基于期权博弈的通信企业3G投资策略研究
|
摘要
第三代移动通信(3G)项目是通信产业发展到寡头垄断阶段的必然产物,同时也是进一步调整中国通信市场格局的重要契机。因此,3G项目对于各个通信运营商都具有巨大的价值,其价值一方面决定了通信运营商如何投资3G,另一方面投资策略也反过来影响3G项目的价值,两者互相促进,互为因果。
在理论界,传统的投资决策理论仅仅从投资的收益成本对比来决定是否投资,不能充分考虑3G项目的不确定性,而狭义的实物期权理论考虑了不确定性却忽视了策略互动对项目价值的影响。期权博弈理论的产生与发展,有效的完善了上述对不确定性处理的方法,其充分考虑了项目的不确定性和策略互动的共同作用,对于项目评价具有重要的指导意义。由于3G项目具有期权博弈理论所假设的条件特征,运用期权博弈理论分析3G项目更加真实的反映了3G项目的价值。
本文在期权博弈理论的框架下,分析了3G项目的管理柔性价值与策略互动价值相互作用的均衡结果。本文具体围绕期权博弈过程,从三个维度对3G项目进行分析：实物期权价值的确定；期权博弈均衡的形成；技术进步与经营成本导致的均衡偏离。以此为基础构建了3G投资项目三维期权博弈模型。最后,通过分析均衡结果对3G投资策略进行了政策建议。本文的主要观点和研究成果如下：
(1)选择了一个崭新的视角分析我国即将发展的3G项目投资策略。论文不同于其他文献仅使用NPV或实物期权等单一方法解决3G项目投资决策,而是将博弈理论与实物期权理论结合起来分析不确定性导致的管理柔性价值和策略互动价值共同作用达到的均衡结果。期权博弈理论从一个崭新的角度分析了3G投资,这是一个全新的尝试。
(2)系统地梳理和归纳第三代移动通信项目涉及的四大理论基础：市场规制理论,传统投资理论,实物期权理论和期权博弈理论。总结了各个理论的主要观点和核心思想,理清了投资决策理论的发展方向,把握了投资决策理论需要着力的重点,提出了3G投资理论研究的重点是市场结构,现金流价值,不确定性,策略互动四个方面。
(3)系统地分析了我国3G投资项目的市场结构以及市场结构的演化过程和运行特点。在总结归纳中国通信市场结构的调整过程中,提出了不同市场格局下,市场结构的运行效率各不相同的观察结果。而根据调整的最终结果看,完全垄断和过度竞争都会导致市场的低效率。本文认为重组后的三寡头垄断市场结构对3G的发展是最有效的。
(4)分析认为垄断与竞争的共同作用是中国通信市场结构发展的动力,市场结构对通信企业行为产生重要的影响。3G所在的移动市场结构具有期权博弈的特性：不可逆性,不确定性,扩展期权性,策略互动性。
(5)构建了3G投资项目三维期权博弈模型。该模型将不确定性,策略互动性以及均衡偏离性三个影响因素有机的融合在三维期权博弈模型的三个维度之中进行阐述。提出了在不考虑策略互动的前提下,3G项目的不确定性导致了在位者和后进入者的期权价值和进入阈值不同。后进入者的进入阈值更小一些,反而在位者的期权价值更大一些。在第二个维度中,模型考虑了竞争的影响。提出了由于竞争的存在,在位者和后进入者的期权价值都受到了侵蚀；在位者充当了追随者的角色,而后进入者充当了领导者的角色。在第三个维度中,提出了由于技术的发展,均衡结果会降低领导者的进入阈值,而增大跟随者的进入阈值。同时,经营成本的增加则也会降低领导者的进入阈值,而增大跟随者的进入的阈值。
(6)对3G项目的三维期权博弈模型进行进一步的敏感性分析和算例测算。通过分析不确定性对期权价值的影响,得出模型的五个参数变量对期权价值的具体作用,并相应的给出策略建议。分析指出,技术进步和经营成本影响了在位者和后进入者的投资阈值。合理掌控技术的发展速度与优化经营成本对于控制本企业的均衡价值以及制约对手竞争策略都具有重要意义。
(7)建议通信博弈者——运营商所采取的各种不同的策略组合。在位者中国移动建议采取激进式强跟随者投资策略,该策略指在足够大的市场冲击下,大范围地增加3G投资,在已有的个人用户市场全面出击；在位者中国联通建议采用渔网型弱跟随者战略,该策略更加适合运营商控制3G运营成本,提高3G期权价值。中国电信是移动通信市场上的后进入者,虽然与原C网运营的协调存在一定时滞性。由于其固网用户利润的快速下滑,其投资3G项目的动机很强。因此,在重点城市和行业快速发展3G,加大3G的覆盖面,采取孤岛型领导者策略抢先进入市场成为中国电信最优的选择。
As one of the most prosperous industries to promote the economic development, telecom industry has been charactered as high risk and high profit. Due to step up the competition and promote the living standard, the telecom industry has been recombined for many times. The development of 3G provides the opportunity for another competition of the telecom market. The merger worked on 2008 brings the new competition market for the 3G investment. The 3G is related to the benefit of the people and the long-term development of the 3G operators.
The traditional theory just judge the investment depent on the ratio between the profit and cost without the uncentaintry. The basic theory of the Real Option has considered of the uncertainty of the projects but neglected the interaction between the competitors. With the development of the Option Games, the real option and the interaction could be combined in the value of the project. The value of the option game could be the most real of the project. The theory of the option games has the special meaning to the projects evaluation.
The 3G has the features of the option games. The option games theory will give the real answer about the 3G's value. The equilibrium between the option and the interaction will arrive a point. The mobile communication operators'goal is to achieve the maximum of the profit. On the equilibrium of the option and interaction, the oprators will adjust the strategy of the investment and the marketing. The paper gives the option games model of the 3G project. The model concludes three parts: the real option; the option games; the equilibrium with interaction from the technology advanced and the operation cost. The equilibrium will concludes some advices for the 3G project. The key ideas and main research results as follows:
(1) There is a new view on the 3G investment strategy that is the option games theory. The theory is different from the traditional NPV or the real option theory. It is combined the real option theory and the games. The equilibrium value is mixed from the soft management value and the interaction strategies value. The option game value is more close to the real and is more significant to the 3G investment. This is a totally fresh approach.
(2) To summarize the basical theory which is about the 3G investment strategy:the government regulation economics, the traditional investment theory, the real option theory, the real option theory, the paper give the main idea and the key view about the above theories and the route about the investment decision theory development. It is the the key point to be focused on that is the cash flow, the uncertainty, the interaction strategies and the market constructure.
(3) The paper analysis the construction and the features about the mobile telecommunication market. After the combing out the route about the mobile telecommunication market change, the pater takes the conclution that is the different effect under the different market constructions and the three oligarch monopolization is the most efficient for the 3G investment. The paper points the market background has decided the option game features which is the unreversible, the uncertainty, the complex option, and the interaction strategies.
