微观经济干预：理论基础与制度边界
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摘要
在市场经济条件下，政府的经济职能包含创造和维护市场经济制度(即对相应的生产关系和生产方式进行干预)的一般职能、对宏观经济调控的职能和对微观经济干预的职能，而从公共经济政策角度看，在给定市场经济制度前提下，后两者则是政府职能的基本内容。不过在我国，经济学界关注得较多的是宏观经济调控，且通常对政府干预经济的两种不同方式不作任何区分，将政府所有的干预行为概括以“宏观调控”。
就微观经济干预而言，20世纪80年代以来，发达市场经济的政策实践发生了令人瞩目的重大变化：自然垄断行业及其规制政策的边界大大缩小；基础设施和公用事业领域出现了民营化和市场化的浪潮；由政府提供的纯公共物品的范围变得越来越小，政府提供公共物品的方式越来越多样化；对企业兼并和垄断问题的态度和政策也较以前宽容许多。总之，发达市场经济中出现了一个放松微观经济干预的大趋势。在我国经济体制转型过程中，一方面政府也逐渐退出一些微观经济领域，总体上按照市场化进程的基本逻辑逐步推进；但是另一方面，“加强宏观调控”在很多场合被政府(尤其是地方政府)部门滥用，并成为政府过度规制和任意干预的护身符，严重扰乱了市场秩序，妨碍了市场化改革的深入。在这一背景下，对微观经济干预问题进行深入的理论分析便显得非常必要。
众所周知，在主流的(新古典)经济学中，市场和政府是资源配置的两种基本的、对立的制度安排。一般认为，竞争性均衡模型基本上准确地描述了市场经济的运行，在此基础上，微观经济干预的领域是所谓的市场失灵的领域，即现实市场与资源配置的帕累托最优之间的“落差地带”。这样，市场失灵论就成为微观经济干预的理论基础。在主流经济学家看来，因为存在对帕累托最优或完全竞争状态的某种偏离，如存在垄断、公共物品、外部性或信息不对称等，就需要通过政府干预来矫正经济的无效率。所谓“完全竞争”理论及其所确立的理想的效率状态，似乎给判断现实市场的有效性提供了恰当的标准：如果现实的市场竞争不同于那个理想模式的话，则应依其程度不同，实施不同的政府干预措施。
这种方法存在很大的缺陷，它来自于作为其基础的竞争性均衡理论对市场所作的均衡论解释，而其根据现实经济生活与完全竞争模型的差距所得出的推论，在用作制定政策的指导时存在逻辑上的问题。在这一方面，由门格尔奠基并经米塞斯、哈耶克等发展起来的现代奥地利学派及其市场过程理论可以为我们分析和判断微观经济干预的合理性提供一个新的理
论视角。本文的主旨就是在对政府经济职能进行严格界分的基础上，借助
奥地利学派的市场过程理论和近30年来市场失灵理论的新发展来重新理
解市场及其运作，探讨政府硼经济干预的理论基础，运用新制度经济学、
菠进经济学、公共边触论等为毗经济干预提供一恻度铡，并对中
国经济转型翔间微观经济干预的若干问题进行分析。
论文分为五章，我所做的研究工作分别体现于：1、按照现代经济学
原理对政府经济职能进行明确的界分；将撤观经济干预细分为撤观规制、
公邯给政策和产业政策三种形式；详细地考察了政府经济职能之间的关
系；回顾了微观经济干预的正统理论，并指出其存在的基本缺陷。2、简
要介绍了现代奥地利经济学派的发展及其独特的方法论；归纳并总结了现
代奥地利学剜市场经济理解的核心思想：包括竞争性市场过程理论，现
代奥地利学顾垄断、产业组织和政府规制所作的独特理解；这为政府微”
观经济干预的理论分析提供了新的思想素材。3、重新考察了作为政府微
观经济干预基础的市场失灵理论；包括效率理论的新视角，重点论述了外
部性理论的新发展及其政策思路的拓宽，对传统公共物品理论的检验和批
评；上述内客中都包含现代奥地利学派在该领域的分析。4、从新制度经
济学的政府经济模型中引出政府微观经济于预的制度约束的必要性及三
。种基本的制度安排，其中包含了对现代经济学的新发展如契约经济学、政
刁 府竞争理论和宪法经济学的具体运用。5、运用上述理论分析和观察我国
经济体制转型过程中微观经济干预的一些具体问题，如对产业政策的理性
思考、公共物品提供机制的分析，政府垄断的具体表现和后果的剖析，对
其演变趋势进行了详纲的考察，并提出了具有新意的改革思路。
论文形成的研究结论和学术观点主要有以下8个方面：
＊）政府对微观经济干预的范围和程度取决于对市场和竞争的基本
理解：新古典经济学以理想中的完全竞争均衡模型来理解市场的运作，微
观经济干预的范围就是现实市场偏离完全竞争时存在的帕累托最优状态
的“区间、如果我们将市场和竞争看作是一个动态的（学习和发现）的
过程，那么就不可能得出这一结论。从?
