the limitation of the amount of shelves'space, supermarkets have to choose only about10%new products of the all to let them in. They asked for slotting allowances to suppliers for the best use of their shelves. And soon after, all the retailers learned to do so until most companies of the world look on slotting allowances as just some kind of tradition in business naturally. Researching conclusion is still in its way. According to the efficiency school, as a mechanism of risk-transmitting and cost-sharing, slotting allowances can speed up the introduction and distribution of new products. And retailers can screen out the most successful new products by the signaling of slotting allowances. On the contrast, the market power school considers the fees a tool, by using which the retailers can put forward some kind of price discrimination to the suppliers. And the using of slotting fees can rise retailing prices and hurt the competitiveness of the market. None of the two schools has been approved enough, and the questions are still here. This situation limited the restrictions on slotting fees from commissions and governments.
To capture a new angle of view to slotting fees, this paper put the question under the two-sided market framework, which has been proved really appropriate to platform industry analysis. Two-sided market theories pay attention to some interesting things, that is, some exchanges can only achieved on a platform. The platform supplies products or services at some certain prices to the users of both sides and manage to make the exchange done. This type of market is two-sided market. There are continuous interactions between users of different sides and the attendant of one side users influence the utility of the other side users. Let the sum of prices of two sides holding on, the amount of exchanges achieved on the platform is related to the price structure. This situation is obviously different to traditional one-sided market. In two-sided market framework view, retailers are platforms which manage to achieve the exchanges between consumers and suppliers. And then, Slotting fees can be a part of price structure, that is, the price given to suppliers, who are users of one side of the two. The two-sided market theories consider the slotting fees as a part of the declining price structure, in which one side price is low and the other is high. Different to other theories, two-sided market framework is more systemetic and dynamic because it includes the consideration of the interaction between consumers and suppliers in the research of slotting fees. And thus, the framework is more appropriate to analysis infromational modern huge chain retailers.
Given new angles of view and more effective resaerching tools from two-sided market framework, this paper put forward some systemetic research on the creation, the source of value, and the pricing featutes of soltting fees. Firstly, based on the present literatures, this paper redifines the definition and scope of slotting fees. According to this paper, slotting fees are all the payments which are paid outside the goods price to retailers by suppliers to gain opportunities of letting their products be displayed and on sale on retailers'shelves. There are two limitations in this definition. The first, the slotting fees must be outside the goods price. Further, the fees must be paid only for the purpose of letting the products entering, being remained on the shelves and being treated in good way. These limitations can prevent the definition from confusion. Secondly, a so-called historical research on the reason of the creation of slotting fees is on board. Based on analysis on historical materials and literatures, this paper concludes that the purst out of new products in1980's is but one condition of the creation of slotting fees. The ultimate reason of that is related to the big changes of retailers themselves, that is, the applications of bar code, laser scanner, multi-functional POS sysms, and large database techniqus, by which the big modern retailers are far more different to traditional retailers, such as department stores or grocers. The big modern retailers can grasp a lot of consumer information by using the modern devices and then response the market trends accurately and rapidly. They have showed the features of platform industries at that time. Thus this paper concludes that, the pacing close to the platform features of modern big retailers is the ultimate reason of slotting fees'creation in1980's. Then there is an empirical research based on the data from Chinese listed companies'quarterly financial reports trying to validate the efficiency school or the market power school. The empirical outcome surprisingly shows that the slotting fees have rather than negative press on suppliers' profits, but positive influences on suppliers'profits. Obviously, this result leans to the efficiency school rather than the market power school. But because there is no posibility to measure the slotting fees directly, this paper has to use alternative substitute target. Thus the result might not be stable enough. Although, based on the empirical resunlt, a hypothesis of the value source of slotting fees is brought forward. Since the slotting fees come from neither the reduction of consumers'welfare nor the reduce of suppliers'profits, given the two-sided market framework suggestions, this paper draws the hypothesis, so-named the surplus of network externalities hypothesis. This hypothesis says that the value of slotting fees comes from the surplus of network externalities which are created by the platform, the retailers. In the next part of this paper, some pricing models based on present two-sided market research works are set to show perspective of slotting fees pricing. The models are initialized in the same way as in the present literature, including the set of variables. The demand-pice elasticity, the cross-group network externalities parameter, the number and homing features of users are key variables in these models. In the last part of the paper is the discussion about how to restrict the abuse of slotting fees. According to this paper, neither the market dominance theories nor the abuse of maket superior status theories is more appropriate than the two-sided markt framework to describe the situations in nowadays retailing market. Closely based on the two-sided market features of retail market, a serie of suggestions on how to restrict the abuse of slotting fees is given.