(4) The paper gives the three-dimensional option game model to analysises the 3G investment strategies. The model include the uncertainty and the interaction and the affect from the technology development. Under the first-dimensional model-the real option theory, the entry market threshold and the option value are different from the mobile telecommucation operators and the followers. The followers will be advanced the entry threshold, but the the option value of the mobile operators is bigger. In the second-dimensional model, the affect of the competition reduce the option value and make the mobile operators to be the market followers. In the third-dimensional model, the techenology advanced and the operation cost will make a change on the 3G investment equilibrium. As the techenology advanced, the market followers will make the entry threshold ahead and the market leaders will put off the entry threshold.
(5) As the facors sensitivity theory, the three-dimensional model will be advanced developed. In the model, the parameters is affected to some 3G investment strategy. They are included the profit, the investment cost, the interest rate, the fluctuate about the capital and the investment period. The operators could control the different parameters to maximum their project value. On the other hand, they could control the technology advanced and the operation cost to change the competitors stragegies.
(6)The pater take the three-dimensional options game model of 3G project for for the further sensitivity analysis and calculation. For the options value of the uncertainty. There are five parameters in the model will impact the final equilibrium. The conclution pointed out that the advanced technology and the operation cost will impact the investment threshold of the leader and the follower. The reasonable development of of technology and the optimization of reasonable operating costs are very significant to the investment strategies.
(7) The paper give three different investment strategies of the 3G for the telecom operators:island-based strategy, net-based strategy and the radical-based strategy. As the "Been" in the mobile telecom market,China Mobile should take the "strong-follower radical-based strategy". Increase their investment to 3G project on the condition of the enough market demand. For another "Been" in the mobile telecom market, China Unicom should take the "weak-follower net-based strategy". It is more suited for it to control costs and increase the value of 3G options. As the "new player" in the mobile telecom market, China Telecom is acquisition of China Unicom's C net, but the coordination with the C net will take a certain period. There is time-delay. However, due to its fixed-line users decline in profits, the motive of the the entering the 3G market is more stronger. The feather of the 3G project is the data services. It's the demand of the Group. Therefore, the choice of 3G industry development and the "leader island-based strategy" are the China Telecom's best stragegy.
在理论界,传统的投资决策理论仅仅从投资的收益成本对比来决定是否投资,不能充分考虑3G项目的不确定性,而狭义的实物期权理论考虑了不确定性却忽视了策略互动对项目价值的影响。期权博弈理论的产生与发展,有效的完善了上述对不确定性处理的方法,其充分考虑了项目的不确定性和策略互动的共同作用,对于项目评价具有重要的指导意义。由于3G项目具有期权博弈理论所假设的条件特征,运用期权博弈理论分析3G项目更加真实的反映了3G项目的价值。
本文在期权博弈理论的框架下,分析了3G项目的管理柔性价值与策略互动价值相互作用的均衡结果。本文具体围绕期权博弈过程,从三个维度对3G项目进行分析：实物期权价值的确定；期权博弈均衡的形成；技术进步与经营成本导致的均衡偏离。以此为基础构建了3G投资项目三维期权博弈模型。最后,通过分析均衡结果对3G投资策略进行了政策建议。本文的主要观点和研究成果如下：
(1)选择了一个崭新的视角分析我国即将发展的3G项目投资策略。论文不同于其他文献仅使用NPV或实物期权等单一方法解决3G项目投资决策,而是将博弈理论与实物期权理论结合起来分析不确定性导致的管理柔性价值和策略互动价值共同作用达到的均衡结果。期权博弈理论从一个崭新的角度分析了3G投资,这是一个全新的尝试。
(2)系统地梳理和归纳第三代移动通信项目涉及的四大理论基础：市场规制理论,传统投资理论,实物期权理论和期权博弈理论。总结了各个理论的主要观点和核心思想,理清了投资决策理论的发展方向,把握了投资决策理论需要着力的重点,提出了3G投资理论研究的重点是市场结构,现金流价值,不确定性,策略互动四个方面。
(3)系统地分析了我国3G投资项目的市场结构以及市场结构的演化过程和运行特点。在总结归纳中国通信市场结构的调整过程中,提出了不同市场格局下,市场结构的运行效率各不相同的观察结果。而根据调整的最终结果看,完全垄断和过度竞争都会导致市场的低效率。本文认为重组后的三寡头垄断市场结构对3G的发展是最有效的。
(4)分析认为垄断与竞争的共同作用是中国通信市场结构发展的动力,市场结构对通信企业行为产生重要的影响。3G所在的移动市场结构具有期权博弈的特性：不可逆性,不确定性,扩展期权性,策略互动性。
(5)构建了3G投资项目三维期权博弈模型。该模型将不确定性,策略互动性以及均衡偏离性三个影响因素有机的融合在三维期权博弈模型的三个维度之中进行阐述。提出了在不考虑策略互动的前提下,3G项目的不确定性导致了在位者和后进入者的期权价值和进入阈值不同。后进入者的进入阈值更小一些,反而在位者的期权价值更大一些。在第二个维度中,模型考虑了竞争的影响。提出了由于竞争的存在,在位者和后进入者的期权价值都受到了侵蚀；在位者充当了追随者的角色,而后进入者充当了领导者的角色。在第三个维度中,提出了由于技术的发展,均衡结果会降低领导者的进入阈值,而增大跟随者的进入阈值。同时,经营成本的增加则也会降低领导者的进入阈值,而增大跟随者的进入的阈值。
(6)对3G项目的三维期权博弈模型进行进一步的敏感性分析和算例测算。通过分析不确定性对期权价值的影响,得出模型的五个参数变量对期权价值的具体作用,并相应的给出策略建议。分析指出,技术进步和经营成本影响了在位者和后进入者的投资阈值。合理掌控技术的发展速度与优化经营成本对于控制本企业的均衡价值以及制约对手竞争策略都具有重要意义。
(7)建议通信博弈者——运营商所采取的各种不同的策略组合。在位者中国移动建议采取激进式强跟随者投资策略,该策略指在足够大的市场冲击下,大范围地增加3G投资,在已有的个人用户市场全面出击；在位者中国联通建议采用渔网型弱跟随者战略,该策略更加适合运营商控制3G运营成本,提高3G期权价值。中国电信是移动通信市场上的后进入者,虽然与原C网运营的协调存在一定时滞性。由于其固网用户利润的快速下滑,其投资3G项目的动机很强。因此,在重点城市和行业快速发展3G,加大3G的覆盖面,采取孤岛型领导者策略抢先进入市场成为中国电信最优的选择。
As one of the most prosperous industries to promote the economic development, telecom industry has been charactered as high risk and high profit. Due to step up the competition and promote the living standard, the telecom industry has been recombined for many times. The development of 3G provides the opportunity for another competition of the telecom market. The merger worked on 2008 brings the new competition market for the 3G investment. The 3G is related to the benefit of the people and the long-term development of the 3G operators.
