自然垄断产业市场结构多元化演进研究
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摘要
传统经济理论认为自然垄断产业不宜引入市场竞争机制,但现实市场需求和技术进步使得传统自然垄断产业面临的经济环境发生了变化,传统一家独占的自然垄断市场结构逐步被侵蚀,自然垄断产业存在引入竞争的可能性与需求。20世纪70年代末以来,发达国家纷纷对传统自然垄断产业进行改革,积极引进和不断强化市场竞争的力量,市场结构多元化重构成为目前各国自然垄断产业改革的一种趋势。以电力产业的市场化改革为例,既有英国电力改革的典型成功经验,也有美国加州电力市场改革失败的惨痛教训。在各国自然垄断产业市场化改革以及国内经济体制转轨的大背景下,中国电力、电信、铁路等传统自然垄断产业引入竞争的市场化改革也纷纷展开。
市场结构多元化重组是当今各国自然垄断产业市场化改革的首选方式,其目的是通过引入市场竞争机制来提高产业效率、配置效率与社会福利,而有效竞争的形成需要结构完善且有组织的市场。本文认为,仅具有多元厂商的市场结构外衣但不能或难以形成有效市场竞争的自然垄断产业市场结构变革不是真正的市场结构多元化,外在的结构需要内在的制度做保障。自然垄断产业的市场化改革追求的是外在结构上的多元主体与内在合意制度保证下的竞争相融合的多元化市场结构。
文章以自然垄断产业的市场结构调整作为研究主线,在分析自然垄断市场结构的终结以及多元化重构可能性与合理性的基础上,从理论角度分析自然垄断产业市场结构演进,提出了“楔形市场进入”的自然演进模式与路径,提出并论证了自然垄断产业市场化改革的“有效”市场结构多元化,指出了市场结构调整与制度变革配合的重要性。最后,将理论发展与实证研究相结合,以电力产业改革作为典型案例,在借鉴发达国家电力市场改革经验与教训的基础上,分析中国电力产业引入竞争的市场结构多元化演进轨迹,考察市场化改革后电力的产业发展状况、市场绩效及其存在制度错位的问题,对当前中国电力产业的市场结构多元化重塑改革作出评价。
根据以上研究思路,本文主要包含以下几部分内容：
第一章首先根据现实自然垄断产业发展提出了本文的研究命题；接下来,为避免可能的误解,对相关概念进行了界定；然后对本文的研究思路、方法、内容、技术路线以及主要创新点进行了简要说明。
第二章梳理了产业组织理论对自然垄断及自然垄断产业变革与市场结构演进问题的认识与发展,简要总结了自然垄断产业发展中政府规制、产权结构变革与竞争三者之间的关系及其重要性等问题的相关文献,通过对理论与文献的简要评述,引出本文所研究的问题。
第三章从理论上分析了传统自然垄断市场结构存在的理由,指出自然垄断产业的一元市场结构存在的弊端,自然垄断市场结构在促进社会福利最大化的同时,可能会引起社会福利的巨大损失,即存在“一元化悖论”,传统的自然垄断市场结构不稳定。接下来,从理论发展和现实支撑两方面分析了多元化市场结构出现的可能性,指出自然垄断市场结构的终结和多元市场经营主体重构是自然垄断产业发展的必然,论证了自然垄断产业市场结构多元化重构的合理性,描述了市场结构调整的可能途径以及OECD对自然垄断产业市场结构重组的五种模式。
第四章从经济条件变化引起的厂商市场进入出发,抽象出理想条件下自然垄断产业市场结构调整与多元化自然演进的经济机制——“楔形市场进入”；逐步放松前提假设,指出制度变革与市场结构相匹配对多元化调整的重要性,提出了自然垄断产业“有效”市场结构多元化的概念及其四个基本判别准则；然后,基于博弈视角,分析了厂商的市场竞争策略对非自然垄断领域厂商数目调整的影响机理,指出为防止市场失灵带来的过度进入,政府仍不能放弃对自然垄断产业的市场进入规制。
第五章以电力产业市场化改革作为典型案例,对自然垄断产业的市场结构演进与变革进行分析。首先通过对比分析英国电力市场结构多元化改革成功的正面典型与美国加州电力市场结构重组失败的反面教训,研究了发达国家电力产业市场结构多元化的有效性与重组中的问题：其次,考察了中国电力产业的市场结构演进进程与市场结构多元化重塑改革,以经验数据为基础,对改革后的市场结构状况作出评判。
第六章对中国电力产业的市场结构多元化重塑改革作出评价。本章实证考察市场化改革后中国电力的产业发展状况、市场绩效,指出目前市场结构调整中的结构偏差与诸多制度错位。经过市场结构多元化塑造的中国电力产业获得了一定的发展,但其市场绩效的提高主要由生产规模的扩大和技术进步导致,而非由我们所期望的市场竞争程度提高所引致；中国电力产业市场结构调整过程中,存在“利益集团博弈陷阱”现象,导致社会公众的社会福利增进有限,大部分改革收益被电力产业集团所获得；市场化改革过程中,存在政府对市场的过分领导。在结合前文理论发展的基础上,本文认为,目前中国电力产业的市场结构重构只是在发电侧初步具备多元化的外部市场结构而尚未形成实质性有效竞争的“低效”市场结构多元化；最后,在以上分析的基础上,有针对性地提出今后中国电力实现“有效”市场结构多元化的相应政策建议。
第七章对文章进行了简要总结,并根据本文的研究不足,提出对该命题的未来研究展望。
Traditional economic theory suggests competition is not suitable for natural monopoly industry. However, Economic environment that the traditional natural monopoly industries faced has been changing because of the practical market demand expansion and technical progress. The classic natural monopolistic market structure has been gradually eroded; the practice of industrial development shows great possibility and demand of introducing competition in traditional natural monopoly industries. Since the 1970s, in order to introduce and intensify competition in these industries, competition-oriented reforms have taken place in developed countries. Diversified reconstruction of market structure becomes a popular trend in the reform of traditional natural monopoly industries. Taking