基于终极控制人视角的公司并购绩效研究
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摘要
公司并购是企业优化股权结构、推进资源优化配置的重要经营活动，所以受到世界各国学者们的关注，而有关并购绩效的研究则成为他们关注的焦点。在过去的30多年里，各国学者对并购绩效问题进行了大量研究，他们一致发现，在并购过程中，被收购公司的股东获得了显著为正的超额收益，而收购公司的收益最多是中性，更大可能是财富损失。西方学者最早是从外部股东和内部管理者之间的代理冲突角度来解释这一问题的。但到了20世纪90年代，人们发现，在世界上大部分国家和地区，股权集中才是公司股权结构的主导形态。股权集中一方面使得控股股东有强烈的动机和能力对经理人的利己行为实施监督，另一方面由于控股股东的现金流权和控制权发生严重背离，他们凭借其控制权侵占公司的资源来获取的控制权私人收益，而并购活动也就可能成为控股股东剥削中小股东的一个利益输送工具。尤其是在投资者法律保护较弱的国家，这种现象更加严重。这无疑为中国上市公司并购绩效的研究提供了一个新视角。
由于历史的原因，我国上市公司股权结构高度集中，终极控制人与中小股东的利益冲突表现尤为突出，而且我国普遍存在对中小股东保护的缺失，相关法律体系很不完善。所以，终极控制人控制权私人收益广泛存在。另外，我国上市公司大部分是国有企业改制而来的，国有股权在上市公司中占据了很大比例，同时也有许多的民营企业发展壮大并成功上市，所以从终极控制人的产权性质划分，我国上市公司可分为政府控制与非政府控制两类；政府控制公司按行政级别划分，又可分为中央政府控制与地方政府控制两种类型；按终极控制人控制权的行权方式不同，又可以分为直接的水平结构控制和间接的金字塔结构控制。这些足以说明我国上市公司终极控制的制度及治理结构状况与西方国家的情况有很大的差异。
我国资本市场是一个新兴市场，同时其发展又根植于经济转轨当中，各个地区之间的市场化程度存在很大差异。由于外部市场环境是公司治理体系中的重要组成部分，它会对终极控制人产生影响并进而影响公司并购绩效。因此，我们从终极控制人的视角研究公司并购绩效问题时，还必须结合上市公司所处的治理环境进行分析。
基于以上的制度背景和我国的实践需要，本文借鉴国内外已有研究成果，利用相关上市公司的公开数据，从终极控制人的角度对我国上市公司并购绩效的问题进行了分析和检验。最终形成的主要研究结论与启示如下：
第一，我国大部分的收购公司在发生并购后的1-2年内长期市场绩效都有所下降，总体来说并购给收购公司的股东带来了财富损失；终极控制人的现金流权具有“激励效应”，但随着两权分离程度增大，终极控制人通过并购投资攫取中小股东的行为越严重，并购绩效也就越差，而且这种现象在高自由现金流和低成长性已经非政府控制的上市公司更加显著。所以应大力促进我国特殊背景下的终极控制人攫取行为约束机制的建立。
第二，政府控制的上市公司，尤其是地方政府控制的上市公司存在着因政府干预而导致的无效并购行为；金字塔结构能够抑制政府干预对并购绩效的负面影响，这种作用也在地方政府控制的企业中表现的更加明显；但相同的证据在中央政府控制与非政府控制的公司里没有找到。
第三，终极控制人的现金流权与控制权的分离程度越大，公司越容易进行多元化并购，进一步还发现多元化并购的绩效明显低于同业并购的绩效，并且这种现象在非政府控制的公司更明显；地方政府控制的公司更趋向于同区域并购，而且同区域并购的绩效也低于异地并购。所以应更多的关注股权结构偏离度较大的公司，同时积极优化企业产权结构，打破地区经济的封锁，有效防止地方政府在公司并购中的过度干预，最大限度促进并购的市场化运
第四，市场化进程与公司并购绩效正相关，而市场化环境的改善缓解了终极控制人与中小股东的代理冲突，从而抑制两权分离对公司并购绩效带来的负面影响；终极控制人的政府控制属性会弱化市场化进程对公司并购绩效的治理效应，这在地方政府控制的上市公司表现更加明显；以地方政府为终极控制人的公司，金字塔层级与公司并购绩效正相关，但随着市场化进程的推进，金字塔层级的这种保护效用会减弱。因此，在通过公司内部治理机制，协调终极控制人与中小股东利益的同时，还应积极推进各地区市场化进程，强化中小投资者的法律保护力度，切实为企业营造一个规范、公平的竞争环境。
As an important link for optimizing equity structure and promoting the optimal allocation ofstock assets, company mergers and acquisitions has been the important topic which the world scholarsdiscuss and research, and studies of M&A performance is one of important content in the study ofmergers and acquisitions. Over the past30years, scholars all over the world made a lot of research onM&A performance, and achieved a consensus that in the process of M&A, the shareholders of targetcompanies have significantly positive excess return, and most acquiring companies’ benefit is neutral,the worse may be loss. The western scholars explained this problem from outside agency conflictbetween shareholders and the inside managers. But in the1990s, people found that different with thediffuse ownership of British and American countries, equity concentration is the dominant form ofownership structure in most of the countries and regions in the world. On the one hand, equityconcentration makes controlling shareholders have strong motivation and ability to supervisemanagers' self-interest behavior, on the other hand, due to the serious deviate from the cash flow rightand control, the controlling shareholders encroach on the company's resources to obtain privatebenefits of control with its control rights, and merger and acquisition activity also can become atransportation tool for the controlling shareholder to exploit the small shareholders. Especially in thecountries where the legal protection of investors is weaker, this kind of phenomenon is more serious.No doubt this provides a new perspective for the research of China's listed companies’ M&Aperformance.