Some innovative viewpoints in this paper are as follows:
Firstly, a new explanation on how slotting fees are generated is given under the two-sided market theory framework. The present theories consider the burst out of new products in1980's to be the main reason of coming out of the retail slotting fees. But they can't explain why the fees are still exist when the burst out of new products have been cooled down. Further more, the range of products which are paid the fees is far beyond "new products", which suggests that there maybe other reasons of the fees' existing. Enlightened by the two-sided market theories, this paper notes two big changes in retail industry in1980's. One change is that the retailers are more and more big sized and chained. The other, they are having effective electric and informational tactics (barcode scanning and database systems). The two big changes allow the retailers to be a kind of platforms which are far more different from traditional retailers. In the two-sided market viewpoint, modern retailers are obviously platforms, which face two-sided markets but not one-sided markets. Thus the slotting fees can be a part of leaning pricing structure in a two-sided market. So this paper draws that it is the emerging of retail platforms that allows the slotting fees' existing.
Secondly, based on not only the empirical analysis but also the theoretical analysis, this paper suggests "the surplus of network externalities hypothesis" to try to explain the value source of slotting fees. Logically, the value of slotting fees come from either the higher prices given to consumers or the lower profits the suppliers gained. But according to this paper, neither of the two sources is proved. The financial analysis to some Chinese listed companies show that the slotting fees even have positive influences rather than negative influences on the suppliers'profits. Then "the surplus of network externalities hypothesis" is drawn, which presumes that the surplus of network externalities which is generated by the retail platforms is the value source of slotting fees.
Finally, based on the two-sided market viewpoints, this paper gives a series of new regulation suggests to restrict slotting fees practices. Even though the economists, the managerial experts, the law researchers, the trade commissions and the policy makers have been noticing the slotting fees and have been taking some restrictions, but the restrictions are not fit the slotting fees well. It is the analysis based on two-sided market theories that can describe the modern retailing market situations exactly and appropriately. In the two-sided market point of view, slotting fees can be the rational pricing practice rather than simple monopoly pricing practice. And thus, some new regulation routs ahead can be seen.
