武器装备采购中的监督和激励机制研究
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摘要
武器装备作为巩固国防、抵御侵略、保卫国家安全的重要手段和物质基础,是国防和军队现代化的重要标志。武器装备采购作为武器装备获取的根本途径,在武器装备建设中占有极其重要的地位。武器装备采购环境是否健康,规章制度是否健全,运行机制是否有效,直接关系到武器装备采购工作的质量和部队战斗力的生成。由于我国长期实行计划经济体制,武器装备一直是国家投资,定点研制,基本上不存在竞争,武器装备研制生产容易出现进度拖延,指标下降、经费上涨现象(简称“拖、降、涨”)。21世纪初,十大军工集团和解放军总装备部的相继成立,为武器装备采购实行市场化竞争格局创造了良好的环境。“坚持寓军于民,建立健全竞争、评价、监督和激励机制(简称:“四个机制”),增强自主创新能力,加快国防科技和武器装备发展”,成为新世纪武器装备采购发展的方向。
本文针对市场经济条件下,武器装备采购中还存在着“拖、降、涨”现象和“四个机制”建设不足等问题,站在军方的视角,围绕武器装备采购市场中的主要构成要素,运用委托代理理论、合约理论、机制设计理论和多属性决策理论与方法,设计出相应的监督和激励机制,旨在为武器装备采购政策制定和进一步发展提供参考依据和理论支持。
论文研究了以下几个方面的主要内容:
①武器装备采购驻厂军代表质量监督激励机制研究。针对武器装备采购方代表在质量监督过程中,有时存在道德风险和不作为的情况,建立了基于军代表质量监督特点和监督绩效的武器装备质量监督委托代理模型,并在信息对称与非对称两种情况下,设计出相应的激励机制,促使军代表在质量监督过程中选择对军方最有利的行为。
②武器装备研制费用补偿激励机制设计。考虑如何利用有限的研制采购经费激励军工企业参与研制竞争,尽好尽快地研制出性能优良,价格适中的武器装备。通过着力分析激励武器装备研制的有效杠杆——研制费用补偿率,建立起武器装备研制费用补偿模型,给出了能使企业按照军方所期望的投入规模进行武器装备研制的最优补偿比率和相应的对策建议。
③基于质量跟踪的武器装备装配系统激励机制设计。考虑如何运用有效激励机制和科学检测方法对武器装备生产过程进行质量检测和监督,以保证武器装备的生产质量。通过建立基于双边道德风险的武器装备装配系统质量跟踪和相应的激励机制,促使武器装备总装厂和配套件供应商在自利行为驱使下,按双方事先约定的质量水平进行武器装备成品和配套件生产,最大化武器装备装配系统和军工企业的利润。
④武器装备配套供应商选择与采购数量分配研究。主要是出于对武器装备配套供应商安全稳定或单个配套供应商供应能力不足的担心,考虑如何从众多的配套供应商中选择合适的配套供应商,并合理分配配套数量。通过建立一种多资源的2阶段混合型多属性决策模型,可以有效帮助军工企业选择产品质量、交货期、技术水平等符合要求的配套供应商,并合理分配采购数量,同时还能有效降低军工企业的采购成本。
⑤武器装备配套供应商质量监督和激励。针对武器装备配套件逐渐市场化的情况,考虑如何对配套供应商进行质量监督和相应的激励。通过建立军工企业与配套供应商质量监督模型,指出军工企业与驻厂军代表要根据配套供应商弄虚作假所获收益情况、检查监督难度和惩罚大小等因素,调整监督检查方式。同时,通过推行优质优价、优质优量,将会有效提高配套厂家的积极性。
论文具有以下创新:
①建立了基于军代表绩效和外部环境因素的质量监督博弈模型,提出了军代表参与武器装备采购质量监督的激励机制。
本论文结合军代表工作实际,在综合考虑军代表工作能力水平、检查监督频次等影响军代表工作绩效的特质因素和外部随机因素的基础上,建立了武器装备采购过程中军方与军代表之间委托代理模型。该模型在一般绩效模型基础上,具有以下几个方面的改进:一是细化努力绩效,把军代表监督频次,技术能力一并考虑进去;二是对于外生不确定因素对绩效影响进行细化,给出一定的影响系数;三是把外生变量具体化为军品外贸订货量,考虑其对军代表工作绩效的影响。所建立的模型分析表明对激励军代表开展质量监督工作能起到较好的作用。
②建立了基于质量跟踪的武器装备装配生产质量监督博弈模型,提出了基于质量跟踪的武器装备制造企业的生产质量控制激励机制。
本论文区别传统武器装备制造中对外购配套件质量监督一般采用事前检测和监督的方式,对所外购配套件不入库检测,只进行质量跟踪。当最终生产出的武器装备出现质量问题时,由军工企业先行对军方作出相应的赔偿,然后由独立第3方(军代表)对武器装备进行质量跟踪,找出质量问题责任方,让其承担相应质量责任。这种方法改变了以往配套件厂商对配套件质量把关动力不足,以及虽然是外购配套件出现质量问题却容易让军工制造企业承担较重质量责任的状况。同时,减轻了军工企业和军代表质量监督的工作量,有效提高了武器装备质量,并有助于最大化武器装备装配系统和军工企业本身的利润。
③建立了混合型多属性决策模型,提出了一种选择武器装备配套供应商并在其之间科学分配配套件采购数量的方法。
目前对于武器装备配套供应商的选择方法研究较少,且大都是定性化的研究。本文建立了一种多资源的2阶段混合型多属性决策模型,分别用熵系数模型确定配套供应商评价指标的客观权重,用TOPSIS模型排定方案优劣次序;然后建立多目标规划模型确定采购数量在入选供应商之间的分配,既真实地从产品质量、交货期、技术水平等情况刻画了配套供应商选择的实际情况,又有效帮助军工企业选择符合要求的配套供应商,并合理分配采购数量。
