转型期乡村庇护网络与基层治理变迁研究
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摘要
权力与治理是乡村中国研究的两个主题,20世纪80年代开始,中国进入转型期,国家一社会关系不断调整,这对乡村社会的关系网络和治理过程产生了重大影响。对于转型期权力结构与地方治理的变化,国家中心理论和社会中心理论进行了不同的解释。从国家视角进行解释的学者强调国家制度对行动者的作用,一方面,国家税收制度和权力下放,激励了地方政府和官员的行为,促进了乡镇企业的发展和地方经济的转型;另一方面,国家行政制度中干部管理和监控制度扭曲了地方官员的行为,基层精英的滥权行为恶化了基层治理和社会秩序。而以社会为中心的理论则强调非正式制度对行动者的影响。在社会资本理论的影响下,认为社会组织(包括庙宇、教堂和宗族等)的发达程度决定了乡村治理的方式和水平,这样,社会中心理论解释了社会结构和价值规范与基层治理的关系。
本文在整合这两种理论视角的基础上,主张从权力的关系网络角度解释地方治理的变化。权力的关系网络在本文被定义为庇护关系网络,其来源于交换理论、网络分析和理性选择理论,权力关系网络视角认为关系网络结构影响共同体的资源动员和集体行动。通过对T村的实证研究,发现转型期,乡村社会的庇护网络结构发生了变化,这种变化直接影响了公共产品的供给方式和水平。具体变迁过程如下:转型前期,国家农业税收和计划生育政策的实施,强化了基层精英的代理人地位,在权力资源增多和农民利益诉求的驱动下,乡村社会延续了基层政治精英一村民间的庇护关系。单一的庇护网络结构被应用于村落共同体的公共治理时,保证了资源动员和集体行动的成功。与此不同,转型后期,乡村社会在市场化、城市化的渗透下,出现了阶层的分化,经济精英作为一个群体形成。同时,国家对农村的制度和政策重新进行调整。在市场和国家的互动作用下,乡村社会单一的庇护网络结构分裂为多元结构,形成了乡村政治精英一经济精英,经济精英一村民和政治精英一村民三种庇护形式。庇护网络结构的变化导致了村落资源动员和集体行动的失败,进而影响了乡村治理水平的提高。
综合以上分析,可以得知本文的核心理论假设是:单一网络结构有利于资源动员和集体行动,多元网络结构则相反,基层社区的关系网络结构决定了乡村治理的方式和水平。通过对T村的个案分析,本文检验了这一理论假设。
For Students, power and governance are the two themes in the study on rural China. With the economic and social transitions in China from the beginning of the 1980s, the state-society relationship also follows changes, which influences power relations and process of governance in rural society. Then what changes happen to power relations in rural China? How do these changes bear upon rural governance? How to explain the deterioration of governance level in rural areas? Why do the village election institutions not improve the level of rural governance?
To respond the questions, some analysts develop two approaches: the state-centered theory and the society-centered theory. The statist approach focuses on state institutions' roles in process of modernization involving two kinds of viewpoints. On the one hand, some students claim that local governments and incumbents gain more incentives to develop local economy under the reform of fiscal institution and power transformation toward state agents, which are regarded as "developmental state" according to the experiences from other East Asian states. On the other hand, some analysts challenging developmental state model argue that Chinese administrative institutions including cadre management and monitoring systems, personnel system reshape local agents' behaviors, which means local cadres' abuse of power over society. As the result, there are more and more social conflicts and contentious events in countryside. The state-centered theory is criticized for neglecting informal institutions' roles in grassroots governance by society-centered approach. The social approach from social capital theory emphasizes social norms and autonomic organizations values on rural governance. Thus from the social approach, to some extent, governance level in rural areas depends on amount of social capital available. The social-centered theory explains why there is maybe high-level governance for some areas with low-level economic performance, but it doesn't explain why there are different governance performances in the whole period for the same community. In addition, how marketization and urbanization impact on rural goverance is not exlpored. Therefore this study attempts to incorporate the two types of approaches into one framework-power relations network theory, that is to say, rural goverance and changes will be explained by this approach.
In this study, power relations is defined as patron-client relations which are based on individual choice, resources exchange and network norms. The core point of power relations network theory is that network structure has great effect on resource mobilizaiton and collcetive action determining the supply of public goods and services in grassroots community. According to my investigations on T village, structural changes of clientelism network in rural area influence governance methods and process for the supply of public goods. The process of changes in detail is following:
(Ⅰ) In the former period of Chinese transition, rural elites, losing the absolute control over distribution of economic resources acquire more power resources as local state-agents with the agricultural taxation and family-planning policies being implemented. Meanwhile, these resources and policies directly get involved in villagers' interests. Under the interaction between power elites and peasants, the single patron-client relation structure remains as the one in Maoist era. Thus being applied to public governance, such relation network structure is capable of keeping effectiveness of resources mobilization and collective action.
(Ⅱ) In the late period of Chinese transition, social differentiation appears in rural area under the impact of marketization and urbanization which is characterized by the rise of businessmen as a group. Besides the social structural changes, central government also adjusts its policies toward villages, especially abolishing the agricultural taxation. Hence, under the interaction between market and state, the single clientelism relation network splits into three forms of patron-client relations which is involved in political elites-economic elites relation, economic elite-peasant relation and political elite-peasant relation. Trilateral clientelism network structures is unable to ensure effective collective action in the provision of public goods, thus influencing the governance level in rural areas.
In a few words, from the statements above, we can get the core research hypothesis is that single relation network structure contributes more to resources mobilization and collective action for supplying public goods than plural network structures do. To some extent, relation network structure determines the level of governance in rual community. In the thesis, the research hypothesis is tested with qualitative data from fieldwork at T village.