the electric power industry as example, there are successful cases such as the reconstruction of market structure of electric power industry in British, and painful lessons such as the failed reform of electricity power market in California. Under the situation of this worldwide trend and the domestic market environment of institutional transformation of economic system, the market-oriented reform of traditional natural monopoly industries, such as the market of electricity power, telecom and railway, did or do conduct in China.
The diversified reconstruction of market structure becomes the preferred and main way in the worldwide market-oriented reform of natural monopoly industries, and its purpose is to improve the productive efficiency, allocation efficiency and social welfare by introducing mechanism into market. The formation and presentation of workable competition needs a well-structured and organized market. In this paper, we think that it's not the real and effective diversification of market structure, which just has the external structural form of diversified market competitors but without or be hard to produce expected competition, in the market-oriented reform of natural monopoly industries; in order to produce workable competition, the matching institutions adjustment should be implemented to act as the internal security of the external diversified market structure. What the market-oriented reform of natural monopoly industries pursuits is the workable diversification of market structure, which has combined the external market structure of diversified competitors with internal expected adaptive institution.
Taking the reconstruction of market structure in natural monopoly as the clue of this study, on the basis of the analysis on the termination of traditional natural monopolistic market structure and the possibility and rationality of diversified reconstruction, the paper have studied the evolution of market structure in natural monopoly industries and proposed a patter of wedge-shaped market entry, demonstrated the target of workable diversification of market structure in the market-oriented reform of natural monopoly industry and presented the importance of institutional change to market structure adjustment. Finally, combined the theoretical development with empirical study, taking the competition-oriented reform of electric power industry as a typical case, the paper has explored the successful experience and painful lessons from the reform of developed countries; and the paper has analyzed the evolution of electric power industry's market structure in China's competition-inducing reform, analyzed the development, market performance and the institutional dislocation in its diversified reconstruction. On this analysis and the former theoretical development, we have evaluated and judged the diversified reconstruction of electric power market in China.
