我国电力企业环境污染的监管分析及对策研究
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摘要
电力工业作为能源部门之一,对整个国民经济发展所起的基础支撑作用是巨大的。改革开放极大地推动了我国电力工业的发展,电力工业也取得了令人瞩目的成就。但电力工业在不断发展的同时,也带来了一系列的环境问题。作为环境污染最大的行业之一,我国的电力工业近几年来排放的二氧化硫约占全国的50%,产生的废水、废气、废渣对我国环境的破坏非常严重。
然而,环境问题在市场机制调节作用下并不能得到有效解决,这是因为市场机制的顺利运行需要一些条件:如产权明晰、完全竞争、无外部性等,但这些条件往往不能得到满足,因此产生了市场失灵问题。市场失灵的存在为政府干预提供了理由。但政府干预也难免出现政府失灵的问题,由于市场失灵和政府失灵的存在,为公众参与提供了机会。公众作为环境利益的相关者积极参与环境管理,可以降低社会管理成本,也有助于减少因市场失灵和政府失灵所造成的环境资源损失。因此,在借鉴国内外相关研究的基础上,本文针对导致我国环境污染的主要原因之一的电力企业污染排放,对电力工业的污染现状进行分析,指出电力工业环境污染的严峻形势及其对社会经济造成的影响;从理论角度分析了电力企业污染行为的本质,揭示市场失灵的必然性;构建政府和电力企业、公众和电力企业的博弈模型,分析了政府监管、公众参与对电力企业污染行为的影响;最后,提出建立“三位一体”的电力环境管理模式的政策建议。本文的主要内容有以下几部分:
第一章,绪论。提出本文的研究背景和研究问题;回顾与评述与本文相关的文献,指出现有国内外研究中存在的不足,明确本研究的目的和意义;阐述本文的基本框架和主要内容。
第二章,理论基础。通过对市场失灵理论、政府环境监管和政府失灵理论、公众参与理论的探讨,为分析电力企业污染行为及政府监管、公众参与与电力企业污染的博弈分析奠定理论基础。
第三章,电力工业污染现状及其影响。通过对我国发电结构、发电技术的环境影响及电力工业污染现状和影响的分析,指出电力企业污染行为对环境构成了巨大压力及其对社会经济发展的影响。
第四章,电力企业污染行为产生的理论分析。构建电力企业在个体理论支配下的环境资源需求和供给的博弈分析框架,从理论上分析电力企业污染行为的本质,揭示电力企业对环境资源需求过度而供给不足的现象是“个体行为理性”下导致的“集体行为非理性”的必然结果。
第五章,电力企业环境污染的监管博弈分析。采用博弈论分析方法和图解法从理论上分析政府监管和公众参与对电力企业污染行为的影响。同时,针对政府监管乏力和公众参与程度较低的原因做了分析。
第六章,加强我国电力工业环境管理的政策建议。在前面研究内容的基础上,提出建立以政府监管为主导、公众参与相协助、电力企业相配合的“三位一体”环境管理模式的政策建议,并对环境管理的实施提出了具体的对策。
第七章,结论及研究展望。对本文进行了总结,指出本文的主要研究结论以及可能的创新,并就本文中的不足和研究展望做了说明。
本论文的研究无论在学术理论还是政策实践方面,都具有研究价值。从学术研究而言,电力市场化改革进程中的环境监管问题不仅是一个世界范围的改革浪潮,也是理论上研究的一个热点,在我国更是一个亟待解决的课题。从使用意义来说,电力工业造成的污染已成为我国环境污染的主要来源之一,能否有效控制电力工业的污染关系到我国“十一五”规划中的环保目标能否实现,本文也极具价值。
As one of energy sectors, the power industry plays basic and important role in the development of the national economy. The reform and opening-up promoted the power industry’s development enormously, and the power industry also achieves the amazing achievement. But at the same time, the power industry has brought a series of environmental problems. As one of the most serious pollution industries, the power industry discharges about 50% of the national sulfur dioxide, waste water, exhaust gas and waste residue which were produced by power plants have caused severe destroy.