本文在整合这两种理论视角的基础上,主张从权力的关系网络角度解释地方治理的变化。权力的关系网络在本文被定义为庇护关系网络,其来源于交换理论、网络分析和理性选择理论,权力关系网络视角认为关系网络结构影响共同体的资源动员和集体行动。通过对T村的实证研究,发现转型期,乡村社会的庇护网络结构发生了变化,这种变化直接影响了公共产品的供给方式和水平。具体变迁过程如下:转型前期,国家农业税收和计划生育政策的实施,强化了基层精英的代理人地位,在权力资源增多和农民利益诉求的驱动下,乡村社会延续了基层政治精英一村民间的庇护关系。单一的庇护网络结构被应用于村落共同体的公共治理时,保证了资源动员和集体行动的成功。与此不同,转型后期,乡村社会在市场化、城市化的渗透下,出现了阶层的分化,经济精英作为一个群体形成。同时,国家对农村的制度和政策重新进行调整。在市场和国家的互动作用下,乡村社会单一的庇护网络结构分裂为多元结构,形成了乡村政治精英一经济精英,经济精英一村民和政治精英一村民三种庇护形式。庇护网络结构的变化导致了村落资源动员和集体行动的失败,进而影响了乡村治理水平的提高。
综合以上分析,可以得知本文的核心理论假设是:单一网络结构有利于资源动员和集体行动,多元网络结构则相反,基层社区的关系网络结构决定了乡村治理的方式和水平。通过对T村的个案分析,本文检验了这一理论假设。
For Students, power and governance are the two themes in the study on rural China. With the economic and social transitions in China from the beginning of the 1980s, the state-society relationship also follows changes, which influences power relations and process of governance in rural society. Then what changes happen to power relations in rural China? How do these changes bear upon rural governance? How to explain the deterioration of governance level in rural areas? Why do the village election institutions not improve the level of rural governance?
To respond the questions, some analysts develop two approaches: the state-centered theory and the society-centered theory. The statist approach focuses on state institutions' roles in process of modernization involving two kinds of viewpoints. On the one hand, some students claim that local governments and incumbents gain more incentives to develop local economy under the reform of fiscal institution and power transformation toward state agents, which are regarded as "developmental state" according to the experiences from other East Asian states. On the other hand, some analysts challenging developmental state model argue that Chinese administrative institutions including cadre management and monitoring systems, personnel system reshape local agents' behaviors, which means local cadres' abuse of power over society. As the result, there are more and more social conflicts and contentious events in countryside. The state-centered theory is criticized for neglecting informal institutions' roles in grassroots governance by society-centered approach. The social approach from social capital theory emphasizes social norms and autonomic organizations values on rural governance. Thus from the social approach, to some extent, governance level in rural areas depends on amount of social capital available. The social-centered theory explains why there is maybe high-level governance for some areas with low-level economic performance, but it doesn't explain why there are different governance performances in the whole period for the same community. In addition, how marketization and urbanization impact on rural goverance is not exlpored. Therefore this study attempts to incorporate the two types of approaches into one framework-power relations network theory, that is to say, rural goverance and changes will be explained by this approach.
In this study, power relations is defined as patron-client relations which are based on individual choice, resources exchange and network norms. The core point of power relations network theory is that network structure has great effect on resource mobilizaiton and collcetive action determining the supply of public goods and services in grassroots community. According to my investigations on T village, structural changes of clientelism network in rural area influence governance methods and process for the supply of public goods. The process of changes in detail is following:
(Ⅰ) In the former period of Chinese transition, rural elites, losing the absolute control over distribution of economic resources acquire more power resources as local state-agents with the agricultural taxation and family-planning policies being implemented. Meanwhile, these resources and policies directly get involved in villagers' interests. Under the interaction between power elites and peasants, the single patron-client relation structure remains as the one in Maoist era. Thus being applied to public governance, such relation network structure is capable of keeping effectiveness of resources mobilization and collective action.
(Ⅱ) In the late period of Chinese transition, social differentiation appears in rural area under the impact of marketization and urbanization which is characterized by the rise of businessmen as a group. Besides the social structural changes, central government also adjusts its policies toward villages, especially abolishing the agricultural taxation. Hence, under the interaction between market and state, the single clientelism relation network splits into three forms of patron-client relations which is involved in political elites-economic elites relation, economic elite-peasant relation and political elite-peasant relation. Trilateral clientelism network structures is unable to ensure effective collective action in the provision of public goods, thus influencing the governance level in rural areas.
In a few words, from the statements above, we can get the core research hypothesis is that single relation network structure contributes more to resources mobilization and collective action for supplying public goods than plural network structures do. To some extent, relation network structure determines the level of governance in rual community. In the thesis, the research hypothesis is tested with qualitative data from fieldwork at T village.
