上市公司信息披露透明度研究
|
摘要
根据现代企业理论,上市公司是由股东、债权人、管理者、员工、供应商、顾客、政府以及社会公众等利益相关者组成的一系列契约的联结,各利益相关者都需要上市公司提供自己需要的信息来进行决策。同时,上市公司是证券市场的重要组成部分,信息披露是沟通证券价格与企业价值之间的桥梁,其质量的高低直接影响到证券市场资源配置的效率。因此,上市公司需要及时、全面、准确地披露相关信息,使信息需求者能够随时了解上市公司的具体情况并做出相应的决策,保证证券市场的高效运行。
我国的证券市场自成立以来,上市公司的信息披露一直存在比较严重的问题,信息披露舞弊事件层出不穷,琼民源、红光实业、郑百文等舞弊丑闻一波未平,接二连三的又发生了银广厦、麦科特、科龙电器等恶性造假案件。在西方发达国家,上市公司的信息披露也并非完美无缺,进入21世纪后,美国相继爆发了安然(Enron)、世通(Worldcom)等重大信息披露舞弊事件,意大利也发生了帕马拉特(Parmalat)事件。这些事件严重损害了投资者的信心,动摇了证券市场运行的基石。面对接连不断的信息披露舞弊丑闻,各国政府积极地采取各种措施以提高信息披露透明度,虽然措施不尽相同,但是加强对信息披露的监管是共同点。
自La Porta等(1999)的研究以来,越来越多的研究发现上市公司的股权结构在绝大多数情况下是集中而非分散,绝大多数上市公司都有实际控制人,我国的上市公司就是典型代表。实际控制人由于其拥有的控制权而对上市公司的行为具有重要影响,包括信息披露策略的选择,因此本文提出提高上市公司的信息披露透明度必须从实际控制人出发,并从控制与制衡两个角度建立了信息披露透明度研究范式。不同性质的实际控制人在代理问题的产生和解决方式上存在明显的差别,并对上市公司的行为产生不同的影响,因此研究实际控制人控制与制衡对信息披露透明度的影响时应该同实际控制人的类型相结合。本文正是以此为基础,选取受中央政府或中央政府直属企业控制的上市公司(以下简称中央上市公司)、受地方政府或地方政府直属企业控制的上市公司(以下简称地方上市公司)和受民营公司控制的上市公司(以下简称民营上市公司)为样本,研究了实际控制人控制和制衡在不同类型的上市公司中对信息披露透明度的影响。
论文主要围绕以下问题展开:
1.信息披露透明度的理论分析和评价。本文从上市公司的信息披露谈起,论述了信息披露的理论基础,然后从信息披露供应链的角度提出了信息披露透明度的定义,并利用因子分析的方法建立了信息披露透明度评价模型,该模型的评价结果同深圳证券交易所的信息披露考核结果显著相关。
2.实际控制人控制对信息披露透明度的影响。本文首先检验了不同类型的实际控制人控制下的上市公司信息披露透明度的区别,然后,从实际控制人的控制权、现金流权、控制权与现金流权分离和控制层次等角度研究其对信息披露透明度的影响。结果发现,民营上市公司的信息披露透明度显著低于中央上市公司和地方上市公司;随着实际控制人控制权、现金流权的增加,中央上市公司和地方上市公司的信息披露透明度显著增加,而民营上市公司的信息披露透明度没有显著提升;随着实际控制人控制权与现金流权分离程度的增加,民营上市公司信息披露透明度显著降低,而中央上市公司和地方上市公司的信息披露透明度没有显著变化;随着实际控制人控制层次的增加,地方上市公司和民营上市公司信息披露透明度显著降低,而中央上市公司的信息披露透明度没有显著变化。
3.实际控制人制衡对信息披露透明度的影响。本文从股东、独立董事和注册会计师三个方面分析了实际控制人受到的制衡力量对信息披露透明度的影响。
关于股东制衡对信息披露透明度的影响,本文将股东按类别分为大股东、机构投资者和中小股东,分别检验不同类型股东的制衡力量对信息披露透明度的影响。结果发现,在民营上市公司中,单一大股东对信息披露透明度具有显著的负面影响,而在中央上市公司和地方上市公司中,这种影响并不显著;关于大股东的联合对信息披露透明度的影响,无论是中央上市公司、地方上市公司和民营上市公司,该影响均不显著;在地方上市公司和民营上市公司中,以基金为代表的机构投资者对信息披露透明度具有显著的正面影响,而在中央上市公司中,该影响并不显著;对于参与股东大会的中小股东来说,其持股占整个中小股东持股的比例在各类型的上市公司中对信息披露透明度均无显著影响,但其人数在中央上市公司和民营上市公司中对信息披露透明度具有显著的正面影响,而在地方上市公司中该影响并不显著。
关于独立董事对信息披露透明度的影响,本文从独立董事占董事会的比例、任职时间、薪酬水平、持股数量、亲自参加会议次数、任职企业数量、会计专家数量和任职行为等角度出发,检验独立董事对信息披露透明度的影响。结果发现,在中央上市公司和地方上市公司,信息披露透明度同独立董事的持股数量、任职企业数量显著正相关,同独立董事发表非标准意见或发生非正常辞职显著负相关,同独立董事的比例、任职时间、薪酬水平、亲自参加会议次数和会计专家数量无显著相关关系;在民营上市公司,信息披露透明度同独立董事发表非标准意见或发生非正常辞职显著负相关,同独立董事的比例、任职时间、薪酬水平、持股数量、任职企业数量、亲自参加会议次数和会计专家数量无显著相关关系。另外,本文发现会计专家独立董事同其他独立董事相比发现信息披露存在问题的能力并没有显著区别,而具有会计实践经验的独立董事相对于其他独立董事发现信息披露存在问题的能力更强。
关于注册会计师审计对信息披露透明度的影响,本文从规模、地域、行业特长等角度检验了会计师事务所对信息披露透明度的影响。结果发现,对于中央上市公司来说,各种类型的会计师事务所之间审计质量并没有显著差异。而对于地方上市公司和民营上市公司来说,与其属于同一省份的不具有复核资格的会计师事务所相对于其他会计师事务所审计收费显著偏低,而且出具标准无保留意见审计报告的比例显著偏高,因此审计质量偏低,并对信息披露透明度产生负面影响。相对于中央上市公司,地方上市公司和民营上市公司更愿意聘请审计质量较低的会计师事务所。
本文的创新之处在于:利用因子分析的方法构建了信息披露透明度评价模型,并通过此模型对上市公司的信息披露透明度进行评价;将研究视角从传统的经理人员转移到实际控制人,并从控制与制衡两个角度建立了信息披露透明度研究范式;发现相对于信息披露透明度较高时,信息披露透明度较低时独立董事提出非标准意见或辞职的概率显著偏高,而且会计专家发现信息披露中存在问题的能力同其他独立董事相比并没有显著区别,但是具有实践经验的会计专家发现信息披露中存在问题的能力相对于其他独立董事更强。
According to the modern enterprise theory, company is the nexus of contracts of stakeholders, which include shareholder, creditor, manager, staff, supplier, client and the public, etc. Stakeholders require company to disclose essential information to make decisions. Listed company is an important part of security market, its information disclosure influences the security market's efficency of allocating resources. So listed company needs disclose information in order to help stakeholders make corresponding decisions and guarantee the efficency of security market.
Since the foundation of China's security market, there have been many fraudlent information disclosure events, for example, Qiongminyuan, Yinguangxia, etc. At the same time, information disclosure in developed countries is not perfect, Enron event,Worldcom event,etc broke out in USA, and Parmalat event broke out in Italy. These events damage the competence of investors, shake the cornerstone of security market. Now, governments are taking active methods to heighten information disclosure transparency. Although the methods are not the same, but strengthen regulation of information disclosure is the common idea.
The ownership of company is focused rather than scattered, and most companies have an ultimate controlling owner. Ultimate controlling owner have important influence on information disclosure, this paper proposes an idea that study information disclosure transparency must start from the basis of ultimate controlling owner, and set a paradigm on the view of control and balance. Different kind of ultimate controlling owner has different influence on company, so we should select different way in different company. On the basis of this view, this paper classify listed company into center listed company, local listed company and private listed company, test the influence of ultimate controlling owner's control and balance on information disclosure transparency.
This paper mainly includes questions as below:
1. Theory analysis and appraisal of information disclosure transparency. This paper analyzes the theory basis of information disclosure, and then gives the concept of information disclosure transparency, establishes an information disclosure transparency appraisal model applying factor analysis, the result of this model is significantly related with the result of Shenzhen Security Exchange.
2. The influence of ultimate controlling owner's control on information disclosure transparency. Firstly, this paper tests the difference of information disclosure transparency with different ultimate controlling owner, and then test the influence of control right, cash flow right, divergence between control right and cash flow right, control range of ultimate controlling owner on information disclosure transparency. The result shows that information disclosure transparency of private listed company is lower than that of center listed company and local listed company; with the increase of control right and cash flow right of ultimate controlling owner, information disclosure transparency of center listed company and local listed company increase significantly, and that of private listed company increase insignificantly; with the increase of divergence between control right and cash flow right of ultimate controlling owner, information disclosure transparency of private listed company decrease significantly, and that of center listed company and local listed company changed insignificantly; with the increase of control range of ultimate controlling owner, information disclosure transparency of local listed company and private listed company decrease signifieantly, and that of center listed company changed insignificantly.
3. The influence of ultimate controlling owner's balance on information disclosure transparency. This paper tests the influence of ultimate controlling owner's balance from the aspect of shareholder, independent boarder and external auditor.
This paper divides shareholders into big shareholder, institutional shareholder and small shareholder, and test the influence of shareholder on information disclosure transparency. The result shows that the influence of single big shareholder is significantly negative in private listed company and insignificant in center listed company and local listed company; the influence of the alliance of big shareholders is insignificant regardless in center listed company,local listed company and private listed company; the influence of institutional shareholder is significantly positive in local listed company and private listed company and insignificant in center listed company; the influence of the ratio of small shareholder' share who take part in the general meeting is insignificant regardless in center listed company,local listed company and private listed company, but the influence of the number of small shareholder is significantly positive in center listed company and private listed company and insignificant in local listed company.
This paper tests the influence of independent boarder on the information disclosure transparency from the aspect of serve time, reward, share, meeting times, serve number, knowledge background and action. The result shows that information disclosure transparency is significantly positive related with the share and serve number, significantly negative related with the unstandard opinion expression or resignation, unrelated with other factors in center listed companies and local listed companies; information disclosure transparency is signifieantly negative related with the unstandard opinion expression or resignation, unrelated with other factors in private listed companies, .In addition, this paper also finds accounting expert's competence of finding problems in information disclosure is not significantly different from other independent boarders,but accounting experts with practical experience are more competent than other independent boarders.
This paper tests the influence of CPA auditing on information disclosure transparency from the aspect of size, position and expertise. The result shows that in center listed company, audit quality of audit firm is not different; in local listed company and private listed company, small audit firms which are in same province with clients have lower audit quality than other audit firms, so they have negative influence on information disclosure transparency. In addition, local listed company and private listed company are more willing to employ lower quality audit firm than center listed company.
The innovations of this paper include three points. Firstly, this paper establishes an information disclosure transparency appraisal model; secondly,this paper switches the view from manager to ultimate controlling owner, and set a paradigm on the view of control and balance; thirdly, this paper finds the probability of unstandard opinion expression or resignation of independent boarders is significantly higher when compared low information disclosure transparency with high information disclosure transparency, and accounting expert's competence of finding problems in information disclosure is not significantly different from other independent boarders,but accounting experts with practical experience are more competent than other independent boarders in finding problems of information disclosure.