零售商与供应商之间因通道费问题产生的纠纷由来已久。在零售商看来,由于零售市场的竞争日趋激烈,零售店铺要吸引顾客、维护市场地位,就必须在维持低毛利的条件下加大促销和服务的力度,这就大大增加了零售商的成本负担,为了获取正常的利润,有必要以通道费的形式向供应商索取经济补偿；但是,在供应商看来,通道费的存在不尽合理。他们认为,零售商收取通道费不仅仅是抵补先期付出的促销、服务成本,而更多地是已经将通道费作为直接的利润来源,是零售商滥用市场优势地位压榨供应商利润的手段。据调查,大卖场所收取的通道费己占到供应商总销售额的8%-25%,最高可达35%。我国零售上市公司的年报显示,部分大型零售商若扣除通道费收入,其经营将处于微利甚至亏损状态。有的大零售商通道费占主营业务收人的比例高达200%以上。2003年,家乐福超市公司与上海炒货行业协会在通道费谈判中爆发激烈对峙,上海炒货行业协会宣布10家会员企业集体“暂停”向家乐福的34家大卖场供货。该事件虽然最后通过双方的庭外和解而平息,但却使全社会第一次将目光聚焦在零售业的巨额通道费上。
那么通道费是合理的吗?通道费真的是零售商无理剥夺供应商利润的手段吗?通道费对消费者的利益又有何影响呢?这些问题的回答需要对通道费现象进行理论上的研究。
实际上通道费在世界范围内的出现可上溯至20世纪80年代。现有研究大多认为通道费是在20世纪80年代美国市场上新产品爆发式增长的背景下出现的。面对每年数以千计要求进店上架的新产品,超市因货架空间有限而只能选择其中的10%甚至更少进入他们的货架。为有效利用货架资源,超市就要求制造商必须事先缴纳高额的通道费才能获得新产品上架的权利。很快,收取通道费的做法在零售业被广泛效仿,直至成为世界范围内的准行业惯例。学术界对通道费问题早有研究,但这些研究至今未有定论。“效率学派”认为,通道费作为零售商与供应商之间的一种“风险转移”和“成本共担”机制,有利于提高新产品上市、分销的效率,通道费具有“信号指示”的作用,便于零售商提高对新产品的“筛选”效率。“市场势力”学派则认为,收取通道费是零售商运用市场势力对供应商进行价格或促销歧视的一种手段,会妨害市场竞争,抬高商品零售价格。多年来两大学派的观点都未得到后续研究的有力证实,理论界关于通道费合理性及经济影响的争论仍在继续。理论研究进展的缓慢导致对通道费的规制缺少足够的依据,因此实践中各国政府对通道费的规制就都只是有限的规制,零供矛盾仍时有发生。
为从新的角度研究通道费问题,本文尝试将这一问题置于双边市场理论的研究框架之下。双边市场理论是近年来开始兴起的专门分析平台型产业的理论工具。该理论着眼于经济现实中这样一个有趣的现象：经济活动中有些市场交易必须在某个交易平台上进行,交易平台通过一定的价格策略向交易双方提供产品或服务,并努力促成他们在交易平台上实现交易,具有此种特征的市场就是双边市场。在一个双边市场中,分处于平台两边的用户之间具有高度互动性,A边用户的参与会对B边用户的效用产生影响。在平台对双边用户总服务价格不变时,平台上实现的交易额受到双边用户之间价格结构的影响。这与单边市场中仅考虑买方、卖方两个主体的情况是截然不同的。双边市场理论视现代大型零售业为具有平台特征的产业,零售商充当为消费者和供应商提供服务的交易平台。在双边市场理论框架下,通道费恰恰被看作是零售平台向双边用户倾斜定价的手段,即通过通道费的收取,零售平台实现了对消费者一边制定低价、对供应商一边制定高价的价格策略。双边市场理论将通道费看作平台倾斜的价格结构中的一部分,并在通道费价格决定机制的探讨中,增加了对消费者与供应商之间互动行为的考察,从而构建了更加系统化、动态化的理论框架。与其他理论相比,双边市场理论应该更适于对日益大型化、连锁化、信息化的零售业做出深入的理论分析。
双边市场理论为通道费研究提供了新的角度和更为有效的研究工具。本文在双边市场框架下对通道费的生成机理、价值来源、定价机制及规制办法做了系统的研究和论述。在现有研究的基础上,本文首先梳理了通道费的定义和范围问题。综合目前的定义,本为给出了自己的通道费定义：供应商为使自己的商品获得进入零售店铺展示和销售的机会而在商品批发价格以外支付给零售商的各种费用。该定义强调：(1)所支付的费用必须在商品批发价格之外；(2)供应商支付费用的目的是为了占有或维持零售货架使用权及零售商对供应商产品的优待。本文认为这样的定义方式有助于将研究对象聚焦在真正的通道费上,避免研究对象的混淆。接下来本文通过一个准历史研究,考察了20世纪80年代美国市场上通道费产生的过程、条件和诱因。通过对历史资料的引证,并结合其他文献分析,本文认为新产品的大爆发仅是通道费出现的条件,更根本的原因是零售业自身所发生的变化——由于条码扫描、POS机、数据库等技术的应用,现代大型连锁零售商已经与传统百货店、杂货店有很大不同,他们能大量收集零售数据,掌握大量市场信息,对市场变化做出精准、快速的反应,这就已经具有了平台企业的特性。本文认为零售商走向平台化是通道费出现并持续存在下来的真正原因。接着本文借助于对中国上市公司数据的研究试图对效率理论或市场势力理论的观点做出验证。实证研究的结论显示,通道费非但没有对制造商的利润产生负影响,反倒表现出对制造商利润的正向贡献。显然,这个结论更倾向于支持效率理论而不是市场势力理论。但由于我们无法直接测量通道费,而是用其他利润率指标替代,这可能造成研究结论的不可靠。接下来,根据实证研究结论,我们提出通道费价值来源的假说。既然通道费没有制造价格上涨以侵占消费者的利益,同时也没有侵占供应商的利润,再考虑到双边市场理论对通道费的新解释,本文提出了“通道费价值是来自平台创造的网络外部性收益”的观点,即“网络外部性剩余假说”。在本文的第五部分,我们在现有双边市场定价模型的基础上,用类似的环境设定和变量提取方法构建了理论分析模型,分三种市场情态分析了零售平台谋求自身利润最大化条件下双边价格的形成。模型分析使我们观察到与通道费水平有关的各变量是如何发挥作用的,这些变量包括双边用户的需求价格弹性、交叉网络外部性系数、用户的数量和归属特性等。最后本文讨论了应如何对通道费加以适当规制的问题。本文认为现有基于“市场优势地位滥用”或“市场支配地位”的规制措施并不完全适用于通道费规制,这些理论依据都不适合描述双边市场的特殊情况。本文从零售业作为双边市场的平台企业这一点出发,提出了一系列基于双边市场特性的规制建议。
本文的创新之处体现在以下三个方面：