引文
1 费孝通:《乡土中国生育制度》,北京:北京大学出版社,1998年版,第24-30页,64-68页。
2 梁漱溟:《乡村建设理论》,上海:上海人民出版社,2006年版,第115-249页。
3[美]杜赞奇:《文化、权力与国家:1900-1942年的华北农村》,南京:江苏人民出版社,2003年版,第10-16页,40-52页。
4[美]施坚雅:《中国农村的市场和社会结构》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,1998年版,第5-11页。
5[美]黄宗智:《华北的小农经济与社会变迁》,北京:中华书局,2000年版,第5-7页。
6 例如,韦伯(Max Weber)认为“权力意味着在一种社会关系里哪怕遇到反对也能贯彻自己意志的任何机会,不管这种机会是建立在什么基础之上。”这里,权力被看作行动的潜在能力。参见[德]马克斯·韦伯:《经济与社会》(上),北京:商务印书馆,1997年版,第81页。而朗(Dennis H.Wrong)则把权力看作某些人对他人产生预期效果的能力,其基础包括个人资源和集体资源,个人资源包括财富、声望和专长等;集体资源包括将个人资源集中起来,服务于共同目标的资源。见[美]丹尼斯·朗:《权力论》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2001年版,第3页,154.166页。达尔(Robert A.Dahl)则把权力等同于影响力,他假设一个体系中只有两个人,A和B。如果A以某些方式改变了B的行动或倾向,那么A就对B有影响力和权力。参见[美]罗伯特·A·达尔:《现代政治分析》,上海译文出版社,1987年版,第30-52页。
7[美]史蒂文·卢克斯:《权力一种激进的观点》,南京:江苏人民出版社,2008年版,第18页。
8 交换理论和网络分析,作为两种分析社会结构的理论方法,具有相似的“结构”(Structure)和“行动”(Action)概念,但交换理论更强调个体行为者的利益和动机,而网络分析侧重网络结构对社会行为和社会变迁的约束。关于这两种理论方法的异同,参见K.S.Cook and J.M.Whitmeyer,"Two Approaches to Social Structure:Exchange Theory and Network Analysis",Annual Review of Sociology,Vol.18(1992),pp.109-127.
9 回归国家学派是20世纪80年代兴起于美国的社会科学研究流派,以Theda Skocpol和Peter B.Evans等人为代表,他们强调国家既作为组织结构又作为自治行动者的角色,通过对国家结构和能力的概念化来解释国家的形成和重构,以及国家对社会的影响。具体参见Peter B.Evans,Dietrich Rueschemeyer,Theda Skocpol(eds),Bring the State Back in(Cambridge University Press,1985).
10 王绍光 胡鞍钢:《中国国家能力报告》,沈阳:辽宁人民出版社,1993年版,第6-9页。
11[美]塞缪尔·亨廷顿:《变动社会中的政治秩序》,北京:华夏出版社,1988年版,第12页。
12 Jean C.Oi,"Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China",World Politics,Vol.45,No.1(Oct.,1992),pp.99-126."The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy",The China Quarterly,No.144.Special Issue:China's Transitional Economy(Dec.,1995),pp.1132-1149."The Evolution of Local State Corporatism" in Andrew Walder(eds.).Zuoping in Transition:The Process of Reform in North Rural China(Cambridge Mass:Harvard University Press,1998)."Local State Corporatism." in Jean.C.Oi(eds.).Rural China Takes Off:Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform(Berkeley:University of California Press,1999).
13 Andrew G Walder,"Local Governments as Industrial Firms:An Organizational Analysis of China's Transition Economy",The American Journal of Sociology,Vol.101,No.2(Sep.,1995),pp.263-301.
14 Marc Blecher and Vivienne Shue,Tethered Deer:Government and Economy in a Chinese County(Stanford:Stanford University Press,1996),pp.202-222.
15 托尼·赛奇(Tony Saich):“盲人摸象:中国地方政府分析”,载《经济社会体制比较》,2006年第4期。
16 对“发展型”和“掠夺性”国家的介绍和讨论,参见Lijun Chen,"Building Local State Capacity in China",Phd dissertation,The University of Chicago,2004,pp.8-10.See also Jianxun Wang,"Political Economy of Village Governance in Contemporary China",Phd dissertation,Indiana University,2006,pp.6-7.
17 Sally Sargeson and Jian Zhang,"Reassessing the Role of the Local State:A Case Study of Local Government Interventions in Property Rights Reform in a Hangzhou District",The China Journal,No.42(Jul.,1999),pp.77-99.
18 托尼·赛奇(Tony Saich):“盲人摸象:中国地方政府分析”,载《经济社会体制比较》,2006年第4期。
19 这里的基层政权包括乡镇和村两级,张静把两者看作一个整体,用于分析国家与社会的关系以及对乡村治理产生的影响。具体参见张静:《基层政权——乡村制度诸问题》,杭州:浙江人民出版社,2000年版。
20 这个概念是张静分析中国乡村政权时的核心概念之一,她认为1949年之后农村权威组织的重构并没有改变“结构性利益分离”的趋势,其表现在四个方面:一是基层政权关心上级利益和自我利益胜过关心农民利益;二是基层政权与农民之间相互不信任,充满隔阂;三是基层权力精英滥用公共权力;四是干部与村民之间的信息流通不畅。参见张静:《基层政权——乡村制度诸问题》,杭州:浙江人民出版社,2000年版,第38-41页。
21 张静:《基层政权——乡村制度诸问题》,杭州:浙江人民出版社,2000年版,第288页。
22 杨善华 苏红:“从代理型政权经营者到谋利型政权经营者”,载《社会学研究》,2002年第1期。
23 王绍光 胡鞍钢:《国家能力报告》沈阳:辽宁人民出版社,1993年版,第38-54页。
24 Yasheng Huang,"Central-Local Relations in China During The Reform Era:The Economic and Institutional Dimensions",World Development,Vol.24,No.4(1996).Inflation and Investment Controls in China:The Political Economy of Central-Local Relations During the Reform Era(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1996).
25 “软预算约束”是经济学家科尔奈用来解释社会主义计划经济下企业行为的重要概念,指计划体制下的企业往往只追求产出,不注重效率,当出现亏损或资源短缺时,可以不断地向上级索取资源以弥补损失,从而使企业预算形同虚设,无法约束其行为。关于这一概念及在经济学中的应用,参见J(?)nos Kornai,"Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems",Econometrica,Vol.47,No.4(Jul.,1979),pp.801-819.J(?)nos Kornai and(?)gnes Matits,"The Softness of Budgetary Constraints:An Analysis of Enterprise Data",Eastern European Economics,Vol.25,No.4,The Hungarian Enterprise(Summer,1987),pp.1-34.J(?)nos Kornai,Eric Maskin and G(?)rard Roland,"Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint",Journal of Economic Literature,Vol.41,No.4(Dee.,2003),pp.1095-1136.
