经济人的行为动机分析
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摘要
经济人是经济学的重要假设,利己、利他与最大化是经济人的三大特征。自斯密奠定经济人在经济学中的历史地位之后,自利行为适应市场经济的发展,成为分析经济问题、解释经济现象的重要工具。在现实生活中,经济人的自利最大化行为作为经济学的一个假设,虽然不能表明是对人类实际行为的最好近似,但是却有效地揭示了现实经济中的人的行为。利他在斯密的描述中,是与利己相对立的一个经济学术语,是对利己效用的一种削弱。虽然经济人自出现之后就不乏批评,但是经济学中的各个流派在建立了自己不同学说之余,大多都坚持了经济人上述三个特征。近几年来,对利他问题的研究开始逐渐增多,在深入研究的同时,人们纷纷指责自利行为,认为狭隘的自利行为假设阻碍了对一些非常有意义的经济关系的研究,利己无法正确解释利他,经济人遭到了史无前例的责难。
     本文共分五部分对经济人的行为动机进行分析,具体安排如下:
     第一部分为导言部分,主要介绍了本文的选题意义与目的,在文献综述中重点介绍了经济人从产生至今所引发的争论与批判,以及伦理学与行为经济学对经济人思想的挑战。同时还介绍了文章中经常出现的几个重要概念,并对论文的结构安排和创新之处做了简要的介绍。
     第二部分为文章中的第一章,主要围绕着经济人展开了简单的理论回顾。对于经济主体的利己、利他研究要追溯到经济学的研究对象上面。经济学是一门十分特殊的学科,它可以容纳不同的观点,允许各个学派百家争鸣。正因为这样,在处理经济学研究对象问题上,不同的学派给予了不同的定义与解释,同时也包含了不同的经济人思想。本文通过分析得出,经济学的研究对象应该是市场经济中人的行为,经济主体——经济人利己和利他的研究是经济学的重要内容。此外,任何理论的研究都不能没有历史的资源,本章还重点介绍了经济人在经济思想史上发展的历程,包含斯密前、斯密、古典经济学派、历史学派、边际效用学派、新古典经济学派、制度学派、行为经济学等等,他们从本学派的研究对象出发,建立了不同的经济人体系。
     第三部分为文章中的第二章,重点介绍了马克思主义的经济人思想渊源以及马克思的经济人思想,这同样也是一个争议性较大的话题。马克思创立的经济学说敲响了资产阶级的丧钟,他被视为整个资产阶级的敌人,可是在东方,马克思的经济学说却被视为无产阶级的圣经。经济人作为资产阶级的思想源于西方,似乎在意识形态上与马克思主义水火不容,但是马克思对于经济人的揭示却是史无前例的,以它为依据,我们可以科学地解释经济学中存在的比较困惑的几个话题即原始社会存不存在经济人、计划经济时期存不存在经济人、共产主义社会存不存在经济人,这必将又是对马克思主义科学性的一个证明。
     第四部分为文章中的第三章,将围绕利己与利他的定义展开,并结合经济发展实际扩大了利己的内涵,探讨了利己与利他互为矛盾、互为统一的关系。经济学的各个流派为了支撑自己的理论体系,提出了不尽相同的经济人理论,尤其是近几年,利他成为经济学研究的新的热点,利己的研究则显得相对冷淡,而对于利己的研究此时也并没有达到尽善尽美的境地,利己内涵方面的研究还一片空白。本章尝试把利己行为的内涵划分为七种形式,并针对利己与利他的关系,提出了一个可以反映社会福利水平的指标——福利辐射指数,这个系数可以较为清晰地反映利己和利他所占份额的大小对社会福利水平的贡献,此外,还进一步分析了利己和利他博弈的实际案例。
     第五部分为文章中的第四章,是对文章基本内容的概括性总结,并对尚需要进一步研究的问题做了简要说明。本文的主要内容包括:第一,在经济学发展的不同阶段,经济学的研究对象各不相同,经济学的研究对象不同揭示了各个学派所持经济人观点的不同。第二,对斯密的经济人、马克思的经济人都进行了全面的探索,同时发现在原始氏族社会、共产主义社会都不适合使用经济人理论,而计划经济时期经济人的存在具有特殊性。第三,对利己的内涵进行了全面揭示,揭示了经济人的利己与利他的真实关系。第四,应用利己、利他的关系揭示了一些经济问题和经济现象的真实本质,增强了经济人解释实践的能力。文章提出进一步要研究的问题是:在第四章研究中所提出的福利辐射指数还需要进一步技术化,同时对利己和利他的博弈问题还需要进一步地细化。
     文章尝试在下面几个方面作出创新:
     第一,重新梳理了经济学的研究对象。第二,探讨了马克思的经济人思想。第三,对于利己含义的划分是一个较为大胆的尝试。第四,对于利己和利他关系的研究也开拓了一个全新的思路。第五,在研究方法上也将突破个人主义方法论和整体主义方法论分离的局面,在研究当中把二者有效地结合,抛弃了使用方法论上的人为色彩。第六,根据利己和利他的关系提出了福利辐射指数,并运用经济事实加以证明,得出在经济领域人的利己行为将随着个人与物质关系的弱化而逐渐演变,物质上的利己将逐渐让位于精神上的利己,人的经济行为动机在物质层面上将要建立起瑰丽无比的精神大厦,而这个美轮美奂的大厦将成为经济主体行为选择的主流,这也将成为经济学说发展的主流。
The assumption on economic man is very important to economic theory. Three characteristics which are self-interest altruism and maximization describe the economic man. Self-interest becomes effective tool to analyze economic questions and reveal economic phenomena, after Adam Smith has founded the historical status of economic man in economic history. In fact, as an economic assumption, seeking maximization although can't become the best approximation for people's action, it provides an adequate exploration for economic action. Altruism is such a definition which is set against self-interest and weakens the revenue of self-interest. Although economic man has received such criticism since it was set up, a lot of economic schools still support the views about the economic man's three characteristics. In recent years, the researches on altruism become much, at the same time, people begin to criticize the assumption of economic man. They think it can't explain scientifically some interesting economic connections. Self-interest can't give an effective explanation for altruism, so economic man receives strong criticism.