However, environmental problems can't be solved effectively by market adjustment. Because the conditions that successful run of market mechanism need such as property rights distinction, perfect competition, nonexistence of externality and so on, but these conditions often cannot obtain satisfy, therefore results in the market failure. The existence of market failure makes adjustment of government mechanism necessary, but government may fail in correcting market failure even makes market mechanism more distorted. Because of the existence of market and government failure, participation of public who have correlation with environmental problem is helpful. Public participation reduces not only cost of social management but also environmental loss from market and government failure. So, based on the relative researches of Chinese and foreign, this paper analyses the power industry's pollution present situation, points out the austere situation of power industry environmental pollution and negative effect of power industry pollution on sustainable development of society and economy by aiming at that emission of power industry pollution is the main one of environmental pollution in our country. It analyzes theoretically the essence of power plants’pollution behavior and discloses the inevitability of market failure. It also constructs the game model between government and power plants, public and power plants, analyzes the effect of government environmental regulation and public participation on power plants’pollution behavior. At last, it puts forward the suggestion of power environmental management model called trinity. The paper is composed with seven chapters. The major contents of each part are as follows:
Chapter one, introduction. It raises the issue and meaning of the study, reviews and comments literatures relates to this research, points out the shortcoming of existing researches, definitudes the purpose and meaning of this research, expatiates base frame and major contents.
Chapter two, theoretical base. It establishes the theoretical base for effect analysis of government environmental regulation and public participation on by discussing theories of market failure, government regulation and government failure, public participation.
Chapter three, situation and effect of power industry pollution. It analyzes great pressure on environmental and the effect on sustainable development of society and economy from power industry by reviewing the situation of generation structure and power plants pollution.
Chapter four, theoretical analysis to the emergence of power plant pollution’s behavior. It establishes game theoretical frame of demand and supply of power plant environmental resource based on individual rationality, analyses the essence of power plant pollution behavior, and discloses excessive demand and insufficient supply to environmental resource as individual rationality resulting in collective non-rationality.
Chapter five, the game analysis to the power plant environmental pollution’s regulation. This paper analyzes theoretically on the effects of government environmental regulation and public participation on power plants environmental behavior by using game theory and graphic method. At the same time, it discusses the reasons why government environmental regulation is weak and public participation is low.
Chapter six, policy suggestion of improving power environmental management in our country. It puts forward to establish the model of power environmental management called trinity. This model is composed of lead of government environmental regulation, assistance of public participation and cooperation of power plants environmental management. It also provides some countermeasures for enforcement of trinity environmental management.
Chapter seven, conclusion and research forecast. It points out the main conclusion of the paper and the possible innovation, and gives showing on insufficiency and the research forecast in the article.
This paper's research has very big research value, including in academic theoretically value and practice value. In the sphere of academic, the environment regulation and reform of power market is a hot spot which theoretically studies. It also is the topic which our country urgently needs to solve in these days. In the practical significance, the environment regulation of power market is a very important condition to finish the "11th five-year plan", so the research also has very great value.