The traditional theory just judge the investment depent on the ratio between the profit and cost without the uncentaintry. The basic theory of the Real Option has considered of the uncertainty of the projects but neglected the interaction between the competitors. With the development of the Option Games, the real option and the interaction could be combined in the value of the project. The value of the option game could be the most real of the project. The theory of the option games has the special meaning to the projects evaluation.
The 3G has the features of the option games. The option games theory will give the real answer about the 3G's value. The equilibrium between the option and the interaction will arrive a point. The mobile communication operators'goal is to achieve the maximum of the profit. On the equilibrium of the option and interaction, the oprators will adjust the strategy of the investment and the marketing. The paper gives the option games model of the 3G project. The model concludes three parts: the real option; the option games; the equilibrium with interaction from the technology advanced and the operation cost. The equilibrium will concludes some advices for the 3G project. The key ideas and main research results as follows:
(1) There is a new view on the 3G investment strategy that is the option games theory. The theory is different from the traditional NPV or the real option theory. It is combined the real option theory and the games. The equilibrium value is mixed from the soft management value and the interaction strategies value. The option game value is more close to the real and is more significant to the 3G investment. This is a totally fresh approach.
(2) To summarize the basical theory which is about the 3G investment strategy:the government regulation economics, the traditional investment theory, the real option theory, the real option theory, the paper give the main idea and the key view about the above theories and the route about the investment decision theory development. It is the the key point to be focused on that is the cash flow, the uncertainty, the interaction strategies and the market constructure.
(3) The paper analysis the construction and the features about the mobile telecommunication market. After the combing out the route about the mobile telecommunication market change, the pater takes the conclution that is the different effect under the different market constructions and the three oligarch monopolization is the most efficient for the 3G investment. The paper points the market background has decided the option game features which is the unreversible, the uncertainty, the complex option, and the interaction strategies.
(4) The paper gives the three-dimensional option game model to analysises the 3G investment strategies. The model include the uncertainty and the interaction and the affect from the technology development. Under the first-dimensional model-the real option theory, the entry market threshold and the option value are different from the mobile telecommucation operators and the followers. The followers will be advanced the entry threshold, but the the option value of the mobile operators is bigger. In the second-dimensional model, the affect of the competition reduce the option value and make the mobile operators to be the market followers. In the third-dimensional model, the techenology advanced and the operation cost will make a change on the 3G investment equilibrium. As the techenology advanced, the market followers will make the entry threshold ahead and the market leaders will put off the entry threshold.
(5) As the facors sensitivity theory, the three-dimensional model will be advanced developed. In the model, the parameters is affected to some 3G investment strategy. They are included the profit, the investment cost, the interest rate, the fluctuate about the capital and the investment period. The operators could control the different parameters to maximum their project value. On the other hand, they could control the technology advanced and the operation cost to change the competitors stragegies.
(6)The pater take the three-dimensional options game model of 3G project for for the further sensitivity analysis and calculation. For the options value of the uncertainty. There are five parameters in the model will impact the final equilibrium. The conclution pointed out that the advanced technology and the operation cost will impact the investment threshold of the leader and the follower. The reasonable development of of technology and the optimization of reasonable operating costs are very significant to the investment strategies.
(7) The paper give three different investment strategies of the 3G for the telecom operators:island-based strategy, net-based strategy and the radical-based strategy. As the "Been" in the mobile telecom market,China Mobile should take the "strong-follower radical-based strategy". Increase their investment to 3G project on the condition of the enough market demand. For another "Been" in the mobile telecom market, China Unicom should take the "weak-follower net-based strategy". It is more suited for it to control costs and increase the value of 3G options. As the "new player" in the mobile telecom market, China Telecom is acquisition of China Unicom's C net, but the coordination with the C net will take a certain period. There is time-delay. However, due to its fixed-line users decline in profits, the motive of the the entering the 3G market is more stronger. The feather of the 3G project is the data services. It's the demand of the Group. Therefore, the choice of 3G industry development and the "leader island-based strategy" are the China Telecom's best stragegy.
引文
[1]胡鞍钢.中国3G：警惕国家被“俘虏”,中国信息界,2005,5(3)：21-23
[2]阈凯力.电信业面临的IP改革,高科技与产业化,2007,8(3)：31-34
[3]郑杰,易卫平,郁义鸿.我国电信行业的主垄断效应研究.经济研究,2001,8(9)：16-21
[4]滕颖,钱宇.我国电信业市场格局与电信业发展分析.电子科技大学学报社科版,2001,7(15)：41-45
[5]马骏.中国电信业竞争分析.当代通信,2003,16(3)：42-46
[6]杨学兵.寡占模型与中国电信市场价格竞争问题研究.重庆邮电学院学报(社会科学版),2004,7(2)：54-56
[7]孔淑红.中国电信业市场竞争格局、竞争策略及发展对策.经济评论,2004,8(11)：41-45
[8]李华威,扬舟.中国移动通信双寡头市场结构及企业行为的博弈分析.移动通信,2004,7(6)：31-33
[9]周勇,周寄中.R&D项目的期权性特征分析与期权性价值的估算.管理科学学报,2002,7(1)：78-81.
[10]孙先定,黄小原.产业投资规模基于期权观点的优化.预测,2002,9(1)：134-137.
[11]司马秀,黄秀清.后价格战——移动通信竞争的新形势.北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版),2004,5(1)：33-35
[12]谢军.电信运营商构建核心竞争力的新框架.通信世界,2004,9(21)：111-144
[13]王健康,肖德荣,黄权国.实物期权研究述评.金融理论与实践,2005,8(9)：22-27
[14]塞迪顾问.中国电信行业年度报告(2002).2003-03-11
[15]吴少凡.分析电信企业成长的阶段与特征.学术研究,2004,3(6)：51-54
[16]陈小洪.中国信息化焦点研究：信息化时代竞争政策的基本结构和启示.中国信息界,2005,6(5)：36-38
[17]于良春.英、美电信产业管制体制之比较研究及其对我国的启示.经济评论,2002,5(5)：41-45
[18]陈富良.政府的准入规制于垄断行业的市场结构.管理世界,2005,21(5)：35-41
[19]陈宏平.市场结构与政府管制的对称与动态均衡.经济评论,2003,6(2)：25-27
[17]郑奇宝.国外电信行业规制改革比较及启示.经济经纬,2003,5(4)：17-19
[18]白让让.强制性管制放松与边缘性进入的发生.中国工业经济,004,7(8)：14-17
[19]王秀屏.从欧盟市场发展看电信准入与竞争状态分析.世界电信,2007,8(4)：27-34
[20]Brealey,R.,&Myers,S.1984,Principles of Corporate Finance[M].New York, McGraw-Hill
[21]Dixit, A.K. and R.S. Pindyck. Investment under uncertainty. New York:Princeton University Press,1994.7-8
[22]Conner,K.R.1991. A historical comparison of resource-based theory and five schools of thought within industrial organaization economics:Do we Have a new theory of the Firm?,Journal of Management,Vol.17.No 1.121-154
[23]Cox,J.,S.Ross,and M.Rubinstein,Option Pricing:A Simplified Approach,Journal of Financial Economice, Vol.7,1979,pp.229-263.