The government economic functions in market economy could be distinguished into three forms named respectively after creating and preserving market economy institutions (interfering with certain production relations), macro-economic adjustment and micro-economic intervention, while from the perspective of public economic policy, they are mainly the latter two forms. In China, economic scholars pay more attention to macro-economic adjustment. They always lump together the latter two forms and generalize them just as macro-economic adjustment.
The practice of the micro-economic intervention in those developed market economy has taken place great changes since 1980s: the natural monopoly and its policy boundary are narrowed. There arose a privatization and commercialization wave in the infrastructure and public utilities. The scope of pure public goods provided by government becomes much more small and the patterns of public goods provision by government have been varied. The merger of firms and monopoly are treated more leniently. As a whole, there is a growing tendency to loosen micro-economic intervention. Following the basic logic of market-oriented reform, government has withdrew from some micro-economic areas during the economic transition in China, on the other hand, the slogan of "macro-economic adjustment should be strengthened" is being abused on many occasions and has become amulet of excessive regulation and unbounded intervention. Against this background, it is essential to make a theoretical analysis of the micro-economic intervention
issues.
In Neoclassical Economics, market and government are two basic opposite institutions of allocating resources. It is generally believed that Competitive Equilibrium Model describes definitely the operation of market economy and the fields of government micro-economic intervention are those of market failure, i.e. the 'gap zone' between real market and Pareto Optimality. The theory of market failure therefore turns into the theoretic foundation of micro-economic intervention. At those mainstream economists' points of view, since there exists some deviation from Pareto Optimality or complete competition, such as monopoly, public goods, externality or information
asymmetry, government intervention is needed to correct economic inefficiency. What is called Complete Competition Model (CCM) and the ideal state of efficiency established by it seem provide appropriate yardstick for judging real market efficiency: if real market competition diverges from that ideal state, then different measures of intervention are required according to its degree.
This land of technique has great defects, which arise from equilibrium interpretation of market by competitive equilibrium theory. The deductions from the disparity between real economic life and CCM have logic problems when they are used as guide of formulating economic policy. In this respect, modern Austrian economics school and their market process theory, which are founded by Menger and then developed by Mises and Hayek, could provide a new theoretic perspective for analyzing and justifying the micro-economic intervention. The gist of this dissertation is to reinterpret market and its operation with the aid of market process theory and the recent 30 years' development of market failure theory, to probe into the theoretic foundation of micro-economic intervention, to provide an institutional foundation for it by applying New-Institutional Economics, Evolutional Economics and Public Choice Theory, and to make analysis of some issues of micro-economic intervention in China's economic transition.