然而,环境问题在市场机制调节作用下并不能得到有效解决,这是因为市场机制的顺利运行需要一些条件:如产权明晰、完全竞争、无外部性等,但这些条件往往不能得到满足,因此产生了市场失灵问题。市场失灵的存在为政府干预提供了理由。但政府干预也难免出现政府失灵的问题,由于市场失灵和政府失灵的存在,为公众参与提供了机会。公众作为环境利益的相关者积极参与环境管理,可以降低社会管理成本,也有助于减少因市场失灵和政府失灵所造成的环境资源损失。因此,在借鉴国内外相关研究的基础上,本文针对导致我国环境污染的主要原因之一的电力企业污染排放,对电力工业的污染现状进行分析,指出电力工业环境污染的严峻形势及其对社会经济造成的影响;从理论角度分析了电力企业污染行为的本质,揭示市场失灵的必然性;构建政府和电力企业、公众和电力企业的博弈模型,分析了政府监管、公众参与对电力企业污染行为的影响;最后,提出建立“三位一体”的电力环境管理模式的政策建议。本文的主要内容有以下几部分:
第一章,绪论。提出本文的研究背景和研究问题;回顾与评述与本文相关的文献,指出现有国内外研究中存在的不足,明确本研究的目的和意义;阐述本文的基本框架和主要内容。
第二章,理论基础。通过对市场失灵理论、政府环境监管和政府失灵理论、公众参与理论的探讨,为分析电力企业污染行为及政府监管、公众参与与电力企业污染的博弈分析奠定理论基础。
第三章,电力工业污染现状及其影响。通过对我国发电结构、发电技术的环境影响及电力工业污染现状和影响的分析,指出电力企业污染行为对环境构成了巨大压力及其对社会经济发展的影响。
第四章,电力企业污染行为产生的理论分析。构建电力企业在个体理论支配下的环境资源需求和供给的博弈分析框架,从理论上分析电力企业污染行为的本质,揭示电力企业对环境资源需求过度而供给不足的现象是“个体行为理性”下导致的“集体行为非理性”的必然结果。
第五章,电力企业环境污染的监管博弈分析。采用博弈论分析方法和图解法从理论上分析政府监管和公众参与对电力企业污染行为的影响。同时,针对政府监管乏力和公众参与程度较低的原因做了分析。
第六章,加强我国电力工业环境管理的政策建议。在前面研究内容的基础上,提出建立以政府监管为主导、公众参与相协助、电力企业相配合的“三位一体”环境管理模式的政策建议,并对环境管理的实施提出了具体的对策。
第七章,结论及研究展望。对本文进行了总结,指出本文的主要研究结论以及可能的创新,并就本文中的不足和研究展望做了说明。
本论文的研究无论在学术理论还是政策实践方面,都具有研究价值。从学术研究而言,电力市场化改革进程中的环境监管问题不仅是一个世界范围的改革浪潮,也是理论上研究的一个热点,在我国更是一个亟待解决的课题。从使用意义来说,电力工业造成的污染已成为我国环境污染的主要来源之一,能否有效控制电力工业的污染关系到我国“十一五”规划中的环保目标能否实现,本文也极具价值。
As one of energy sectors, the power industry plays basic and important role in the development of the national economy. The reform and opening-up promoted the power industry’s development enormously, and the power industry also achieves the amazing achievement. But at the same time, the power industry has brought a series of environmental problems. As one of the most serious pollution industries, the power industry discharges about 50% of the national sulfur dioxide, waste water, exhaust gas and waste residue which were produced by power plants have caused severe destroy.
However, environmental problems can't be solved effectively by market adjustment. Because the conditions that successful run of market mechanism need such as property rights distinction, perfect competition, nonexistence of externality and so on, but these conditions often cannot obtain satisfy, therefore results in the market failure. The existence of market failure makes adjustment of government mechanism necessary, but government may fail in correcting market failure even makes market mechanism more distorted. Because of the existence of market and government failure, participation of public who have correlation with environmental problem is helpful. Public participation reduces not only cost of social management but also environmental loss from market and government failure. So, based on the relative researches of Chinese and foreign, this paper analyses the power industry's pollution present situation, points out the austere situation of power industry environmental pollution and negative effect of power industry pollution on sustainable development of society and economy by aiming at that emission of power industry pollution is the main one of environmental pollution in our country. It analyzes theoretically the essence of power plants’pollution behavior and discloses the inevitability of market failure. It also constructs the game model between government and power plants, public and power plants, analyzes the effect of government environmental regulation and public participation on power plants’pollution behavior. At last, it puts forward the suggestion of power environmental management model called trinity. The paper is composed with seven chapters. The major contents of each part are as follows:
Chapter one, introduction. It raises the issue and meaning of the study, reviews and comments literatures relates to this research, points out the shortcoming of existing researches, definitudes the purpose and meaning of this research, expatiates base frame and major contents.
Chapter two, theoretical base. It establishes the theoretical base for effect analysis of government environmental regulation and public participation on by discussing theories of market failure, government regulation and government failure, public participation.
Chapter three, situation and effect of power industry pollution. It analyzes great pressure on environmental and the effect on sustainable development of society and economy from power industry by reviewing the situation of generation structure and power plants pollution.
Chapter four, theoretical analysis to the emergence of power plant pollution’s behavior. It establishes game theoretical frame of demand and supply of power plant environmental resource based on individual rationality, analyses the essence of power plant pollution behavior, and discloses excessive demand and insufficient supply to environmental resource as individual rationality resulting in collective non-rationality.