As an important means and material base of consolidating national defenses, resisting aggressions and defending the national securities, weapon equipment is an important symbol of the modernization of national defense and armed forces. As a fundamental way to obtain weapon equipment, the weapon equipment procurement occupies an extremely important position in the weapons equipment construction. The quality of weapon equipment procurement and troop fighting are directly related to its healthy environment, sound rules and regulations, and effective operating mechanism. Because of a long-term of planned economic system in China, weapon equipment has been a national investment, on-site research. Basically, there is no competition in weapon equipment. The development and production of weapon equipment is prone to some phenomena such as delays in progress, indicators declined and funding rising ("dragging, dropping, rising"). At the early 21st century, ten military industry groups and the PLA General Armament Department have been established which creates a good environment to implement a market-oriented pattern of competition in the weapon equipment procurement. It is necessary to deepen the restructuring of defense-related science, technology and industry, combine military efforts with civilian support, establish and improve the mechanism of competition, appraisal, supervision and incentive (referred to as "four mechanism") and enhance the capabilities of independent innovation so as to speed up the development of defense-related science and technology as well as arms and equipment. And this is the development direction of weapon equipment procurement in the new century.
Standing on the military perspective, the paper, which aims at the "dragging, dropping, rising" in weapon equipment procurement and the insufficiency on "four mechanism" under market economic condition, designed the supervision and incentive system with the principal-agent theory, contract theory, mechanism design theory and multi-attribute decision-making,in order to make a reference and theory support for setting up weapon equipment procurement policy and its further development by deduction of the principal elements of the weapon equipment procurement market.
This paper deals with the contents as the following aspects:
①Study on quality supervision and incentive mechanism by factory-location military representatives for weapon equipment. Aiming at the circumstances of moral risks or weak-execution of factory-location military representatives, the quality supervision of principal-agent model for weapon equipment has been set up on the basis of quality supervision system and supervision performance, while the incentive mechanism has also been designed accordingly under the circumstances of information symmetry and asymmetry, which urges military representative to make the choices that benefit the military party.