The dissertation is composed of 5 chapters. The author's research work are following: 1.distinguishing definitely the government economic functions in the light of principles of modern economics, dividing micro-economic intervention into government regulation, public provision policy and industrial policy, reviewing the orthodox theory of micro-economic intervention and demonstrating its defects. 2 introducing the developm
就微观经济干预而言，20世纪80年代以来，发达市场经济的政策实践发生了令人瞩目的重大变化：自然垄断行业及其规制政策的边界大大缩小；基础设施和公用事业领域出现了民营化和市场化的浪潮；由政府提供的纯公共物品的范围变得越来越小，政府提供公共物品的方式越来越多样化；对企业兼并和垄断问题的态度和政策也较以前宽容许多。总之，发达市场经济中出现了一个放松微观经济干预的大趋势。在我国经济体制转型过程中，一方面政府也逐渐退出一些微观经济领域，总体上按照市场化进程的基本逻辑逐步推进；但是另一方面，“加强宏观调控”在很多场合被政府(尤其是地方政府)部门滥用，并成为政府过度规制和任意干预的护身符，严重扰乱了市场秩序，妨碍了市场化改革的深入。在这一背景下，对微观经济干预问题进行深入的理论分析便显得非常必要。
众所周知，在主流的(新古典)经济学中，市场和政府是资源配置的两种基本的、对立的制度安排。一般认为，竞争性均衡模型基本上准确地描述了市场经济的运行，在此基础上，微观经济干预的领域是所谓的市场失灵的领域，即现实市场与资源配置的帕累托最优之间的“落差地带”。这样，市场失灵论就成为微观经济干预的理论基础。在主流经济学家看来，因为存在对帕累托最优或完全竞争状态的某种偏离，如存在垄断、公共物品、外部性或信息不对称等，就需要通过政府干预来矫正经济的无效率。所谓“完全竞争”理论及其所确立的理想的效率状态，似乎给判断现实市场的有效性提供了恰当的标准：如果现实的市场竞争不同于那个理想模式的话，则应依其程度不同，实施不同的政府干预措施。
这种方法存在很大的缺陷，它来自于作为其基础的竞争性均衡理论对市场所作的均衡论解释，而其根据现实经济生活与完全竞争模型的差距所得出的推论，在用作制定政策的指导时存在逻辑上的问题。在这一方面，由门格尔奠基并经米塞斯、哈耶克等发展起来的现代奥地利学派及其市场过程理论可以为我们分析和判断微观经济干预的合理性提供一个新的理
论视角。本文的主旨就是在对政府经济职能进行严格界分的基础上，借助
奥地利学派的市场过程理论和近30年来市场失灵理论的新发展来重新理
解市场及其运作，探讨政府硼经济干预的理论基础，运用新制度经济学、
菠进经济学、公共边触论等为毗经济干预提供一恻度铡，并对中
国经济转型翔间微观经济干预的若干问题进行分析。
论文分为五章，我所做的研究工作分别体现于：1、按照现代经济学
原理对政府经济职能进行明确的界分；将撤观经济干预细分为撤观规制、
公邯给政策和产业政策三种形式；详细地考察了政府经济职能之间的关
系；回顾了微观经济干预的正统理论，并指出其存在的基本缺陷。2、简
要介绍了现代奥地利经济学派的发展及其独特的方法论；归纳并总结了现
代奥地利学剜市场经济理解的核心思想：包括竞争性市场过程理论，现
代奥地利学顾垄断、产业组织和政府规制所作的独特理解；这为政府微”
观经济干预的理论分析提供了新的思想素材。3、重新考察了作为政府微
观经济干预基础的市场失灵理论；包括效率理论的新视角，重点论述了外
部性理论的新发展及其政策思路的拓宽，对传统公共物品理论的检验和批
评；上述内客中都包含现代奥地利学派在该领域的分析。4、从新制度经
济学的政府经济模型中引出政府微观经济于预的制度约束的必要性及三
。种基本的制度安排，其中包含了对现代经济学的新发展如契约经济学、政
刁 府竞争理论和宪法经济学的具体运用。5、运用上述理论分析和观察我国
经济体制转型过程中微观经济干预的一些具体问题，如对产业政策的理性
思考、公共物品提供机制的分析，政府垄断的具体表现和后果的剖析，对
其演变趋势进行了详纲的考察，并提出了具有新意的改革思路。
论文形成的研究结论和学术观点主要有以下8个方面：
＊）政府对微观经济干预的范围和程度取决于对市场和竞争的基本
理解：新古典经济学以理想中的完全竞争均衡模型来理解市场的运作，微
观经济干预的范围就是现实市场偏离完全竞争时存在的帕累托最优状态
的“区间、如果我们将市场和竞争看作是一个动态的（学习和发现）的
过程，那么就不可能得出这一结论。从?