Chapter five, the game analysis to the power plant environmental pollution’s regulation. This paper analyzes theoretically on the effects of government environmental regulation and public participation on power plants environmental behavior by using game theory and graphic method. At the same time, it discusses the reasons why government environmental regulation is weak and public participation is low.
Chapter six, policy suggestion of improving power environmental management in our country. It puts forward to establish the model of power environmental management called trinity. This model is composed of lead of government environmental regulation, assistance of public participation and cooperation of power plants environmental management. It also provides some countermeasures for enforcement of trinity environmental management.
Chapter seven, conclusion and research forecast. It points out the main conclusion of the paper and the possible innovation, and gives showing on insufficiency and the research forecast in the article.
This paper's research has very big research value, including in academic theoretically value and practice value. In the sphere of academic, the environment regulation and reform of power market is a hot spot which theoretically studies. It also is the topic which our country urgently needs to solve in these days. In the practical significance, the environment regulation of power market is a very important condition to finish the "11th five-year plan", so the research also has very great value.
引文
①数据来自中国电力网: http://www.chinapower.com.cn/article/1014/art1014426.asp
②数据来自中国网: http://www.china.com.cn/news/txt/2007-03/19/content_7980382.htm
③本文的电力企业主要指发电企业,包括火电、水电、核电等。
①薛联芳.中国电力工业可持续发展与环境保护[J].中国水电, 2000, 1: 6-9.
②该数据引自《中国能源规划的环境影响评估和管理政策研究》(2004)
①施仲齐,方栋,云桂春.核电站的环境影响[J].北京:水利电力出版社, 1984.
①吴运东.风力发电厂对未来环境的影响[J].能源工程, 1999, 6: 23-24
①在我国的发电结构中,火力发电占有很大的比重,况且火力发电造成的环境污染更为严重和明显,因此,这里主要讨论火力发电的污染影响。
②数据来源:国家电监会《电力监管年度报告(2006)》。
①参见中国绿色时报:http://www.greentimes.com/News/lm_105/53196.asp
②徐冠华.全国科技工作会议上的讲话[C].2004年2月20日.
①数据来自中国公众环保民生指数2005年度报告:http://www.horizonkey.com/index.asp.
②公众环境权利是指公众为维护公共环境毅力不受损害而独立的行使的、对其他任何单位、个人污染和破坏环境的行为以及环境行政权在运作过程中的懈怠行为进行监督和制约的权利。具体解释见朱谦:论环境保护中的权利和权利的配置.2001年武汉大学环境法研究所基地会议论文集[C].http://www.riel.whu.edu.cn/show.asp?ID=628.
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②数据来自中国网: http://www.china.com.cn/news/txt/2007-03/19/content_7980382.htm
③本文的电力企业主要指发电企业,包括火电、水电、核电等。
①薛联芳.中国电力工业可持续发展与环境保护[J].中国水电, 2000, 1: 6-9.
②该数据引自《中国能源规划的环境影响评估和管理政策研究》(2004)
①施仲齐,方栋,云桂春.核电站的环境影响[J].北京:水利电力出版社, 1984.
①吴运东.风力发电厂对未来环境的影响[J].能源工程, 1999, 6: 23-24
①在我国的发电结构中,火力发电占有很大的比重,况且火力发电造成的环境污染更为严重和明显,因此,这里主要讨论火力发电的污染影响。
②数据来源:国家电监会《电力监管年度报告(2006)》。
①参见中国绿色时报:http://www.greentimes.com/News/lm_105/53196.asp
②徐冠华.全国科技工作会议上的讲话[C].2004年2月20日.
①数据来自中国公众环保民生指数2005年度报告:http://www.horizonkey.com/index.asp.
②公众环境权利是指公众为维护公共环境毅力不受损害而独立的行使的、对其他任何单位、个人污染和破坏环境的行为以及环境行政权在运作过程中的懈怠行为进行监督和制约的权利。具体解释见朱谦:论环境保护中的权利和权利的配置.2001年武汉大学环境法研究所基地会议论文集[C].http://www.riel.whu.edu.cn/show.asp?ID=628.
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