②The design of reimbursement incentive mechanism for weapon equipment development cost. The thesis argues how to use the limited development and procurement funds to encourage the military industry enterprises to get involved into competition and quickly develop the excellent cost-performance military hardware. Furthermore, weapon equipment development cost reimbursement model has been established and the best rate of research and development reimbursement anticipated by the military industry enterprises has been offered, while the corresponding advices have also been proposed through the analysis of the best rate of research and development cost reimbursement which is the effective gearing of stimulating weapon equipment development.
③The incentive mechanism design in weapon equipment assemble system base on quality tracing. To ensure the weapon equipment’s quality, the paper thinks over the means of applying the effective incentive mechanism and scientific methods to test and inspect the weapon equipment productive progress. Through setting up the weapon equipment quality tracing and corresponding incentive mechanisms which are based on the double moral hazard, urge the weapon equipment assembly factory and components supplier to make the weapon equipment assembly and components production according to the promissory quality standard while maximize the weapon equipment enterprises’profit.
④The study on weapon equipment supplier’s selection and procurement quantity allocation. To select the appreciate ones from the crowds of suppliers and to allocate supplying quantity among them according to the stability and deliverability of the suppliers. To help the military industry enterprises selecting the qualified suppliers in quality, lead time and technique level, distributing the procurement quantity justly and cutting down the procurement cost by setting up two phase multi-attribute decision-making method.
⑤The quality supervision and incentive for weapon equipment suppliers. The paper discusses how to supervise the vendor’s quality and offer the corresponding incentive under the circumstances of weapon equipment components’marketization. Through establishing the supervision model to military industry enterprises and the vendors, the paper reaches the conclusion that inspection mode should be improved in accordance with the situation that military industry enterprises get benefits by practicing fraud, the supervision difficulty degree and the severity. Meanwhile, the measure of“high quality, high price, and high quantity”is also to be argued for boosting the vendors’enthusiasm.
This paper has the following innovations:
①The paper establishes a game theory model of quality supervision based on the military representative performance and the external environmental factors and puts forward incentive mechanism of quality supervision for the military representative taking part in weapon equipment procurement.
This paper comprehensively considers the trait factors which influence the performance of military representative performance such as the ability level of the military performance, frequency of supervision, and external random factors, establishing a principal-agent model between the military and the military performance in the period of weapon equipment procurement. This model based on the classic performance model, which makes such improvements: First, the effort performance has been refined and the supervision frequency of military performance and technical capacity are taken into account. Second, the influence which exogenous uncertainty factors impact on the performance is refined, and a certain degree of influence is given. Third, specifies the exogenous variables to military order of foreign trade in the expansion model, considering the performance impact of military performance. The model shows that it can play a better role to incentive the military representative to carry out quality supervision.
②The paper establishes a game theory model of quality supervision for assembly and produce of weapon equipment and presents incentive mechanism of quality control for weapon equipment product based on quality track.
This paper is different from those generally use the pre-testing and monitoring methods when monitor the quality of purchased component in conventional weapon equipment product. The manufacture does not test the outsourcing component, only for quality tracking. When the final product of weapon equipment have a quality problems, first the military manufacture make appropriate compensation for the military, after a quality track to weapon equipment is made by an independent 3rd party (the military representatives),and find identify quality problems responsible parties, let it take the corresponding responsibility for quality. This after-way changes the manufacturers’opinion of the component quality. And it converts the situation in which manufacturers are easy to take a heavier military responsibility though the quality of a purchased component is the main cause. This approach reduces the workload of quality supervision in the military industrial enterprises and military performance and improves the quality of weapon equipment effectively, and maximizes the profits of weapon equipment, system and military factories.
③The paper establishes a hybrid multi-attribute model and presents a method of choice among weapons equipment suppliers and in its distribution of the number of component scientifically.