我国的证券市场自成立以来,上市公司的信息披露一直存在比较严重的问题,信息披露舞弊事件层出不穷,琼民源、红光实业、郑百文等舞弊丑闻一波未平,接二连三的又发生了银广厦、麦科特、科龙电器等恶性造假案件。在西方发达国家,上市公司的信息披露也并非完美无缺,进入21世纪后,美国相继爆发了安然(Enron)、世通(Worldcom)等重大信息披露舞弊事件,意大利也发生了帕马拉特(Parmalat)事件。这些事件严重损害了投资者的信心,动摇了证券市场运行的基石。面对接连不断的信息披露舞弊丑闻,各国政府积极地采取各种措施以提高信息披露透明度,虽然措施不尽相同,但是加强对信息披露的监管是共同点。
自La Porta等(1999)的研究以来,越来越多的研究发现上市公司的股权结构在绝大多数情况下是集中而非分散,绝大多数上市公司都有实际控制人,我国的上市公司就是典型代表。实际控制人由于其拥有的控制权而对上市公司的行为具有重要影响,包括信息披露策略的选择,因此本文提出提高上市公司的信息披露透明度必须从实际控制人出发,并从控制与制衡两个角度建立了信息披露透明度研究范式。不同性质的实际控制人在代理问题的产生和解决方式上存在明显的差别,并对上市公司的行为产生不同的影响,因此研究实际控制人控制与制衡对信息披露透明度的影响时应该同实际控制人的类型相结合。本文正是以此为基础,选取受中央政府或中央政府直属企业控制的上市公司(以下简称中央上市公司)、受地方政府或地方政府直属企业控制的上市公司(以下简称地方上市公司)和受民营公司控制的上市公司(以下简称民营上市公司)为样本,研究了实际控制人控制和制衡在不同类型的上市公司中对信息披露透明度的影响。
论文主要围绕以下问题展开:
1.信息披露透明度的理论分析和评价。本文从上市公司的信息披露谈起,论述了信息披露的理论基础,然后从信息披露供应链的角度提出了信息披露透明度的定义,并利用因子分析的方法建立了信息披露透明度评价模型,该模型的评价结果同深圳证券交易所的信息披露考核结果显著相关。
2.实际控制人控制对信息披露透明度的影响。本文首先检验了不同类型的实际控制人控制下的上市公司信息披露透明度的区别,然后,从实际控制人的控制权、现金流权、控制权与现金流权分离和控制层次等角度研究其对信息披露透明度的影响。结果发现,民营上市公司的信息披露透明度显著低于中央上市公司和地方上市公司;随着实际控制人控制权、现金流权的增加,中央上市公司和地方上市公司的信息披露透明度显著增加,而民营上市公司的信息披露透明度没有显著提升;随着实际控制人控制权与现金流权分离程度的增加,民营上市公司信息披露透明度显著降低,而中央上市公司和地方上市公司的信息披露透明度没有显著变化;随着实际控制人控制层次的增加,地方上市公司和民营上市公司信息披露透明度显著降低,而中央上市公司的信息披露透明度没有显著变化。
3.实际控制人制衡对信息披露透明度的影响。本文从股东、独立董事和注册会计师三个方面分析了实际控制人受到的制衡力量对信息披露透明度的影响。
关于股东制衡对信息披露透明度的影响,本文将股东按类别分为大股东、机构投资者和中小股东,分别检验不同类型股东的制衡力量对信息披露透明度的影响。结果发现,在民营上市公司中,单一大股东对信息披露透明度具有显著的负面影响,而在中央上市公司和地方上市公司中,这种影响并不显著;关于大股东的联合对信息披露透明度的影响,无论是中央上市公司、地方上市公司和民营上市公司,该影响均不显著;在地方上市公司和民营上市公司中,以基金为代表的机构投资者对信息披露透明度具有显著的正面影响,而在中央上市公司中,该影响并不显著;对于参与股东大会的中小股东来说,其持股占整个中小股东持股的比例在各类型的上市公司中对信息披露透明度均无显著影响,但其人数在中央上市公司和民营上市公司中对信息披露透明度具有显著的正面影响,而在地方上市公司中该影响并不显著。
关于独立董事对信息披露透明度的影响,本文从独立董事占董事会的比例、任职时间、薪酬水平、持股数量、亲自参加会议次数、任职企业数量、会计专家数量和任职行为等角度出发,检验独立董事对信息披露透明度的影响。结果发现,在中央上市公司和地方上市公司,信息披露透明度同独立董事的持股数量、任职企业数量显著正相关,同独立董事发表非标准意见或发生非正常辞职显著负相关,同独立董事的比例、任职时间、薪酬水平、亲自参加会议次数和会计专家数量无显著相关关系;在民营上市公司,信息披露透明度同独立董事发表非标准意见或发生非正常辞职显著负相关,同独立董事的比例、任职时间、薪酬水平、持股数量、任职企业数量、亲自参加会议次数和会计专家数量无显著相关关系。另外,本文发现会计专家独立董事同其他独立董事相比发现信息披露存在问题的能力并没有显著区别,而具有会计实践经验的独立董事相对于其他独立董事发现信息披露存在问题的能力更强。
关于注册会计师审计对信息披露透明度的影响,本文从规模、地域、行业特长等角度检验了会计师事务所对信息披露透明度的影响。结果发现,对于中央上市公司来说,各种类型的会计师事务所之间审计质量并没有显著差异。而对于地方上市公司和民营上市公司来说,与其属于同一省份的不具有复核资格的会计师事务所相对于其他会计师事务所审计收费显著偏低,而且出具标准无保留意见审计报告的比例显著偏高,因此审计质量偏低,并对信息披露透明度产生负面影响。相对于中央上市公司,地方上市公司和民营上市公司更愿意聘请审计质量较低的会计师事务所。
本文的创新之处在于:利用因子分析的方法构建了信息披露透明度评价模型,并通过此模型对上市公司的信息披露透明度进行评价;将研究视角从传统的经理人员转移到实际控制人,并从控制与制衡两个角度建立了信息披露透明度研究范式;发现相对于信息披露透明度较高时,信息披露透明度较低时独立董事提出非标准意见或辞职的概率显著偏高,而且会计专家发现信息披露中存在问题的能力同其他独立董事相比并没有显著区别,但是具有实践经验的会计专家发现信息披露中存在问题的能力相对于其他独立董事更强。
According to the modern enterprise theory, company is the nexus of contracts of stakeholders, which include shareholder, creditor, manager, staff, supplier, client and the public, etc. Stakeholders require company to disclose essential information to make decisions. Listed company is an important part of security market, its information disclosure influences the security market's efficency of allocating resources. So listed company needs disclose information in order to help stakeholders make corresponding decisions and guarantee the efficency of security market.
Since the foundation of China's security market, there have been many fraudlent information disclosure events, for example, Qiongminyuan, Yinguangxia, etc. At the same time, information disclosure in developed countries is not perfect, Enron event,Worldcom event,etc broke out in USA, and Parmalat event broke out in Italy. These events damage the competence of investors, shake the cornerstone of security market. Now, governments are taking active methods to heighten information disclosure transparency. Although the methods are not the same, but strengthen regulation of information disclosure is the common idea.
The ownership of company is focused rather than scattered, and most companies have an ultimate controlling owner. Ultimate controlling owner have important influence on information disclosure, this paper proposes an idea that study information disclosure transparency must start from the basis of ultimate controlling owner, and set a paradigm on the view of control and balance. Different kind of ultimate controlling owner has different influence on company, so we should select different way in different company. On the basis of this view, this paper classify listed company into center listed company, local listed company and private listed company, test the influence of ultimate controlling owner's control and balance on information disclosure transparency.
This paper mainly includes questions as below:
1. Theory analysis and appraisal of information disclosure transparency. This paper analyzes the theory basis of information disclosure, and then gives the concept of information disclosure transparency, establishes an information disclosure transparency appraisal model applying factor analysis, the result of this model is significantly related with the result of Shenzhen Security Exchange.
2. The influence of ultimate controlling owner's control on information disclosure transparency. Firstly, this paper tests the difference of information disclosure transparency with different ultimate controlling owner, and then test the influence of control right, cash flow right, divergence between control right and cash flow right, control range of ultimate controlling owner on information disclosure transparency. The result shows that information disclosure transparency of private listed company is lower than that of center listed company and local listed company; with the increase of control right and cash flow right of ultimate controlling owner, information disclosure transparency of center listed company and local listed company increase significantly, and that of private listed company increase insignificantly; with the increase of divergence between control right and cash flow right of ultimate controlling owner, information disclosure transparency of private listed company decrease significantly, and that of center listed company and local listed company changed insignificantly; with the increase of control range of ultimate controlling owner, information disclosure transparency of local listed company and private listed company decrease signifieantly, and that of center listed company changed insignificantly.
3. The influence of ultimate controlling owner's balance on information disclosure transparency. This paper tests the influence of ultimate controlling owner's balance from the aspect of shareholder, independent boarder and external auditor.
This paper divides shareholders into big shareholder, institutional shareholder and small shareholder, and test the influence of shareholder on information disclosure transparency. The result shows that the influence of single big shareholder is significantly negative in private listed company and insignificant in center listed company and local listed company; the influence of the alliance of big shareholders is insignificant regardless in center listed company,local listed company and private listed company; the influence of institutional shareholder is significantly positive in local listed company and private listed company and insignificant in center listed company; the influence of the ratio of small shareholder' share who take part in the general meeting is insignificant regardless in center listed company,local listed company and private listed company, but the influence of the number of small shareholder is significantly positive in center listed company and private listed company and insignificant in local listed company.
This paper tests the influence of independent boarder on the information disclosure transparency from the aspect of serve time, reward, share, meeting times, serve number, knowledge background and action. The result shows that information disclosure transparency is significantly positive related with the share and serve number, significantly negative related with the unstandard opinion expression or resignation, unrelated with other factors in center listed companies and local listed companies; information disclosure transparency is signifieantly negative related with the unstandard opinion expression or resignation, unrelated with other factors in private listed companies, .In addition, this paper also finds accounting expert's competence of finding problems in information disclosure is not significantly different from other independent boarders,but accounting experts with practical experience are more competent than other independent boarders.
This paper tests the influence of CPA auditing on information disclosure transparency from the aspect of size, position and expertise. The result shows that in center listed company, audit quality of audit firm is not different; in local listed company and private listed company, small audit firms which are in same province with clients have lower audit quality than other audit firms, so they have negative influence on information disclosure transparency. In addition, local listed company and private listed company are more willing to employ lower quality audit firm than center listed company.
The innovations of this paper include three points. Firstly, this paper establishes an information disclosure transparency appraisal model; secondly,this paper switches the view from manager to ultimate controlling owner, and set a paradigm on the view of control and balance; thirdly, this paper finds the probability of unstandard opinion expression or resignation of independent boarders is significantly higher when compared low information disclosure transparency with high information disclosure transparency, and accounting expert's competence of finding problems in information disclosure is not significantly different from other independent boarders,but accounting experts with practical experience are more competent than other independent boarders in finding problems of information disclosure.
引文
[1]秦江萍.会计舞弊的市场反应与识别:理论分析与经验证据[M].经济科学出版社:北京.2005年版.第3页.
[1]秦江萍.会计舞弊的市场反应与识别:理论分析与经验证据[M].经济科学出版社:北京.2005年版.第4页.
[1]根据Berle和Means的统计,在1929年,美国最大的铁路公司宾夕法尼亚铁路公司、最大的公用事业公司美国电话电报公司、最大的工业公司美国钢铁公司最大股东的持股比例均不超过公开发行股票的1%,前20位股东的持股总和占股份总数的比例分别为2.7%、4.0%和5.1%。
[2]Berle和Means认为,由于股权分散,并没有股东可以依靠自己持有的股权取得控制地位,这时公司的控制权转移到了董事会。对于董事会的选举,股东由于没有具有影响的股份,囚此或者选择放弃或者选择将投票权转让给代理(投票)委员会,这时控制权就转移到了挑选代理(投票)委员会的人手中。实际上代理(投票)委员会是由经营者指派的,因此实际的控制权转移到了经营者手中,这种控制被称为“经营者控制”。
[3]Larner,R.Ownership and control in the 200 Largest Non-Financial Corporations,1929 and 1963[J].American Economic Review,1966,56:777-787.
[4]转引自谢朝斌.独立董事法律制度研究[M].法律出版社:北京.2004年版.第124-125页.
[1]Jensen和Meckling认为,代理成本主要包括三部分:第一是委托人的监督成本,即委托人激励和监控代理人,使后者为前者的利益而尽力的成本:第二是代理人的担保成本,即代理人用以保证不采取损害委托人行为的成本,以及如果采用了那种行为将给予赔偿的成本:第三是剩余损失,它是委托人因代理人代行决策而产生的一种价值损失,等于代理人决策和委托人在假定具有与代理人相同信息和才能情况下自行效用最大化决策之间的差异。
[2]La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleifer.Corporate Ownership around the World[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54:471-517.
[3]Claessens,S.,S,Djankov,J.Fan,L.Lang.The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations[J].Journal of FinancialEconomics,2000,58:81-112.
[4]Faccio,M.,L.H.P.Lang.The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002,65:365-395.
[1]Wiwattanakantang.Y.Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Value:Evidence from Thailand[J].Pacific Basin Finance Journal,2001,9:323-362.
[2]股东与经理人员之间的冲突通常被称为第一类代理问题。
[3]大股东与小股东之间的冲突通常被称为第二类代理问题。
[1]转引自田翠香.中国资本市场会计信息质量研究[M].上海财经大学出版社:上海.2007年版.
[1]Coase(1937)并没有提出交易费用的概念,只是提出“发现有关价格的成本”,交易费用的概念是其追随者提出的。
[2]Coase,R.The Nature of the Firm[J].Economica,1937,4:386-405.
[3]Cheung,S.The Contractual Nature of the Firm[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26:1-21.
[4][美]奥利弗·E·威廉姆森著.段毅才、王伟等译.资本主义经济制度——论企业签约与市场签约[M].商务印书馆:北京.2002年版.
[5]Ross.S.The Economic Theory of Agent:The Principal's Problem[J].American Economic Review,1973,63.
[6]Jensen,M.C.,W.H.Meekling.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J|.Journal of Financial Economics.1976.3:305-360.
[1][美]R·科斯、A·阿尔钦、D·诺斯等著.刘守英等译.财产权利与制度变迁:产权学派与新制度学派译文集[M].上海三联出版社、上海人民出版社:上海.1994年版.59页.