     There are 5 parts in the articles. They are as follows:
     Part one mainly sets the foundation for the economic man. It includes the background and importance of economic man. In the section, it provides some argues and criticism from economic man which includes some challenges. At the same time, in order to clear the views, it gives some important definitions and brief construction about the article.
     Part two is the first chapter. It mainly gives a brief theory conclusion. If we want to get the exact explanation for the self-interest and altruism of economic man, we must give a research on the object about economics. Economics is a special branch, because it can hold different views at the same time. Different schools show different definitions and explanation. After analyzing, we can get such a conclusion: the object of economics is the people' action. The self-interest and altruism of economic man are the emphasis. In addition, it gives a developing thread of thought about economic man, including before Adam Smith, Adam Smith, Classic School, Historical School, Marginal School, Neotectonic School and Behavior School. According to different objects, they founded different theories of economic man.
     In chapter two, the primary intention is to theoretically analyze the origin of Marxism's economic man and gives an exploration for Marxism's economic man. It is also a controversy. Marxism brings a funeral bell for capitalist class. Marx was viewed as the enemy of capitalist class, however, Marxism was accepted as the Holy Bible of proletariat in the east. Although economic man was born from economics of capitalist class, which has huge difference with Marxism, Marx put forward scientific theory to economic man. Based on it, we can explain several more puzzled topics: if economic man exists in primitive society、communist society and planned economy period. All those will be a scientific identification to Maxism.
     In chapter three we will give a try to reveal the relations between self-interest and altruism by researching the definitions and expand the meaning of self-interest. Each school of economics is in order to support one's own theoretical system, put forward different theories about economic man. Especially in recent years, with the rapid development of behavioral economics, altruism becomes the new focus of economics research. The development of altruism theory is becoming better and approaching perfection day by day. Compared with this, the research for self-interest seems relatively cold, but the research for self-interest is not becoming perfect at this moment. The research for the intension of self-interest returns a blank. This chapter tries to divide self-interest behavior into seven kinds of forms and put forward an index that can reflect the social welfare level—The welfare radiates the index. The index can comparatively reflect the contribution to the social welfare level of the size of self-interest and altruism clearly, in addition, also further analyze self-interest and altruism that he play game.
     Chapter four is to the summary of the basic content of the article, and has done the brief illustration to the problem that still needed to further study. The main content includes: First, at different stages for development of economics, the research object of economics has nothing in common with each other. It accords with the special properties of this discipline of economics to choose to carry on research to the person in the economic life. Second, it will carry on overall exploration for economic man of Smith and Marx. It will find that it is unsuitable to use theories of economic man in the primitive society and communist society. At the same time, we'll find that economic man in planned economy is special. Third, we'll go on an all-round way to research the intension of economic man, and give an actual relation between self-interest and altruism. Fourth, applying these views we can announce some economic questions and true essence of the economic phenomenon. It can strengthen the ability that economic man explains practice. The article puts forward the problem that should be further studied: The welfare radiation index put forward in the research of chapter three further needs technicalization; the play game between self-interest and altruism needs to be further at the same time.
     In the article we will give some exploration:
     First, we'll make some new research for object of economics. Second, we'll draw a conclusion: what's the economic man of Marx. Third, the research to the intention of self-interest has given a new try. Fourth, the research for the relation between self-interest and altruism has opened up a brand-new thinking. Fifth, we will break through the separation between individualism methodology and wholism methodology on the research approach and combine the two in studying effectively. At the same time we have abandoned the artificial view used on methodology. Sixth, we propose the welfare radiation index according to the relation between self-interest and altruism. It proves that the self-interest action will gradually be weakened with the reduction of individual and material relation and material self-interest will make way for spiritual self-interest. It will set up a magnificent spiritual mansion on the aspect of material about people's economic behavior motive, and this mansion will become the mainstream. It also will become the mainstream of development of economic theory.
引文
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