At present, the researches for selection method of weapon equipment supplier are not so much, and most of them are qualitative research. This paper constructs a decision model with multi-resources, two stages and hybrid multi-attribute. In this model, the entropy coefficient model is applied to confirm the objective weights of supplier evaluation index, and TOPSIS model is applied to arrange the order of scheduled programs; then a multi-objective programming model is established to determine the number of the distribution between selected suppliers. This model can not only depict the actual situation of selected suppliers in several faces, such as quality, delivery, and technical level; but also help the military enterprises effectively choose the requirements of supporting suppliers, and reasonably distribute the quantity of purchase.
本文针对市场经济条件下,武器装备采购中还存在着“拖、降、涨”现象和“四个机制”建设不足等问题,站在军方的视角,围绕武器装备采购市场中的主要构成要素,运用委托代理理论、合约理论、机制设计理论和多属性决策理论与方法,设计出相应的监督和激励机制,旨在为武器装备采购政策制定和进一步发展提供参考依据和理论支持。
论文研究了以下几个方面的主要内容:
①武器装备采购驻厂军代表质量监督激励机制研究。针对武器装备采购方代表在质量监督过程中,有时存在道德风险和不作为的情况,建立了基于军代表质量监督特点和监督绩效的武器装备质量监督委托代理模型,并在信息对称与非对称两种情况下,设计出相应的激励机制,促使军代表在质量监督过程中选择对军方最有利的行为。
②武器装备研制费用补偿激励机制设计。考虑如何利用有限的研制采购经费激励军工企业参与研制竞争,尽好尽快地研制出性能优良,价格适中的武器装备。通过着力分析激励武器装备研制的有效杠杆——研制费用补偿率,建立起武器装备研制费用补偿模型,给出了能使企业按照军方所期望的投入规模进行武器装备研制的最优补偿比率和相应的对策建议。
③基于质量跟踪的武器装备装配系统激励机制设计。考虑如何运用有效激励机制和科学检测方法对武器装备生产过程进行质量检测和监督,以保证武器装备的生产质量。通过建立基于双边道德风险的武器装备装配系统质量跟踪和相应的激励机制,促使武器装备总装厂和配套件供应商在自利行为驱使下,按双方事先约定的质量水平进行武器装备成品和配套件生产,最大化武器装备装配系统和军工企业的利润。
④武器装备配套供应商选择与采购数量分配研究。主要是出于对武器装备配套供应商安全稳定或单个配套供应商供应能力不足的担心,考虑如何从众多的配套供应商中选择合适的配套供应商,并合理分配配套数量。通过建立一种多资源的2阶段混合型多属性决策模型,可以有效帮助军工企业选择产品质量、交货期、技术水平等符合要求的配套供应商,并合理分配采购数量,同时还能有效降低军工企业的采购成本。
⑤武器装备配套供应商质量监督和激励。针对武器装备配套件逐渐市场化的情况,考虑如何对配套供应商进行质量监督和相应的激励。通过建立军工企业与配套供应商质量监督模型,指出军工企业与驻厂军代表要根据配套供应商弄虚作假所获收益情况、检查监督难度和惩罚大小等因素,调整监督检查方式。同时,通过推行优质优价、优质优量,将会有效提高配套厂家的积极性。
论文具有以下创新:
①建立了基于军代表绩效和外部环境因素的质量监督博弈模型,提出了军代表参与武器装备采购质量监督的激励机制。
本论文结合军代表工作实际,在综合考虑军代表工作能力水平、检查监督频次等影响军代表工作绩效的特质因素和外部随机因素的基础上,建立了武器装备采购过程中军方与军代表之间委托代理模型。该模型在一般绩效模型基础上,具有以下几个方面的改进:一是细化努力绩效,把军代表监督频次,技术能力一并考虑进去;二是对于外生不确定因素对绩效影响进行细化,给出一定的影响系数;三是把外生变量具体化为军品外贸订货量,考虑其对军代表工作绩效的影响。所建立的模型分析表明对激励军代表开展质量监督工作能起到较好的作用。
②建立了基于质量跟踪的武器装备装配生产质量监督博弈模型,提出了基于质量跟踪的武器装备制造企业的生产质量控制激励机制。
本论文区别传统武器装备制造中对外购配套件质量监督一般采用事前检测和监督的方式,对所外购配套件不入库检测,只进行质量跟踪。当最终生产出的武器装备出现质量问题时,由军工企业先行对军方作出相应的赔偿,然后由独立第3方(军代表)对武器装备进行质量跟踪,找出质量问题责任方,让其承担相应质量责任。这种方法改变了以往配套件厂商对配套件质量把关动力不足,以及虽然是外购配套件出现质量问题却容易让军工制造企业承担较重质量责任的状况。同时,减轻了军工企业和军代表质量监督的工作量,有效提高了武器装备质量,并有助于最大化武器装备装配系统和军工企业本身的利润。
③建立了混合型多属性决策模型,提出了一种选择武器装备配套供应商并在其之间科学分配配套件采购数量的方法。
目前对于武器装备配套供应商的选择方法研究较少,且大都是定性化的研究。本文建立了一种多资源的2阶段混合型多属性决策模型,分别用熵系数模型确定配套供应商评价指标的客观权重,用TOPSIS模型排定方案优劣次序;然后建立多目标规划模型确定采购数量在入选供应商之间的分配,既真实地从产品质量、交货期、技术水平等情况刻画了配套供应商选择的实际情况,又有效帮助军工企业选择符合要求的配套供应商,并合理分配采购数量。