[2][美]R·科斯、A·阿尔钦、D·诺斯等著.刘守英等译.财产权利与制度变迁:产权学派与新制度学派译文集[M].上海三联出版社、上海人民出版社:上海.1994年版.63页.
1. Agrawal, A., G Mandelker. Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1990,25:143-161.
2. Alexander, J. A., M. L. Fennell, M. T. Halpern. Leadership in Stability in Hospitals: The Influence of Board-CEO Relations and Organizational Growth and Decline [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38:74-99.
3. Blue Ribbon Committee(BRC). 1999. Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees. New York, NY: New York Stock Exchange and National Association of Securities Dealers. Available at: http://www.nyse.com.
4. Berle, A., Means, G.C.The Modern Corporate and Private Property[M]. New York: Macmillan.1932.
5. Bhagat, S., J. Brickley, J. Coles. Managerial Indemnification and Liability Insurance: The Effect on Shareholder Wealth [J]. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 1987, 54: 721-736.
6. Beasley, M.S. An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud [J]. The Accounting Review, 1996, 71(October): 443-465.
7. Beatty, R. P. Auditor Reputation and the Pricing of Initial Public Offerings [J].The Accounting Review, 1989,64:693-709.
8. Becker, C.L., M. L. DeFond, J. Jiambalvo, K.R.Subramanyam.The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1998,15(spring):1-24.
9. Balsam, S., J.Krishnan, J.S.Yang.Auditor Industry Specialization and Earnings Quality [J].Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 2003,22(2):71-97.
10. Berkman, H., Cole, R., A, Fu, J.Agency Conflicts, Expropriation and Firm Value: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China.Working paper, 2005.
11. Bennedsen, Fosgerau, Nielsen. The Strategic Choice of Control Allocation and Ownership Distribution in Closely Held Corporations. Working Paper, Copenhagen Business School, 2003.
12. Botosan, C. A. Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital [J].The Accounting Review, 1997, 72:323-349.
13. Bradbury, M., Mak, Y. and Tan, S. Board Characteristics, Audit Committee Characteristics and Abnormal Accruals [J]. Pacific Accounting Review, 2006, 18: 47-68.
14. Bebchuk, L.A., R.Kraakman, G.Triantis.Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights. Concentrated Corporate Ownership (R.Morck, ed.), 2000
15. Brickley,J, Coles,J,Terry,RL.Outside Diretors and the Adoption of Poison Pills[J].Journal of Financial and Economics,1994,35:371-390.
16. Brickley, J.A., and James, CM. The Takeover Market, Corporate Board Composition, and Ownership Structure: The Case of Banking [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1987,30(1):161-180.
17. Bushman, R., and A.Smith. Transparency, Financial Accounting Information, and Corporate Governance [J]. FRBNY Economic Policy Review, 2003,9:65-87.
18. Byrd, J., K.Hickman. Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence from Tender Offer Bids [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1992,32:195-221.
19. Benjamin Maurya, Anete Pajuste. Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Value [J]. Journal of Banking and Finance, 2005,29:1813-1834.
20. Bennedsen,M.,D.,Wolfenzon.The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:113-139.
21. Bennedsen、 Fosgerau、 Nielsen. The Strategic Choice of Control Allocation and Ownership Distribution in Closely Held Corporations, 2003, Copenhagen Business School
22. Botosan, C., M. Plumlee. A Re-Examination of Disclosure Level and the Expected Cost of Equity Capital [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2002,40: 21- 40.
23. Bloch Francis, Ulrich Hege.Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests [EB/OL]. http://www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr/PP/bloch/papers/controlcontests.pdf,2001.
24. Bradbury, M.E. The Incentives for Voluntary Audit Committee Formation [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 1990,9:19-36.
25. Berle, A.A., Means G.C.The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M]. New York: MacMillan, 1932.
26. Blair, M. M. Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century [M]. Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC. 1995.
27. Cochran, P.L., Wartrick, S.L. Corporate Governance-A Review of the Literature [M].Financial Executives Research Foundation: New Jersey. 1988.
28. Carcello, J. V., Neal, T. L. Audit Committee Independence and Disclosure: Choice for Financially Distressed Firms [J]. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 2003,11:289-299.
29. Carcello,J.V,Nagy,A.L.Auditor Industry Specialization and Fraudulent Financial Reporting[M].Proceedings of the 2002 Deloitte&Touche/University of Kansas Symposium on Auditing Problems,2002.
30. Claessens,S.,S,Djankov,J.Fan,L.Lang.The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations[J]. Journal of FinancialEconomics,2000,58:81-112.
31. Claessens, S., S.Djankov, J.Fan, L.Lang. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings [J]. Journal of Finance, 2002, 57:2741-2772.
32. Chaganti, R.S., V.Mahajan, S.Sharma.Corporate Board Size, Composition and Corporate Failures in Retailing Industry [J]. Journal of Management Studies, 1985,22:400-417.
33. Chau, G.K.Gray S.J.Ownership Structure and Corporate Voluntary Disclosure in Hongkong and Singapore [J].The International Journal of Accounting, 2002, 37:247-256.
34. Chen,CJ.P.,Jaggi,B.Association between Independent Non-executive Directors, Family Control and Financial Disclosures in Hong Kong[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2000,19:285-310.
35. Clikeman, P.M. Constraints to Earnings Management: An Empirical Study of Auditor Type and Institutional Ownership.Working Paper, University of Richmond, 1996.
36. Dalton, D.R., C.M.Daily, A.E.Ellstrand, J.L.Johnson. Number of Directors and Financial Performance: A Meta-analysis [J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1999,42(6): 674-686.
37. DeAngelo, L. E. Auditor Size and Audit Quality [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1981, 3(3): 183-199.
38. DeFond, M., Jiambalvo, J. Incidence and Circumstances of Accounting Errors [J]. The Accounting Review, 1991,66(July):643-655.
39. Denis, D.J., A.Sarin.Ownership and Board Structures in Publicly Traded Corporations [J]. Journal of Finance, 1999, 52: 187-223.
40. Dan S. Dhaliwal, Vic Naiker and Farshid Navissi. Audit Committee Financial Expertise, Corporate Governance and Accruals Quality: An Empirical Analysis [EB/OL]. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=906690,2006.
41. Dye,R.Auditing Standards, Legal Liability, and Auditing Wealth[J].Journal of Political Economy, 1993,101: 887-914.
42. DeFond, M. L., J. Jiambalvo. Factors related to auditor-client disagreements over income-increasing accounting methods [J].Contemporary Accounting Research, 1993, spring: 411-431.
43. DeFond, M., Wong, T.J., Li, S. The Impact of Improved Auditor Independence on Auditor Market Concentration in China [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1999,28:269-305.
44. Demsets, H., K, Lehn.The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Cause and Consequences [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1985,93:1155-1177.
45. Dechow, P.M., Sloan, R. G, Sweeney, A. P. Detecting Earnings Management [J]. The Accounting Review ,1995,70:193 - 225.
46. Dopuch, N., D.A.Simunic.The Nature of Competition in the Auditing Profession: A Descriptive and Normative View. Regulation and the Accounting Profession, 1980,77-94.
47. Dunn, K.A., B.W.Mayhew., S.GMorsefield.Disclosure Quality and Auditor Choice. Working paper, CUNY-Baruch, 2000.
48. Eisenberg, T., S. Sundgren and M .T. Wells. Larger Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1998.48: 35-54.
49. Eng L. L., Y. T. Mak. Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2003, 22:325-345.
50. Forker, J. J. Corporate Governance and Disclosure Quality [J]. Accounting and Business Research, 1992,22(86):111-124.
51. Fama, E., M.C.Jensen.Separation of Ownership and Control [J].Joumal of Law and Economics, 1983, 26:301-325.
52. Fama, E. F. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1980, 88:288-307.
53. Farber, D. Restoring Trust after Fraud: Does Corporate Governance Matter? [J]. The Accounting Review 2005,2: 539-561.
54. Fan, J.P.H, T.J.Wong.Do External Auditors Perform a Corporate Governance Role in Emerging Markets? Evidence from East Asia [J].Journal of Accounting Research, 2005,43:35-72.
55. Fan,Joseph P.H.,T.J.Wong.Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia[J] .Journal of Accounting and Economics,2002,33:401-425.
56. Faccio, M., L.H.P.Lang.The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 2002,65:365-395.
57. Felo, A. J., S. Krishnamurthy, S. A. Solieri. Audit Committee Characteristics and the Perceived Quality of Financial Reporting: An Empirical Analysis [EB/OL]. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfrn?abstract_id=401240,2003.
58. Francis, J., K.Schipper, L.Vincent.Earnings and Dividend Informativeness when Cash Flow Rights are separated from Voting Rights [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2005,39:329-360.
59. Francis,J.R.,E.L.Maydew,H.C.Sparks.The Role of Big 6 Auditors in the Credible Reporting of Accruals[J].Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 1999,18:17-34.
60. Gerety, M., K.Lehn.Causes and Consequences of Accounting Fraud [J] .Managerial and Decision.Economics, 1997,18:587-599.
61. Grossman, S., O.Hart.Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation [J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1980.11 (spring) :42-64.
62. Gul, F.A., S.Leung.CEO Dominance and Voluntary Corporate Disclosure Strategies in Hong Kong Annual Reports. Working paper, City University of Hong Kong, 2002.
63. Gramling, A.A., V.E.Johnson, I.K.Khurana.The Association between Audit Firm Industry Experience and Financial Reporting Quality [J].Working paper, Georgia State University, 2001.
64. Gongmeng Chen, Michael Firth, Ning Daniel Gao, Oliver M Rui.Do Ownership Structure and Governance Mechanisms Have an Affect on Corporate Fraud in China's Listed Firms? [EB/OL]. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=728945,2005.
65. Gongmeng Chen, Michael Firth, Daniel N. Gao, Oliver M Rui. Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Fraud: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2006,12:424-448.
66.Goyal,V.,C.Park.Board Leadership Structure and CEO Turnover[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2002,8:49-66.
67.Gomes,A.,Novaes,W.Sharing of Control as a Corporate Governance Mechanism[EB/OL].http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=277111,2005.
68.Grossman,S.,O.Hart.One Share One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control [J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20:175-202.
69.Grossman,S.,Hart O.Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives [J].In McCall(ed.).The Economics of Information and Uncertainty[C].Chicago:1982.
70.Hart,O.Corporate Governance:Some Theory and Implications[J].The Economic Journal,1995,105:678-689.
71.Healy,P.,Hutton,A.,Palepu,K.Stock Performance and Intermediation Changes Surrounding Sustained Increases in Disclosure[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,1999,16:485-520.
72.Hill,C.,S.Snell.External Control,Corporate Strategy,and Firm Performance in Research-Intensive Industries[J].Strategic Management Journal,1988,9:577-590.
73.Jensen,M.C.,W.H.Meekling.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3:305-360.
74.Jensen,M.C.The Modern Industrial Revolution,Exit,and the Failure of Internal Control Systems[J].Journal of Finance,1993,48:831-880.
75.Jiambalvo,J.,S.Rajgopal,M.Venkatachalam.Institutional Ownership and the Extent to Which Stock Prices Reflect Future Earnings[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2002,19:117-145.
76.Kahneman,D.,Tversky,A.Prospect Theory:An Analysis of Decision under Risk [J].Econometrica,1979,47:263-290.
77.Krishnan,G.V.Does Big 6 Auditor Industry Expertise Constrain Earnings Management?[J].Accounting Horizons,2003,17(Supplement):1-16.
78.Klein,A.Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1998,41:275-303.
79.Kaplan,S.,D.Reishus.Outside Directorships and Corporate Performance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990,27:389-410.
80. Klein, A.Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2002, 33: 375-400.
81. Khurana, Inder., K.K.Raman . Litigation Risk and the Financial Reporting Credibility of Big4 versus Non-big4 Auditors: Evidence from Anglo-American Countries [J]. The Accounting Review, 2004, 79: 473-495.
82. Larner, R.Ownership and control in the 200 Largest Non-Financial Corporations, 1929 and 1963[J]. American Economic Review, 1966, 56:777-787.
83. Lang, M., R. Lundholm. Cross-sectional Determinants of Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosures [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1993, 31: 246-271.
84. Lang, M,, R. Lundholm. Disclosure Quality and Analyst Behavior [J]. The Accounting Review 1996, 71: 467-492.
85. La Porta, R., F.Lopez-de-Silanes, A.Shleifer.Corporate Ownership around the World [J]. Journal of Finance, 1999, 54:471-517.
86. La Porta, R., F.Lopez-de-Silanes, A.Shleifer, R.Vishny.Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation [J]. Journal of Finance, 2002,57: 1147-1170.
87. Leech,D.,J.Leahy.Ownership Structure, Control Type Classification and the Performance of Large British Companies[J].The Economic Journal,1991,409:1418-1437.
88. Lehman, E., and J.Weigand.Does the Governed Corportion Perform Better? Governance Structures and Corporate Performance in Germany [J].European Finance Rview, 2000,4:157-195.
