论中国上市公司治理中的违法违规问题
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摘要
中国股市建立近20年,已经在国民经济的持续增长中占据了不可忽略的重要地位。但中国上市公司违法违规事件的发生层出不穷,广大中小投资者的合法权益蒙受巨大损失,并阻碍证券市场优化资源配置功能的有效发挥。本研究聚焦在我国沪深两市的A股市场从理论和实证两个角度分析上市公司违法违规的规律,探讨上市公司违法违规行为的特征及其监管处罚的变化规律,公司治理法律环境对上市公司行为选择的影响,以及如何调整外部法律环境以强化对上市公司的规范和约束,并为高效配置有限的监管资源提供方向性的政策建议。
法律环境作为上市公司治理的重要外部环境,对引导上市公司合规运作具有不可或缺的意义。但从既有的研究来看,对上市公司治理法律坏境的探讨缺乏深入的剖析。本研究提出上市公司治理法律环境的“四构成论”,即将上市公司治理法律环境分解为立法、执法、司法、法律宣传和教育四个基本构成,并依赖15年(1994-2008)的纵向数据,以及相关调查问卷,对此进行实证分析,这有助于形成对中国上市公司治理法律环境全面而客观的整体认识。
传统的监管理论认为违法违规行为是监管体制下一种趋利避害的理性选择,这种解释流于表面化。本研究提出中小投资者“双重身份论”,并以此解释违法违规的根本原因。广大中小投资者作为社会公众股股东在我国股票市场中具有双重身份:一是以上市公司治理主体身份出现的股东,二是购买了上市公司股票这种金融产品并期望获得资本利得这一产品效用的“消费者”。从市场现实来看,二者相比较,前一种身份属性虚化,后一种身份属性更加突出。由于我国的股票市场具有不同于西方国家的“新兴加转轨”特征,控股股东普遍存在、国有股权比例较高,使得具有双重身份的广大中小投资者在与控制性大股东以及高层管理人员为代表的内部人之间进行利益博弈时矛盾冲突性远大于协调一致性,并处于弱势地位,这是我国上市公司频发违法违规事件的重要根源。
在现实应用方面,随着中小投资者法律保护的不断加强,必然要求监管部门对违法违规行为实施更高的监管标准,以防范违法违规行为对投资者和市场经济稳定造成的损害。本研究通过揭示上市公司治理中的违法违规,在主体、行业、地域等方面的分布规律,向投资者展示潜在的违法违规风险,并探索监管部门提高监管效果的制度路径,指出改善中国上市公司治理法律环境的政策方向,从而为更加有效地监管股票市场开辟一个新的视角。以上三个方面的内容构成了本文的主要创新。
本研究采用规范分析与实证分析相结合的方法,以A股上市公司作为研究样本,依照“环境因素影响行为选择”这一逻辑展开论证。全文分为七章。第一章为引言。介绍论文的选题背景及研究意义、基本概念、研究范围和对象、研究方法、论文结构安排、研究创新等。第二章为理论基础。本研究以公司治理学和法律经济学中的经典理论作为研究的基础。主要有多重委托代理理论、公司控制理论、利益相关者理论,以及交易成本理论。第三章为文献综述。对违法违规现象的研究现状从法律环境、违法违规两个方面介绍了相关研究文献及主要结论,指出当前研究的不足与改进、完善的方向。第四章为我国上市公司治理中的违法违规的经验研究。在本部分中,首先指出我国上市公司违法违规发生的具体市场环境是国有股权占主要比重和大股东主导的市场。随后,从历史数据中充分挖掘,找出违法违规的规律,为本研究展开监管措施改进的建议提供实证研究的支持。第五章为我国上市公司治理法律环境研究。本部分首先是对我国上市公司治理法律环境的建设和发展的历程进行回顾,梳理关于上市公司治理监管的相关法律条目,并对我国上市公司治理监管的立法体制、执法环境、法院的民事司法活动,以及有关法律宣传和教育的状况进行了分析。这些共同构成了本研究对上市公司治理法律环境的分析框架。第六章为我国上市公司治理法律环境对违法违规的影响。研究将从法律环境的四个层面展开,分析在立法上,即文本意义上的法律制度,和执法、司法,即实操意义上的法律活动,以及法律宣传和教育对违法违规产生的影响。第七章为研究结论和政策建议。本部分对于全文的研究结果进行总结,阐述我国上市公司治理法律环境和违法违规之间的关系及其在中国“新兴加转轨”的证券市场中所体现出的特殊性,并基于本文结论,提出了若干改进上市公司治理监管的政策建议。
Illegal case of stock market pose a significant threat to Enterprise competition and market development, It is an important link that conduct strict and efficient supervision on the illegal acts to ensure the securities market with development of sustainable growth. The stock market of China which set up for nearly 20 years, has been occupied an important position that can not be ignored in the sustained growth of national economy.