As an important means and material base of consolidating national defenses, resisting aggressions and defending the national securities, weapon equipment is an important symbol of the modernization of national defense and armed forces. As a fundamental way to obtain weapon equipment, the weapon equipment procurement occupies an extremely important position in the weapons equipment construction. The quality of weapon equipment procurement and troop fighting are directly related to its healthy environment, sound rules and regulations, and effective operating mechanism. Because of a long-term of planned economic system in China, weapon equipment has been a national investment, on-site research. Basically, there is no competition in weapon equipment. The development and production of weapon equipment is prone to some phenomena such as delays in progress, indicators declined and funding rising ("dragging, dropping, rising"). At the early 21st century, ten military industry groups and the PLA General Armament Department have been established which creates a good environment to implement a market-oriented pattern of competition in the weapon equipment procurement. It is necessary to deepen the restructuring of defense-related science, technology and industry, combine military efforts with civilian support, establish and improve the mechanism of competition, appraisal, supervision and incentive (referred to as "four mechanism") and enhance the capabilities of independent innovation so as to speed up the development of defense-related science and technology as well as arms and equipment. And this is the development direction of weapon equipment procurement in the new century.
Standing on the military perspective, the paper, which aims at the "dragging, dropping, rising" in weapon equipment procurement and the insufficiency on "four mechanism" under market economic condition, designed the supervision and incentive system with the principal-agent theory, contract theory, mechanism design theory and multi-attribute decision-making,in order to make a reference and theory support for setting up weapon equipment procurement policy and its further development by deduction of the principal elements of the weapon equipment procurement market.
This paper deals with the contents as the following aspects:
①Study on quality supervision and incentive mechanism by factory-location military representatives for weapon equipment. Aiming at the circumstances of moral risks or weak-execution of factory-location military representatives, the quality supervision of principal-agent model for weapon equipment has been set up on the basis of quality supervision system and supervision performance, while the incentive mechanism has also been designed accordingly under the circumstances of information symmetry and asymmetry, which urges military representative to make the choices that benefit the military party.
②The design of reimbursement incentive mechanism for weapon equipment development cost. The thesis argues how to use the limited development and procurement funds to encourage the military industry enterprises to get involved into competition and quickly develop the excellent cost-performance military hardware. Furthermore, weapon equipment development cost reimbursement model has been established and the best rate of research and development reimbursement anticipated by the military industry enterprises has been offered, while the corresponding advices have also been proposed through the analysis of the best rate of research and development cost reimbursement which is the effective gearing of stimulating weapon equipment development.