89. Lipton, M., J.W.Lorsch.A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance [J]. Business Lawyer, 1992,48(1):59-77.
90. Marchica, M.T., R.Mura.Direct and Ultimate Ownership Structures in the UK: An Intertemporal Perspective over the Last Decade [J].Corporate Governance, 2005, 13(1):26-45.
91. McConnell, J.J, Servaes, H.Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990,27:595-612.
92. McMullen, D.A. Audit Committee Performance: An Investigation of the Consequences Associated with Audit Committees [J].Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 1996, 15: 87-103.
93. Michael Firth, Peter M.Y. Fung and Oliver M. Rui .How Ownership and Corporate Governance Influence Chief Executive Pay in China's Listed Firms[EB/OL].http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=963697,2007.
94. Miller, G. S. Earnings Performance and Discretionary Disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting Disclosure, 2002,40: 173-204.
95. Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny .Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20:.293-315.
96. Mudambi, R., C. Nicosia. Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from theUK Financial Services Industry [J]. Applied Financial Economics, 1998, 8: 175-180.
97. Nagar, V., K.Petroni, D.Wolfenzon.Ownership Structure and Firm Performance in Closely-Held Corporations. Working Paper, 2001.
98. Ocasio, W. Political Dynamics and the Circulation of Power: CEO Succession in U.S. Industrial Corporations, 1960-1990[J].Administrative Science Quarterly, 1994,39(2):285-313.
99. OECD.OECD Principles of Corporate Governance [EB/OL]. http://www.oecd.org,2004.
100. O'Keefe, T.B., R.D.King, K.M.Gaver.Audit Fees, Industry Specialization, and Compliance with GAAS Reporting Standards [J].Auditng: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 1994,13(2):41-55.
101.Owhoso,V.E.,W.F.Messier,Jr.,J.GLynch,Ir.Error Detection by Industry-Specialized Teams during Sequential Audit Review[J] Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40:883-900.
102.Palmrose, Z. An Analysis of Auditor Litigation and Audit Service Quality [J]. The Accounting Review, 1988,63:55-73.
103.Patton, A., J. Baker. Why do Directors Not Rock the Boat [J].Harvard Business Review, 1987,65:10-18.
104.Peasnell, K.V., Pope, P.F., Young, S.Board Monitoring and Earnings Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals? [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 2005, 32(7): 1311 -1346.
105.Pagno, M., A.Roell.The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public [JJ.Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998,113:187-225.
106.Rosenstein, S., Wyatt, J.G.Outside Directors, Board Independence and Shareholder Wealth[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990,26(2): 175-191.
107.Robert M.Bushman. Transparency, Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance [J].Economic Policy Review, 2003,9:65-87.
108.Shleifer, A., R.Vishny.Large Shareholders and Corporate Control [J].Journal of Political Economy, 1986,94:461-488.
109.Shleifer, A., R.Vishny.A Survey of Corporate Governance [J].Journal of Finance, 1997, 52:737-783.
110.Shivdasani, A. Board Composition, Ownership Structure, and Hostile Takeovers [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1993,16:167 - 198.
111.Sun, Q., W.Tong.China Share Issue Privatization: The Extent of Its Success [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 2003, 70:183-222.
112.Simon S.M.Ho., Kar Shun Wong.A Study of the Relationship between Corporate Governance Structure and the Extent of Voluntary Disclosure [J]. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 2001,10:139-156.
113.Teoh, S.H., T.J.Wong.Perceived Auditor Quality and the Earnings Response Coefficient [J]. The Accounting Review. 1993,68(April): 346-366.
114.Uzun H.,Samuel H.S.,Varma R.Board Composition and Corporate Fraud[J].Financial Analysts JournaI,2004,60:33-43.
115.Hatice Uzun, Samuel H.Szewczyk An empirical investigation of the relationship between corporate fraud and effectiveness of internal and external monitoring
116.Velury, Uma. , D.S.Jenkins.Institutional Ownership and the Quality of Earnings [J]. Journal of Business Research, 2006,59:1043-1051.
117.Vineeta D. Sharma. Board of Director Characteristics, Institutional Ownership, and Fraud: Evidence from Australia [J]. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 2004,23:105-117.
118.Vafeas, N. Board Meeting Frequency and Firm Performance [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1999, 53:113-142.
119.Vishwanath, T., D.Kaufrnann.Towards Transparency in Finance and Governance [EB/OL]. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfrn?abstract_id=258978,1999.
120.Volpin P.Governance with Poor Investor Protection: Evidence from Top Executive Turnover [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 2002, 64(1):61-90.
121.Wang, Qian, T. J. Wong, Xia, Lijun. State Ownership, Institutional Environment and Auditor Choice: Evidence from China. Center for Institutions and Government, 2005, working paper.
122.Wild, J. J. The Audit Committee and Earnings Quality [J]. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance,1996,11:247-276.
123.Wei,Z.,F.Xie,S.Zhang.Ownership Structure and Firm Value in China's Privatized Firms:1991-2001[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2005,40:87-108.
124.Weisbach M.Outside Directors and CEO Turnover[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20:431-460.
125.Wiwattanakantang.Y.Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Value:Evidence from Thailand[J].Pacific Basin Finance Journal,2001,9:323-362.
126.Xie,B.,W.N.Davidson,P.J.DaDalt.Earnings Management and Corporate Governance..The Role of the Board and the Audit Committee[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2003,9(June):295-316.
127.Yeh H.Do Controlling Shareholders Enhance Corporate Value?[J].Corporate Governance,2005,13:313-325.
128.Yermack,D.Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors[J].Journal of Financial Economic,1996,40:185-211.
129.[美]阿道夫·A·伯利、加德纳·C·米恩斯著.甘华鸣、罗锐韧、蔡如海译.现代公司与私有财产[M].商务印书馆:北京.2005年版.
130.[美]美国会计学会著.文硕、王效平、黄世忠译.基本会计理论[M].中国商业出版社:北京.1991年版.
131.[美]美国注册会计师协会财务报告特别委员会.陈毓圭译.论改进企业报告[M].中国财政经济出版社:北京.1997年版.
132.[美]玛格丽特·M·布莱尔著.张荣刚译.所有权与控制——面向21世纪的公司治理探索[M].中国社会科学出版社:北京.1999年版.
133.[美]小艾尔弗雷德·D·钱德勒著.重武译.看得见的手——美国企业的管理革命[M].商务印书馆:北京.1987年版.
134.[英]亚当·斯密著.郭大力、王亚南译.国民财富的性质和原因的研究[M].商务印书馆:北京.1997年版.
135.[美]罗斯·L·瓦茨、杰罗尔德·L·齐默尔曼著.陈少华、黄世忠、陈光、陈箭深译.实证会计理论[M].东北财经大学出版社:大连.1999年版.
136.白重恩、刘俏、陆洲、宋敏、张俊喜.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005,2:81-91.
137.蔡春、黄益建、赵莎.关于审计质量对盈余管理影响的实证研究——来自沪市制造业的经验证据[J].审计研究,2005,2:3-10.
138.蔡春、鲜文铎.会计师事务所行业专长与审计质量相关性的检验——来自中国上市公司审计市场的经验证据[J].会计研究,2007,6:41-47+95.
139.蔡宁、梁丽珍.公司治理与财务舞弊关系的经验分析[J].财经理论与实践,2003,6:80-84.
140.常成.会计师事务所行业专长与审计质量相关性的实证研究[J].审计月刊,2008,4:38-39.
141.陈关亭、兰凌.操控性应计利润审计质量的实证比较[J].审计与经济研究,2004,4:16-19.
142.陈晓、江东.股权多元化、公司业绩与行业竞争性[J].经济研究,2000,8:28-35+80.
143.陈小悦、徐晓东.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护[J].经济研究,2001,11:3-11+94.
144.陈晓丽、宋晓宁、楼瑜.机构投资者持股对上市公司透明度影响的实证分析[J].经济论坛,2007,18:111-116.
145.程书强.机构投资者持股与上市公司会计盈余信息关系实证研究[J].管理世界,2006,9:129-136.
146.程新生、徐婷婷、王琦、孙婧.自愿性信息披露与公司治理:董事会功能与大股东行为[J].武汉大学学报:哲学社会科学版,2008,4:489-494.
147.崔伟、陆正飞.董事会规模、独立性与会计信息透明度——来自中国资本市场的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2008,2:22-27.
148.崔学刚.公司治理机制对公司透明度的影响——来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].会计研究,2004,8:72-80+97.
149.杜淑洁.独立董事比例与上市公司自愿披露程度关系的实证分析[J].内蒙古科技与经济,2005,1:58-59.
150.杜兴强.会计信息的产权问题研究[M].东北财经大学出版社:大连.2002.
151.杜兴强、温日光.公司治理与会计信息质量:一项经验研究[J].财经研究,2007,1:122-133.
152.杜兴强、周泽将.会计信息质量与公司治理:基于中国资本市场的进一步经验证据[J].财经论丛,2007,3:71-79.
153.方军雄、洪剑峭.信息披露透明度及其经济后果性的实证研究[EB/OL].http://www.baf.cuhk.edu.hk/research/cig/pdf_download/Fang+Hong.p df,2006.
154.费方域.什么是公司治理?[J].上海经济研究,1996,5:36-39.
155.高雷、罗洋.上市公司董事会特征与违规行为[J].广东金融学院学报,2008,3:106-113.
156.高雷、宋顺林.公司治理与公司透明度[J].金融研究,2007,11:28-44.
157.高彦兵、王平心.独立董事与审计委员会治理效果研究——来自年报披露及时性的经验证据[J].石家庄经济学院学报,2007,5:23-28.
158.葛家澍、陈少华.改进企业财务报告问题研究[M].中国财政经济出版社:北京.2002.
159.葛家澍、林志军.现代西方会计理论[M].厦门大学出版社:厦门.2000.
160.葛家澍、刘峰.会计理论——关于财务会计概念的研究[M].中国财政经济出版社:北京.2002.
161.葛文雷、姜萍.我国上市公司盈余管理程度与公司治理结构的实证研究[J].华东经济管理,2007,4:82-87.
162.谷祺、邓建强、路倩.现金流权与控制权分离下的公司价值——基于我国家族上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2006,4:30-36.
163.韩慧博.公司治理、信息披露透明度与盈余管理,2007年吉林大学博士论文.
164.洪剑峭、薛浩.股权制衡对关联交易和关联销售的持续性影响[J].南开管理评论,2008,1:24-30.
165.侯雪筠,杨婷.上市公司会计透明度的三级模式与价值报告[J].哈尔滨商业大学学报:社会科学版,2005,5:38-42.
166.胡旭阳.“五大”的声誉是否具有显著信息含量?——来自我国IPOs的经验证据[J].证券市场导报,2002,3:43-46.
167.黄巧.董事会构成与财务报告舞弊问题研究[J].财会通讯:学术版,2005, 3:49-52.
168.黄新建、吴江.公司治理结构与盈余管理研究[J].绿色经济,2007,1:78-82.
169.黄志良、刘志娟.股权结构、公司治理、财务状况与上市公司信息披露质量[J].财会通讯:学术版,2007,6:26-28+34.
170.雷光勇、刘慧龙.控股股东性质、利益输送与盈余管理幅度——来自中国A 股公司首次亏损年度的经验证据[J].中国工业经济,2007,8:90-97.
171.孔翔、陈炜.我国上市公司应选择什么样的股权结构?——上市公司股权结构与经营绩效关系研究[R].深圳证券交易所研究成果,2005.
172.李常青、管连云.股权结构与盈余管理关系的实证研究[J].商业研究,2004,19:48-53.
173.李奇凤、宋琰纹.事务所地域与其对盈余管理的抑制能力[J].中国会计评论,2007,1:83-94.
174.李若山、方军雄.香饽饽臭馍馍:财务报表里的“馅饼”与“陷阱”[M].中国时代经济出版社:北京.2003.
175.李善民、王德友、朱滔.控制权和现金流权的分离与上市公司绩效[J].中山大学学报:社会科学版,2006,6:83-91+124.
176.李维安、李滨.机构投资者介入公司治理效果的实证研究——基于CCGI~(NK)的经验研究[J].南开管理评论,2008,1:4-14.
177.李仙、聂丽洁.我国上市公司IPO中审计质量与盈余管理实证研究[J].审计研究,2006,6:67-72.
178.李远勤、刘艳萍.股权结构与自愿性信息披露——来自深市国有上市公司的经验证据[J].统计与决策,2006,20:97-99.
179.李增泉、孙铮、王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004,12.3-13+97.
180.梁能.公司治理结构:中国的实践与美国的经验[M].中国人民大学出版社:北京.2000.
181.林毅夫、蔡窻、李周.现代企业制度的内涵与国有企业改革方向[J].经济研究,1997,3:3-10.
182.李维安、武立东.公司治理教程[M].上海人民出版社:上海.2002.
183.梁杰、王璇、李进中.现代公司治理结构与会计舞弊关系的实证研究[J].南 开管理评论,2004,6:47-51.
184.刘斌、吴娅玲.股权集中、投资者保护与信息披露质量[J].山西财经大学学报,2007,10:67-71.
