植物品种权许可实施问题研究
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摘要
我国是农业大国,农作物种业是国家战略性、基础性的核心产业。植物品种权是关乎一国农业发展、粮食安全和生态可持续发展的源头关键环节,是育种部门、种业企业生存和发展的战略资源,植物品种权许可实施是使这一战略资源得到有效配置的市场路径。植物新品种保护制度已经成为发达国家在全球范围内抢占种质资源、加强农业知识产权保护的游戏规则,跨国种业公司更是将生物技术专利和植物品种权作为开拓国际市场的利器。研究植物品种权许可实施问题有助于提高植物新品种保护制度的有效性,提高植物品种权交易实施效率,促进农作物优良品种推广,推动种业科技成果转化为现实生产力。
本研究综合农业技术经济理论、产权理论、知识产权经济学理论,构建了植物品种权许可实施的理论研究框架,运用规范分析和实证分析相结合的方法,考察了植物品种权许可实施主体、客体、许可模式选择、许可费用方式选择等问题,并通过调查分析,对相应的理论问题进行实证检验,比较借鉴发达国家植物品种权许可实施的经验,提出加强我国植物品种权有效许可实施的对策建议。
本研究的主要内容和结论如下:
(1)植物品种权许可实施主体是许可实施的基础。地市级农业科研院所是我国植物品种权许可实施最主要的许可方,民营种业企业是植物品种权许可实施的主要被许可方。许可主体之间存在复杂的交易、竞争与合作关系。通过主成分分析、因子分析和聚类分析方法对地市级农科院所进行综合评价,分析得出地市级农业科研院所的创新能力和综合实力状况与区域经济发展基础、地方农业发展水平相一致,存在地域差距和不平衡性,影响植物品种权许可实施效率。
(2)植物品种权许可实施客体是已经获得新品种授权,且处于保护期限内的有效植物品种权,是许可双方谈判的基础。植物品种权既具有专有性、地域性和期限性等法律特性,又具有无形性、潜在收益性和价值不确定性等商品特性,同时还具有排他性、可分割性、有限性和可转让性等产权特性,从权能特性出发,建立植物品种权质量模型,提出测度植物品种权质量的Q值法,帮助决策者了解植物品种权的内在质量,有效选择植物品种权许可实施客体。
(3)植物品种权许可实施模式:独占许可、独家许可、普通许可和联盟许可模式具有不同的内涵特点和适用性,许可主体应选择合理方式,以降低交易成本,获得最佳预期收益。植物品种权联盟许可实施是应对未来新挑战的植物品种权许可实施的高效模式。
(4)固定费用、提成费用和入门费加提成费用方式等植物品种权许可费用方式选择是许可谈判的核心,影响许可费用方式选择的关键因素是许可双方地位、授权品种特性和信息,当这些关键因素发生变化,构成不同的情境,植物品种权许可费用方式决策也随之发生改变,在不同的情境下存在相对最优的植物品种权许可费用方式,归纳提出植物品种权许可费用方式选择情境理论,并利用Logistic回归模型对该理论进行了检验。
(5)在许可主体有限理性、环境不确定、合同不完全的前提假设下,从许可主体群体视角对农科院所和种业企业植物品种权许可实施行为进行动态演化博弈分析表明,许可实施产生的超额收益及其分配、双方为许可付出的初始成本,以及双方的期望投资回报系数和对机会主义的惩罚是影响博弈均衡的主要因素,应完善植物品种权许可实施的利益分配机制、信誉激励机制和风险规避机制,优化许可主体行为。
(6)植物品种权许可实施实证分析是对前述理论的检验和证实,是植物品种权许可实施机制研究的深化,农科院所和种业企业的植物品种权许可实施的动机、行为和绩效存在差异,并发现植物品种权许可实施主体错位、许可合同不完善、许可模式单一,降低了植物品种权许可实施的有效性,建议提高种业企业品种创新能力,规范植物品种权许可实施合同,提高品种权人许可实施的管理能力。
(7)吸收、借鉴美国和德国在植物品种权许可实施方面取得的丰富实践经验,促进我国植物品种权的有效实施,促进农业技术创新,推动农业发展。
本研究的主要创新点在于:建立植物品种权质量模型,提出测度植物品种权质量的Q值法;运用因子分析法对地市级农科院所进行综合评价,为植物品种权许可实施主体的客观评价提供量化依据;提出植物品种权许可费用方式选择情境理论,并运用Logistic回归模型进行了实证检验;利用调查统计数据验证植物品种权许可实施的理论体系,提高了植物品种权许可实施研究的现实意义。
China is a huge agricultural country. Field crop seeding industry is a strategic and fundamental core industry. Plant Variety Rights is not only the essential part of the agriculture technology innovation which has the extremely vital significance to the agriculture development, to the food security and the sustainable development of the ecology, but also the strategic resources of agriculture research institutions and seed corporations. So Plant Variety Rights licensing is the key market path to allocate the strategic resources effectively and efficiently for the agriculture research institutions and seed corporations. Plant variety protection system has been the sharp instrument for the developed countries to enforce the agricultural intellectual property protection rules and explore the genetic resources all over the world, and for the multinational seed companies to capture the world seed market share by using plant patents and plant variety rights. As far as these key points are concerned, the research on the plant variety rights licensing is so important and significant that it is helpful to improve the efficiency of plant variety rights trade, to promote the use of good seed varieties, and to enhance the institution effectiveness of the plant variety protection system.