Due to historical reasons, the equity structure of listed companies in our country is highlycentralized, and the interests conflict between the ultimate controlling shareholders and minorityshareholders is particularly prominent in the listed companies in our country, and the widespread lackof protection for minority shareholders, the relevant legal system is not perfect. So, the ultimatecontrolling shareholders’ private benefit of control is widespread. In addition, the purpose ofestablishing securities market in China is to serve the reform of state-owned enterprises, thestate-owned companies is a large share in listed companies occupy, also there are many privateenterprises successful listing through various channels, so from the properties of property rights of theultimate control, the listed companies in China can be divided into two categories, the governmentand non-governmental control, and according to the government administrative level of the control,the companies controlled by government and can be divided into the companies controlled by thecentral government and companies controlled by the local government; According to the ultimatecontrol of the control way of exercise, and can be divided into direct control of horizontal structureand indirect pyramid structure. These enough to show that the system of ultimate control and the governance structure of listed companies in China have very big difference from the westerncountries.
Capital market of China is an emerging market, at the same time, its development is rooted inthe economic transition, and the marketization process is not balanced between the various regions,Fan et al.,2012). Due to the external market environment is an important part of corporate governancesystem, it will affect the ultimate controlling shareholders, in turn, affect the company merger andacquisition performance. Therefore, we must combined with the governance environment of listedcompany, when we study the problem of company mergers and acquisitions performance from theangle of ultimate controlling shareholders.
Based on the above system background and the need of practice in our country, this article makesreference to existing research results at home and abroad, using the public data of relevant listedcompany, from the angle of ultimate controlling shareholders to analyze and test the performance ofmergers and acquisitions of listed companies in China. Eventually form the main research conclusionand enlightenment as follows:
First, the acquisition of most of the company after the merger in1-2years had fallen to long-termmarket performance, overall M&A brings to the acquired company's shareholders wealth loss;Ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash flow right has a "incentive effect", but as the two rightsseparation degree increases, the ultimate controlling shareholders’ behavior of exploit minorityshareholders by a merger and acquisition investment is more serious, also the mergers andacquisitions performance is bad, and this kind of phenomenon is even more significant in the high freecash flow and low growth non-state-run listed companies. So we should vigorously promote ourcountry to establish behavior restraint mechanism under the special background of the ultimatecontrolling shareholders in this paper.
Second, the government control companies, especially local government control companies existineffective merger behavior which cause by government intervention; Pyramid can restrain thenegative impact of government intervention on M&A performance, and this effect is also moreobvious in the companies local government control, and there is no evidence that governmentintervention affect M&A performance in companies controlled by the central government andnon-governmental control, thus the pyramids protection effect is not obvious. We should furtheraccelerate the separation of government and enterprises, reduce the government's intervention oncorporate behavior, and constantly improve the degree of legal protection for investors.
Third, the greater the ultimate controlling shareholders’ separation degree of cash flow right andcontrol, the company are more likely to make diversification M&A, further diversification M&Aperformance was found to significantly lower than the trade performance of M&A, and this kind ofphenomenon in non-governmental control company is more obvious; Tend to local government control of the company with regional mergers and acquisitions, and city of M&A performance islower than the foreign mergers and acquisitions. So we should pay more attention to larger degree ofequity structure deviation, so as to improve the efficiency of supervision, and actively improve thestructure of enterprise property rights, break the regional economic blockade, effectively prevent thelocal government in corporate mergers and acquisitions in the excessive intervention, maximum limitpromote mergers and acquisitions market.