However, It's the incident of violate laws and regulations concerning listed companies of China happened one after another that the majority of investors' legitimate rights and interests suffer huge losses, in particular the small investors, and impede the functions of stock market to optimize the allocation of resources effectively.
This study focused on A-share market of Shanghai and Shenzhen in China with the perspective of both theoretical and empirical to analysis the law of violation of laws and regulations in listed companies, and probe into the characteristics of illegal acts of listed company and the regulatory changes in the law of punishment, the how legal environment of corporate governance influencing the act of choosing of listed companies, and how to adjust the external legal environment for listed companies to strengthen the norms and constraints, and offering directional policy recommendations for the efficient allocation of limited resources.
This dissertation has six parts. Chapter 1 is introduction. It provides backgrounds, methods, structure and contributions. Chapter 2 reviews the related literature from two aspects of the legal environment and the illegal to introduct the relevant research literature and the major conclusions.Carry out a detailed research of the situation of laws and regulations to the situation of violation. Chapter 3 introduces of Law and Economics, then comment on the current research, pointing out Inadequate Research and direction of consummating. Chapter 4 Research on illegal acts of listed companyIn this section, first of all, analysis the specific market environment of illegal acts in our country of listed companies happened, pointed out that the A-share market is an accounting for the major proportion of state-owned shares, and the major shareholder of the leading markets. Subsequently, from our country's history of violations of laws and regulations to exploit the data to identify the characteristics of violation of laws and regulations, provided empirical research support by carried out the recommendations of the regulatory measures. Chapter 5 Research on legal environment of corporate governance of listed companies in China.Frist, review the construction on legal environment for corporate governance of listed companies and development process, sort out the regulatory governance of listed companies regarding the relevant legal entry, and the regulatory governance of listed companies in China's legislative system, law enforcement environment, the Court of Civil Justice Events, as well as publicity and education on the legal analysis of the situation. These studies constitute the governance of listed companies of the analytical framework for the legal environment. Chapter 6 How do legal environment of corporate governance of listed companies influence the illegal acts Research from the four dimensions of the legal environment to start up analysis the practical significance of the Legal Events in the Legislative impact on the meaning of the text on the legal system and law enforcement, judicial. Chapter 7 Research conclusions and policy recommendations.This part take a systematic sort out and summary of the research results of the full text, governance the relationship between the legal environment on listed companies and illegals in China, "add new transition" in the stock market reflects the specificity of, and based on the In this paper, the conclusions put forward a number of listed companies to improve the regulatory governance of policy recommendations.
The main conclusions of this dissertation are as follow:
Firstly, the various stakeholders in the interests of listed companies in both the demands of coherence, but also of contradictions and conflicts, violation of laws and regulations of such contradictions and conflicts is a typical example of. Listed companies on the carrier, the various stakeholders is the relationship between the unity of opposites. In accordance with the Law and Economics of the analytical framework, we can easily understand that illegal activities should be under the regulatory system are an advantage of rational choice, and the initiator side, as stakeholders, or are based on the "for profit" or "married disaster, "the original motive, the other parties will be hollowed out to enjoy the legitimate interests of the other parties should not have to bear the risks and losses add to its body.
Secondly, legal environment including not only the create, modify, improve, or legislation for corporate governance of listed companies, that is the legal system related to the main activity, but also including the implementation of the legal system of corporate governance with listed companies, that is the securities regulatory department of the administration of law enforcement, courts and other judicial activities of the department, as well as related legal advocacy and education. In other words, the legal environment for corporate governance of listed companies not only for the static text of all laws, and dynamic performance of law enforcement, judicial and legal publicity activities.
Thirdly, the socio-economic reasons for the formation of legal environment: the system of share defects, deviation of the stock market functions, the fragile system and the lack of competitive market are the two major obstacles to set up corporate governance mechanisms, the implementation of the operation of corporate governance compliance is often encountered resistance from vested interests.