26 周雪光:“逆向软预算约束':一个政府行为的组织分析”,载《中国社会科学》,2005年第2期。
27 Yongshun Cai,"State and Peasant:Local Cadres and Statistical Reporting in Rural China",The China Quarterly,No.163(Sep.,2000),pp.783-805.
28 Kevin J.O' Brien and Lianjiang Li,Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China",Comparative Politics,Vol.31,No.2(Jan.,1999),pp.167-186.
29 Thomas P.Bernstein and Xiaobo Lu,"Taxation without Representation:Peasants,the Central and the Local States in Reform China",The China Quarterly,No.163(Sep.,2000),pp.742-763.
30 Mafia Edin,"State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China:CCP Cadre Management from a Township",The China Quarterly,No.173(Mar.,2003),pp.35-52.
31 Jean C.Oi and Scott Rozelle,"Elections and Power:The Locus of Decision-Making in Chinese Villages",The China Quarterly,No.162,Special Issue:Elections and Democracy in Greater China.(Jun.,2000),pp.513-539.
32 吴毅认为国家利益与村庄公共利益在农村社区内部的整合与再生产成为这一时期主导村政的基本因素。参见吴毅:《村治变迁中的权威与秩序——20世纪川东双村的表达》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2002年版,第228-246页。
33[美]道格拉斯·C·诺思:《经济史中的结构与变迁》,上海:上海人民出版社,1994年版,第225-226页。
34 结构主义是社会学理论的一个学派,贝尔特(Patrick Baert)认为结构主义理论主要有四个特征:一是主张“整体论的观点”,二是倾向优先考虑不变的东西而不是暂时异变的东西,三是反对实证主义,四是强调社会结构的约束性质,即基本的结构制约着人们的行动和思想。关于结构主义的代表人物及与其他学派的比较,参见[英]帕特里克·贝尔特:《二十世纪的社会理论》,上海:上海译文出版社,2002年版,第1-36页。
35 社会资本是个备受争议的概念,林南(Nan Lin)、弗拉普(Flap)、伯特(Butt)、布迪厄(Bourdieu)和科尔曼(Coleman)等人对它都有独特的理解,但如林南所言,这些学者的共同之处在于,都认为社会资本是由嵌入在社会关系和社会结构中的资源组成,当行动者希望提高目的性行动的可能性时,他们可以动员。具体论述参见[美]林南:《社会资本——关于社会结构与行动的理论》,上海:上海人民出版社,2004年版,第18-27页。
36[美]罗伯特D·帕特南:《使民主运转起来》,南昌:江西人民出版社,2001年版,第190-217页。
37[美]杜赞奇:《文化、权力与国家:1900-1942年的华北农村》,南京:江苏人民出版社,2003年版,第1-4页,15-25页。
38 Lily Lee Tsai,"Cadres,Temple and Lineage Institutions,and Governance in Rural China",The China Journal,No.48(Jul.,2002),pp.1-27.Accountability without Democracy:Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2007).pp.251-271.
39[法]埃米尔·涂尔干:《社会分工论》,北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店,2000年版,第108-158页。
40 贺雪峰根据社区记忆和经济分化程度划分了四种具有不同关联度的村庄类型,进而论证了村庄关联度与村庄秩序间的关系。具体参见贺雪峰:《乡村治理的社会基础——转型期乡村社会性质研究》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2003年版,第3-27页。
41 仝志辉:《选举事件与村庄政治:村庄社会关联中的村民选举参与》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2004年版,第274-298页。
42 张静:《基层政权——乡村制度诸问题》,杭州:浙江人民出版社,2000年版,第116-120页。
43 阎云翔:《礼物的流动:一个中国村庄中的互惠原则与社会网络》,上海:上海人民出版社,第19-22页。
44 作为晚近几十年影响最大社会理论之一,学者在定义和应用理性选择时的标准并不一致,格林(Donald P.Green)和沙皮罗(Ian Shapiro)认为理性选择涉及功利最大化、偏好结构、不确定条件下的决策等。关于理论选择理论的介绍和批判,参见[美]唐纳德P·格林和爱恩·沙皮罗:《理性选择理论的病变:政治学应用批判》,桂林:广西师范大学出版社,2004年版,第17-63页。[英]帕特里克·贝尔特:《二十世纪的社会理论》,上海:上海译文出版社,2002年版,第198-225页。Mark P.Petracca,“The Rational Choice Approach to Politics:A Challenge to Democratic Theory",The Review of Politics,Vol.53,No.2(Spring,1991),pp.289-319.
45[美]黄宗智:《中国研究的范式问题讨论》,北京:社会科学文献出版社,2003年版,第260-283页。
46 例如,帕特南在研究互惠规范和公民参与网络时,把人际关系网络区分为“横向”和“垂直”两类,“横向”关系网的主体是具有相同权力和地位的人,而“垂直”关系网则将不平等的行为者整合到不对称的等级和依附关系中。参见[美]帕特南:《使民主运转起来》,南昌:江西人民出版社,2001年版,第201-205页。Jonathan Murdoch区分了“垂直网络”和“水平网络”用于研究乡村发展的多样形式,参见Jonathan Murdoch,"Networks—a new paradigm of rural development?",Journal of Rural Studies 16(2000)407-419.Kwang-kuo Hwang在研究中国社会的人际关系时区分出“表达性关系”(Expressive Relationship)和“工具性关系”(Instrumental Relationship),他认为表达性关系更持久、稳定,主要发生于家庭、朋友和类群体间;而工具性关系则不稳定,暂时性的,互动双方把这种关系看作实现目的的手段。参见Kwang-kuo Hwang,"Face and Favor:The Chinese Power Game",The American Journal of Sociology,Vol.92,No.4(Jan.,1987),pp.944-974.
