农产品流通渠道结构分析及其选择研究
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摘要
由于农产品质量存在差异,并且难以鉴别,不同质量的农产品可能选择不一样的流通渠道。近年来农产品质量安全事故频出,如何保障高质量的农产品更好地进入市场,并且被消费者识别购买,是具有现实意义的研究课题。本研究针对不同质量农产品流通渠道不同的现实问题,建立生产者、销售者以及消费者之间的博弈模型,考虑不同影响因素(如农产品质量、价格、政府调控)下三者的行为变化,最后得到了保障高质量农产品流通渠道畅通的措施。具体研究内容及成果如下：
(1)总结现有商品流通理论及农产品流通相关的研究成果,阐述了我国农业的发展现状以及农产品流通的特点,描绘了现有农产品流通渠道模式的结构。
(2)由于生产者与销售者之间的竞争合作关系,建立了两者之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,主要分析了生产者及销售者的规模、农产品质量、销售定价对零售商采购过程中流通渠道选择的影响。研究结果表明：大型生产者生产的农产品一般流向超市,小型生产者生产的农产品一般流向农贸市场；超市采购数量与消费需求成正比,但是采购质量与消费需求成反比；小型零售商趋向于选择高质量的农产品,大型超市趋向于选择低质量的农产品；对于同一零售商来说,采购高质量农产品的比例要低于低质量的农产品。
(3)以价格为质量高低的信号建立了销售者与消费者之间的信号传递博弈,分析不同销售商的质量信息传递差异对消费者购买过程中流通渠道选择的影响,得到消费者在不同传递信号下可能做出的消费决策。博弈分析结果表明,在均衡状态下,消费者愿意以较低价格在超市购买农产品；愿意以较高价格在农贸市场购买较高质量的农产品。所以,超市为压低成本会选择低质量农产品,农贸市场为留住顾客会选择高质量农产品,这也解释了低质量的产品往往会流向超市,高质量的农产品往往会流向农贸市场。
(4)考虑政府可以施加的政策变量,分别从税收和财政补贴的角度分析了销售者与生产者之间的交易行为。税收变量影响的是销售者的行为,即采购量及最终销售价格,补贴政策影响的是生产者的行为,即产量及生产投资成本。博弈结果表明当税收优惠或者财政补贴达到一定程度时,销售者对高质量农产品的最优采购量会大于低质量农产品,即更多的优质农产品将流入市场,促进农民养殖或种植优质农产品的积极性,提高了流通市场中农产品的整体质量,优化了农产品的流通渠道。
Agricultural products of different quality may choose different distribution channels due to the difficulties to identify their quality. With the high frequency of quality and safety accident, the research is practical to solve the problems about how to guarantee the high quality agricultural products to enter the market to be identified and purchased. Based on different quality agricultural products corresponding different circulation channels, Game models are established among the producer, seller and consumer. Different factors (such as the agricultural product quality, price, and government regulation) are considered in analyzing the gamers' behavioral changes. And finally the measures to provide smooth circulation channels for the high quality agricultural products are obtained. The research content and achievements are as follows:
(1) The current theoretical and circulation related researches of agricultural products are concluded to describe the current agricultural development situation and characteristics of agricultural products circulation, as well as the existing channel mode structure.
(2) Based on the competition and cooperation relationship between producers and sellers, the Stackelberg Game Model is established to analyze the influences of producer and seller scale, the agricultural products quality and pricing on circulation channel choice. The results show that the productions of large producers generally go to the supermarket, and small producers'generally flow to Farmers Markets. The quantity purchased by supermarket is direct proportion to consumer demand, while the quality is inversely proportion to consumer demand. Small retailers tend to choose high quality agricultural products, and large supermarkets tend to choose that of low quality. To the same retailer, the proportion of purchasing high quality agricultural products is lower than that of low quality.
(3) Signal transmission Game Model is established between sellers and consumers with price as the quality signal to analyze how the difference of quality information transmission affects the choice of circulation channels, and obtained how consumers make purchasing decisions in face of different transmission signals. The Game model analysis shows that in the equilibrium state, consumers are willing to purchase product in low price at the supermarket, while tend to pay high price for high-quality products at the Farmers'market. That is, supermarkets like to choose low-quality product in order to save cost, while the Farmer's markets opt to sell high-quality product in order to maintain consumer loyalty. Thus, high-quality products generally go to Farmers'Market and the low-quality product mostly go to supermarkets.
(4) The transactions behavior between sellers and producer is analyzed based on the governmental policy variables, including Taxation variable and Subsidy variable. Taxation variable mainly influence the consumers'behaviors, that is, purchasing amount and ultimate selling price. Subsidy variable affects the producers'behaviors, that is, production and investment costs. The Game Theory results show that when the tax incentives and financial subsidy reaches a certain degree, the optimal purchases quantity of high-quality products are larger than that of low-quality products. It means that more high-quality products will flux into markets, so accordingly farmers are encouraged to make high-quality products. In more abstract aspect, the quality of the products in the circulation market is improved and the circulation channel of products is optimized.