According to the research ideas and clues above, the main contents of the paper are developing as follows:
Chapter one is the introduction of the paper. The research proposition has been firstly presented due to the development of the natural monopoly in practice. Then, in order to avoid the possible misunderstanding of the study, correlating concepts are meticulously re-defined and explained. Finally, the main ideas, research clues, research methods used, main contents, technical route and main innovations of the paper are briefly illuminated.
The second chapter has made a systematical review on the understanding and development of natural monopoly, the reform of natural monopoly industry and the issue on the evolution of its market structure in the theory of industrial organization. In this part, the paper has briefly summarized the literatures that have argued and debated the relationship between government regulation, the change of the structure of property right and competition in the development of natural monopoly industries. The research proposition of the study has been presented through the brief review and comment on the theory and literatures.
In chapter three, the paper has theoretically analyzed the reason of the existence of traditional natural monopolistic market structure, pointed out the drawbacks of the market. The unified market structure of natural monopoly industry can promote the social welfare but may cause the loss of it at the same time, which is called "unified paradox", namely that the unified traditional natural monopolistic market structure is unstable. Consequently, form two aspects of theory development and practical support, the paper has analyzed the possibility of the diversified reconstruction of market structure, clarified that the diversified reconstruction of market structure, as well as the end of traditional natural monopolistic market structure, is an inevitable trend and direction in the development of natural monopoly. Then, it has argued the rationality of the diversified reconstruction, described the possible ways of adjustment of its market structure and the five diversified patterns of the natural monopoly industries in the practice of OECD countries.
Form the firm's market entry caused by the change of economic environment, in the fourth chapter, the paper has firstly induced the economic mechanism of the adjustment of market structure of natural monopoly and its evolution of diversified reconstruction, namely the so-called "wedge-shaped market entry". Then, the hypotheses are gradually released, it has been pointed out that it's very important for the matching of internal institution with the external market structure to the diversified reconstruction of natural monopoly. Further, the concept of workable diversification of market structure and its four fundamental judgment criterions have been put forward in this part. Finally, form the perspective of gambling, the paper has analyzed the mechanism of strategy of market competition to the number of firms in contestable business of natural monopoly industry; in order to avoid the existence of excessive market competitors result from market failure, the government's regulation of entry into natural monopoly market can not be cancelled yet.
Taking the market-oriented reform of electric power industry as a typical case, chapter five has studied the evolution and reconstruction of market structure in monopoly industry. Firstly, the paper has explored the effectiveness and issues on institutional changes in diversified reconstruction of market structure of electric power industry in developed countries by comparing the successful experiences of the diversification in British with the painful failure of American reform in California. Secondly, the paper has described the evolutionary history of market-oriented reform of electricity power market and its diversified reconstruction of market structure in China, and judged its status and changes of market structure since the diversified reconstruction according to empirical analysis.
In chapter six, evaluation and judgment on the diversified reconstruction of market structure in China's electric power industry has been made. By empirical study on the development and market performance of China's electric power industry since its competition-oriented reform, the paper has presented that the bias of external market structure and the dislocation of internal institution are existing. China's electric power industry has made a certain degree of development since the reform of diversified reconstruction; however, the increased market performance mainly does not results from the expected market competition but expansion of the industry's scale and technical progress. There has the phenomenon of trap of interest group gambling in the diversified adjustment of market structure in China's electric power industry. As the weak interest group, consumers have obtained limited benefit in social welfare; most revenue of the market-oriented reform has been got by the producer which acts as the strong interest group in gambling. In the process of diversified reconstruction of market structure of China's electric power industry, government has led and controlled the market excessively. According the four fundamental judgment criterions presented in former theoretical development and on the basis of empirical analysis, the paper has concluded that the present competition-oriented reform of China's electric power industry is merely an inefficient or low-efficient diversification of market structure, which just initially established the external diversified competitor in the generate side of the whole electricity power market but without the expected substantial workable competition. Finally, based on the analysis above, corresponding proposals and recommendations have been put forward to achieve the goal of workable diversification of market structure in China's electric power industry.