[24]黄健柏,钟美瑞.实物期权理论及其应用.经济管理,2002,15(12)：51-55
[25]Black.F.,and M.Scholes,The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,Journal of Political Economy, Vol.81,May-Jun 1973,pp.637-659.
[26]Cox,J.,and S.Ross,1976,The Valuation of Options for Alternative Stochastic Processes. Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.3,pp.229-263.
[27]Margrabe,W.,The Value of an Option to Exchange One Asset for Another,The Journal of Finance, Vol.33,No.1,Mar 1978,pp.177-186
[28]Shapiro,C.1989. The theory of business strategy. Rand Journal of Economics 20:125-37
[29]Mason, R. and H.Weeds. Irreversible Investment with Strategic Interactions. Discussion Papers in Industrial Organization 3013. London:Centre for Economic Policy Research,2001.
[30]Trigeorgis,L.2000,Real Options in Capital Investment,Praeger Press,pp.1-31
[31]Trigeorgis,L.1993b,The Nature of Option Interactions and the Valuation of Investments with Multiple Real Options,Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,March,pp 1-20.
[32]Kelly,S.,A Binomial Lattice Approach for Valuing a Mining Property IPO,The QuarterlyReview of Economics and Finance, Vol.38,Special Issue,1998,pp.693-709.
[33]Williams, J.T. Equilibrium and Options on Real Assets. Review of Financial Studies,1999.
[34]Huisman, K.J.M. and P.M.Kort. Strategic Investment in Technological Innovations. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,2003(27):619-643
[35]曾力勇,裘亚峥.房地产开发项目三阶段投资决策的实物期权模型研究.长沙理工大学学报(社会科学版),2005,10(6)：16-21.
[36]Bain,J.Industrial Organization[M].New York:Wiley,1959
[37]Kogut,B.,and N.Kulatilaka,Options Thinking and Platform Investments:Investing in Opprotunity[J], California Management Review, Vol.36,No.2,Winter 1994,pp.52-67.
[38]Schumpeter,J.1934. The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge:Harvard University Press.Sep.
[39]Levinthal,D.A.1991. Organizational adaptation and environmental selection: Interrelated processes of change. Organization Science 2:140-5.
[40]Barney,J.B. Strategic factor markets:Expectations, luck and business strategy. Management Science 1986(32):1231-1241.
[41]Carr,P.,The Valuation of Sequential Exchange Opportunities.The Journal of Finance, Vol.43,No.5,Dec 1988,pp.1235-1256.
[42]Harrison,J.M.and D.Kreps,1979,Martingales and Arbitrage in Multiperiod Securities Markets[J] Journal of Economic Theory,Vol.20,pp.381-408.
[43]黄凯.期权定价理论的基本思路、方法及其在企业战略投资领域的应用.中国管理科学,1998,5(6)：11-16.
[44]谢联恒,孟繁.投资项目的传统评价方法和现实期权评-方法的比较分析.科技管理研究,2001(2)：54-57.
[45]张维,程功.实物期权方法的信息经济学解释.现代财经,2001,5(1)：11-16.
[46]方曙,武振业.实物期权理论及其在企业决策中的应用.科学管理研究,2001,5(4)：13_17
[47]张维,郑德渊.融资结构对R&D项目期权价值的影响研究.预侧.2001,5(1)：21-25
[48]杨春鹏,伍海华.实物期权在专利权价值评估中的应用.系统工程理论与实践,2002,11(6)：23-25
[49]简志宏,李楚霖.公司债务重组的实物期权方法研究.管理科学学报,2002,3(4)：31-35
[50]于洋,王辉,杜永怡.我国实物期权研究的回顾与思考.科研管理,2003,24(4)：35-37
[51]周立新,尹晓玲.实物期权理论及应用研究综述.重庆工商大学学报,2003,20(2)：24-27
[52]刘兵军,欧阳令南.实物期权在企业战略投资中的运用研究.工业工程与管理,2003,6(3)11-15
[53]李洪江,曲晓飞,冯敬海.阶段性投资最优比例问题的实物期权方法.管理科学学报,2003,6(1)：42-45
[54]庄新田,黄小原.委托代理框架下实物期权最优投资策略研究.控制与决策,2003,8(1)：41-45
[55]朱其树,赵喜仓.论实物期权在人力资源价值评估中的应用.商业研究,2003,5(1)：13-15.
[56]唐振鹏,黄杰.企业项目投资决策方法及其最新发展.科技管理研究,2003,7(1)：21-24.
[57]张坚,陶树人.基于遗传算法的R & D项目实物期权评价模型.科学学与科学技术管理,2003,5(4)：17-19
[58]李洪江,冯敬海,李汝船,曲晓飞.专有出版权定价的实物期权方法.系统工程理论方法应用,2002,7(4)：17-20
[59]Dean Paxson, Helena Pinto. Third Generation Mobile Games-An app;ication of real competition options.
[60]谭跃.中国3G移动通信服务的实物期权价值分析与香港的实践.2005,7(8)：81-83
[61]何家龙.差异化技术竞争下之投资决策：实质选择权分析法.通信世界,2005,5(5)：37-39
[62]方琮恺.台湾行动电话市场转换成本之估计：[硕士论文].台湾：中山国立大学.2006
[63]Vesa Riihimaki. Real Option Valuation of Broadband Access Networks-Statistical Analysis of WIMAX and ADSL Investments:Thesis.2006
[64]Fotios C, Harmantzis, Venkata Praveen Tanguturi. Investment decisions in the wireless industry applying real options. Telecommunications Policy 2007,31(07):107-123
[65]谈毅,冯宗宪.高新技术产业风险投资的期权特征与经济评价.科研管理,1999,9(3)：41-42
[66]郑德渊,伍青生,李湛.企业R & D项目的实物期权评价方法.研究与开发管理,2000.8
[67]杨宝臣,刘铮,张彤.基于Black-Scholes模型的公司资本结构模型.管理科学学报,1999,9(2)：25-29
[68]Trigeorgis, L.,1991,A Log-transformed Binomial Numerical Analysis Method for Valuing Complex Multi-Option Investments[J],Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis(September 1991).pp.309-326.