(1)总结现有商品流通理论及农产品流通相关的研究成果,阐述了我国农业的发展现状以及农产品流通的特点,描绘了现有农产品流通渠道模式的结构。
(2)由于生产者与销售者之间的竞争合作关系,建立了两者之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,主要分析了生产者及销售者的规模、农产品质量、销售定价对零售商采购过程中流通渠道选择的影响。研究结果表明：大型生产者生产的农产品一般流向超市,小型生产者生产的农产品一般流向农贸市场；超市采购数量与消费需求成正比,但是采购质量与消费需求成反比；小型零售商趋向于选择高质量的农产品,大型超市趋向于选择低质量的农产品；对于同一零售商来说,采购高质量农产品的比例要低于低质量的农产品。
(3)以价格为质量高低的信号建立了销售者与消费者之间的信号传递博弈,分析不同销售商的质量信息传递差异对消费者购买过程中流通渠道选择的影响,得到消费者在不同传递信号下可能做出的消费决策。博弈分析结果表明,在均衡状态下,消费者愿意以较低价格在超市购买农产品；愿意以较高价格在农贸市场购买较高质量的农产品。所以,超市为压低成本会选择低质量农产品,农贸市场为留住顾客会选择高质量农产品,这也解释了低质量的产品往往会流向超市,高质量的农产品往往会流向农贸市场。
(4)考虑政府可以施加的政策变量,分别从税收和财政补贴的角度分析了销售者与生产者之间的交易行为。税收变量影响的是销售者的行为,即采购量及最终销售价格,补贴政策影响的是生产者的行为,即产量及生产投资成本。博弈结果表明当税收优惠或者财政补贴达到一定程度时,销售者对高质量农产品的最优采购量会大于低质量农产品,即更多的优质农产品将流入市场,促进农民养殖或种植优质农产品的积极性,提高了流通市场中农产品的整体质量,优化了农产品的流通渠道。
Agricultural products of different quality may choose different distribution channels due to the difficulties to identify their quality. With the high frequency of quality and safety accident, the research is practical to solve the problems about how to guarantee the high quality agricultural products to enter the market to be identified and purchased. Based on different quality agricultural products corresponding different circulation channels, Game models are established among the producer, seller and consumer. Different factors (such as the agricultural product quality, price, and government regulation) are considered in analyzing the gamers' behavioral changes. And finally the measures to provide smooth circulation channels for the high quality agricultural products are obtained. The research content and achievements are as follows:
(1) The current theoretical and circulation related researches of agricultural products are concluded to describe the current agricultural development situation and characteristics of agricultural products circulation, as well as the existing channel mode structure.
(2) Based on the competition and cooperation relationship between producers and sellers, the Stackelberg Game Model is established to analyze the influences of producer and seller scale, the agricultural products quality and pricing on circulation channel choice. The results show that the productions of large producers generally go to the supermarket, and small producers'generally flow to Farmers Markets. The quantity purchased by supermarket is direct proportion to consumer demand, while the quality is inversely proportion to consumer demand. Small retailers tend to choose high quality agricultural products, and large supermarkets tend to choose that of low quality. To the same retailer, the proportion of purchasing high quality agricultural products is lower than that of low quality.
(3) Signal transmission Game Model is established between sellers and consumers with price as the quality signal to analyze how the difference of quality information transmission affects the choice of circulation channels, and obtained how consumers make purchasing decisions in face of different transmission signals. The Game model analysis shows that in the equilibrium state, consumers are willing to purchase product in low price at the supermarket, while tend to pay high price for high-quality products at the Farmers'market. That is, supermarkets like to choose low-quality product in order to save cost, while the Farmer's markets opt to sell high-quality product in order to maintain consumer loyalty. Thus, high-quality products generally go to Farmers'Market and the low-quality product mostly go to supermarkets.
(4) The transactions behavior between sellers and producer is analyzed based on the governmental policy variables, including Taxation variable and Subsidy variable. Taxation variable mainly influence the consumers'behaviors, that is, purchasing amount and ultimate selling price. Subsidy variable affects the producers'behaviors, that is, production and investment costs. The Game Theory results show that when the tax incentives and financial subsidy reaches a certain degree, the optimal purchases quantity of high-quality products are larger than that of low-quality products. It means that more high-quality products will flux into markets, so accordingly farmers are encouraged to make high-quality products. In more abstract aspect, the quality of the products in the circulation market is improved and the circulation channel of products is optimized.
引文
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