185.刘峰、许菲.风险导向型审计·法律风险·审计质量——兼论“四大”在我国审计市场的行为[J].会计研究,2002,2:21-27+65.
186.刘峰、周福源.国际四大意味着高审计质量吗?——来自我国A股市场的初步证据[EB/OL].http://www.baf.cuhk.edu.hk/research/cig/pdf_download/GroupC.pdf,2006.
187.刘立国、杜莹.公司治理与会计信息质量关系的实证研究[J].会计研究,2003,2:28-36.
188.刘明辉、李黎、张羽.我国审计市场集中度与审计质量关系的实证分析[J].会计研究,2003,7:37-41.
189.刘少锋.会计师事务所行业专长对审计质量的影响[J].财会月刊:综合版,2006,12:40-41.
190.刘芍佳、孙霈、刘乃全.终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效[J].经济研究,2003,4:51-62.
191.马连福、陈德球、高丽.投资者关系管理、现金流权与公司价值——基于中国家族上市公司的实证研究[J].山西财经大学学报,2007,12:72-79.
192.马忠、吴翔宇.金字塔结构对自愿性信息披露程度的影响:来自家族控股上市公司的经验验证[J].会计研究,2007,1:44-50+92-93.
193.毛志宏、李何、张星明.独立董事制度与财务报告舞弊相关性的实证研究[J].会计之友:中旬刊,2006,7:20-22.
194.彭有桂、杨青.独立董事与审计委员会执行效果研究——来自财务重述的证据[J].财会通讯:学术版,2006,12:82-85.
195.钱颖一.企业的治理结构改革和融资结构改革[J].经济研究,1995,1:20-29.
196.漆江娜、陈慧霖、张阳.事务所规模·品牌·价格与审计质量——国际“四大”中国审计市场收费与质量研究[J].审计研究,2004,3:59-65.
197.秦江萍.会计舞弊的市场反应与识别:理论分析与经验证据[M].经济科学出版社:北京.2005年版.
198.沈艺峰、张俊生.ST公司董事会治理失败若干成因分析[J].证券市场导报,2002,3:21-25.
199.史丛莉.中国上市公司内部治理结构与盈余管理的实证研究[J].沈阳工业大学学报,2006,3:348-360.
200.司茹、高齐圣.独立董事特征与财务报告舞弊关系研究[J].渤海大学学报:哲学社会科学版,2007,3:132-134.
201.宋敏、张俊喜、李春涛.股权结构的陷阱[J].南开管理评论,2004,1:9-23+56.
202.苏启林、朱文.上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究,2003,8:36-45+91.
203.孙敬水、周永强.我国上市公司董事会特征与信息披露违规——基于2004-2006年数据实证分析[J].工业技术经济,2008,1:138-142.
204.孙永祥、章融.董事会规模、公司治理与绩效[J].企业经济,2000,10:13-15.
205.唐敏、徐文聪.上市公司董事会与盈余管理关系研究[J].财会通讯:学术版,2007,5:19-25.
206.唐清泉、罗党论、王莉.大股东的隧道挖掘与制衡力量——来自中国市场的经验证据[J].中国会计评论,2005,1:63-86.
207.唐盛培.机构投资者与上市公司会计信息相关性分析[J].证券市场导报,2006,5:49-52.
208.唐跃军、吕斐适、程新生.大股东制衡、治理战略与信息披露——来自2003年中国上市公司的证据[J].经济学(季刊),2008,2:647-664.
209.王斌、梁欣欣.公司治理、财务状况与信息披露质量——来自深圳证券交易所的经验证据[J].会计研究,2008,2:31-38+95.
210.王琨、肖星.机构投资者持股与关联方占用的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2005,2:27-33.
211.王怀明、宿金香.董事会特征与企业自愿信息披露[J].审计与经济研究,2007,3:73-76.
212.王俊秋、张奇峰.公司治理机制与信息披露透明度的实证研究[J].山西财经大学学报,2007,2:69-74.
213.王俊秋、张奇峰.家族企业的“掏空”行为与会计盈余质量[J].上海立信会计学院学报,2008,1:58-64.
214.王俊秋、张奇峰.治理环境、治理机制与信息披露质量:来自深圳证券交易所的证据[J].当代经济管理,2007,3:111-115.
215.王俊秋、张奇峰.终极控制权、现金流量权与盈余信息含量——来自家族上市公司的经验证据[J].经济与管理研究,2007,12:10-16.
216.王建新.公司治理结构,盈余管理动机与长期资产减值转回——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2007,5:60-66.
217.王力军.金字塔控制、关联交易与公司价值——基于我国民营上市公司的实证研究[J].证券市场导报,2006,2:18-24.
218.王鹏、周黎安.控股股东的控制权、所有权与公司绩效:基于中国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2006,2:88-98.
219.王奇波、宋常.国外关于最优股权结构与股权制衡的文献综述[J].会计研究,2006,1:83-88+94.
220.汪炜、蒋高峰.信息披露、透明度与资本成本[J].经济研究,2004,7:107-114.
221.王雄元、沈维成.上市公司控制结构与信息披露质量[J].证券市场导报,2008,4:63-69.
222.王艳艳、陈汉文.审计质量与会计信息透明度——来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].会计研究,2006,4:9-15.
223.王颖、王平心、吴清华.审计委员会特征对上市公司盈余管理的影响研究[J].当代经济管理,2006,6:101-106.
224.王咏梅、王鹏.“四大”与“非四大”审计质量市场认同度的差异性研究[J].审计研究,2006,5:49-56.
225.王跃堂、朱琳、陈世敏.董事会独立性、股权制衡与财务信息质量[J].会计研究,2008,1:55-62+96.
226.魏明海、刘峰、施鲲翔.论会计透明度[J].会计研究,2001,9:14-18+63.
227.吴敬琏.现代公司与企业改革[M].天津人民出版社:天津.1994.
228.武立东、张云、何力武.民营上市公司集团治理与终极控制人侵占效应分析[J].南开管理评论,2007,4:58-66.
229.吴联生.上市公司会计报告研究[M].东北财经大学出版社:大连.2001.
230.吴清华、王平心.公司盈余质量:董事会微观治理绩效之考察——来自我国独立董事制度强制性变迁的经验证据[J].数理统计与管理,2007,1:30-40.
231.吴水澎、李奇凤.国际四大、国内十大与国内非十大的审计质量——来自2003年中国上市公司的经验证据[J].当代财经,2006,2:114-118.
232.向凯.董事会效率对自愿信息披露影响的实证研究[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2006,5:126-132.
233.谢百三、谢曙光.关于中国民营上市公司低绩效问题的深层思考[J].财经科学,2003,1:32-36.
234.谢国强、王道平、李林.从盈余管理角度对独立董事制度有效性的实证分析[J].统计与信息论坛,2006,1:54-58.
235.谢识予.经济博弈论[M].复旦大学出版社:上海.1997.
236.熊莉.独立董事特征与上市公司信息披露质量[J].商场现代化,2007,15:253-254.
237.徐莉萍、辛宇、陈工孟.股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响[J].经济研究,2006,1:90-100.
238.徐向艺.公司治理制度安排与组织设计[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2006.
239.许小年、王燕.中国上市公司的所有制结构与公司治理[A].梁能.公司治理结构:中国的实践与美国的经验[C].北京:中国人民出版社,2000.
240.许永斌、彭白颖.控制权、现金流权与公司业绩——来自中国民营上市公司的经验研究[J].商业经济与管理,2007,4:74-79.
241.薛祖云.会计信息市场与市场管制—关于会计信息管制的经济学思考[M].暨南大学出版社:广州.2002.
242.薛祖云、黄彤.董事会、监事会制度特征与会计信息质量——来自中国资本市场的经验分析[J].财经理论与实践,2004,4:84-89.
243.杨克磊、刘继业、张志勇.董事会特征与盈余管理关系研究[J].河北工程大学学报:社会科学版,2007,1:8-10.
244.杨薇、姚涛.公司治理与财务舞弊的关系——来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].重庆大学学报:社会科学版,2006,5:24-30.
245.杨兴君、宗长玉、江艺.民营企业控制多家上市公司实证研究,深圳证券交易所第六届会员单位,基金公司研究评选结果,2003.
246.杨忠莲、杨振慧.独立董事与审计委员会执行效果研究——来自报表重述的证据[J].审计研究,2006,2:81-85+51.
247.叶勇、胡培、谭德庆、黄雷.控制权和现金流量权偏离下的公司价值和公司治理[J].管理工程学报,2007,1:71-76+82.
248.叶勇、淳伟德、黄雷.不同行业的上市公司终极控制权、现金流量权和公司绩效[J].软科学,2007,5:42-44+60.
249.叶勇、胡培、黄登仕.中国上市公司终极控制权、现金流量权及其国际比较分析[J].南开管理评论,2005,3:25-31.
250.叶勇、胡培、刘波.上市公司终极控制股东侵害度及实证研究[J].系统工程理论方法应用,2006,2:164-169.
251.叶勇、黄雷.终极控制股东、控制权溢价和公司治理研究[J].管理科学,2004,5:9-14.
252.叶勇、刘波、黄雷.终极控制权、现金流量权与企业价值——基于隐性终极控制论的中国上市公司治理实证研究[J].管理科学学报,2007,2:66-79.
253.殷枫.公司治理结构和自愿性信息披露关系的实证研究[J].审计与经济研究,2006,2:88-92.
254.原红旗、李海建.会计师事务所组织形式、规模与审计质量[J].审计研究,2003,1:32-37.
255.张程睿.上市公司透明度的影响因素研究——基于对2001-2006年深圳上市公司的经验分析[J].软科学,2008,5:134-140.
256.张国华、陈方正.我国上市公司盈余管理与董事会特征相关性实证研究[J].技术经济与管理研究,2006,2:42-44.
257.张华、张俊喜、宋敏.所有权和控制权分离对企业价值的影响——我国民营上市企业的实证研究[J].经济学(季刊),2004,S1:1-14.
258.张为国、邱昱芳.后安然时代[M].中国财政经济出版社:北京.2003.
259.张维迎.博奕论与信息经济学[M].上海三联出版社:上海.1996.
260.张维迎.所有制、治理结构与委托—代理关系——简评崔之元和周其仁的一些观点[J].经济研究,1996,9:3-15+53.
261.支晓强、童盼.盈余管理,控制权转移与独立董事变更——兼论独立董事治理作用的发挥[J].管理世界,2005,11:137-144.
262.钟伟强、张天西.公司治理状况对自愿披露水平的影响[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2006,1:62-68+143.
263.周泽将.信息披露透明度与公司治理关系的实证分析——源自深市信息披露评分的证据[J].铜陵学院学报,2007,4:34-37.
264.朱红军、汪辉.“股权制衡”可以改善公司治理吗——宏智科技股份有限公司控制权之争的案例研究[J].管理世界,2004,10:114-123+140-156.
265.朱蓉、许慧.控制权、利益掏空与现金流的转移——基于上市公司异常经营现金流的研究[J].中南财经政法大学研究生学报,2007,4:80-89.
266.朱松.最终控制人特征与盈余信息含量[J].中国会计与财务研究,2006,1.
267.邹晖.家族企业大股东侵占与股权制衡——基于家族类上市公司控制权转移事件的实证分析[J].现代管理科学,2008,4:95-96+119.
268.邹平、付莹.我国上市公司控制权与现金流权分离——理论研究与实证检验[J].财经研究,2007,9:135-143.
[1]秦江萍.会计舞弊的市场反应与识别:理论分析与经验证据[M].经济科学出版社:北京.2005年版.第4页.
[1]根据Berle和Means的统计,在1929年,美国最大的铁路公司宾夕法尼亚铁路公司、最大的公用事业公司美国电话电报公司、最大的工业公司美国钢铁公司最大股东的持股比例均不超过公开发行股票的1%,前20位股东的持股总和占股份总数的比例分别为2.7%、4.0%和5.1%。
[2]Berle和Means认为,由于股权分散,并没有股东可以依靠自己持有的股权取得控制地位,这时公司的控制权转移到了董事会。对于董事会的选举,股东由于没有具有影响的股份,囚此或者选择放弃或者选择将投票权转让给代理(投票)委员会,这时控制权就转移到了挑选代理(投票)委员会的人手中。实际上代理(投票)委员会是由经营者指派的,因此实际的控制权转移到了经营者手中,这种控制被称为“经营者控制”。
[3]Larner,R.Ownership and control in the 200 Largest Non-Financial Corporations,1929 and 1963[J].American Economic Review,1966,56:777-787.
[4]转引自谢朝斌.独立董事法律制度研究[M].法律出版社:北京.2004年版.第124-125页.
[1]Jensen和Meckling认为,代理成本主要包括三部分:第一是委托人的监督成本,即委托人激励和监控代理人,使后者为前者的利益而尽力的成本:第二是代理人的担保成本,即代理人用以保证不采取损害委托人行为的成本,以及如果采用了那种行为将给予赔偿的成本:第三是剩余损失,它是委托人因代理人代行决策而产生的一种价值损失,等于代理人决策和委托人在假定具有与代理人相同信息和才能情况下自行效用最大化决策之间的差异。
[2]La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleifer.Corporate Ownership around the World[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54:471-517.