47 关于庇护主义和庇护关系的应用分析,参见John Duncan Powell,"Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics",The American Political Science Review,Vol.64,No.2(Jun.,1970),pp.411-425.James C,Scott,"Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia",The American Political Science Review,Vol.66,No.1(Mar.,1972),pp.91-113."The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Rural Southeast Asia",The Journal of,4sian Studies,Vol.32,No.1(Nov.,1972),pp.5-37.Rene Lemarchand and Keith Legg,"Political Clientelism and Development:A Preliminary Analysis",Comparative Politics,Vol.4,No.2(Jan.,1972),pp.149-178.S.N.Eisenstadt and Louis Roniger,"Patron—Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange",Comparative Studies in Society and History,Vol.22,No.1(Jan.,1980),pp.42-77.Carl H.Lande,"Political Clientelism in Political Studies:Retrospect and Prospects",International Political Science Review/Revue internationale de science politique,Vol.4,No.4,Political Clientelism and Comparative Perspectives(1983),pp.435-454.Sharon Kettering,"The Historical Development of Political Clientelism",Journal of Interdisciplinary History,Vol.18,No.3(Winter,1988),pp.419-447.
48 James C.Scott,"Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia",The American Political Science Review,Vol.66,No.1(Mar.,1972),pp.91-113.
49 John Duncan Powell,"Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics",The American Political Science Review,Vol.64,No.2(Jun.,1970),pp.411-425.
50 S.N.Eisenstadt and Louis Roniger,"Patron—Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange",Comparative Studies in Society and History,Vol.22,No.1(Jan.,1980),pp.42-77.
51 “治理”一词于20世纪80年代末被世界银行提出后,得到广泛应用,但学者间的理解不尽相同。罗伯特·罗茨(Robert Rhodes)归纳了治理的四个基本特征:一组织之间的相互依赖,公共、私人和自愿部门界限模糊;二相互交换资源及协商共同目的导致网络成员之间持续的互动;三互动以信任为基础,并由共同同意的规则来调节;四保持相当程度的相对于国家的自主性。具体参见俞可平:《治理与善治》,北京:社会科学文献出版社,2000年版,第96-97页。
52[美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森:《集体行动的逻辑》,上海:上海人民出版社,1995年版,第31-42页。
53 类似的关于网络结构和制度结构与集体行动关系的分析,参见Jonathan Bendor and Dilip Mookherjee,"Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action",The American Political Science Review,Vol.81,No.1(Mar.,1987),pp.129-154.Douglas D.Heckathom,"Collective Action and Group Heterogeneity:Voluntary Provision Versus Selective Incentives",American Sociological Review,Vol.58,No.3(Jun.,1993),pp.329-350.Brent Simpson and Michael W.Macy,"Collective Action and Power Inequality:Coalitions in Exchange Networks",Social Psychology Quarterly,Vol.64,No.1(Mar.,2001),pp.88-100.Brent Simpson and Michael W.Macy,"Power,Identity,and Collective Action in Social Exchange",Social Forces,Vol.82,No.4(Jun.,2004),pp.1373-1409.
54 与社会运动有关的资源动员理论(Resource Mobilization Theory)认为资源汇集的程度是集体行动的关键。参见 John D.McCarthy and Mayer N.Zald,"Resource Mobilization and Social Movements:A Partial Theory",The American Journal of Sociology,Vol.82,No.6(May,1977),pp.1212-1241.
55 Jean.C.Oi,State and Peasant in Contemporary China:The Political Economy of Village Government(Berkeley Los Angeles Oxford:University of California Press,1989),pp.131-154."Communism and Clientelism:Rural Politics in China",World Politics,Vol.37,No.2.(Jan.,1985).pp.238-266.
56 Antina Chan,Richard Madsen and Jonathan Unger,Chen Village under Mao and Deng(Berkeley Los Angeles Oxford:University of California Press,1992).pp.19-101.
57 Helen Siu,Agents and victims in South China:Accomplices in rural revolution(New Haven:Yale University Press,1989),pp.211.有关集体农业时期乡村庇护主义政治的争论和讨论,参见Young Kyun Yang."Peasants and the State:the Political Economy of a Village in the Maoist and Post-Mao China",Phd dissertation,University of Pittsburgh,2000.pp.254-258.
58 David Wank通过在厦门的田野调查,发现地方政府官员与企业间权力是不平衡的,地方官员仍掌握着资源和机会的配置权,而私营企业通过庇护而获得了权力的资源和保护,双方都这种非正式关系中都获得了利益,Wank称之为“市场庇护主义”,并认为这种共生性庇护关系对中国的市场化具有积极作用。参见David L.Wank,"Private Business,Bureaucracy,and Political Alliance in a Chinese City',The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs,No.33(Jan.,1995),pp.55-71."The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism:Guanxi and Private Business in a South China City",The China Quarterly,No.147(Sep.,1996),pp.820-838.本文借用Wank的分析来概括乡村新富群体与基层干部间的关系。
59 关于民族志研究及其在中国的发展,参见王铭铭:《村落视野中的文化与权力:闽台三村无论》,北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店,1997年版,第359-361页,369-385页。
60 如埃德蒙·利奇(Edmund Leach)认为在中国这样的广大国家,个别社区的微型研究如何概括中国国情。同样,莫里斯·弗里德曼(Maurice Freedman)也认为“小地方难以描述大社会,社区不是社会的缩影”。分别见Edmund Leach,Social Anthropology,Fontana,1983.Maurice Freedman,"A Chinese Phase in Social Anthropology",British Journal of Sociology,1963:1:1-19.转引自王铭铭:《村落视野中的文化与权力:闽台三村无论》,北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店,1997年版,第375-378页。
61 费孝通《江村经济——中国农民的生活》,北京:商务印书馆,2001年版,第326-330页。
62 Jonathan Unger and Anita Chart,"Inheritors of the Boom:Private Enterprise and the Role of Local Government in a Rural South China Township",The China Journal,No.42(Jul.,1999),pp.45-74.