As the conclusive part, chapter seven has made a brief review and summary of the whole research, and proposed the further study perspectives on this issue according to the research deficiency of this paper.
市场结构多元化重组是当今各国自然垄断产业市场化改革的首选方式,其目的是通过引入市场竞争机制来提高产业效率、配置效率与社会福利,而有效竞争的形成需要结构完善且有组织的市场。本文认为,仅具有多元厂商的市场结构外衣但不能或难以形成有效市场竞争的自然垄断产业市场结构变革不是真正的市场结构多元化,外在的结构需要内在的制度做保障。自然垄断产业的市场化改革追求的是外在结构上的多元主体与内在合意制度保证下的竞争相融合的多元化市场结构。
文章以自然垄断产业的市场结构调整作为研究主线,在分析自然垄断市场结构的终结以及多元化重构可能性与合理性的基础上,从理论角度分析自然垄断产业市场结构演进,提出了“楔形市场进入”的自然演进模式与路径,提出并论证了自然垄断产业市场化改革的“有效”市场结构多元化,指出了市场结构调整与制度变革配合的重要性。最后,将理论发展与实证研究相结合,以电力产业改革作为典型案例,在借鉴发达国家电力市场改革经验与教训的基础上,分析中国电力产业引入竞争的市场结构多元化演进轨迹,考察市场化改革后电力的产业发展状况、市场绩效及其存在制度错位的问题,对当前中国电力产业的市场结构多元化重塑改革作出评价。
根据以上研究思路,本文主要包含以下几部分内容：
第一章首先根据现实自然垄断产业发展提出了本文的研究命题；接下来,为避免可能的误解,对相关概念进行了界定；然后对本文的研究思路、方法、内容、技术路线以及主要创新点进行了简要说明。
第二章梳理了产业组织理论对自然垄断及自然垄断产业变革与市场结构演进问题的认识与发展,简要总结了自然垄断产业发展中政府规制、产权结构变革与竞争三者之间的关系及其重要性等问题的相关文献,通过对理论与文献的简要评述,引出本文所研究的问题。
第三章从理论上分析了传统自然垄断市场结构存在的理由,指出自然垄断产业的一元市场结构存在的弊端,自然垄断市场结构在促进社会福利最大化的同时,可能会引起社会福利的巨大损失,即存在“一元化悖论”,传统的自然垄断市场结构不稳定。接下来,从理论发展和现实支撑两方面分析了多元化市场结构出现的可能性,指出自然垄断市场结构的终结和多元市场经营主体重构是自然垄断产业发展的必然,论证了自然垄断产业市场结构多元化重构的合理性,描述了市场结构调整的可能途径以及OECD对自然垄断产业市场结构重组的五种模式。
第四章从经济条件变化引起的厂商市场进入出发,抽象出理想条件下自然垄断产业市场结构调整与多元化自然演进的经济机制——“楔形市场进入”；逐步放松前提假设,指出制度变革与市场结构相匹配对多元化调整的重要性,提出了自然垄断产业“有效”市场结构多元化的概念及其四个基本判别准则；然后,基于博弈视角,分析了厂商的市场竞争策略对非自然垄断领域厂商数目调整的影响机理,指出为防止市场失灵带来的过度进入,政府仍不能放弃对自然垄断产业的市场进入规制。
第五章以电力产业市场化改革作为典型案例,对自然垄断产业的市场结构演进与变革进行分析。首先通过对比分析英国电力市场结构多元化改革成功的正面典型与美国加州电力市场结构重组失败的反面教训,研究了发达国家电力产业市场结构多元化的有效性与重组中的问题：其次,考察了中国电力产业的市场结构演进进程与市场结构多元化重塑改革,以经验数据为基础,对改革后的市场结构状况作出评判。
第六章对中国电力产业的市场结构多元化重塑改革作出评价。本章实证考察市场化改革后中国电力的产业发展状况、市场绩效,指出目前市场结构调整中的结构偏差与诸多制度错位。经过市场结构多元化塑造的中国电力产业获得了一定的发展,但其市场绩效的提高主要由生产规模的扩大和技术进步导致,而非由我们所期望的市场竞争程度提高所引致；中国电力产业市场结构调整过程中,存在“利益集团博弈陷阱”现象,导致社会公众的社会福利增进有限,大部分改革收益被电力产业集团所获得；市场化改革过程中,存在政府对市场的过分领导。在结合前文理论发展的基础上,本文认为,目前中国电力产业的市场结构重构只是在发电侧初步具备多元化的外部市场结构而尚未形成实质性有效竞争的“低效”市场结构多元化；最后,在以上分析的基础上,有针对性地提出今后中国电力实现“有效”市场结构多元化的相应政策建议。
第七章对文章进行了简要总结,并根据本文的研究不足,提出对该命题的未来研究展望。
Traditional economic theory suggests competition is not suitable for natural monopoly industry. However, Economic environment that the traditional natural monopoly industries faced has been changing because of the practical market demand expansion and technical progress. The classic natural monopolistic market structure has been gradually eroded; the practice of industrial development shows great possibility and demand of introducing competition in traditional natural monopoly industries. Since the 1970s, in order to introduce and intensify competition in these industries, competition-oriented reforms have taken place in developed countries. Diversified reconstruction of market structure becomes a popular trend in the reform of traditional natural monopoly industries. Taking the electric power industry as example, there are successful cases such as the reconstruction of market structure of electric power industry in British, and painful lessons such as the failed reform of electricity power market in California. Under the situation of this worldwide trend and the domestic market environment of institutional transformation of economic system, the market-oriented reform of traditional natural monopoly industries, such as the market of electricity power, telecom and railway, did or do conduct in China.