This study uses agricultural technology economics, property rights economics and intellectual property rights economics comprehensively to establish the theory analysis framework of plant variety rights licensing. By synthesizing the normative and positive analysis methods, it studies deeply on the plant variety rights licensing subject, object, licensing modes, licensing fees and royalties, and licensing mechanism. The plant variety rights licensing theory is proved by empirical test on the practice through the investigation data. The successful experiences of plant variety rights licensing in the U.S. and German are referenced, feasible suggestions are supplied to improve the effective plant variety rights licensing in China.
The main contents and conclusions of the study are organized as follow:
(1) The plant variety rights licensing subject is the basis of licensing theory and practice. The subject of plant variety rights licensing refers to the legal entity and natural person who has the willingness to license the plant variety rights, and has the authority and responsibility to license it to maximize their economic interests. Prefectural and city level seed research institutions are the major licensors and the private seed corporations are the major licensees. There are complex transaction relationship, competition and cooperation relationship between the plant variety rights licensors and licensees. Utilizing the data of prefectural and city level agricultural R&D institutions, this study adopts combined quantitive methods of factor analysis and cluster analysis, assesses the samples’comprehensive power, which indicates that the imbalance and differences decrease the effectiveness of plant variety rights licensing.
(2) The plant variety rights licensing object refers to plant variety rights which are effectively protected within the valid period. They are the basis of plant variety rights licensing negotiation. From the multiple viewpoints, the plant variety rights have the features of appropriateness, locality and duration, they are intangible, their returns are potential and value is uncertain. They are a bundle of rights which consists of a collection of multi-dimensional characteristics, such as exclusivity, divisibility, durability and transferability. An economic model analyses the quality of plant variety rights quantitatively by Q-value method to evaluate the property quality of plant variety rights.
(3) Exclusive licensing, sole licensing, simple licensing and plant variety rights alliance licensing are important modes with different characteristics, advantages, disadvantages and applicability. The brilliant applicability of the plant variety rights alliance licensing mode lies in the future development situation of the plant patent concentration and biotechnology application in plant breeding.
(4) Fixed fees, royalties and two-part tariffs are the core of plant variety licensing negotiation. There are three critical contingency factors influencing the licensing fee methods decision-making. There is no one-fits-for all best licensing methods, the best licensing fee method changes when these contingency factors vary. The contingency theory of plant variety rights licensing fees and royalties is empirical tested by using Logistic regression econometric method, and the result is positive.
(5) By changing the assumptions from perfect rationality to bounded rationality, from certainty to uncertainty, and from perfect contract to imperfect contract, this part applies evolutionary game, reveals that the excess earnings, intitial costs, expected investment return ratio and the punishiment of opportunity behaviors are the key factors that influence the equilibrium of the game, and the benefit-sharing, reputation-motivating and risk-mitigating mechanisms can optimize the licensing behavior.
(6) The positive analysis on the plant variety rights licensing is to deepen and test the licensing theory empirically. Using the data from questionnaire and field investigation, the study compares the different motivation, behavior and performance of plant variety rights licensing between agricultural research institutions and seed companies. It is the licensing subject imposition, the imperfect licensing contract and the monotonous licensing mode that decreases the effectiveness of plant variety rights licensing. It should enhance the innovation ability of the seed companies, standard the licensing contract and improve the rights holders’management competency.