63 Jean C.Oi and Scott Rozelle,"Elections and Power:The Locus of Decision-Making in Chinese Villages",The China Quarterly,No.162,Special Issue:Elections and Democracy in Greater China.(Jun.,2000),pp.513-539.
65 费孝通:《乡土中国 生育制度》,北京:北京大学出版社,1998年版,第24-36页。
66 许多学者对这一时期乡村社会的变化进行了研究,如张乐天的《告别理想:人民公社制度研究》,黄树民的《林村故事:1949年后的中国农村变革》,Antina Chan,Richard Madsen and Jonathan Unger's Chen village under Mao and Deng.Vivienne Shue's Peasant China in Transition:The Dynamics of Development Toward Socialism,1949-1956.Willam L.Parish and Martin K.White's village and family in contemporary China.Jean.C.Oi's State and Peasant in Contemporary China:The Political Economy of Village Government.具体参见[美]费正清 麦克法夸尔:《剑桥中华人民共和国史》(1949-1982),北京:中国社会科学出版社,1992年版,第620-677页。
67 Ezra F.Vogel,"From Friendship to Comradeship:The Change in Personal Relations in Communist China",The China Quarterly,No.21(Jan.-Mar.,1965),pp.46-60.
68 Jean.C.Oi,"Peasant Households between Plan and Market:Cadre Control over Agricultural Inputs",Modern China,Vol.12,No.2(Apr.,1986),pp.230-251.
69 关于村落文化对生育行为的影响,参见李银河:《生育与村落文化》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,1994年版。
70 我通过对T村6组的调查,发现改组适育夫妇80年代生育数平均为3个,虽然他们成功“超生”并不都是在村干部的帮助下实现的,但在国家政策从紧的情况下,能顺利的实现自己的生育愿望,没有村干部的庇护与帮助是不可能的。而且,这一角度和数据也为我们测量庇护关系的规模和程度提供了方便。
72 曹锦清:《黄河边的中国》,上海:上海文艺出版社,2000年版,第61-62页。
73 贺雪峰:《乡村治理的社会基础:转型期乡村社会性质研究》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2003年版,第119-147页。
74 仝志辉:《选举事件与村庄政治:村庄社会关联中的村民选举》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2004年版第226-252页。
75 Dwayne Benjamin and Loren Brandt,"Markets and Inequality in Rural China:Parallels with the Past",The American Economic Review,Vol.89,No.2,Papers and Proceedings of the One Hundred Eleventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association(May,1999),pp.292-295.James K.S.Kung and Yiu-fai Lee,"So What If There Is Income Inequality? The Distributive Consequence of Nonfarm Employment in Rural China",Economic Development and Cultural Change,Vol.50,No.1(Oct.,2001),pp.19-46.
76 阎云翔通过在下呷村的调查也发现了类似的情况,他认为这是消费主义作为一种文化观进入农村的表现,展现了年轻人的消费欲望和自利性。参见:阎云翔《私人生活的变革:一个中国村庄里的爱情、家庭与亲密关系1949-1999)),上海:上海书店出版社,2006年版,第169-175页、243-251页。
77 蔡晓莉通过对江西和福建不同类型村庄的考察,划分了村干部在社区公共产品供给上可能采取的四种策略。 Lily Lee Tsai,"Cadres,Temple and Lineage Institutions,and Governance in Rural China",The China Journal,No.48(Jul.,2002),pp.1-27.
78 David L.Wank,"Private Business,Bureaucracy,and Political Alliance in a Chinese City',The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs,No.33(Jan.,1995),pp.55-71."The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism:Guanxi and Private Business in a South China City",The China Quarterly,No.147(Sep.,1996),pp.820-838.
79 阎云翔:《私人生活的变革:一个中国村庄里的爱情、家庭与亲密关系》,上海:上海书店出版社,2006年版,第211-236页。
80[美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森:《集体行动的逻辑》,上海:上海人民出版社,1995年版,第41-42页。
81 个人动因包括:理性选择(Rational Choice)、人际关系(Affective Bonding)和顺从规范(Normative conformity),而组织诱因则分为效益诱因(utilitarian incentives)、社会诱因(social incentives),以及规范诱因(normative incentives)。关于这两者的讨论,参见Knoke,David.1988."Incentive in Collective Action Organizations." American Sociological Review 53(3):311-329.转引自 黄诗涵 汤京平:“政府、企业与农村社区发展:一个灾后社区重建个案的省思”,基层民主与社区治理国际研讨会会议论文,上海师范大学,2008。
82 对于农民行为的认知上,存在着两种对立的观点,即斯科特的“道义经济”与波普金的“理性小农”。斯科特强调农民的生存伦理,而波普金则强调其理性计算。双方在对农村共同体、庇护关系、集体反抗与搭便车等问题存在分歧。具体参见[美]詹姆斯·C斯科特:《农民的道义经济学:东南亚的反叛与生存》,南京:译林出版社,2001年版。Samuel Pookin,"The Rational Peasant:The Political Economy of Peasant Society",Theory and Society,Vol.9,No.3(May,1980),pp.411-471.对双方理论的评述,参见郭于华:“重读农民学经典论题——‘道义经济'还是‘理性小农'”,载《读书》,2002年第5期。
85 农村地区公共产品供给的方式,一般分为三种,即由市场来供给、由村落民间组织供给、由政府强制供给。具体讨论,参见贺雪峰罗兴佐:“论农村公共物品供给中的均衡”,载《经济学家》,2006年第1期。
86 黄宗智在研究20世纪前半期华北农村的结构变迁时,也论述了类似的现象。他特别提到了村落中通过婚俗而表现出来的身份地位差别。参见[美]黄宗智:《华北的小农经济与社会变迁》,北京:中华书局,2000年版,第259-283页。
87 Douglas D.Heckathom,"Collective Action and Group Heterogeneity:Voluntary Provision Versus Selective Incentives",American Sociological Review,Vol.58,No.3(Jun.,1993),pp.329-350.