[69]Smit, H.T.J. and L.A.Ankum. A Real Options and Game-Theoretic Approach to
[70]Corporate Investment Strategy under Competition[J]. Financial Management, 1993(22):241-250
[71]Lambrecht, B. and W. Perraudin. Option Games[M]. Working Paper. Cambridge University.1994
[72]Trigeorgis,L.1996a,Real Options and Interactions with Financial Flexibility, Financial Management,Autumn, pp.202-224
[73]Grenadier,S.R. and A.M.Weiss. Investment in Technological Innovations:An Option Pricing Approach. Journal of Financial Economics,1997(44):397-416
[74]Amram,M. and N. Kulatilaka.Real Options:Managing Stragegic Investment in an Uncertain World.Harvard Business School Press,Boston,1999.
[75]Lintner,J.,1965,The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets,Review of Economics and Statistics,Vol.47,pp.13-37.
[76]Myers,S.,1977,Determinants of Capital Borrowing[J],Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.5(2),pp.147-175.
[77]Thijssen, J.J.J. and K.J.M Huisman. and P.M.Kort. The Effect of Information Streams on Capital Budgeting Decisions. Forthcoming in:European Journal of Operational Rearch,2003
[78]Dixit, A.K. Entry and Exit Decisions under Uncertainty. Journal of Political Economics,1989(97):620-638
[79]安瑛晖,张维.期权博弈理论的方法模型与发展.管理科学学报,2001,3(1)：13-18
[80]唐振鹏,刘国新.基于期权理论与博弈论的投资决策方法研究—不确定环境下的投资管理
[8l]王蔚松.竞争环境下公司投资战略的实物期权博弈思考.外国经济与管理,2003,25(9)：19-23
[82]雷星晖,李来竣,许庆瑞.R & D项目管理的模式及商标定为研究.科研管理,2001,4(2)：56-61
[83]吴建祖,张钢.试论界面管理发展的三个阶段.科研管理,2000,5(2)：34-37
[84]韩隽,郑德渊.融资结构对R仙项目期权价值的影响研究.预侧.2001,12(1)：45-51.
[85]悉尼·豪威尔,安德鲁·斯塔克,大卫·牛顿等著：徐海乐译,实物期权.经济管理出版社,2005.89-95
[86]王惠,吴冲锋,王意冈.期权定价理论在敏捷企业战略分析中的应用.系统工程与电子技术,21(11)：5-6.
[87]Hoppe, H.C. Second-mover Advantages in the Strategic Adoption of New Technology under Uncertainty [J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2000(18):315-338.
[88]Huisman, K.J.M. Technology Investment:a Game Theoretic Real Option Approach.Boston:Kluwer Academic Publish.2001
[89]蔚林巍,章刚,实物期权方法综述.企业经济,2005,15(5)：31-34
[90]周立新,尹晓玲.实物期权理论及应用研究综述.重庆工商大学学报(社会科学版),2003,5(4)：51-55
[91]Hull,J. and A.White,An Overview of Contigent Claims Pricing,Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, Vol.5,Sep1998,pp.55-61.
[92]曹宏铎,韩文秀,李昊.投资机会决策中分数布朗运动理论.系统工程学报,2001,8(1)：45-49
[93]高佳卿,刘胜军,康力立,李汉铃.资本投资的期权理论与方法.经济理论与经济管理,1998(2)：41-43
[94]齐安甜,张维.企业并购投资的期权特征及经济评价.系统工程,2001,9(5)：129-134
[95]Guiso,L and P.Giuseppe. Investment and Demand Uncertainty[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1999(114):185-228
[96]陈松男.金融分析—投资、融资策略与衍生创新.上海：复旦大学出版社,2001：145-147
[97]肖江月.实物期权理论及其在投资决策中的应用研究.湖南大学硕士学位论文,2002,138-172
[98]Merton,R.,Applications of Option-Pricing Theory:Twenty-Five Years Later,The American Economic Review,Vol.88,No.3,Jun 1998,pp.323-349.
[99]Merton,R.,Theory of Rational Option Pricing[J],Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,Vol.4,Spring 1973,pp.141-183.
[100]高芳敏,钱水土,盛建平.实物期权在风险投资决策中的应用研究.财经论丛,2001(1)：49-53.
[101]简志宏,李楚霖.公司债务重组的实物期权方法研究.管理科学学报,2002,5(5)：38-43.
[102]李子奈编著.计量经诉讼济学.高等教育出版社,2000.68-72
[103]Sprenkle,C.M.1961,Warrat Prices as Indicators of Expectations and Preferences,Yale Economic Essays,Vol.1.pp.172-231
[104]Prahalad, C.K. and G.Hamel.1990. The core competence of the corporation. Harvard Business Review 66(May/June):79-91
[105]Alchian,A. Uncertainty, evolution and economic theory. Journal of Political Economy,1950:211-221.
[106]陈龙.项目投资价值分析创新方法研究.厦门大学硕士学位论文,2002,89-92
[107]Hoppe, H.C. Second-mover Advantages in the Strategic Adoption of New Technology under Uncertainty. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2000(18):315-338
[108]Alvarez,L.H.R and R.Stenbacka. Adoption of Uncertain Multi-Stage Technology Projects:A Real Options Approach[J].Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2001(35):71-97
[109]Langlois,R.N.1995. Capabilities and coherence in firms and markets. In Montgomery,C.A.(ed.). Resource-based and Evolutionary Theories of the firm:Towards a Synthesis. Boston:Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[110]唐海洋.企业实物期权理论与方法研究.河北工业大学硕士学位论文,2002,59-62
[111]邓光军.技术创新投资项目实物期权定价.电子科技大学硕士学位论文,2002.89-92
[112]杨明,李楚霖.不确定竞争市场投资决策.经济数学,2002,19(2)：10-14
[113]吉姆·罗根斯著：宋清秋译,杨冠琼审.战略、价值与风险——不动产期权理论[M].经济管理出版社,2003.
[114]朱玉旭,黄洁纲,吴冲锋.序列投资决策的期权分析方法.管理科学学报,1997,8(2)：137-139.
[115]Dutta, P.K. and A. Rustichini. Equilibriua in Stochastic Games[J]. Journal of Economic theory,1995(67):1-39
[116]Lander, D.M. and G.E. Pinches, Challenges to the practical implementation of modeling and valuing real options[J], Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance. Greenwich:1998. Vol.38; p.537-568.
[117]杨明.有潜在竞争者的R & D项目策略分析.数量经济技术经济研究,2002(10):66-68.Amit,R. and P.J.H.Schoemaker. Strategic assets and organizational rent. Strategic Management Journal,1993(14):33-46.
[118]肖条军,盛昭翰.R & D中心与企业集团的博弈分析.中国管理科学,2000.7(8)：61-64
[119]Williamson,O.E. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism [M]. New York:Free Press,1985b.