(7) It is beneficial to learn the advanced experience and practice from plant breeders’right licensing of German and plant patent licensing in the U.S. to promote the plant variety rights licensing, the agricultural technology innovation, and agriculture development of China.
The innovations lie in the Q value method to evaluate the quality of plant variety rights, the comprehensive evaluation of fundamental agriculture R&D intuitions, the contingency theory of licensing fee and royalties decision-making, and the empirical test of the plant variety rights licensing to improve the realistic significance of plant variety rights licensing theory.
本研究综合农业技术经济理论、产权理论、知识产权经济学理论,构建了植物品种权许可实施的理论研究框架,运用规范分析和实证分析相结合的方法,考察了植物品种权许可实施主体、客体、许可模式选择、许可费用方式选择等问题,并通过调查分析,对相应的理论问题进行实证检验,比较借鉴发达国家植物品种权许可实施的经验,提出加强我国植物品种权有效许可实施的对策建议。
本研究的主要内容和结论如下:
(1)植物品种权许可实施主体是许可实施的基础。地市级农业科研院所是我国植物品种权许可实施最主要的许可方,民营种业企业是植物品种权许可实施的主要被许可方。许可主体之间存在复杂的交易、竞争与合作关系。通过主成分分析、因子分析和聚类分析方法对地市级农科院所进行综合评价,分析得出地市级农业科研院所的创新能力和综合实力状况与区域经济发展基础、地方农业发展水平相一致,存在地域差距和不平衡性,影响植物品种权许可实施效率。
(2)植物品种权许可实施客体是已经获得新品种授权,且处于保护期限内的有效植物品种权,是许可双方谈判的基础。植物品种权既具有专有性、地域性和期限性等法律特性,又具有无形性、潜在收益性和价值不确定性等商品特性,同时还具有排他性、可分割性、有限性和可转让性等产权特性,从权能特性出发,建立植物品种权质量模型,提出测度植物品种权质量的Q值法,帮助决策者了解植物品种权的内在质量,有效选择植物品种权许可实施客体。
(3)植物品种权许可实施模式:独占许可、独家许可、普通许可和联盟许可模式具有不同的内涵特点和适用性,许可主体应选择合理方式,以降低交易成本,获得最佳预期收益。植物品种权联盟许可实施是应对未来新挑战的植物品种权许可实施的高效模式。
(4)固定费用、提成费用和入门费加提成费用方式等植物品种权许可费用方式选择是许可谈判的核心,影响许可费用方式选择的关键因素是许可双方地位、授权品种特性和信息,当这些关键因素发生变化,构成不同的情境,植物品种权许可费用方式决策也随之发生改变,在不同的情境下存在相对最优的植物品种权许可费用方式,归纳提出植物品种权许可费用方式选择情境理论,并利用Logistic回归模型对该理论进行了检验。
(5)在许可主体有限理性、环境不确定、合同不完全的前提假设下,从许可主体群体视角对农科院所和种业企业植物品种权许可实施行为进行动态演化博弈分析表明,许可实施产生的超额收益及其分配、双方为许可付出的初始成本,以及双方的期望投资回报系数和对机会主义的惩罚是影响博弈均衡的主要因素,应完善植物品种权许可实施的利益分配机制、信誉激励机制和风险规避机制,优化许可主体行为。
(6)植物品种权许可实施实证分析是对前述理论的检验和证实,是植物品种权许可实施机制研究的深化,农科院所和种业企业的植物品种权许可实施的动机、行为和绩效存在差异,并发现植物品种权许可实施主体错位、许可合同不完善、许可模式单一,降低了植物品种权许可实施的有效性,建议提高种业企业品种创新能力,规范植物品种权许可实施合同,提高品种权人许可实施的管理能力。
(7)吸收、借鉴美国和德国在植物品种权许可实施方面取得的丰富实践经验,促进我国植物品种权的有效实施,促进农业技术创新,推动农业发展。
本研究的主要创新点在于:建立植物品种权质量模型,提出测度植物品种权质量的Q值法;运用因子分析法对地市级农科院所进行综合评价,为植物品种权许可实施主体的客观评价提供量化依据;提出植物品种权许可费用方式选择情境理论,并运用Logistic回归模型进行了实证检验;利用调查统计数据验证植物品种权许可实施的理论体系,提高了植物品种权许可实施研究的现实意义。
China is a huge agricultural country. Field crop seeding industry is a strategic and fundamental core industry. Plant Variety Rights is not only the essential part of the agriculture technology innovation which has the extremely vital significance to the agriculture development, to the food security and the sustainable development of the ecology, but also the strategic resources of agriculture research institutions and seed corporations. So Plant Variety Rights licensing is the key market path to allocate the strategic resources effectively and efficiently for the agriculture research institutions and seed corporations. Plant variety protection system has been the sharp instrument for the developed countries to enforce the agricultural intellectual property protection rules and explore the genetic resources all over the world, and for the multinational seed companies to capture the world seed market share by using plant patents and plant variety rights. As far as these key points are concerned, the research on the plant variety rights licensing is so important and significant that it is helpful to improve the efficiency of plant variety rights trade, to promote the use of good seed varieties, and to enhance the institution effectiveness of the plant variety protection system.