Fourthly, in China, the regulatory system of laws and regulations management of Listed Companies, including the basic legal and administrative regulations, departmental rules and regulations and the four levels of self-discipline. China's legislative system is too complicated, the various laws and regulations, policy documents, have become market participants must be the espousal of the "normative documents" .To the law enforcement, the legal basis for the diversification would clearly affect the quality of law enforcement activities accordingly. To the corresponding terms of being regulated, in the face of such a massive system of rules, the law has become unbearable stress.
Fifthly, illegal acts against listed companies in China concerning those type of violation of laws and regulations such as, market manipulation, false statements, the disclosure of information breaches, violations transactions and internal governance violation.Violation of laws and regulations of listed companies appears the following common features: the highest frequency of irregularities to disclose information by executives, and major shareholders of a listed company; types of financial fraud violations from a loss of many listed companies in the ST category; illegal trading activities increase substantially by executives and major shareholders of the listed company; the internal governance of listed companies still can not be ignored violations; insider dealing and market manipulation investigated the frequency is not high, a large number of dark.
Finally, in the corporate governance of the legal system, the relevant regulatory system of corporate governance carried out gradually from the establishment of rules and systems, compliance supervision, accountability of the three aspects of the rectification, the former from set up the legal system perspective of the corporate governance of listed companies, and the next from the legal system of the implementation perspective in governance of listed companies. These systems not only produce a normative effect for the company's internal governance structure, but also has the role of guidance and restraint for the operation of external mechanisms of governance, and gradually formed corporate governance of listed companies to run the legal environment. Therefore illegal acts of corporate governance as a form of alienation is bound to the negative evaluation by the relevant legal system.
法律环境作为上市公司治理的重要外部环境,对引导上市公司合规运作具有不可或缺的意义。但从既有的研究来看,对上市公司治理法律坏境的探讨缺乏深入的剖析。本研究提出上市公司治理法律环境的“四构成论”,即将上市公司治理法律环境分解为立法、执法、司法、法律宣传和教育四个基本构成,并依赖15年(1994-2008)的纵向数据,以及相关调查问卷,对此进行实证分析,这有助于形成对中国上市公司治理法律环境全面而客观的整体认识。
传统的监管理论认为违法违规行为是监管体制下一种趋利避害的理性选择,这种解释流于表面化。本研究提出中小投资者“双重身份论”,并以此解释违法违规的根本原因。广大中小投资者作为社会公众股股东在我国股票市场中具有双重身份:一是以上市公司治理主体身份出现的股东,二是购买了上市公司股票这种金融产品并期望获得资本利得这一产品效用的“消费者”。从市场现实来看,二者相比较,前一种身份属性虚化,后一种身份属性更加突出。由于我国的股票市场具有不同于西方国家的“新兴加转轨”特征,控股股东普遍存在、国有股权比例较高,使得具有双重身份的广大中小投资者在与控制性大股东以及高层管理人员为代表的内部人之间进行利益博弈时矛盾冲突性远大于协调一致性,并处于弱势地位,这是我国上市公司频发违法违规事件的重要根源。
在现实应用方面,随着中小投资者法律保护的不断加强,必然要求监管部门对违法违规行为实施更高的监管标准,以防范违法违规行为对投资者和市场经济稳定造成的损害。本研究通过揭示上市公司治理中的违法违规,在主体、行业、地域等方面的分布规律,向投资者展示潜在的违法违规风险,并探索监管部门提高监管效果的制度路径,指出改善中国上市公司治理法律环境的政策方向,从而为更加有效地监管股票市场开辟一个新的视角。以上三个方面的内容构成了本文的主要创新。
本研究采用规范分析与实证分析相结合的方法,以A股上市公司作为研究样本,依照“环境因素影响行为选择”这一逻辑展开论证。全文分为七章。第一章为引言。介绍论文的选题背景及研究意义、基本概念、研究范围和对象、研究方法、论文结构安排、研究创新等。第二章为理论基础。本研究以公司治理学和法律经济学中的经典理论作为研究的基础。主要有多重委托代理理论、公司控制理论、利益相关者理论,以及交易成本理论。第三章为文献综述。对违法违规现象的研究现状从法律环境、违法违规两个方面介绍了相关研究文献及主要结论,指出当前研究的不足与改进、完善的方向。第四章为我国上市公司治理中的违法违规的经验研究。在本部分中,首先指出我国上市公司违法违规发生的具体市场环境是国有股权占主要比重和大股东主导的市场。随后,从历史数据中充分挖掘,找出违法违规的规律,为本研究展开监管措施改进的建议提供实证研究的支持。第五章为我国上市公司治理法律环境研究。本部分首先是对我国上市公司治理法律环境的建设和发展的历程进行回顾,梳理关于上市公司治理监管的相关法律条目,并对我国上市公司治理监管的立法体制、执法环境、法院的民事司法活动,以及有关法律宣传和教育的状况进行了分析。这些共同构成了本研究对上市公司治理法律环境的分析框架。第六章为我国上市公司治理法律环境对违法违规的影响。研究将从法律环境的四个层面展开,分析在立法上,即文本意义上的法律制度,和执法、司法,即实操意义上的法律活动,以及法律宣传和教育对违法违规产生的影响。第七章为研究结论和政策建议。本部分对于全文的研究结果进行总结,阐述我国上市公司治理法律环境和违法违规之间的关系及其在中国“新兴加转轨”的证券市场中所体现出的特殊性,并基于本文结论,提出了若干改进上市公司治理监管的政策建议。