③The incentive mechanism design in weapon equipment assemble system base on quality tracing. To ensure the weapon equipment’s quality, the paper thinks over the means of applying the effective incentive mechanism and scientific methods to test and inspect the weapon equipment productive progress. Through setting up the weapon equipment quality tracing and corresponding incentive mechanisms which are based on the double moral hazard, urge the weapon equipment assembly factory and components supplier to make the weapon equipment assembly and components production according to the promissory quality standard while maximize the weapon equipment enterprises’profit.
④The study on weapon equipment supplier’s selection and procurement quantity allocation. To select the appreciate ones from the crowds of suppliers and to allocate supplying quantity among them according to the stability and deliverability of the suppliers. To help the military industry enterprises selecting the qualified suppliers in quality, lead time and technique level, distributing the procurement quantity justly and cutting down the procurement cost by setting up two phase multi-attribute decision-making method.
⑤The quality supervision and incentive for weapon equipment suppliers. The paper discusses how to supervise the vendor’s quality and offer the corresponding incentive under the circumstances of weapon equipment components’marketization. Through establishing the supervision model to military industry enterprises and the vendors, the paper reaches the conclusion that inspection mode should be improved in accordance with the situation that military industry enterprises get benefits by practicing fraud, the supervision difficulty degree and the severity. Meanwhile, the measure of“high quality, high price, and high quantity”is also to be argued for boosting the vendors’enthusiasm.
This paper has the following innovations:
①The paper establishes a game theory model of quality supervision based on the military representative performance and the external environmental factors and puts forward incentive mechanism of quality supervision for the military representative taking part in weapon equipment procurement.
This paper comprehensively considers the trait factors which influence the performance of military representative performance such as the ability level of the military performance, frequency of supervision, and external random factors, establishing a principal-agent model between the military and the military performance in the period of weapon equipment procurement. This model based on the classic performance model, which makes such improvements: First, the effort performance has been refined and the supervision frequency of military performance and technical capacity are taken into account. Second, the influence which exogenous uncertainty factors impact on the performance is refined, and a certain degree of influence is given. Third, specifies the exogenous variables to military order of foreign trade in the expansion model, considering the performance impact of military performance. The model shows that it can play a better role to incentive the military representative to carry out quality supervision.
②The paper establishes a game theory model of quality supervision for assembly and produce of weapon equipment and presents incentive mechanism of quality control for weapon equipment product based on quality track.
This paper is different from those generally use the pre-testing and monitoring methods when monitor the quality of purchased component in conventional weapon equipment product. The manufacture does not test the outsourcing component, only for quality tracking. When the final product of weapon equipment have a quality problems, first the military manufacture make appropriate compensation for the military, after a quality track to weapon equipment is made by an independent 3rd party (the military representatives),and find identify quality problems responsible parties, let it take the corresponding responsibility for quality. This after-way changes the manufacturers’opinion of the component quality. And it converts the situation in which manufacturers are easy to take a heavier military responsibility though the quality of a purchased component is the main cause. This approach reduces the workload of quality supervision in the military industrial enterprises and military performance and improves the quality of weapon equipment effectively, and maximizes the profits of weapon equipment, system and military factories.
③The paper establishes a hybrid multi-attribute model and presents a method of choice among weapons equipment suppliers and in its distribution of the number of component scientifically.
At present, the researches for selection method of weapon equipment supplier are not so much, and most of them are qualitative research. This paper constructs a decision model with multi-resources, two stages and hybrid multi-attribute. In this model, the entropy coefficient model is applied to confirm the objective weights of supplier evaluation index, and TOPSIS model is applied to arrange the order of scheduled programs; then a multi-objective programming model is established to determine the number of the distribution between selected suppliers. This model can not only depict the actual situation of selected suppliers in several faces, such as quality, delivery, and technical level; but also help the military enterprises effectively choose the requirements of supporting suppliers, and reasonably distribute the quantity of purchase.
引文
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