[3]Claessens,S.,S,Djankov,J.Fan,L.Lang.The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations[J].Journal of FinancialEconomics,2000,58:81-112.
[4]Faccio,M.,L.H.P.Lang.The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002,65:365-395.
[1]Wiwattanakantang.Y.Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Value:Evidence from Thailand[J].Pacific Basin Finance Journal,2001,9:323-362.
[2]股东与经理人员之间的冲突通常被称为第一类代理问题。
[3]大股东与小股东之间的冲突通常被称为第二类代理问题。
[1]转引自田翠香.中国资本市场会计信息质量研究[M].上海财经大学出版社:上海.2007年版.
[1]Coase(1937)并没有提出交易费用的概念,只是提出“发现有关价格的成本”,交易费用的概念是其追随者提出的。
[2]Coase,R.The Nature of the Firm[J].Economica,1937,4:386-405.
[3]Cheung,S.The Contractual Nature of the Firm[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26:1-21.
[4][美]奥利弗·E·威廉姆森著.段毅才、王伟等译.资本主义经济制度——论企业签约与市场签约[M].商务印书馆:北京.2002年版.
[5]Ross.S.The Economic Theory of Agent:The Principal's Problem[J].American Economic Review,1973,63.
[6]Jensen,M.C.,W.H.Meekling.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J|.Journal of Financial Economics.1976.3:305-360.
[1][美]R·科斯、A·阿尔钦、D·诺斯等著.刘守英等译.财产权利与制度变迁:产权学派与新制度学派译文集[M].上海三联出版社、上海人民出版社:上海.1994年版.59页.
[2][美]R·科斯、A·阿尔钦、D·诺斯等著.刘守英等译.财产权利与制度变迁:产权学派与新制度学派译文集[M].上海三联出版社、上海人民出版社:上海.1994年版.63页.
1. Agrawal, A., G Mandelker. Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1990,25:143-161.
2. Alexander, J. A., M. L. Fennell, M. T. Halpern. Leadership in Stability in Hospitals: The Influence of Board-CEO Relations and Organizational Growth and Decline [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38:74-99.
3. Blue Ribbon Committee(BRC). 1999. Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees. New York, NY: New York Stock Exchange and National Association of Securities Dealers. Available at: http://www.nyse.com.
4. Berle, A., Means, G.C.The Modern Corporate and Private Property[M]. New York: Macmillan.1932.
5. Bhagat, S., J. Brickley, J. Coles. Managerial Indemnification and Liability Insurance: The Effect on Shareholder Wealth [J]. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 1987, 54: 721-736.
6. Beasley, M.S. An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud [J]. The Accounting Review, 1996, 71(October): 443-465.
7. Beatty, R. P. Auditor Reputation and the Pricing of Initial Public Offerings [J].The Accounting Review, 1989,64:693-709.
8. Becker, C.L., M. L. DeFond, J. Jiambalvo, K.R.Subramanyam.The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1998,15(spring):1-24.
9. Balsam, S., J.Krishnan, J.S.Yang.Auditor Industry Specialization and Earnings Quality [J].Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 2003,22(2):71-97.
10. Berkman, H., Cole, R., A, Fu, J.Agency Conflicts, Expropriation and Firm Value: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China.Working paper, 2005.
11. Bennedsen, Fosgerau, Nielsen. The Strategic Choice of Control Allocation and Ownership Distribution in Closely Held Corporations. Working Paper, Copenhagen Business School, 2003.
12. Botosan, C. A. Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital [J].The Accounting Review, 1997, 72:323-349.
13. Bradbury, M., Mak, Y. and Tan, S. Board Characteristics, Audit Committee Characteristics and Abnormal Accruals [J]. Pacific Accounting Review, 2006, 18: 47-68.
14. Bebchuk, L.A., R.Kraakman, G.Triantis.Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights. Concentrated Corporate Ownership (R.Morck, ed.), 2000
15. Brickley,J, Coles,J,Terry,RL.Outside Diretors and the Adoption of Poison Pills[J].Journal of Financial and Economics,1994,35:371-390.
16. Brickley, J.A., and James, CM. The Takeover Market, Corporate Board Composition, and Ownership Structure: The Case of Banking [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1987,30(1):161-180.
17. Bushman, R., and A.Smith. Transparency, Financial Accounting Information, and Corporate Governance [J]. FRBNY Economic Policy Review, 2003,9:65-87.
18. Byrd, J., K.Hickman. Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence from Tender Offer Bids [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1992,32:195-221.
19. Benjamin Maurya, Anete Pajuste. Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Value [J]. Journal of Banking and Finance, 2005,29:1813-1834.
20. Bennedsen,M.,D.,Wolfenzon.The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:113-139.
21. Bennedsen、 Fosgerau、 Nielsen. The Strategic Choice of Control Allocation and Ownership Distribution in Closely Held Corporations, 2003, Copenhagen Business School
22. Botosan, C., M. Plumlee. A Re-Examination of Disclosure Level and the Expected Cost of Equity Capital [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2002,40: 21- 40.
23. Bloch Francis, Ulrich Hege.Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests [EB/OL]. http://www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr/PP/bloch/papers/controlcontests.pdf,2001.
24. Bradbury, M.E. The Incentives for Voluntary Audit Committee Formation [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 1990,9:19-36.
25. Berle, A.A., Means G.C.The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M]. New York: MacMillan, 1932.
26. Blair, M. M. Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century [M]. Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC. 1995.
27. Cochran, P.L., Wartrick, S.L. Corporate Governance-A Review of the Literature [M].Financial Executives Research Foundation: New Jersey. 1988.
28. Carcello, J. V., Neal, T. L. Audit Committee Independence and Disclosure: Choice for Financially Distressed Firms [J]. Corporate Governance-An International Review, 2003,11:289-299.
29. Carcello,J.V,Nagy,A.L.Auditor Industry Specialization and Fraudulent Financial Reporting[M].Proceedings of the 2002 Deloitte&Touche/University of Kansas Symposium on Auditing Problems,2002.
30. Claessens,S.,S,Djankov,J.Fan,L.Lang.The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations[J]. Journal of FinancialEconomics,2000,58:81-112.
31. Claessens, S., S.Djankov, J.Fan, L.Lang. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings [J]. Journal of Finance, 2002, 57:2741-2772.
32. Chaganti, R.S., V.Mahajan, S.Sharma.Corporate Board Size, Composition and Corporate Failures in Retailing Industry [J]. Journal of Management Studies, 1985,22:400-417.
33. Chau, G.K.Gray S.J.Ownership Structure and Corporate Voluntary Disclosure in Hongkong and Singapore [J].The International Journal of Accounting, 2002, 37:247-256.
34. Chen,CJ.P.,Jaggi,B.Association between Independent Non-executive Directors, Family Control and Financial Disclosures in Hong Kong[J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2000,19:285-310.
35. Clikeman, P.M. Constraints to Earnings Management: An Empirical Study of Auditor Type and Institutional Ownership.Working Paper, University of Richmond, 1996.
36. Dalton, D.R., C.M.Daily, A.E.Ellstrand, J.L.Johnson. Number of Directors and Financial Performance: A Meta-analysis [J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1999,42(6): 674-686.
37. DeAngelo, L. E. Auditor Size and Audit Quality [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1981, 3(3): 183-199.
38. DeFond, M., Jiambalvo, J. Incidence and Circumstances of Accounting Errors [J]. The Accounting Review, 1991,66(July):643-655.
39. Denis, D.J., A.Sarin.Ownership and Board Structures in Publicly Traded Corporations [J]. Journal of Finance, 1999, 52: 187-223.
40. Dan S. Dhaliwal, Vic Naiker and Farshid Navissi. Audit Committee Financial Expertise, Corporate Governance and Accruals Quality: An Empirical Analysis [EB/OL]. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=906690,2006.
41. Dye,R.Auditing Standards, Legal Liability, and Auditing Wealth[J].Journal of Political Economy, 1993,101: 887-914.
42. DeFond, M. L., J. Jiambalvo. Factors related to auditor-client disagreements over income-increasing accounting methods [J].Contemporary Accounting Research, 1993, spring: 411-431.
43. DeFond, M., Wong, T.J., Li, S. The Impact of Improved Auditor Independence on Auditor Market Concentration in China [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1999,28:269-305.
44. Demsets, H., K, Lehn.The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Cause and Consequences [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1985,93:1155-1177.
45. Dechow, P.M., Sloan, R. G, Sweeney, A. P. Detecting Earnings Management [J]. The Accounting Review ,1995,70:193 - 225.
46. Dopuch, N., D.A.Simunic.The Nature of Competition in the Auditing Profession: A Descriptive and Normative View. Regulation and the Accounting Profession, 1980,77-94.
47. Dunn, K.A., B.W.Mayhew., S.GMorsefield.Disclosure Quality and Auditor Choice. Working paper, CUNY-Baruch, 2000.
48. Eisenberg, T., S. Sundgren and M .T. Wells. Larger Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1998.48: 35-54.
49. Eng L. L., Y. T. Mak. Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2003, 22:325-345.
50. Forker, J. J. Corporate Governance and Disclosure Quality [J]. Accounting and Business Research, 1992,22(86):111-124.
51. Fama, E., M.C.Jensen.Separation of Ownership and Control [J].Joumal of Law and Economics, 1983, 26:301-325.
52. Fama, E. F. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1980, 88:288-307.
53. Farber, D. Restoring Trust after Fraud: Does Corporate Governance Matter? [J]. The Accounting Review 2005,2: 539-561.
54. Fan, J.P.H, T.J.Wong.Do External Auditors Perform a Corporate Governance Role in Emerging Markets? Evidence from East Asia [J].Journal of Accounting Research, 2005,43:35-72.
55. Fan,Joseph P.H.,T.J.Wong.Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia[J] .Journal of Accounting and Economics,2002,33:401-425.
56. Faccio, M., L.H.P.Lang.The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 2002,65:365-395.
57. Felo, A. J., S. Krishnamurthy, S. A. Solieri. Audit Committee Characteristics and the Perceived Quality of Financial Reporting: An Empirical Analysis [EB/OL]. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfrn?abstract_id=401240,2003.
58. Francis, J., K.Schipper, L.Vincent.Earnings and Dividend Informativeness when Cash Flow Rights are separated from Voting Rights [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2005,39:329-360.
59. Francis,J.R.,E.L.Maydew,H.C.Sparks.The Role of Big 6 Auditors in the Credible Reporting of Accruals[J].Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 1999,18:17-34.
60. Gerety, M., K.Lehn.Causes and Consequences of Accounting Fraud [J] .Managerial and Decision.Economics, 1997,18:587-599.
61. Grossman, S., O.Hart.Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation [J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1980.11 (spring) :42-64.
62. Gul, F.A., S.Leung.CEO Dominance and Voluntary Corporate Disclosure Strategies in Hong Kong Annual Reports. Working paper, City University of Hong Kong, 2002.
63. Gramling, A.A., V.E.Johnson, I.K.Khurana.The Association between Audit Firm Industry Experience and Financial Reporting Quality [J].Working paper, Georgia State University, 2001.
64. Gongmeng Chen, Michael Firth, Ning Daniel Gao, Oliver M Rui.Do Ownership Structure and Governance Mechanisms Have an Affect on Corporate Fraud in China's Listed Firms? [EB/OL]. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=728945,2005.
65. Gongmeng Chen, Michael Firth, Daniel N. Gao, Oliver M Rui. Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Fraud: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2006,12:424-448.
66.Goyal,V.,C.Park.Board Leadership Structure and CEO Turnover[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2002,8:49-66.
67.Gomes,A.,Novaes,W.Sharing of Control as a Corporate Governance Mechanism[EB/OL].http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=277111,2005.
68.Grossman,S.,O.Hart.One Share One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control [J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20:175-202.
69.Grossman,S.,Hart O.Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives [J].In McCall(ed.).The Economics of Information and Uncertainty[C].Chicago:1982.
70.Hart,O.Corporate Governance:Some Theory and Implications[J].The Economic Journal,1995,105:678-689.
71.Healy,P.,Hutton,A.,Palepu,K.Stock Performance and Intermediation Changes Surrounding Sustained Increases in Disclosure[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,1999,16:485-520.
72.Hill,C.,S.Snell.External Control,Corporate Strategy,and Firm Performance in Research-Intensive Industries[J].Strategic Management Journal,1988,9:577-590.
73.Jensen,M.C.,W.H.Meekling.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3:305-360.
74.Jensen,M.C.The Modern Industrial Revolution,Exit,and the Failure of Internal Control Systems[J].Journal of Finance,1993,48:831-880.
75.Jiambalvo,J.,S.Rajgopal,M.Venkatachalam.Institutional Ownership and the Extent to Which Stock Prices Reflect Future Earnings[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2002,19:117-145.
76.Kahneman,D.,Tversky,A.Prospect Theory:An Analysis of Decision under Risk [J].Econometrica,1979,47:263-290.