88 孙立平:《现代化与社会转型》,北京:北京大学出版社,2005年版,第357-358页。
89 “地方性知识”是人类学家克利福德·格尔兹(Clifford Geertz)提出的概念,地方性不仅意指“地方、时间、阶级与各种问题,还包括情调——事情发生经过充满地方性并与当地人对事情的想像有关”。这一概念兼具知识论和方法论的意义,格尔兹用它来倡导对本土知识和文化的认知与研究。参见[美]克利福德·格尔兹:《地方性知识:阐释人类学论文集》,北京:中央编译出版社,2000年版,第273页。
90[美]帕特南:《使民主运转起来》,南昌:江西人民出版社,2001年版,第202-203页。
91 关于两派理论的评述,参见刘欣:“市场转型与社会分层:理论争辩的焦点和有待研究的问题”,载《中国社会科学》,2003年第5期。“当前中国社会阶层分化的多元动力基础——一种权力衍生论的解释”,载《中国社会科学》,2005年第4期。Qian Forrest Zhang,"Economic Rewards to Political Office-holders in a Marketizing Economy:the Case of Rural China",Phd dissertation,Yale University,2004.
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2 梁漱溟:《乡村建设理论》,上海:上海人民出版社,2006年版,第115-249页。
3[美]杜赞奇:《文化、权力与国家:1900-1942年的华北农村》,南京:江苏人民出版社,2003年版,第10-16页,40-52页。
4[美]施坚雅:《中国农村的市场和社会结构》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,1998年版,第5-11页。
5[美]黄宗智:《华北的小农经济与社会变迁》,北京:中华书局,2000年版,第5-7页。
6 例如,韦伯(Max Weber)认为“权力意味着在一种社会关系里哪怕遇到反对也能贯彻自己意志的任何机会,不管这种机会是建立在什么基础之上。”这里,权力被看作行动的潜在能力。参见[德]马克斯·韦伯:《经济与社会》(上),北京:商务印书馆,1997年版,第81页。而朗(Dennis H.Wrong)则把权力看作某些人对他人产生预期效果的能力,其基础包括个人资源和集体资源,个人资源包括财富、声望和专长等;集体资源包括将个人资源集中起来,服务于共同目标的资源。见[美]丹尼斯·朗:《权力论》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2001年版,第3页,154.166页。达尔(Robert A.Dahl)则把权力等同于影响力,他假设一个体系中只有两个人,A和B。如果A以某些方式改变了B的行动或倾向,那么A就对B有影响力和权力。参见[美]罗伯特·A·达尔:《现代政治分析》,上海译文出版社,1987年版,第30-52页。
7[美]史蒂文·卢克斯:《权力一种激进的观点》,南京:江苏人民出版社,2008年版,第18页。
8 交换理论和网络分析,作为两种分析社会结构的理论方法,具有相似的“结构”(Structure)和“行动”(Action)概念,但交换理论更强调个体行为者的利益和动机,而网络分析侧重网络结构对社会行为和社会变迁的约束。关于这两种理论方法的异同,参见K.S.Cook and J.M.Whitmeyer,"Two Approaches to Social Structure:Exchange Theory and Network Analysis",Annual Review of Sociology,Vol.18(1992),pp.109-127.
9 回归国家学派是20世纪80年代兴起于美国的社会科学研究流派,以Theda Skocpol和Peter B.Evans等人为代表,他们强调国家既作为组织结构又作为自治行动者的角色,通过对国家结构和能力的概念化来解释国家的形成和重构,以及国家对社会的影响。具体参见Peter B.Evans,Dietrich Rueschemeyer,Theda Skocpol(eds),Bring the State Back in(Cambridge University Press,1985).
10 王绍光 胡鞍钢:《中国国家能力报告》,沈阳:辽宁人民出版社,1993年版,第6-9页。
11[美]塞缪尔·亨廷顿:《变动社会中的政治秩序》,北京:华夏出版社,1988年版,第12页。
12 Jean C.Oi,"Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China",World Politics,Vol.45,No.1(Oct.,1992),pp.99-126."The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy",The China Quarterly,No.144.Special Issue:China's Transitional Economy(Dec.,1995),pp.1132-1149."The Evolution of Local State Corporatism" in Andrew Walder(eds.).Zuoping in Transition:The Process of Reform in North Rural China(Cambridge Mass:Harvard University Press,1998)."Local State Corporatism." in Jean.C.Oi(eds.).Rural China Takes Off:Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform(Berkeley:University of California Press,1999).
13 Andrew G Walder,"Local Governments as Industrial Firms:An Organizational Analysis of China's Transition Economy",The American Journal of Sociology,Vol.101,No.2(Sep.,1995),pp.263-301.