The diversified reconstruction of market structure becomes the preferred and main way in the worldwide market-oriented reform of natural monopoly industries, and its purpose is to improve the productive efficiency, allocation efficiency and social welfare by introducing mechanism into market. The formation and presentation of workable competition needs a well-structured and organized market. In this paper, we think that it's not the real and effective diversification of market structure, which just has the external structural form of diversified market competitors but without or be hard to produce expected competition, in the market-oriented reform of natural monopoly industries; in order to produce workable competition, the matching institutions adjustment should be implemented to act as the internal security of the external diversified market structure. What the market-oriented reform of natural monopoly industries pursuits is the workable diversification of market structure, which has combined the external market structure of diversified competitors with internal expected adaptive institution.
Taking the reconstruction of market structure in natural monopoly as the clue of this study, on the basis of the analysis on the termination of traditional natural monopolistic market structure and the possibility and rationality of diversified reconstruction, the paper have studied the evolution of market structure in natural monopoly industries and proposed a patter of wedge-shaped market entry, demonstrated the target of workable diversification of market structure in the market-oriented reform of natural monopoly industry and presented the importance of institutional change to market structure adjustment. Finally, combined the theoretical development with empirical study, taking the competition-oriented reform of electric power industry as a typical case, the paper has explored the successful experience and painful lessons from the reform of developed countries; and the paper has analyzed the evolution of electric power industry's market structure in China's competition-inducing reform, analyzed the development, market performance and the institutional dislocation in its diversified reconstruction. On this analysis and the former theoretical development, we have evaluated and judged the diversified reconstruction of electric power market in China.
According to the research ideas and clues above, the main contents of the paper are developing as follows:
Chapter one is the introduction of the paper. The research proposition has been firstly presented due to the development of the natural monopoly in practice. Then, in order to avoid the possible misunderstanding of the study, correlating concepts are meticulously re-defined and explained. Finally, the main ideas, research clues, research methods used, main contents, technical route and main innovations of the paper are briefly illuminated.