77.Krishnan,G.V.Does Big 6 Auditor Industry Expertise Constrain Earnings Management?[J].Accounting Horizons,2003,17(Supplement):1-16.
78.Klein,A.Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1998,41:275-303.
79.Kaplan,S.,D.Reishus.Outside Directorships and Corporate Performance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990,27:389-410.
80. Klein, A.Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2002, 33: 375-400.
81. Khurana, Inder., K.K.Raman . Litigation Risk and the Financial Reporting Credibility of Big4 versus Non-big4 Auditors: Evidence from Anglo-American Countries [J]. The Accounting Review, 2004, 79: 473-495.
82. Larner, R.Ownership and control in the 200 Largest Non-Financial Corporations, 1929 and 1963[J]. American Economic Review, 1966, 56:777-787.
83. Lang, M., R. Lundholm. Cross-sectional Determinants of Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosures [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1993, 31: 246-271.
84. Lang, M,, R. Lundholm. Disclosure Quality and Analyst Behavior [J]. The Accounting Review 1996, 71: 467-492.
85. La Porta, R., F.Lopez-de-Silanes, A.Shleifer.Corporate Ownership around the World [J]. Journal of Finance, 1999, 54:471-517.
86. La Porta, R., F.Lopez-de-Silanes, A.Shleifer, R.Vishny.Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation [J]. Journal of Finance, 2002,57: 1147-1170.
87. Leech,D.,J.Leahy.Ownership Structure, Control Type Classification and the Performance of Large British Companies[J].The Economic Journal,1991,409:1418-1437.
88. Lehman, E., and J.Weigand.Does the Governed Corportion Perform Better? Governance Structures and Corporate Performance in Germany [J].European Finance Rview, 2000,4:157-195.
89. Lipton, M., J.W.Lorsch.A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance [J]. Business Lawyer, 1992,48(1):59-77.
90. Marchica, M.T., R.Mura.Direct and Ultimate Ownership Structures in the UK: An Intertemporal Perspective over the Last Decade [J].Corporate Governance, 2005, 13(1):26-45.
91. McConnell, J.J, Servaes, H.Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990,27:595-612.
92. McMullen, D.A. Audit Committee Performance: An Investigation of the Consequences Associated with Audit Committees [J].Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 1996, 15: 87-103.
93. Michael Firth, Peter M.Y. Fung and Oliver M. Rui .How Ownership and Corporate Governance Influence Chief Executive Pay in China's Listed Firms[EB/OL].http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=963697,2007.
94. Miller, G. S. Earnings Performance and Discretionary Disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting Disclosure, 2002,40: 173-204.
95. Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny .Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20:.293-315.
96. Mudambi, R., C. Nicosia. Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from theUK Financial Services Industry [J]. Applied Financial Economics, 1998, 8: 175-180.
97. Nagar, V., K.Petroni, D.Wolfenzon.Ownership Structure and Firm Performance in Closely-Held Corporations. Working Paper, 2001.
98. Ocasio, W. Political Dynamics and the Circulation of Power: CEO Succession in U.S. Industrial Corporations, 1960-1990[J].Administrative Science Quarterly, 1994,39(2):285-313.
99. OECD.OECD Principles of Corporate Governance [EB/OL]. http://www.oecd.org,2004.
100. O'Keefe, T.B., R.D.King, K.M.Gaver.Audit Fees, Industry Specialization, and Compliance with GAAS Reporting Standards [J].Auditng: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 1994,13(2):41-55.
101.Owhoso,V.E.,W.F.Messier,Jr.,J.GLynch,Ir.Error Detection by Industry-Specialized Teams during Sequential Audit Review[J] Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40:883-900.
102.Palmrose, Z. An Analysis of Auditor Litigation and Audit Service Quality [J]. The Accounting Review, 1988,63:55-73.
103.Patton, A., J. Baker. Why do Directors Not Rock the Boat [J].Harvard Business Review, 1987,65:10-18.
104.Peasnell, K.V., Pope, P.F., Young, S.Board Monitoring and Earnings Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals? [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 2005, 32(7): 1311 -1346.
105.Pagno, M., A.Roell.The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public [JJ.Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998,113:187-225.
106.Rosenstein, S., Wyatt, J.G.Outside Directors, Board Independence and Shareholder Wealth[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990,26(2): 175-191.
107.Robert M.Bushman. Transparency, Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance [J].Economic Policy Review, 2003,9:65-87.
108.Shleifer, A., R.Vishny.Large Shareholders and Corporate Control [J].Journal of Political Economy, 1986,94:461-488.
109.Shleifer, A., R.Vishny.A Survey of Corporate Governance [J].Journal of Finance, 1997, 52:737-783.
110.Shivdasani, A. Board Composition, Ownership Structure, and Hostile Takeovers [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1993,16:167 - 198.
111.Sun, Q., W.Tong.China Share Issue Privatization: The Extent of Its Success [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 2003, 70:183-222.
112.Simon S.M.Ho., Kar Shun Wong.A Study of the Relationship between Corporate Governance Structure and the Extent of Voluntary Disclosure [J]. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 2001,10:139-156.
113.Teoh, S.H., T.J.Wong.Perceived Auditor Quality and the Earnings Response Coefficient [J]. The Accounting Review. 1993,68(April): 346-366.
114.Uzun H.,Samuel H.S.,Varma R.Board Composition and Corporate Fraud[J].Financial Analysts JournaI,2004,60:33-43.
115.Hatice Uzun, Samuel H.Szewczyk An empirical investigation of the relationship between corporate fraud and effectiveness of internal and external monitoring
116.Velury, Uma. , D.S.Jenkins.Institutional Ownership and the Quality of Earnings [J]. Journal of Business Research, 2006,59:1043-1051.
117.Vineeta D. Sharma. Board of Director Characteristics, Institutional Ownership, and Fraud: Evidence from Australia [J]. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 2004,23:105-117.
118.Vafeas, N. Board Meeting Frequency and Firm Performance [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1999, 53:113-142.
119.Vishwanath, T., D.Kaufrnann.Towards Transparency in Finance and Governance [EB/OL]. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfrn?abstract_id=258978,1999.
120.Volpin P.Governance with Poor Investor Protection: Evidence from Top Executive Turnover [J].Journal of Financial Economics, 2002, 64(1):61-90.
121.Wang, Qian, T. J. Wong, Xia, Lijun. State Ownership, Institutional Environment and Auditor Choice: Evidence from China. Center for Institutions and Government, 2005, working paper.
122.Wild, J. J. The Audit Committee and Earnings Quality [J]. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance,1996,11:247-276.
123.Wei,Z.,F.Xie,S.Zhang.Ownership Structure and Firm Value in China's Privatized Firms:1991-2001[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2005,40:87-108.
124.Weisbach M.Outside Directors and CEO Turnover[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20:431-460.
125.Wiwattanakantang.Y.Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Value:Evidence from Thailand[J].Pacific Basin Finance Journal,2001,9:323-362.
126.Xie,B.,W.N.Davidson,P.J.DaDalt.Earnings Management and Corporate Governance..The Role of the Board and the Audit Committee[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2003,9(June):295-316.
127.Yeh H.Do Controlling Shareholders Enhance Corporate Value?[J].Corporate Governance,2005,13:313-325.
128.Yermack,D.Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors[J].Journal of Financial Economic,1996,40:185-211.
129.[美]阿道夫·A·伯利、加德纳·C·米恩斯著.甘华鸣、罗锐韧、蔡如海译.现代公司与私有财产[M].商务印书馆:北京.2005年版.
130.[美]美国会计学会著.文硕、王效平、黄世忠译.基本会计理论[M].中国商业出版社:北京.1991年版.
131.[美]美国注册会计师协会财务报告特别委员会.陈毓圭译.论改进企业报告[M].中国财政经济出版社:北京.1997年版.
132.[美]玛格丽特·M·布莱尔著.张荣刚译.所有权与控制——面向21世纪的公司治理探索[M].中国社会科学出版社:北京.1999年版.
133.[美]小艾尔弗雷德·D·钱德勒著.重武译.看得见的手——美国企业的管理革命[M].商务印书馆:北京.1987年版.
134.[英]亚当·斯密著.郭大力、王亚南译.国民财富的性质和原因的研究[M].商务印书馆:北京.1997年版.
135.[美]罗斯·L·瓦茨、杰罗尔德·L·齐默尔曼著.陈少华、黄世忠、陈光、陈箭深译.实证会计理论[M].东北财经大学出版社:大连.1999年版.
136.白重恩、刘俏、陆洲、宋敏、张俊喜.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005,2:81-91.
137.蔡春、黄益建、赵莎.关于审计质量对盈余管理影响的实证研究——来自沪市制造业的经验证据[J].审计研究,2005,2:3-10.
138.蔡春、鲜文铎.会计师事务所行业专长与审计质量相关性的检验——来自中国上市公司审计市场的经验证据[J].会计研究,2007,6:41-47+95.
139.蔡宁、梁丽珍.公司治理与财务舞弊关系的经验分析[J].财经理论与实践,2003,6:80-84.
140.常成.会计师事务所行业专长与审计质量相关性的实证研究[J].审计月刊,2008,4:38-39.
141.陈关亭、兰凌.操控性应计利润审计质量的实证比较[J].审计与经济研究,2004,4:16-19.
142.陈晓、江东.股权多元化、公司业绩与行业竞争性[J].经济研究,2000,8:28-35+80.
143.陈小悦、徐晓东.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护[J].经济研究,2001,11:3-11+94.
144.陈晓丽、宋晓宁、楼瑜.机构投资者持股对上市公司透明度影响的实证分析[J].经济论坛,2007,18:111-116.
145.程书强.机构投资者持股与上市公司会计盈余信息关系实证研究[J].管理世界,2006,9:129-136.
146.程新生、徐婷婷、王琦、孙婧.自愿性信息披露与公司治理:董事会功能与大股东行为[J].武汉大学学报:哲学社会科学版,2008,4:489-494.
147.崔伟、陆正飞.董事会规模、独立性与会计信息透明度——来自中国资本市场的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2008,2:22-27.
148.崔学刚.公司治理机制对公司透明度的影响——来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].会计研究,2004,8:72-80+97.
149.杜淑洁.独立董事比例与上市公司自愿披露程度关系的实证分析[J].内蒙古科技与经济,2005,1:58-59.
150.杜兴强.会计信息的产权问题研究[M].东北财经大学出版社:大连.2002.
151.杜兴强、温日光.公司治理与会计信息质量:一项经验研究[J].财经研究,2007,1:122-133.
152.杜兴强、周泽将.会计信息质量与公司治理:基于中国资本市场的进一步经验证据[J].财经论丛,2007,3:71-79.
153.方军雄、洪剑峭.信息披露透明度及其经济后果性的实证研究[EB/OL].http://www.baf.cuhk.edu.hk/research/cig/pdf_download/Fang+Hong.p df,2006.
154.费方域.什么是公司治理?[J].上海经济研究,1996,5:36-39.
155.高雷、罗洋.上市公司董事会特征与违规行为[J].广东金融学院学报,2008,3:106-113.
156.高雷、宋顺林.公司治理与公司透明度[J].金融研究,2007,11:28-44.
157.高彦兵、王平心.独立董事与审计委员会治理效果研究——来自年报披露及时性的经验证据[J].石家庄经济学院学报,2007,5:23-28.
158.葛家澍、陈少华.改进企业财务报告问题研究[M].中国财政经济出版社:北京.2002.
159.葛家澍、林志军.现代西方会计理论[M].厦门大学出版社:厦门.2000.
160.葛家澍、刘峰.会计理论——关于财务会计概念的研究[M].中国财政经济出版社:北京.2002.
161.葛文雷、姜萍.我国上市公司盈余管理程度与公司治理结构的实证研究[J].华东经济管理,2007,4:82-87.
162.谷祺、邓建强、路倩.现金流权与控制权分离下的公司价值——基于我国家族上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2006,4:30-36.
163.韩慧博.公司治理、信息披露透明度与盈余管理,2007年吉林大学博士论文.
164.洪剑峭、薛浩.股权制衡对关联交易和关联销售的持续性影响[J].南开管理评论,2008,1:24-30.
165.侯雪筠,杨婷.上市公司会计透明度的三级模式与价值报告[J].哈尔滨商业大学学报:社会科学版,2005,5:38-42.
166.胡旭阳.“五大”的声誉是否具有显著信息含量?——来自我国IPOs的经验证据[J].证券市场导报,2002,3:43-46.
167.黄巧.董事会构成与财务报告舞弊问题研究[J].财会通讯:学术版,2005, 3:49-52.
168.黄新建、吴江.公司治理结构与盈余管理研究[J].绿色经济,2007,1:78-82.
169.黄志良、刘志娟.股权结构、公司治理、财务状况与上市公司信息披露质量[J].财会通讯:学术版,2007,6:26-28+34.
170.雷光勇、刘慧龙.控股股东性质、利益输送与盈余管理幅度——来自中国A 股公司首次亏损年度的经验证据[J].中国工业经济,2007,8:90-97.
171.孔翔、陈炜.我国上市公司应选择什么样的股权结构?——上市公司股权结构与经营绩效关系研究[R].深圳证券交易所研究成果,2005.