Illegal case of stock market pose a significant threat to Enterprise competition and market development, It is an important link that conduct strict and efficient supervision on the illegal acts to ensure the securities market with development of sustainable growth. The stock market of China which set up for nearly 20 years, has been occupied an important position that can not be ignored in the sustained growth of national economy.
However, It's the incident of violate laws and regulations concerning listed companies of China happened one after another that the majority of investors' legitimate rights and interests suffer huge losses, in particular the small investors, and impede the functions of stock market to optimize the allocation of resources effectively.
This study focused on A-share market of Shanghai and Shenzhen in China with the perspective of both theoretical and empirical to analysis the law of violation of laws and regulations in listed companies, and probe into the characteristics of illegal acts of listed company and the regulatory changes in the law of punishment, the how legal environment of corporate governance influencing the act of choosing of listed companies, and how to adjust the external legal environment for listed companies to strengthen the norms and constraints, and offering directional policy recommendations for the efficient allocation of limited resources.
This dissertation has six parts. Chapter 1 is introduction. It provides backgrounds, methods, structure and contributions. Chapter 2 reviews the related literature from two aspects of the legal environment and the illegal to introduct the relevant research literature and the major conclusions.Carry out a detailed research of the situation of laws and regulations to the situation of violation. Chapter 3 introduces of Law and Economics, then comment on the current research, pointing out Inadequate Research and direction of consummating. Chapter 4 Research on illegal acts of listed companyIn this section, first of all, analysis the specific market environment of illegal acts in our country of listed companies happened, pointed out that the A-share market is an accounting for the major proportion of state-owned shares, and the major shareholder of the leading markets. Subsequently, from our country's history of violations of laws and regulations to exploit the data to identify the characteristics of violation of laws and regulations, provided empirical research support by carried out the recommendations of the regulatory measures. Chapter 5 Research on legal environment of corporate governance of listed companies in China.Frist, review the construction on legal environment for corporate governance of listed companies and development process, sort out the regulatory governance of listed companies regarding the relevant legal entry, and the regulatory governance of listed companies in China's legislative system, law enforcement environment, the Court of Civil Justice Events, as well as publicity and education on the legal analysis of the situation. These studies constitute the governance of listed companies of the analytical framework for the legal environment. Chapter 6 How do legal environment of corporate governance of listed companies influence the illegal acts Research from the four dimensions of the legal environment to start up analysis the practical significance of the Legal Events in the Legislative impact on the meaning of the text on the legal system and law enforcement, judicial. Chapter 7 Research conclusions and policy recommendations.This part take a systematic sort out and summary of the research results of the full text, governance the relationship between the legal environment on listed companies and illegals in China, "add new transition" in the stock market reflects the specificity of, and based on the In this paper, the conclusions put forward a number of listed companies to improve the regulatory governance of policy recommendations.