首先,本文在双边市场理论框架下对通道费的产生原因作出了新的解释。现有理论在解释通道费产生的原因时大多聚焦于20世纪80年代美国日用消费品市场的新产品大爆发,认为新产品集中大量涌向零售商有限的货架空间是引发零售商竞价收取高额通道费的直接原因。但这个观点并不能解释当新产品热潮逐渐冷却以后,为何通道费机制却保留了下来。况且,在通道费实践中,收费的对象早己超越了“新产品”的范围。这说明通道费的生成可能另有原因。受双边市场理论的启发,本文认为零售商在20世纪80年代实现了两个大的转变,一是经营规模的扩大化、连锁化；二是经营手段的电子化、信息化(条码扫描和数据库系统)。这两个大的转变使零售商一跃从传统零售商变成了现代化的“零售平台”。以双边市场的标准来看,现代大型零售商已经具有明显的平台属性,其面对的市场已经不是传统的单边市场,而是更加复杂和联动的双边市场,而通道费很可能就是作为双边市场中平台企业的倾斜价格结构而出现的。因此本文提出了“平台化零售商的出现是通道费产生的根本原因”这个理论假说。
其次,本文将定量数据分析与理论分析相结合,提出关于通道费价值来源的“网络外部性剩余假说”。通道费的价值来源问题一直是个谜团。但从逻辑上讲,不外乎两大来源：要么来自对消费者涨价带来的收入,要么来自对供应商利润的剥夺。本文首先对这两个来源做了考察,结论是,通道费既不是来自对消费者的涨价,也不是来自对供应商利润的单纯剥夺。对中国上市公司的财务数据分析表明,通道费非但没有对供应商的利润产生负面影响,反倒在一定的滞后期内对其产生了正面的影响。那么通道费的价值来源究竟在哪里呢?借助于双边市场理论,本文提出了关于通道费价值来源的“网络外部性剩余假说”,即认为通道费只能来源于零售平台为供应商创造的交叉网络外部性的剩余。
最后,本文基于现代零售商的双边市场特性提出通道费规制的新思路。国内外经济学、管理学界,法学界,以及政策制定部门、贸易协会等,对通道费规制的问题关注己久,已经形成了一些各具特色的规制办法。但这些规制基本都是从“商业贿赂”、“市场优势地位滥用”、“市场支配地位”等角度进行的规制,也并非专门针对通道费的规制。现有规制依据大都限于以传统的单边市场或纵向结构的角度来考察、判定零售业的状况。本文认为双边市场分析能更贴切地对当代零售业作出描摹。从双边市场理论的角度,通道费不再是简单的买方垄断行为,而是平台的合理定价行为,由此对现有规制思路给出了新的补充。
Slotting allowances or slotting fees is a lump-sum payment which is paid by suppliers to persuade retailers initializing introduction of a new product, and give the product an opportunity to be stored and displayed on retailers' shelves.
There have been dissensions between retailers and suppliers because of the existence of slotting allowances. In retailers'position, they have to gain the payment from suppliers to cover the increasing cost, which is really necessary to attract more consumers or enhancing services in order to survive the competing with rivals. Because, they can't cover the huge cost by increasing revenue from consumers. But in the opposite position, the suppliers say that, rather than to cover the promotion cost, most of the fees is transferred to the retailers'net profits. Retailers are using slotting allowances as a pressing tool to absorb the suppliers'profits. According to some statistics, the rate of slotting allowances in sales revenue of retailers is8%up to25%, and the highest can reach35%. The financial reports of some Chinese listed retailing companies show that, their profits would be tiny or even negative without the income from slotting allowances. The rate of slotting allowances in revenue from main operation can be up to more than200%. Carrefour, a French retailer, encountered furious revolt of some suppliers because the suppliers considered the level of slotting allowances far more beyond justice. The suppliers,10food manufacturers from a food industry union in Shanghai City, stopped supplying to the34shops of Carrefour. Despite the final settlement, the well-known accident raised a lot of attention to retailers'slotting allowances nationwide for the first time.
Are slotting allowances injustice? Did the fees rob the suppliers? What are the influences to consumers'welfare? All the answers depend on deep researching on slotting allowances.