This study uses agricultural technology economics, property rights economics and intellectual property rights economics comprehensively to establish the theory analysis framework of plant variety rights licensing. By synthesizing the normative and positive analysis methods, it studies deeply on the plant variety rights licensing subject, object, licensing modes, licensing fees and royalties, and licensing mechanism. The plant variety rights licensing theory is proved by empirical test on the practice through the investigation data. The successful experiences of plant variety rights licensing in the U.S. and German are referenced, feasible suggestions are supplied to improve the effective plant variety rights licensing in China.
The main contents and conclusions of the study are organized as follow:
(1) The plant variety rights licensing subject is the basis of licensing theory and practice. The subject of plant variety rights licensing refers to the legal entity and natural person who has the willingness to license the plant variety rights, and has the authority and responsibility to license it to maximize their economic interests. Prefectural and city level seed research institutions are the major licensors and the private seed corporations are the major licensees. There are complex transaction relationship, competition and cooperation relationship between the plant variety rights licensors and licensees. Utilizing the data of prefectural and city level agricultural R&D institutions, this study adopts combined quantitive methods of factor analysis and cluster analysis, assesses the samples’comprehensive power, which indicates that the imbalance and differences decrease the effectiveness of plant variety rights licensing.
(2) The plant variety rights licensing object refers to plant variety rights which are effectively protected within the valid period. They are the basis of plant variety rights licensing negotiation. From the multiple viewpoints, the plant variety rights have the features of appropriateness, locality and duration, they are intangible, their returns are potential and value is uncertain. They are a bundle of rights which consists of a collection of multi-dimensional characteristics, such as exclusivity, divisibility, durability and transferability. An economic model analyses the quality of plant variety rights quantitatively by Q-value method to evaluate the property quality of plant variety rights.
(3) Exclusive licensing, sole licensing, simple licensing and plant variety rights alliance licensing are important modes with different characteristics, advantages, disadvantages and applicability. The brilliant applicability of the plant variety rights alliance licensing mode lies in the future development situation of the plant patent concentration and biotechnology application in plant breeding.
(4) Fixed fees, royalties and two-part tariffs are the core of plant variety licensing negotiation. There are three critical contingency factors influencing the licensing fee methods decision-making. There is no one-fits-for all best licensing methods, the best licensing fee method changes when these contingency factors vary. The contingency theory of plant variety rights licensing fees and royalties is empirical tested by using Logistic regression econometric method, and the result is positive.
(5) By changing the assumptions from perfect rationality to bounded rationality, from certainty to uncertainty, and from perfect contract to imperfect contract, this part applies evolutionary game, reveals that the excess earnings, intitial costs, expected investment return ratio and the punishiment of opportunity behaviors are the key factors that influence the equilibrium of the game, and the benefit-sharing, reputation-motivating and risk-mitigating mechanisms can optimize the licensing behavior.
(6) The positive analysis on the plant variety rights licensing is to deepen and test the licensing theory empirically. Using the data from questionnaire and field investigation, the study compares the different motivation, behavior and performance of plant variety rights licensing between agricultural research institutions and seed companies. It is the licensing subject imposition, the imperfect licensing contract and the monotonous licensing mode that decreases the effectiveness of plant variety rights licensing. It should enhance the innovation ability of the seed companies, standard the licensing contract and improve the rights holders’management competency.
(7) It is beneficial to learn the advanced experience and practice from plant breeders’right licensing of German and plant patent licensing in the U.S. to promote the plant variety rights licensing, the agricultural technology innovation, and agriculture development of China.
The innovations lie in the Q value method to evaluate the quality of plant variety rights, the comprehensive evaluation of fundamental agriculture R&D intuitions, the contingency theory of licensing fee and royalties decision-making, and the empirical test of the plant variety rights licensing to improve the realistic significance of plant variety rights licensing theory.