172.李常青、管连云.股权结构与盈余管理关系的实证研究[J].商业研究,2004,19:48-53.
173.李奇凤、宋琰纹.事务所地域与其对盈余管理的抑制能力[J].中国会计评论,2007,1:83-94.
174.李若山、方军雄.香饽饽臭馍馍:财务报表里的“馅饼”与“陷阱”[M].中国时代经济出版社:北京.2003.
175.李善民、王德友、朱滔.控制权和现金流权的分离与上市公司绩效[J].中山大学学报:社会科学版,2006,6:83-91+124.
176.李维安、李滨.机构投资者介入公司治理效果的实证研究——基于CCGI~(NK)的经验研究[J].南开管理评论,2008,1:4-14.
177.李仙、聂丽洁.我国上市公司IPO中审计质量与盈余管理实证研究[J].审计研究,2006,6:67-72.
178.李远勤、刘艳萍.股权结构与自愿性信息披露——来自深市国有上市公司的经验证据[J].统计与决策,2006,20:97-99.
179.李增泉、孙铮、王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004,12.3-13+97.
180.梁能.公司治理结构:中国的实践与美国的经验[M].中国人民大学出版社:北京.2000.
181.林毅夫、蔡窻、李周.现代企业制度的内涵与国有企业改革方向[J].经济研究,1997,3:3-10.
182.李维安、武立东.公司治理教程[M].上海人民出版社:上海.2002.
183.梁杰、王璇、李进中.现代公司治理结构与会计舞弊关系的实证研究[J].南 开管理评论,2004,6:47-51.
184.刘斌、吴娅玲.股权集中、投资者保护与信息披露质量[J].山西财经大学学报,2007,10:67-71.
185.刘峰、许菲.风险导向型审计·法律风险·审计质量——兼论“四大”在我国审计市场的行为[J].会计研究,2002,2:21-27+65.
186.刘峰、周福源.国际四大意味着高审计质量吗?——来自我国A股市场的初步证据[EB/OL].http://www.baf.cuhk.edu.hk/research/cig/pdf_download/GroupC.pdf,2006.
187.刘立国、杜莹.公司治理与会计信息质量关系的实证研究[J].会计研究,2003,2:28-36.
188.刘明辉、李黎、张羽.我国审计市场集中度与审计质量关系的实证分析[J].会计研究,2003,7:37-41.
189.刘少锋.会计师事务所行业专长对审计质量的影响[J].财会月刊:综合版,2006,12:40-41.
190.刘芍佳、孙霈、刘乃全.终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效[J].经济研究,2003,4:51-62.
191.马连福、陈德球、高丽.投资者关系管理、现金流权与公司价值——基于中国家族上市公司的实证研究[J].山西财经大学学报,2007,12:72-79.
192.马忠、吴翔宇.金字塔结构对自愿性信息披露程度的影响:来自家族控股上市公司的经验验证[J].会计研究,2007,1:44-50+92-93.
193.毛志宏、李何、张星明.独立董事制度与财务报告舞弊相关性的实证研究[J].会计之友:中旬刊,2006,7:20-22.
194.彭有桂、杨青.独立董事与审计委员会执行效果研究——来自财务重述的证据[J].财会通讯:学术版,2006,12:82-85.
195.钱颖一.企业的治理结构改革和融资结构改革[J].经济研究,1995,1:20-29.
196.漆江娜、陈慧霖、张阳.事务所规模·品牌·价格与审计质量——国际“四大”中国审计市场收费与质量研究[J].审计研究,2004,3:59-65.
197.秦江萍.会计舞弊的市场反应与识别:理论分析与经验证据[M].经济科学出版社:北京.2005年版.
198.沈艺峰、张俊生.ST公司董事会治理失败若干成因分析[J].证券市场导报,2002,3:21-25.
199.史丛莉.中国上市公司内部治理结构与盈余管理的实证研究[J].沈阳工业大学学报,2006,3:348-360.
200.司茹、高齐圣.独立董事特征与财务报告舞弊关系研究[J].渤海大学学报:哲学社会科学版,2007,3:132-134.
201.宋敏、张俊喜、李春涛.股权结构的陷阱[J].南开管理评论,2004,1:9-23+56.
202.苏启林、朱文.上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究,2003,8:36-45+91.
203.孙敬水、周永强.我国上市公司董事会特征与信息披露违规——基于2004-2006年数据实证分析[J].工业技术经济,2008,1:138-142.
204.孙永祥、章融.董事会规模、公司治理与绩效[J].企业经济,2000,10:13-15.
205.唐敏、徐文聪.上市公司董事会与盈余管理关系研究[J].财会通讯:学术版,2007,5:19-25.
206.唐清泉、罗党论、王莉.大股东的隧道挖掘与制衡力量——来自中国市场的经验证据[J].中国会计评论,2005,1:63-86.
207.唐盛培.机构投资者与上市公司会计信息相关性分析[J].证券市场导报,2006,5:49-52.
208.唐跃军、吕斐适、程新生.大股东制衡、治理战略与信息披露——来自2003年中国上市公司的证据[J].经济学(季刊),2008,2:647-664.
209.王斌、梁欣欣.公司治理、财务状况与信息披露质量——来自深圳证券交易所的经验证据[J].会计研究,2008,2:31-38+95.
210.王琨、肖星.机构投资者持股与关联方占用的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2005,2:27-33.
211.王怀明、宿金香.董事会特征与企业自愿信息披露[J].审计与经济研究,2007,3:73-76.
212.王俊秋、张奇峰.公司治理机制与信息披露透明度的实证研究[J].山西财经大学学报,2007,2:69-74.
213.王俊秋、张奇峰.家族企业的“掏空”行为与会计盈余质量[J].上海立信会计学院学报,2008,1:58-64.
214.王俊秋、张奇峰.治理环境、治理机制与信息披露质量:来自深圳证券交易所的证据[J].当代经济管理,2007,3:111-115.
215.王俊秋、张奇峰.终极控制权、现金流量权与盈余信息含量——来自家族上市公司的经验证据[J].经济与管理研究,2007,12:10-16.
216.王建新.公司治理结构,盈余管理动机与长期资产减值转回——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2007,5:60-66.
217.王力军.金字塔控制、关联交易与公司价值——基于我国民营上市公司的实证研究[J].证券市场导报,2006,2:18-24.
218.王鹏、周黎安.控股股东的控制权、所有权与公司绩效:基于中国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2006,2:88-98.
219.王奇波、宋常.国外关于最优股权结构与股权制衡的文献综述[J].会计研究,2006,1:83-88+94.
220.汪炜、蒋高峰.信息披露、透明度与资本成本[J].经济研究,2004,7:107-114.
221.王雄元、沈维成.上市公司控制结构与信息披露质量[J].证券市场导报,2008,4:63-69.
222.王艳艳、陈汉文.审计质量与会计信息透明度——来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].会计研究,2006,4:9-15.
223.王颖、王平心、吴清华.审计委员会特征对上市公司盈余管理的影响研究[J].当代经济管理,2006,6:101-106.
224.王咏梅、王鹏.“四大”与“非四大”审计质量市场认同度的差异性研究[J].审计研究,2006,5:49-56.
225.王跃堂、朱琳、陈世敏.董事会独立性、股权制衡与财务信息质量[J].会计研究,2008,1:55-62+96.
226.魏明海、刘峰、施鲲翔.论会计透明度[J].会计研究,2001,9:14-18+63.
227.吴敬琏.现代公司与企业改革[M].天津人民出版社:天津.1994.
228.武立东、张云、何力武.民营上市公司集团治理与终极控制人侵占效应分析[J].南开管理评论,2007,4:58-66.
229.吴联生.上市公司会计报告研究[M].东北财经大学出版社:大连.2001.
230.吴清华、王平心.公司盈余质量:董事会微观治理绩效之考察——来自我国独立董事制度强制性变迁的经验证据[J].数理统计与管理,2007,1:30-40.
231.吴水澎、李奇凤.国际四大、国内十大与国内非十大的审计质量——来自2003年中国上市公司的经验证据[J].当代财经,2006,2:114-118.
232.向凯.董事会效率对自愿信息披露影响的实证研究[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2006,5:126-132.
233.谢百三、谢曙光.关于中国民营上市公司低绩效问题的深层思考[J].财经科学,2003,1:32-36.
234.谢国强、王道平、李林.从盈余管理角度对独立董事制度有效性的实证分析[J].统计与信息论坛,2006,1:54-58.
235.谢识予.经济博弈论[M].复旦大学出版社:上海.1997.
236.熊莉.独立董事特征与上市公司信息披露质量[J].商场现代化,2007,15:253-254.
237.徐莉萍、辛宇、陈工孟.股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响[J].经济研究,2006,1:90-100.
238.徐向艺.公司治理制度安排与组织设计[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2006.
239.许小年、王燕.中国上市公司的所有制结构与公司治理[A].梁能.公司治理结构:中国的实践与美国的经验[C].北京:中国人民出版社,2000.
240.许永斌、彭白颖.控制权、现金流权与公司业绩——来自中国民营上市公司的经验研究[J].商业经济与管理,2007,4:74-79.
241.薛祖云.会计信息市场与市场管制—关于会计信息管制的经济学思考[M].暨南大学出版社:广州.2002.
242.薛祖云、黄彤.董事会、监事会制度特征与会计信息质量——来自中国资本市场的经验分析[J].财经理论与实践,2004,4:84-89.
243.杨克磊、刘继业、张志勇.董事会特征与盈余管理关系研究[J].河北工程大学学报:社会科学版,2007,1:8-10.
244.杨薇、姚涛.公司治理与财务舞弊的关系——来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].重庆大学学报:社会科学版,2006,5:24-30.
245.杨兴君、宗长玉、江艺.民营企业控制多家上市公司实证研究,深圳证券交易所第六届会员单位,基金公司研究评选结果,2003.
246.杨忠莲、杨振慧.独立董事与审计委员会执行效果研究——来自报表重述的证据[J].审计研究,2006,2:81-85+51.
247.叶勇、胡培、谭德庆、黄雷.控制权和现金流量权偏离下的公司价值和公司治理[J].管理工程学报,2007,1:71-76+82.
248.叶勇、淳伟德、黄雷.不同行业的上市公司终极控制权、现金流量权和公司绩效[J].软科学,2007,5:42-44+60.
249.叶勇、胡培、黄登仕.中国上市公司终极控制权、现金流量权及其国际比较分析[J].南开管理评论,2005,3:25-31.
250.叶勇、胡培、刘波.上市公司终极控制股东侵害度及实证研究[J].系统工程理论方法应用,2006,2:164-169.
251.叶勇、黄雷.终极控制股东、控制权溢价和公司治理研究[J].管理科学,2004,5:9-14.
252.叶勇、刘波、黄雷.终极控制权、现金流量权与企业价值——基于隐性终极控制论的中国上市公司治理实证研究[J].管理科学学报,2007,2:66-79.
253.殷枫.公司治理结构和自愿性信息披露关系的实证研究[J].审计与经济研究,2006,2:88-92.
254.原红旗、李海建.会计师事务所组织形式、规模与审计质量[J].审计研究,2003,1:32-37.
255.张程睿.上市公司透明度的影响因素研究——基于对2001-2006年深圳上市公司的经验分析[J].软科学,2008,5:134-140.
256.张国华、陈方正.我国上市公司盈余管理与董事会特征相关性实证研究[J].技术经济与管理研究,2006,2:42-44.
257.张华、张俊喜、宋敏.所有权和控制权分离对企业价值的影响——我国民营上市企业的实证研究[J].经济学(季刊),2004,S1:1-14.
258.张为国、邱昱芳.后安然时代[M].中国财政经济出版社:北京.2003.
259.张维迎.博奕论与信息经济学[M].上海三联出版社:上海.1996.
260.张维迎.所有制、治理结构与委托—代理关系——简评崔之元和周其仁的一些观点[J].经济研究,1996,9:3-15+53.
261.支晓强、童盼.盈余管理,控制权转移与独立董事变更——兼论独立董事治理作用的发挥[J].管理世界,2005,11:137-144.
262.钟伟强、张天西.公司治理状况对自愿披露水平的影响[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2006,1:62-68+143.
263.周泽将.信息披露透明度与公司治理关系的实证分析——源自深市信息披露评分的证据[J].铜陵学院学报,2007,4:34-37.
264.朱红军、汪辉.“股权制衡”可以改善公司治理吗——宏智科技股份有限公司控制权之争的案例研究[J].管理世界,2004,10:114-123+140-156.
265.朱蓉、许慧.控制权、利益掏空与现金流的转移——基于上市公司异常经营现金流的研究[J].中南财经政法大学研究生学报,2007,4:80-89.
266.朱松.最终控制人特征与盈余信息含量[J].中国会计与财务研究,2006,1.
267.邹晖.家族企业大股东侵占与股权制衡——基于家族类上市公司控制权转移事件的实证分析[J].现代管理科学,2008,4:95-96+119.
268.邹平、付莹.我国上市公司控制权与现金流权分离——理论研究与实证检验[J].财经研究,2007,9:135-143.