Actually, the first sight of slotting allowances can be cast back to1980's, when too many new products burst out to supermarkets' shelves. Burst out of new products is considered the direct reason of the creation of slotting allowances in many literatures. Because of the limitation of the amount of shelves'space, supermarkets have to choose only about10%new products of the all to let them in. They asked for slotting allowances to suppliers for the best use of their shelves. And soon after, all the retailers learned to do so until most companies of the world look on slotting allowances as just some kind of tradition in business naturally. Researching conclusion is still in its way. According to the efficiency school, as a mechanism of risk-transmitting and cost-sharing, slotting allowances can speed up the introduction and distribution of new products. And retailers can screen out the most successful new products by the signaling of slotting allowances. On the contrast, the market power school considers the fees a tool, by using which the retailers can put forward some kind of price discrimination to the suppliers. And the using of slotting fees can rise retailing prices and hurt the competitiveness of the market. None of the two schools has been approved enough, and the questions are still here. This situation limited the restrictions on slotting fees from commissions and governments.
To capture a new angle of view to slotting fees, this paper put the question under the two-sided market framework, which has been proved really appropriate to platform industry analysis. Two-sided market theories pay attention to some interesting things, that is, some exchanges can only achieved on a platform. The platform supplies products or services at some certain prices to the users of both sides and manage to make the exchange done. This type of market is two-sided market. There are continuous interactions between users of different sides and the attendant of one side users influence the utility of the other side users. Let the sum of prices of two sides holding on, the amount of exchanges achieved on the platform is related to the price structure. This situation is obviously different to traditional one-sided market. In two-sided market framework view, retailers are platforms which manage to achieve the exchanges between consumers and suppliers. And then, Slotting fees can be a part of price structure, that is, the price given to suppliers, who are users of one side of the two. The two-sided market theories consider the slotting fees as a part of the declining price structure, in which one side price is low and the other is high. Different to other theories, two-sided market framework is more systemetic and dynamic because it includes the consideration of the interaction between consumers and suppliers in the research of slotting fees. And thus, the framework is more appropriate to analysis infromational modern huge chain retailers.
Given new angles of view and more effective resaerching tools from two-sided market framework, this paper put forward some systemetic research on the creation, the source of value, and the pricing featutes of soltting fees. Firstly, based on the present literatures, this paper redifines the definition and scope of slotting fees. According to this paper, slotting fees are all the payments which are paid outside the goods price to retailers by suppliers to gain opportunities of letting their products be displayed and on sale on retailers'shelves. There are two limitations in this definition. The first, the slotting fees must be outside the goods price. Further, the fees must be paid only for the purpose of letting the products entering, being remained on the shelves and being treated in good way. These limitations can prevent the definition from confusion. Secondly, a so-called historical research on the reason of the creation of slotting fees is on board. Based on analysis on historical materials and literatures, this paper concludes that the purst out of new products in1980's is but one condition of the creation of slotting fees. The ultimate reason of that is related to the big changes of retailers themselves, that is, the applications of bar code, laser scanner, multi-functional POS sysms, and large database techniqus, by which the big modern retailers are far more different to traditional retailers, such as department stores or grocers. The big modern retailers can grasp a lot of consumer information by using the modern devices and then response the market trends accurately and rapidly. They have showed the features of platform industries at that time. Thus this paper concludes that, the pacing close to the platform features of modern big retailers is the ultimate reason of slotting fees'creation in1980's. Then there is an empirical research based on the data from Chinese listed companies'quarterly financial reports trying to validate the efficiency school or the market power school. The empirical outcome surprisingly shows that the slotting fees have rather than negative press on suppliers' profits, but positive influences on suppliers'profits. Obviously, this result leans to the efficiency school rather than the market power school. But because there is no posibility to measure the slotting fees directly, this paper has to use alternative substitute target. Thus the result might not be stable enough. Although, based on the empirical resunlt, a hypothesis of the value source of slotting fees is brought forward. Since the slotting fees come from neither the reduction of consumers'welfare nor the reduce of suppliers'profits, given the two-sided market framework suggestions, this paper draws the hypothesis, so-named the surplus of network externalities hypothesis. This hypothesis says that the value of slotting fees comes from the surplus of network externalities which are created by the platform, the retailers. In the next part of this paper, some pricing models based on present two-sided market research works are set to show perspective of slotting fees pricing. The models are initialized in the same way as in the present literature, including the set of variables. The demand-pice elasticity, the cross-group network externalities parameter, the number and homing features of users are key variables in these models. In the last part of the paper is the discussion about how to restrict the abuse of slotting fees. According to this paper, neither the market dominance theories nor the abuse of maket superior status theories is more appropriate than the two-sided markt framework to describe the situations in nowadays retailing market. Closely based on the two-sided market features of retail market, a serie of suggestions on how to restrict the abuse of slotting fees is given.