[120]黎国华,黎凯.实物期权的二叉树模型应用.江西财经大学学报,2002,9(3)：
21-25
[121]叶瑛.基于期权理论的投资评价方法研究.大连理工大学硕士学位论文,2001.4551
[122]Barney,J. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management,1991(17):99-120.
[123]曾力勇,裘亚峥.不确定条件下房地产企业投资决策方法研究.求索,2005,5(10)：11-15
[124]Lint,O.,and E.Pennings,An Option Approach to the New Product Development Process:A Case Study at Phillips Electronics,R&D Management, Vol.31, No.2, 2001, pp.163-172.
[125]王迁.实物期权理论在企业投资决策中的应用[D].江西财经大学硕士学位论文,2002.
[126]Peteraf,M.A.,1993,the cornerstones of competitive advantage:a resource-based view,strategic management Journal,Vol.14,179-191
[127]项盛辉,何芳.实物期权方法在房地产开发中的应用.建筑管理现代化,2002,4(2)：41-46
[128]Sharpe,W.F.,1964,Capital Asset Prices:A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk,Journal of Finance,Vol.19,pp425-442.
[129]Weeds, H. Strategic Delay in a Real Options Model of R&D Competition. Review of Economic Studies,2002(69):729-747
[130]Teece,D.J., G.Pisano and A.Shuen.1997. Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. Strategic Management Journal 18:509-33.
[131]Sharp,D.J.1991,Uncovering the Hidden Value in High-Risk Investment,Sloan Management Review,Summer:69-74.
[132]范龙振,唐国兴.投资机会价值的期权评价方法.管理工程学报,2000,5(4)：41-51.
[133]周赫.现实期权理论及其在投资决策中的应用.大连理工大学硕士学位论文,2002.19-21
[134]Boyle,P.,Option Valuation Using a Three-Jump Process.International Options Journal,Vol.3,1986,pp.7-12.
[135]范龙振,唐国兴.投资机会的价值与投资决策-几何布朗运动.系统工程学报,1998,11(9)：15-21.
[136]Porter,M.E.1991.Towards a dynamic theory of strategy. Strategic Management Journal 12:95-117
[137]Andrews,K.R.. The Concept of Corporate Strategy.Homewood:Richard D. Irwin,1965.
[2]阈凯力.电信业面临的IP改革,高科技与产业化,2007,8(3)：31-34
[3]郑杰,易卫平,郁义鸿.我国电信行业的主垄断效应研究.经济研究,2001,8(9)：16-21
[4]滕颖,钱宇.我国电信业市场格局与电信业发展分析.电子科技大学学报社科版,2001,7(15)：41-45
[5]马骏.中国电信业竞争分析.当代通信,2003,16(3)：42-46
[6]杨学兵.寡占模型与中国电信市场价格竞争问题研究.重庆邮电学院学报(社会科学版),2004,7(2)：54-56
[7]孔淑红.中国电信业市场竞争格局、竞争策略及发展对策.经济评论,2004,8(11)：41-45
[8]李华威,扬舟.中国移动通信双寡头市场结构及企业行为的博弈分析.移动通信,2004,7(6)：31-33
[9]周勇,周寄中.R&D项目的期权性特征分析与期权性价值的估算.管理科学学报,2002,7(1)：78-81.
[10]孙先定,黄小原.产业投资规模基于期权观点的优化.预测,2002,9(1)：134-137.
[11]司马秀,黄秀清.后价格战——移动通信竞争的新形势.北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版),2004,5(1)：33-35
[12]谢军.电信运营商构建核心竞争力的新框架.通信世界,2004,9(21)：111-144
[13]王健康,肖德荣,黄权国.实物期权研究述评.金融理论与实践,2005,8(9)：22-27
[14]塞迪顾问.中国电信行业年度报告(2002).2003-03-11
[15]吴少凡.分析电信企业成长的阶段与特征.学术研究,2004,3(6)：51-54
[16]陈小洪.中国信息化焦点研究：信息化时代竞争政策的基本结构和启示.中国信息界,2005,6(5)：36-38
[17]于良春.英、美电信产业管制体制之比较研究及其对我国的启示.经济评论,2002,5(5)：41-45
[18]陈富良.政府的准入规制于垄断行业的市场结构.管理世界,2005,21(5)：35-41
[19]陈宏平.市场结构与政府管制的对称与动态均衡.经济评论,2003,6(2)：25-27
[17]郑奇宝.国外电信行业规制改革比较及启示.经济经纬,2003,5(4)：17-19
[18]白让让.强制性管制放松与边缘性进入的发生.中国工业经济,004,7(8)：14-17
[19]王秀屏.从欧盟市场发展看电信准入与竞争状态分析.世界电信,2007,8(4)：27-34
[20]Brealey,R.,&Myers,S.1984,Principles of Corporate Finance[M].New York, McGraw-Hill
[21]Dixit, A.K. and R.S. Pindyck. Investment under uncertainty. New York:Princeton University Press,1994.7-8
[22]Conner,K.R.1991. A historical comparison of resource-based theory and five schools of thought within industrial organaization economics:Do we Have a new theory of the Firm?,Journal of Management,Vol.17.No 1.121-154
[23]Cox,J.,S.Ross,and M.Rubinstein,Option Pricing:A Simplified Approach,Journal of Financial Economice, Vol.7,1979,pp.229-263.
[24]黄健柏,钟美瑞.实物期权理论及其应用.经济管理,2002,15(12)：51-55
[25]Black.F.,and M.Scholes,The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,Journal of Political Economy, Vol.81,May-Jun 1973,pp.637-659.
[26]Cox,J.,and S.Ross,1976,The Valuation of Options for Alternative Stochastic Processes. Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.3,pp.229-263.
[27]Margrabe,W.,The Value of an Option to Exchange One Asset for Another,The Journal of Finance, Vol.33,No.1,Mar 1978,pp.177-186
[28]Shapiro,C.1989. The theory of business strategy. Rand Journal of Economics 20:125-37
[29]Mason, R. and H.Weeds. Irreversible Investment with Strategic Interactions. Discussion Papers in Industrial Organization 3013. London:Centre for Economic Policy Research,2001.
[30]Trigeorgis,L.2000,Real Options in Capital Investment,Praeger Press,pp.1-31
[31]Trigeorgis,L.1993b,The Nature of Option Interactions and the Valuation of Investments with Multiple Real Options,Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,March,pp 1-20.
[32]Kelly,S.,A Binomial Lattice Approach for Valuing a Mining Property IPO,The QuarterlyReview of Economics and Finance, Vol.38,Special Issue,1998,pp.693-709.
[33]Williams, J.T. Equilibrium and Options on Real Assets. Review of Financial Studies,1999.
[34]Huisman, K.J.M. and P.M.Kort. Strategic Investment in Technological Innovations. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,2003(27):619-643
[35]曾力勇,裘亚峥.房地产开发项目三阶段投资决策的实物期权模型研究.长沙理工大学学报(社会科学版),2005,10(6)：16-21.