The second chapter has made a systematical review on the understanding and development of natural monopoly, the reform of natural monopoly industry and the issue on the evolution of its market structure in the theory of industrial organization. In this part, the paper has briefly summarized the literatures that have argued and debated the relationship between government regulation, the change of the structure of property right and competition in the development of natural monopoly industries. The research proposition of the study has been presented through the brief review and comment on the theory and literatures.
In chapter three, the paper has theoretically analyzed the reason of the existence of traditional natural monopolistic market structure, pointed out the drawbacks of the market. The unified market structure of natural monopoly industry can promote the social welfare but may cause the loss of it at the same time, which is called "unified paradox", namely that the unified traditional natural monopolistic market structure is unstable. Consequently, form two aspects of theory development and practical support, the paper has analyzed the possibility of the diversified reconstruction of market structure, clarified that the diversified reconstruction of market structure, as well as the end of traditional natural monopolistic market structure, is an inevitable trend and direction in the development of natural monopoly. Then, it has argued the rationality of the diversified reconstruction, described the possible ways of adjustment of its market structure and the five diversified patterns of the natural monopoly industries in the practice of OECD countries.
Form the firm's market entry caused by the change of economic environment, in the fourth chapter, the paper has firstly induced the economic mechanism of the adjustment of market structure of natural monopoly and its evolution of diversified reconstruction, namely the so-called "wedge-shaped market entry". Then, the hypotheses are gradually released, it has been pointed out that it's very important for the matching of internal institution with the external market structure to the diversified reconstruction of natural monopoly. Further, the concept of workable diversification of market structure and its four fundamental judgment criterions have been put forward in this part. Finally, form the perspective of gambling, the paper has analyzed the mechanism of strategy of market competition to the number of firms in contestable business of natural monopoly industry; in order to avoid the existence of excessive market competitors result from market failure, the government's regulation of entry into natural monopoly market can not be cancelled yet.
Taking the market-oriented reform of electric power industry as a typical case, chapter five has studied the evolution and reconstruction of market structure in monopoly industry. Firstly, the paper has explored the effectiveness and issues on institutional changes in diversified reconstruction of market structure of electric power industry in developed countries by comparing the successful experiences of the diversification in British with the painful failure of American reform in California. Secondly, the paper has described the evolutionary history of market-oriented reform of electricity power market and its diversified reconstruction of market structure in China, and judged its status and changes of market structure since the diversified reconstruction according to empirical analysis.
In chapter six, evaluation and judgment on the diversified reconstruction of market structure in China's electric power industry has been made. By empirical study on the development and market performance of China's electric power industry since its competition-oriented reform, the paper has presented that the bias of external market structure and the dislocation of internal institution are existing. China's electric power industry has made a certain degree of development since the reform of diversified reconstruction; however, the increased market performance mainly does not results from the expected market competition but expansion of the industry's scale and technical progress. There has the phenomenon of trap of interest group gambling in the diversified adjustment of market structure in China's electric power industry. As the weak interest group, consumers have obtained limited benefit in social welfare; most revenue of the market-oriented reform has been got by the producer which acts as the strong interest group in gambling. In the process of diversified reconstruction of market structure of China's electric power industry, government has led and controlled the market excessively. According the four fundamental judgment criterions presented in former theoretical development and on the basis of empirical analysis, the paper has concluded that the present competition-oriented reform of China's electric power industry is merely an inefficient or low-efficient diversification of market structure, which just initially established the external diversified competitor in the generate side of the whole electricity power market but without the expected substantial workable competition. Finally, based on the analysis above, corresponding proposals and recommendations have been put forward to achieve the goal of workable diversification of market structure in China's electric power industry.
As the conclusive part, chapter seven has made a brief review and summary of the whole research, and proposed the further study perspectives on this issue according to the research deficiency of this paper.
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