Fourth, marketization and corporate mergers and acquisitions performance are related, and themarket environment to improve reduced proxy conflict between the ultimate controlling shareholdersand minority shareholders, thus inhibiting the negative effects of two rights separation on M&Aperformance; Ultimate controller’s property of the government control would weaken the governanceeffect of marketization process to company merger and acquisition performance, and thisphenomenon is more obvious in the local government control companies; In the companies controlledby local government, pyramid hierarchy is positive with company mergers and acquisitionsperformance, but with the advancement of marketization, the protection effectiveness of pyramidhierarchy will weaker. Accordingly, we should coordinate the interests of ultimate controllingshareholders and minority shareholders through internal governance mechanism, at the same time, weshould also actively promote regional marketization process, strengthening the legal protection ofminority investors, to build a standardized, fair competition environment for companies.
由于历史的原因，我国上市公司股权结构高度集中，终极控制人与中小股东的利益冲突表现尤为突出，而且我国普遍存在对中小股东保护的缺失，相关法律体系很不完善。所以，终极控制人控制权私人收益广泛存在。另外，我国上市公司大部分是国有企业改制而来的，国有股权在上市公司中占据了很大比例，同时也有许多的民营企业发展壮大并成功上市，所以从终极控制人的产权性质划分，我国上市公司可分为政府控制与非政府控制两类；政府控制公司按行政级别划分，又可分为中央政府控制与地方政府控制两种类型；按终极控制人控制权的行权方式不同，又可以分为直接的水平结构控制和间接的金字塔结构控制。这些足以说明我国上市公司终极控制的制度及治理结构状况与西方国家的情况有很大的差异。
我国资本市场是一个新兴市场，同时其发展又根植于经济转轨当中，各个地区之间的市场化程度存在很大差异。由于外部市场环境是公司治理体系中的重要组成部分，它会对终极控制人产生影响并进而影响公司并购绩效。因此，我们从终极控制人的视角研究公司并购绩效问题时，还必须结合上市公司所处的治理环境进行分析。
基于以上的制度背景和我国的实践需要，本文借鉴国内外已有研究成果，利用相关上市公司的公开数据，从终极控制人的角度对我国上市公司并购绩效的问题进行了分析和检验。最终形成的主要研究结论与启示如下：
第一，我国大部分的收购公司在发生并购后的1-2年内长期市场绩效都有所下降，总体来说并购给收购公司的股东带来了财富损失；终极控制人的现金流权具有“激励效应”，但随着两权分离程度增大，终极控制人通过并购投资攫取中小股东的行为越严重，并购绩效也就越差，而且这种现象在高自由现金流和低成长性已经非政府控制的上市公司更加显著。所以应大力促进我国特殊背景下的终极控制人攫取行为约束机制的建立。
第二，政府控制的上市公司，尤其是地方政府控制的上市公司存在着因政府干预而导致的无效并购行为；金字塔结构能够抑制政府干预对并购绩效的负面影响，这种作用也在地方政府控制的企业中表现的更加明显；但相同的证据在中央政府控制与非政府控制的公司里没有找到。
第三，终极控制人的现金流权与控制权的分离程度越大，公司越容易进行多元化并购，进一步还发现多元化并购的绩效明显低于同业并购的绩效，并且这种现象在非政府控制的公司更明显；地方政府控制的公司更趋向于同区域并购，而且同区域并购的绩效也低于异地并购。所以应更多的关注股权结构偏离度较大的公司，同时积极优化企业产权结构，打破地区经济的封锁，有效防止地方政府在公司并购中的过度干预，最大限度促进并购的市场化运
第四，市场化进程与公司并购绩效正相关，而市场化环境的改善缓解了终极控制人与中小股东的代理冲突，从而抑制两权分离对公司并购绩效带来的负面影响；终极控制人的政府控制属性会弱化市场化进程对公司并购绩效的治理效应，这在地方政府控制的上市公司表现更加明显；以地方政府为终极控制人的公司，金字塔层级与公司并购绩效正相关，但随着市场化进程的推进，金字塔层级的这种保护效用会减弱。因此，在通过公司内部治理机制，协调终极控制人与中小股东利益的同时，还应积极推进各地区市场化进程，强化中小投资者的法律保护力度，切实为企业营造一个规范、公平的竞争环境。
As an important link for optimizing equity structure and promoting the optimal allocation ofstock assets, company mergers and acquisitions has been the important topic which the world scholarsdiscuss and research, and studies of M&A performance is one of important content in the study ofmergers and acquisitions. Over the past30years, scholars all over the world made a lot of research onM&A performance, and achieved a consensus that in the process of M&A, the shareholders of targetcompanies have significantly positive excess return, and most acquiring companies’ benefit is neutral,the worse may be loss. The western scholars explained this problem from outside agency conflictbetween shareholders and the inside managers. But in the1990s, people found that different with thediffuse ownership of British and American countries, equity concentration is the dominant form ofownership structure in most of the countries and regions in the world. On the one hand, equityconcentration makes controlling shareholders have strong motivation and ability to supervisemanagers' self-interest behavior, on the other hand, due to the serious deviate from the cash flow rightand control, the controlling shareholders encroach on the company's resources to obtain privatebenefits of control with its control rights, and merger and acquisition activity also can become atransportation tool for the controlling shareholder to exploit the small shareholders. Especially in thecountries where the legal protection of investors is weaker, this kind of phenomenon is more serious.No doubt this provides a new perspective for the research of China's listed companies’ M&Aperformance.