[36]Bain,J.Industrial Organization[M].New York:Wiley,1959
[37]Kogut,B.,and N.Kulatilaka,Options Thinking and Platform Investments:Investing in Opprotunity[J], California Management Review, Vol.36,No.2,Winter 1994,pp.52-67.
[38]Schumpeter,J.1934. The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge:Harvard University Press.Sep.
[39]Levinthal,D.A.1991. Organizational adaptation and environmental selection: Interrelated processes of change. Organization Science 2:140-5.
[40]Barney,J.B. Strategic factor markets:Expectations, luck and business strategy. Management Science 1986(32):1231-1241.
[41]Carr,P.,The Valuation of Sequential Exchange Opportunities.The Journal of Finance, Vol.43,No.5,Dec 1988,pp.1235-1256.
[42]Harrison,J.M.and D.Kreps,1979,Martingales and Arbitrage in Multiperiod Securities Markets[J] Journal of Economic Theory,Vol.20,pp.381-408.
[43]黄凯.期权定价理论的基本思路、方法及其在企业战略投资领域的应用.中国管理科学,1998,5(6)：11-16.
[44]谢联恒,孟繁.投资项目的传统评价方法和现实期权评-方法的比较分析.科技管理研究,2001(2)：54-57.
[45]张维,程功.实物期权方法的信息经济学解释.现代财经,2001,5(1)：11-16.
[46]方曙,武振业.实物期权理论及其在企业决策中的应用.科学管理研究,2001,5(4)：13_17
[47]张维,郑德渊.融资结构对R&D项目期权价值的影响研究.预侧.2001,5(1)：21-25
[48]杨春鹏,伍海华.实物期权在专利权价值评估中的应用.系统工程理论与实践,2002,11(6)：23-25
[49]简志宏,李楚霖.公司债务重组的实物期权方法研究.管理科学学报,2002,3(4)：31-35
[50]于洋,王辉,杜永怡.我国实物期权研究的回顾与思考.科研管理,2003,24(4)：35-37
[51]周立新,尹晓玲.实物期权理论及应用研究综述.重庆工商大学学报,2003,20(2)：24-27
[52]刘兵军,欧阳令南.实物期权在企业战略投资中的运用研究.工业工程与管理,2003,6(3)11-15
[53]李洪江,曲晓飞,冯敬海.阶段性投资最优比例问题的实物期权方法.管理科学学报,2003,6(1)：42-45
[54]庄新田,黄小原.委托代理框架下实物期权最优投资策略研究.控制与决策,2003,8(1)：41-45
[55]朱其树,赵喜仓.论实物期权在人力资源价值评估中的应用.商业研究,2003,5(1)：13-15.
[56]唐振鹏,黄杰.企业项目投资决策方法及其最新发展.科技管理研究,2003,7(1)：21-24.
[57]张坚,陶树人.基于遗传算法的R & D项目实物期权评价模型.科学学与科学技术管理,2003,5(4)：17-19
[58]李洪江,冯敬海,李汝船,曲晓飞.专有出版权定价的实物期权方法.系统工程理论方法应用,2002,7(4)：17-20
[59]Dean Paxson, Helena Pinto. Third Generation Mobile Games-An app;ication of real competition options.
[60]谭跃.中国3G移动通信服务的实物期权价值分析与香港的实践.2005,7(8)：81-83
[61]何家龙.差异化技术竞争下之投资决策：实质选择权分析法.通信世界,2005,5(5)：37-39
[62]方琮恺.台湾行动电话市场转换成本之估计：[硕士论文].台湾：中山国立大学.2006
[63]Vesa Riihimaki. Real Option Valuation of Broadband Access Networks-Statistical Analysis of WIMAX and ADSL Investments:Thesis.2006
[64]Fotios C, Harmantzis, Venkata Praveen Tanguturi. Investment decisions in the wireless industry applying real options. Telecommunications Policy 2007,31(07):107-123
[65]谈毅,冯宗宪.高新技术产业风险投资的期权特征与经济评价.科研管理,1999,9(3)：41-42
[66]郑德渊,伍青生,李湛.企业R & D项目的实物期权评价方法.研究与开发管理,2000.8
[67]杨宝臣,刘铮,张彤.基于Black-Scholes模型的公司资本结构模型.管理科学学报,1999,9(2)：25-29
[68]Trigeorgis, L.,1991,A Log-transformed Binomial Numerical Analysis Method for Valuing Complex Multi-Option Investments[J],Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis(September 1991).pp.309-326.
[69]Smit, H.T.J. and L.A.Ankum. A Real Options and Game-Theoretic Approach to
[70]Corporate Investment Strategy under Competition[J]. Financial Management, 1993(22):241-250
[71]Lambrecht, B. and W. Perraudin. Option Games[M]. Working Paper. Cambridge University.1994
[72]Trigeorgis,L.1996a,Real Options and Interactions with Financial Flexibility, Financial Management,Autumn, pp.202-224
[73]Grenadier,S.R. and A.M.Weiss. Investment in Technological Innovations:An Option Pricing Approach. Journal of Financial Economics,1997(44):397-416
[74]Amram,M. and N. Kulatilaka.Real Options:Managing Stragegic Investment in an Uncertain World.Harvard Business School Press,Boston,1999.
[75]Lintner,J.,1965,The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets,Review of Economics and Statistics,Vol.47,pp.13-37.
[76]Myers,S.,1977,Determinants of Capital Borrowing[J],Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.5(2),pp.147-175.
[77]Thijssen, J.J.J. and K.J.M Huisman. and P.M.Kort. The Effect of Information Streams on Capital Budgeting Decisions. Forthcoming in:European Journal of Operational Rearch,2003
[78]Dixit, A.K. Entry and Exit Decisions under Uncertainty. Journal of Political Economics,1989(97):620-638
[79]安瑛晖,张维.期权博弈理论的方法模型与发展.管理科学学报,2001,3(1)：13-18
[80]唐振鹏,刘国新.基于期权理论与博弈论的投资决策方法研究—不确定环境下的投资管理
[8l]王蔚松.竞争环境下公司投资战略的实物期权博弈思考.外国经济与管理,2003,25(9)：19-23
[82]雷星晖,李来竣,许庆瑞.R & D项目管理的模式及商标定为研究.科研管理,2001,4(2)：56-61
[83]吴建祖,张钢.试论界面管理发展的三个阶段.科研管理,2000,5(2)：34-37
[84]韩隽,郑德渊.融资结构对R仙项目期权价值的影响研究.预侧.2001,12(1)：45-51.
[85]悉尼·豪威尔,安德鲁·斯塔克,大卫·牛顿等著：徐海乐译,实物期权.经济管理出版社,2005.89-95
[86]王惠,吴冲锋,王意冈.期权定价理论在敏捷企业战略分析中的应用.系统工程与电子技术,21(11)：5-6.