引文
3黄季焜、徐志刚、胡瑞法、张世煌,我国种子产业:成就、问题和发展思路[J],农业经济与管理,2010(3):5-10
4李寅秋、陈超、唐力,品种权保护制度对我国种业集中度影响的实证研究[J],南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2010(6):35-38,53
5装饰性育种是指通过一定育种技术对原有品种性状稍加改进,得到的新品种与原品种之间遗传距离很小,仅仅是修饰性的改变。
6“中单909”玉米品种转让协议在北京签订,中国农业科学院网站,2009年11月9日,http://www.caas.net.cn/caas/news/shownews.asp?Id=7071
7根据2010年11月,农业部主办的种业企业合作经验交流会材料整理。
8《中华人民共和国种子法》第十三条
9 Klein等人(1978)提出的由于交易方进行了关系专用性资产投资,在合同签订后,双方存在机会主义行为,威胁对方,为自己寻求更多租金的现象。
11参数取值,通过取α=β=γ=1,δ=1/3, w_1 =0.6, w_2 =0.40,计算得到Q值。
15姜夕泉等,关于淮麦20号品种权实施许可转让的思考[J],江苏农业科学,2004(1):13-14
16杂交水稻专利技术管窥,http://ziliao.hzu.edu.cn/z10662.html
17根据“郑单958”相关植物品种权侵权纠纷判决书整理。
18根据2010年11月30日,北京种业科企合作经验交流会会议资料整理。
19根据农业部植物新品种保护办公室授权公告统计,2011年3月30日,农业部植物新品种保护办公室网址,http://www.cnpvp.cn/index.aspx
20胡慧英,水稻新品种保护在中国水稻研究所的有效实施[J],中国稻米,2005(1):23-24
26美国经济学家赫伯特·西蒙(Herbert Simon,1916-2001)提出了以有限理性为基础的满意决策理论,获得1978年诺贝尔经济学奖。
27阿罗(Arrow)最早按照专利的技术创新程度将技术创新划分为显著性创新(drastic innovation)和非显著创新(non-drastic innovation)。创新程度用专利技术带来的生产边际成本降低的相对程度衡量。新品种能够带来生产边际成本的降低,且程度不同。
28品种创新程度越高,种子边际生产成本越低,新品种种子价格远远低于老品种种子价格,从而可以取代老品种在市场上推广。
31斯坦科尔伯格模型是德国经济学家斯坦科尔伯格(Stackelberg)于1934年提出的不对称寡头垄断(领先者—追随者)产量决策理论。
33 (美)西蒙著,孙涤译,基于实践的微观经济学[M],上海:上海格致出版社;上海人民出版社,2009年,第4页
34喻卫斌、晓勇,现代不确定性理论的比较研究[J],经济问题,2008(3):3-6
36 Friedman, D., Evolutionary Games in Economics[J], Econometrica, 1991,59
37例如,在植物品种权联盟许可模式中可以采用多人合作博弈的Shapley值分配方法。
40由于单纯的提成费用方式应用较少,在第5章“5.3植物品种权许可费用方式情境理论实证检验”中,将提成费用方式与入门费加提成费用方式合并为一种方式--提成费用方式,分析植物品种权许可费用方式情境因素。
43德国育种者协会网站,2011年5月9日,http://www.bdp-online.de/en/Branche/
44根据2010年10月21日,农业部主办(北京)中德植物新品种保护研讨会、第三届全国农业知识产权论坛暨中国农业科技管理研究会植物品种权专业委员会年会会议资料整理。
48美国植物专利法于1952年并入普通专利法,成为专利法第15章第161-164条,虽然不再是一部独立的单行法,但习惯上仍成为植物专利法,后又经1954年和1998年两次修订。
49一般品种保护期限为20年,木本和藤本植物的保护期限为25年,自授权之日起计算,如果不能满足有关要求,保护期限可以提前终止。
50 Jorge, Fernandez-Cornejo, The Seed Industry in U.S. Agriculture: An Exploration of Data and Information on Crop Seed Markets, Regulation, Industry Structure, and Research and Development [M]. Resource Economics Division, Economic Research Service, Agriculture Information Bulletin, Number 786, 2004: 53. U.S. Department of Agriculture
51 Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, U.S. Plant Variety Protection: Sound and Fury . . . ?, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 2002,http://www.houstonlawreview.org/archive/downloads/39-3_pdf/janicke.pdf
52只是在种子销售包装上,印有销售许可的警告。