Due to historical reasons, the equity structure of listed companies in our country is highlycentralized, and the interests conflict between the ultimate controlling shareholders and minorityshareholders is particularly prominent in the listed companies in our country, and the widespread lackof protection for minority shareholders, the relevant legal system is not perfect. So, the ultimatecontrolling shareholders’ private benefit of control is widespread. In addition, the purpose ofestablishing securities market in China is to serve the reform of state-owned enterprises, thestate-owned companies is a large share in listed companies occupy, also there are many privateenterprises successful listing through various channels, so from the properties of property rights of theultimate control, the listed companies in China can be divided into two categories, the governmentand non-governmental control, and according to the government administrative level of the control,the companies controlled by government and can be divided into the companies controlled by thecentral government and companies controlled by the local government; According to the ultimatecontrol of the control way of exercise, and can be divided into direct control of horizontal structureand indirect pyramid structure. These enough to show that the system of ultimate control and the governance structure of listed companies in China have very big difference from the westerncountries.
Capital market of China is an emerging market, at the same time, its development is rooted inthe economic transition, and the marketization process is not balanced between the various regions,Fan et al.,2012). Due to the external market environment is an important part of corporate governancesystem, it will affect the ultimate controlling shareholders, in turn, affect the company merger andacquisition performance. Therefore, we must combined with the governance environment of listedcompany, when we study the problem of company mergers and acquisitions performance from theangle of ultimate controlling shareholders.
Based on the above system background and the need of practice in our country, this article makesreference to existing research results at home and abroad, using the public data of relevant listedcompany, from the angle of ultimate controlling shareholders to analyze and test the performance ofmergers and acquisitions of listed companies in China. Eventually form the main research conclusionand enlightenment as follows:
First, the acquisition of most of the company after the merger in1-2years had fallen to long-termmarket performance, overall M&A brings to the acquired company's shareholders wealth loss;Ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash flow right has a "incentive effect", but as the two rightsseparation degree increases, the ultimate controlling shareholders’ behavior of exploit minorityshareholders by a merger and acquisition investment is more serious, also the mergers andacquisitions performance is bad, and this kind of phenomenon is even more significant in the high freecash flow and low growth non-state-run listed companies. So we should vigorously promote ourcountry to establish behavior restraint mechanism under the special background of the ultimatecontrolling shareholders in this paper.
Second, the government control companies, especially local government control companies existineffective merger behavior which cause by government intervention; Pyramid can restrain thenegative impact of government intervention on M&A performance, and this effect is also moreobvious in the companies local government control, and there is no evidence that governmentintervention affect M&A performance in companies controlled by the central government andnon-governmental control, thus the pyramids protection effect is not obvious. We should furtheraccelerate the separation of government and enterprises, reduce the government's intervention oncorporate behavior, and constantly improve the degree of legal protection for investors.
Third, the greater the ultimate controlling shareholders’ separation degree of cash flow right andcontrol, the company are more likely to make diversification M&A, further diversification M&Aperformance was found to significantly lower than the trade performance of M&A, and this kind ofphenomenon in non-governmental control company is more obvious; Tend to local government control of the company with regional mergers and acquisitions, and city of M&A performance islower than the foreign mergers and acquisitions. So we should pay more attention to larger degree ofequity structure deviation, so as to improve the efficiency of supervision, and actively improve thestructure of enterprise property rights, break the regional economic blockade, effectively prevent thelocal government in corporate mergers and acquisitions in the excessive intervention, maximum limitpromote mergers and acquisitions market.
Fourth, marketization and corporate mergers and acquisitions performance are related, and themarket environment to improve reduced proxy conflict between the ultimate controlling shareholdersand minority shareholders, thus inhibiting the negative effects of two rights separation on M&Aperformance; Ultimate controller’s property of the government control would weaken the governanceeffect of marketization process to company merger and acquisition performance, and thisphenomenon is more obvious in the local government control companies; In the companies controlledby local government, pyramid hierarchy is positive with company mergers and acquisitionsperformance, but with the advancement of marketization, the protection effectiveness of pyramidhierarchy will weaker. Accordingly, we should coordinate the interests of ultimate controllingshareholders and minority shareholders through internal governance mechanism, at the same time, weshould also actively promote regional marketization process, strengthening the legal protection ofminority investors, to build a standardized, fair competition environment for companies.
引文
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