The government economic functions in market economy could be distinguished into three forms named respectively after creating and preserving market economy institutions (interfering with certain production relations), macro-economic adjustment and micro-economic intervention, while from the perspective of public economic policy, they are mainly the latter two forms. In China, economic scholars pay more attention to macro-economic adjustment. They always lump together the latter two forms and generalize them just as macro-economic adjustment.
The practice of the micro-economic intervention in those developed market economy has taken place great changes since 1980s: the natural monopoly and its policy boundary are narrowed. There arose a privatization and commercialization wave in the infrastructure and public utilities. The scope of pure public goods provided by government becomes much more small and the patterns of public goods provision by government have been varied. The merger of firms and monopoly are treated more leniently. As a whole, there is a growing tendency to loosen micro-economic intervention. Following the basic logic of market-oriented reform, government has withdrew from some micro-economic areas during the economic transition in China, on the other hand, the slogan of "macro-economic adjustment should be strengthened" is being abused on many occasions and has become amulet of excessive regulation and unbounded intervention. Against this background, it is essential to make a theoretical analysis of the micro-economic intervention
issues.
In Neoclassical Economics, market and government are two basic opposite institutions of allocating resources. It is generally believed that Competitive Equilibrium Model describes definitely the operation of market economy and the fields of government micro-economic intervention are those of market failure, i.e. the 'gap zone' between real market and Pareto Optimality. The theory of market failure therefore turns into the theoretic foundation of micro-economic intervention. At those mainstream economists' points of view, since there exists some deviation from Pareto Optimality or complete competition, such as monopoly, public goods, externality or information
asymmetry, government intervention is needed to correct economic inefficiency. What is called Complete Competition Model (CCM) and the ideal state of efficiency established by it seem provide appropriate yardstick for judging real market efficiency: if real market competition diverges from that ideal state, then different measures of intervention are required according to its degree.
This land of technique has great defects, which arise from equilibrium interpretation of market by competitive equilibrium theory. The deductions from the disparity between real economic life and CCM have logic problems when they are used as guide of formulating economic policy. In this respect, modern Austrian economics school and their market process theory, which are founded by Menger and then developed by Mises and Hayek, could provide a new theoretic perspective for analyzing and justifying the micro-economic intervention. The gist of this dissertation is to reinterpret market and its operation with the aid of market process theory and the recent 30 years' development of market failure theory, to probe into the theoretic foundation of micro-economic intervention, to provide an institutional foundation for it by applying New-Institutional Economics, Evolutional Economics and Public Choice Theory, and to make analysis of some issues of micro-economic intervention in China's economic transition.
The dissertation is composed of 5 chapters. The author's research work are following: 1.distinguishing definitely the government economic functions in the light of principles of modern economics, dividing micro-economic intervention into government regulation, public provision policy and industrial policy, reviewing the orthodox theory of micro-economic intervention and demonstrating its defects. 2 introducing the developm
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34．刘云龙，2001：《民主机制与民主财政——政府间财政分工及分工方式》，中国城市出版社。
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36．刘志铭，2001b：“竞争性市场过程、产业组织与经济增长：奥地利经济学派的发展”，《南开经济研究》第4期。
37．刘志铭，2002：“经济思想成长中的自发秩序传统：从斯密、门格尔到哈耶克，”《东南学术》第1期。
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40．门格尔，2001：《国民经济学原理》，上海世纪出版集团、上海人民出版社。
41．缪勒，1999：《公共选择理论》，中国社会科学出版社。
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47．钱颖一，2000：“市场与法治，”《经济社会体制比较》第3期。
48．青木昌彦，2001：《比较制度分析》，上海远东出版社。
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