55林祥明,植物新品种保护对我国种业发展的影响[D],中国农业科学院博士学位论文,2006
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5装饰性育种是指通过一定育种技术对原有品种性状稍加改进,得到的新品种与原品种之间遗传距离很小,仅仅是修饰性的改变。
6“中单909”玉米品种转让协议在北京签订,中国农业科学院网站,2009年11月9日,http://www.caas.net.cn/caas/news/shownews.asp?Id=7071
7根据2010年11月,农业部主办的种业企业合作经验交流会材料整理。
8《中华人民共和国种子法》第十三条
9 Klein等人(1978)提出的由于交易方进行了关系专用性资产投资,在合同签订后,双方存在机会主义行为,威胁对方,为自己寻求更多租金的现象。
11参数取值,通过取α=β=γ=1,δ=1/3, w_1 =0.6, w_2 =0.40,计算得到Q值。
15姜夕泉等,关于淮麦20号品种权实施许可转让的思考[J],江苏农业科学,2004(1):13-14
16杂交水稻专利技术管窥,http://ziliao.hzu.edu.cn/z10662.html
17根据“郑单958”相关植物品种权侵权纠纷判决书整理。
18根据2010年11月30日,北京种业科企合作经验交流会会议资料整理。
19根据农业部植物新品种保护办公室授权公告统计,2011年3月30日,农业部植物新品种保护办公室网址,http://www.cnpvp.cn/index.aspx
20胡慧英,水稻新品种保护在中国水稻研究所的有效实施[J],中国稻米,2005(1):23-24
26美国经济学家赫伯特·西蒙(Herbert Simon,1916-2001)提出了以有限理性为基础的满意决策理论,获得1978年诺贝尔经济学奖。
27阿罗(Arrow)最早按照专利的技术创新程度将技术创新划分为显著性创新(drastic innovation)和非显著创新(non-drastic innovation)。创新程度用专利技术带来的生产边际成本降低的相对程度衡量。新品种能够带来生产边际成本的降低,且程度不同。
28品种创新程度越高,种子边际生产成本越低,新品种种子价格远远低于老品种种子价格,从而可以取代老品种在市场上推广。
31斯坦科尔伯格模型是德国经济学家斯坦科尔伯格(Stackelberg)于1934年提出的不对称寡头垄断(领先者—追随者)产量决策理论。
33 (美)西蒙著,孙涤译,基于实践的微观经济学[M],上海:上海格致出版社;上海人民出版社,2009年,第4页
34喻卫斌、晓勇,现代不确定性理论的比较研究[J],经济问题,2008(3):3-6
36 Friedman, D., Evolutionary Games in Economics[J], Econometrica, 1991,59
37例如,在植物品种权联盟许可模式中可以采用多人合作博弈的Shapley值分配方法。
40由于单纯的提成费用方式应用较少,在第5章“5.3植物品种权许可费用方式情境理论实证检验”中,将提成费用方式与入门费加提成费用方式合并为一种方式--提成费用方式,分析植物品种权许可费用方式情境因素。
43德国育种者协会网站,2011年5月9日,http://www.bdp-online.de/en/Branche/
44根据2010年10月21日,农业部主办(北京)中德植物新品种保护研讨会、第三届全国农业知识产权论坛暨中国农业科技管理研究会植物品种权专业委员会年会会议资料整理。
48美国植物专利法于1952年并入普通专利法,成为专利法第15章第161-164条,虽然不再是一部独立的单行法,但习惯上仍成为植物专利法,后又经1954年和1998年两次修订。
49一般品种保护期限为20年,木本和藤本植物的保护期限为25年,自授权之日起计算,如果不能满足有关要求,保护期限可以提前终止。
50 Jorge, Fernandez-Cornejo, The Seed Industry in U.S. Agriculture: An Exploration of Data and Information on Crop Seed Markets, Regulation, Industry Structure, and Research and Development [M]. Resource Economics Division, Economic Research Service, Agriculture Information Bulletin, Number 786, 2004: 53. U.S. Department of Agriculture
51 Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, U.S. Plant Variety Protection: Sound and Fury . . . ?, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 2002,http://www.houstonlawreview.org/archive/downloads/39-3_pdf/janicke.pdf
52只是在种子销售包装上,印有销售许可的警告。
55林祥明,植物新品种保护对我国种业发展的影响[D],中国农业科学院博士学位论文,2006
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