The main conclusions of this dissertation are as follow:
Firstly, the various stakeholders in the interests of listed companies in both the demands of coherence, but also of contradictions and conflicts, violation of laws and regulations of such contradictions and conflicts is a typical example of. Listed companies on the carrier, the various stakeholders is the relationship between the unity of opposites. In accordance with the Law and Economics of the analytical framework, we can easily understand that illegal activities should be under the regulatory system are an advantage of rational choice, and the initiator side, as stakeholders, or are based on the "for profit" or "married disaster, "the original motive, the other parties will be hollowed out to enjoy the legitimate interests of the other parties should not have to bear the risks and losses add to its body.
Secondly, legal environment including not only the create, modify, improve, or legislation for corporate governance of listed companies, that is the legal system related to the main activity, but also including the implementation of the legal system of corporate governance with listed companies, that is the securities regulatory department of the administration of law enforcement, courts and other judicial activities of the department, as well as related legal advocacy and education. In other words, the legal environment for corporate governance of listed companies not only for the static text of all laws, and dynamic performance of law enforcement, judicial and legal publicity activities.
Thirdly, the socio-economic reasons for the formation of legal environment: the system of share defects, deviation of the stock market functions, the fragile system and the lack of competitive market are the two major obstacles to set up corporate governance mechanisms, the implementation of the operation of corporate governance compliance is often encountered resistance from vested interests.
Fourthly, in China, the regulatory system of laws and regulations management of Listed Companies, including the basic legal and administrative regulations, departmental rules and regulations and the four levels of self-discipline. China's legislative system is too complicated, the various laws and regulations, policy documents, have become market participants must be the espousal of the "normative documents" .To the law enforcement, the legal basis for the diversification would clearly affect the quality of law enforcement activities accordingly. To the corresponding terms of being regulated, in the face of such a massive system of rules, the law has become unbearable stress.
Fifthly, illegal acts against listed companies in China concerning those type of violation of laws and regulations such as, market manipulation, false statements, the disclosure of information breaches, violations transactions and internal governance violation.Violation of laws and regulations of listed companies appears the following common features: the highest frequency of irregularities to disclose information by executives, and major shareholders of a listed company; types of financial fraud violations from a loss of many listed companies in the ST category; illegal trading activities increase substantially by executives and major shareholders of the listed company; the internal governance of listed companies still can not be ignored violations; insider dealing and market manipulation investigated the frequency is not high, a large number of dark.
Finally, in the corporate governance of the legal system, the relevant regulatory system of corporate governance carried out gradually from the establishment of rules and systems, compliance supervision, accountability of the three aspects of the rectification, the former from set up the legal system perspective of the corporate governance of listed companies, and the next from the legal system of the implementation perspective in governance of listed companies. These systems not only produce a normative effect for the company's internal governance structure, but also has the role of guidance and restraint for the operation of external mechanisms of governance, and gradually formed corporate governance of listed companies to run the legal environment. Therefore illegal acts of corporate governance as a form of alienation is bound to the negative evaluation by the relevant legal system.
引文
[1]南开大学公司治理研究中心,公司治理评价课题组,中国上市公司治理评价与指数研究-基于中国1149家上市公司的研究(2004年),南开管理评论,2006年第1期。
[1]陈兴良:“论证券犯罪及其刑法调控”,载于《中国法学》,1994年第4期。
[2]顾肖荣:《证券犯罪与证券违法违规行为》,中国检察出版社,1998年10月版,第21页。这一观点是当前的通说。
[3]另有财政部处罚6次,具体处罚的记录:600094.SH.~*ST华源、600757.SH.ST源发、600656.SH.ST方源、600687.SH.华盛达、600190.SH.锦州港、600201.SH.金宇集团;国家外汇管理局上海市分局处罚1次,即600637.SH,广电信息,因2006年12月30日,上海广电信息产业股份有限公司的下属公司上海广电数字音像电子有限公司,在数字音像贸易中存在出口收汇违规问题,故根据《外汇管理条例》给予警告,并罚款人民币360万元;国家外汇管理局福建省分局处罚1次,即600734.SH,ST实达,因2007年6月21日,福建实达电脑集团股份有限公司在向境外投资者英属维尔京群岛CONWAY VENTURELIMITED(中文为康威有限公司)转让股权时,未经外汇管理部门核准,直接收取外方以人民币4429.11万元(折合535万美元)支付的并购款。故根据《外汇管理条例》给予警告,并罚款人民币1328万元。本研究的实证分析将不包含以上8次处罚记录。
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