[87]Hoppe, H.C. Second-mover Advantages in the Strategic Adoption of New Technology under Uncertainty [J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2000(18):315-338.
[88]Huisman, K.J.M. Technology Investment:a Game Theoretic Real Option Approach.Boston:Kluwer Academic Publish.2001
[89]蔚林巍,章刚,实物期权方法综述.企业经济,2005,15(5)：31-34
[90]周立新,尹晓玲.实物期权理论及应用研究综述.重庆工商大学学报(社会科学版),2003,5(4)：51-55
[91]Hull,J. and A.White,An Overview of Contigent Claims Pricing,Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, Vol.5,Sep1998,pp.55-61.
[92]曹宏铎,韩文秀,李昊.投资机会决策中分数布朗运动理论.系统工程学报,2001,8(1)：45-49
[93]高佳卿,刘胜军,康力立,李汉铃.资本投资的期权理论与方法.经济理论与经济管理,1998(2)：41-43
[94]齐安甜,张维.企业并购投资的期权特征及经济评价.系统工程,2001,9(5)：129-134
[95]Guiso,L and P.Giuseppe. Investment and Demand Uncertainty[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1999(114):185-228
[96]陈松男.金融分析—投资、融资策略与衍生创新.上海：复旦大学出版社,2001：145-147
[97]肖江月.实物期权理论及其在投资决策中的应用研究.湖南大学硕士学位论文,2002,138-172
[98]Merton,R.,Applications of Option-Pricing Theory:Twenty-Five Years Later,The American Economic Review,Vol.88,No.3,Jun 1998,pp.323-349.
[99]Merton,R.,Theory of Rational Option Pricing[J],Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,Vol.4,Spring 1973,pp.141-183.
[100]高芳敏,钱水土,盛建平.实物期权在风险投资决策中的应用研究.财经论丛,2001(1)：49-53.
[101]简志宏,李楚霖.公司债务重组的实物期权方法研究.管理科学学报,2002,5(5)：38-43.
[102]李子奈编著.计量经诉讼济学.高等教育出版社,2000.68-72
[103]Sprenkle,C.M.1961,Warrat Prices as Indicators of Expectations and Preferences,Yale Economic Essays,Vol.1.pp.172-231
[104]Prahalad, C.K. and G.Hamel.1990. The core competence of the corporation. Harvard Business Review 66(May/June):79-91
[105]Alchian,A. Uncertainty, evolution and economic theory. Journal of Political Economy,1950:211-221.
[106]陈龙.项目投资价值分析创新方法研究.厦门大学硕士学位论文,2002,89-92
[107]Hoppe, H.C. Second-mover Advantages in the Strategic Adoption of New Technology under Uncertainty. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2000(18):315-338
[108]Alvarez,L.H.R and R.Stenbacka. Adoption of Uncertain Multi-Stage Technology Projects:A Real Options Approach[J].Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2001(35):71-97
[109]Langlois,R.N.1995. Capabilities and coherence in firms and markets. In Montgomery,C.A.(ed.). Resource-based and Evolutionary Theories of the firm:Towards a Synthesis. Boston:Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[110]唐海洋.企业实物期权理论与方法研究.河北工业大学硕士学位论文,2002,59-62
[111]邓光军.技术创新投资项目实物期权定价.电子科技大学硕士学位论文,2002.89-92
[112]杨明,李楚霖.不确定竞争市场投资决策.经济数学,2002,19(2)：10-14
[113]吉姆·罗根斯著：宋清秋译,杨冠琼审.战略、价值与风险——不动产期权理论[M].经济管理出版社,2003.
[114]朱玉旭,黄洁纲,吴冲锋.序列投资决策的期权分析方法.管理科学学报,1997,8(2)：137-139.
[115]Dutta, P.K. and A. Rustichini. Equilibriua in Stochastic Games[J]. Journal of Economic theory,1995(67):1-39
[116]Lander, D.M. and G.E. Pinches, Challenges to the practical implementation of modeling and valuing real options[J], Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance. Greenwich:1998. Vol.38; p.537-568.
[117]杨明.有潜在竞争者的R & D项目策略分析.数量经济技术经济研究,2002(10):66-68.Amit,R. and P.J.H.Schoemaker. Strategic assets and organizational rent. Strategic Management Journal,1993(14):33-46.
[118]肖条军,盛昭翰.R & D中心与企业集团的博弈分析.中国管理科学,2000.7(8)：61-64
[119]Williamson,O.E. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism [M]. New York:Free Press,1985b.
[120]黎国华,黎凯.实物期权的二叉树模型应用.江西财经大学学报,2002,9(3)：
21-25
[121]叶瑛.基于期权理论的投资评价方法研究.大连理工大学硕士学位论文,2001.4551
[122]Barney,J. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management,1991(17):99-120.
[123]曾力勇,裘亚峥.不确定条件下房地产企业投资决策方法研究.求索,2005,5(10)：11-15
[124]Lint,O.,and E.Pennings,An Option Approach to the New Product Development Process:A Case Study at Phillips Electronics,R&D Management, Vol.31, No.2, 2001, pp.163-172.
[125]王迁.实物期权理论在企业投资决策中的应用[D].江西财经大学硕士学位论文,2002.
[126]Peteraf,M.A.,1993,the cornerstones of competitive advantage:a resource-based view,strategic management Journal,Vol.14,179-191
[127]项盛辉,何芳.实物期权方法在房地产开发中的应用.建筑管理现代化,2002,4(2)：41-46
[128]Sharpe,W.F.,1964,Capital Asset Prices:A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk,Journal of Finance,Vol.19,pp425-442.
[129]Weeds, H. Strategic Delay in a Real Options Model of R&D Competition. Review of Economic Studies,2002(69):729-747
[130]Teece,D.J., G.Pisano and A.Shuen.1997. Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. Strategic Management Journal 18:509-33.
[131]Sharp,D.J.1991,Uncovering the Hidden Value in High-Risk Investment,Sloan Management Review,Summer:69-74.
[132]范龙振,唐国兴.投资机会价值的期权评价方法.管理工程学报,2000,5(4)：41-51.
[133]周赫.现实期权理论及其在投资决策中的应用.大连理工大学硕士学位论文,2002.19-21
[134]Boyle,P.,Option Valuation Using a Three-Jump Process.International Options Journal,Vol.3,1986,pp.7-12.
[135]范龙振,唐国兴.投资机会的价值与投资决策-几何布朗运动.系统工程学报,1998,11(9)：15-21.
[136]Porter,M.E.1991.Towards a dynamic theory of strategy. Strategic Management Journal 12:95-117
[137]Andrews,K.R.. The Concept of Corporate Strategy.Homewood:Richard D. Irwin,1965.