Some innovative viewpoints in this paper are as follows:
Firstly, a new explanation on how slotting fees are generated is given under the two-sided market theory framework. The present theories consider the burst out of new products in1980's to be the main reason of coming out of the retail slotting fees. But they can't explain why the fees are still exist when the burst out of new products have been cooled down. Further more, the range of products which are paid the fees is far beyond "new products", which suggests that there maybe other reasons of the fees' existing. Enlightened by the two-sided market theories, this paper notes two big changes in retail industry in1980's. One change is that the retailers are more and more big sized and chained. The other, they are having effective electric and informational tactics (barcode scanning and database systems). The two big changes allow the retailers to be a kind of platforms which are far more different from traditional retailers. In the two-sided market viewpoint, modern retailers are obviously platforms, which face two-sided markets but not one-sided markets. Thus the slotting fees can be a part of leaning pricing structure in a two-sided market. So this paper draws that it is the emerging of retail platforms that allows the slotting fees' existing.
Secondly, based on not only the empirical analysis but also the theoretical analysis, this paper suggests "the surplus of network externalities hypothesis" to try to explain the value source of slotting fees. Logically, the value of slotting fees come from either the higher prices given to consumers or the lower profits the suppliers gained. But according to this paper, neither of the two sources is proved. The financial analysis to some Chinese listed companies show that the slotting fees even have positive influences rather than negative influences on the suppliers'profits. Then "the surplus of network externalities hypothesis" is drawn, which presumes that the surplus of network externalities which is generated by the retail platforms is the value source of slotting fees.
Finally, based on the two-sided market viewpoints, this paper gives a series of new regulation suggests to restrict slotting fees practices. Even though the economists, the managerial experts, the law researchers, the trade commissions and the policy makers have been noticing the slotting fees and have been taking some restrictions, but the restrictions are not fit the slotting fees well. It is the analysis based on two-sided market theories that can describe the modern retailing market situations exactly and appropriately. In the two-sided market point of view, slotting fees can be the rational pricing practice rather than simple monopoly pricing practice. And thus, some new regulation routs ahead can be seen.
引文
② Margaret Webb Pressler. Shelf Game;When Stores Force Makers to Pay Them Fees, You Lose. The Washington Post, January 18,2004 Sunday, Financial; F05.
① Caroline E. Mayer. No Room on the Shelf;Grocers and Manufacturers Debate Fees for New Products. The Washington Post, October 17,1990, Wednesday, Final Edition, Section:Food; Pg. E1.
① Margaret Webb Pressler. Shelf Game;When Stores Force Makers to Pay Them Fees, You Lose. The Washington Post, January 18,2004 Sunday, Financial; F05.
① Calum MacLeod. Wal-Mart may be set to woo China shoppers;Companies Won't Comment On Plans. USA TODAY, October 19,2006 Thursday, Section:Money, Pg.5B.
1 Julia Finch. Financial:Retail:How suppliers get the sharp end of supermarkets' hard sell:Watchdog may be on trail of bullyboys whose threats drive down prices. The Guardian (London),August 25, 2007 Saturday, Section:Guardian Financial Pages; Pg.37.
①这里只讨论通道费的合理范围,定价模型已在本文第5章讨论过了。
①黄渊普.艾瑞咨询：2012年中国网络购物市场交易规模超1.3万亿.艾瑞网(http://ec.iresearch.cn/shopping/20130125/192011.shtml),2013年1月25日.
②由中国连锁经营协会2012年5月7日公布的连锁零售业数据计算.
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1 Julia Finch. Financial:Retail:How suppliers get the sharp end of supermarkets' hard sell:Watchdog may be on trail of bullyboys whose threats drive down prices. The Guardian (London),August 25, 2007 Saturday, Section:Guardian Financial Pages; Pg.37.
①这里只讨论通道费的合理范围,定价模型已在本文第5章讨论过了。
①黄渊普.艾瑞咨询：2012年中国网络购物市场交易规模超1.3万亿.艾瑞网(http://ec.iresearch.cn/shopping/20130125/192011.shtml),2013年1月25日.
②由中国连锁经营协会2012年5月7日公布的连锁零售业数据计算.
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