14 Marc Blecher and Vivienne Shue,Tethered Deer:Government and Economy in a Chinese County(Stanford:Stanford University Press,1996),pp.202-222.
15 托尼·赛奇(Tony Saich):“盲人摸象:中国地方政府分析”,载《经济社会体制比较》,2006年第4期。
16 对“发展型”和“掠夺性”国家的介绍和讨论,参见Lijun Chen,"Building Local State Capacity in China",Phd dissertation,The University of Chicago,2004,pp.8-10.See also Jianxun Wang,"Political Economy of Village Governance in Contemporary China",Phd dissertation,Indiana University,2006,pp.6-7.
17 Sally Sargeson and Jian Zhang,"Reassessing the Role of the Local State:A Case Study of Local Government Interventions in Property Rights Reform in a Hangzhou District",The China Journal,No.42(Jul.,1999),pp.77-99.
18 托尼·赛奇(Tony Saich):“盲人摸象:中国地方政府分析”,载《经济社会体制比较》,2006年第4期。
19 这里的基层政权包括乡镇和村两级,张静把两者看作一个整体,用于分析国家与社会的关系以及对乡村治理产生的影响。具体参见张静:《基层政权——乡村制度诸问题》,杭州:浙江人民出版社,2000年版。
20 这个概念是张静分析中国乡村政权时的核心概念之一,她认为1949年之后农村权威组织的重构并没有改变“结构性利益分离”的趋势,其表现在四个方面:一是基层政权关心上级利益和自我利益胜过关心农民利益;二是基层政权与农民之间相互不信任,充满隔阂;三是基层权力精英滥用公共权力;四是干部与村民之间的信息流通不畅。参见张静:《基层政权——乡村制度诸问题》,杭州:浙江人民出版社,2000年版,第38-41页。
21 张静:《基层政权——乡村制度诸问题》,杭州:浙江人民出版社,2000年版,第288页。
22 杨善华 苏红:“从代理型政权经营者到谋利型政权经营者”,载《社会学研究》,2002年第1期。
23 王绍光 胡鞍钢:《国家能力报告》沈阳:辽宁人民出版社,1993年版,第38-54页。
24 Yasheng Huang,"Central-Local Relations in China During The Reform Era:The Economic and Institutional Dimensions",World Development,Vol.24,No.4(1996).Inflation and Investment Controls in China:The Political Economy of Central-Local Relations During the Reform Era(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1996).
25 “软预算约束”是经济学家科尔奈用来解释社会主义计划经济下企业行为的重要概念,指计划体制下的企业往往只追求产出,不注重效率,当出现亏损或资源短缺时,可以不断地向上级索取资源以弥补损失,从而使企业预算形同虚设,无法约束其行为。关于这一概念及在经济学中的应用,参见J(?)nos Kornai,"Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems",Econometrica,Vol.47,No.4(Jul.,1979),pp.801-819.J(?)nos Kornai and(?)gnes Matits,"The Softness of Budgetary Constraints:An Analysis of Enterprise Data",Eastern European Economics,Vol.25,No.4,The Hungarian Enterprise(Summer,1987),pp.1-34.J(?)nos Kornai,Eric Maskin and G(?)rard Roland,"Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint",Journal of Economic Literature,Vol.41,No.4(Dee.,2003),pp.1095-1136.
26 周雪光:“逆向软预算约束':一个政府行为的组织分析”,载《中国社会科学》,2005年第2期。
27 Yongshun Cai,"State and Peasant:Local Cadres and Statistical Reporting in Rural China",The China Quarterly,No.163(Sep.,2000),pp.783-805.
28 Kevin J.O' Brien and Lianjiang Li,Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China",Comparative Politics,Vol.31,No.2(Jan.,1999),pp.167-186.
29 Thomas P.Bernstein and Xiaobo Lu,"Taxation without Representation:Peasants,the Central and the Local States in Reform China",The China Quarterly,No.163(Sep.,2000),pp.742-763.
30 Mafia Edin,"State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China:CCP Cadre Management from a Township",The China Quarterly,No.173(Mar.,2003),pp.35-52.
31 Jean C.Oi and Scott Rozelle,"Elections and Power:The Locus of Decision-Making in Chinese Villages",The China Quarterly,No.162,Special Issue:Elections and Democracy in Greater China.(Jun.,2000),pp.513-539.
32 吴毅认为国家利益与村庄公共利益在农村社区内部的整合与再生产成为这一时期主导村政的基本因素。参见吴毅:《村治变迁中的权威与秩序——20世纪川东双村的表达》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2002年版,第228-246页。
33[美]道格拉斯·C·诺思:《经济史中的结构与变迁》,上海:上海人民出版社,1994年版,第225-226页。
34 结构主义是社会学理论的一个学派,贝尔特(Patrick Baert)认为结构主义理论主要有四个特征:一是主张“整体论的观点”,二是倾向优先考虑不变的东西而不是暂时异变的东西,三是反对实证主义,四是强调社会结构的约束性质,即基本的结构制约着人们的行动和思想。关于结构主义的代表人物及与其他学派的比较,参见[英]帕特里克·贝尔特:《二十世纪的社会理论》,上海:上海译文出版社,2002年版,第1-36页。
35 社会资本是个备受争议的概念,林南(Nan Lin)、弗拉普(Flap)、伯特(Butt)、布迪厄(Bourdieu)和科尔曼(Coleman)等人对它都有独特的理解,但如林南所言,这些学者的共同之处在于,都认为社会资本是由嵌入在社会关系和社会结构中的资源组成,当行动者希望提高目的性行动的可能性时,他们可以动员。具体论述参见[美]林南:《社会资本——关于社会结构与行动的理论》,上海:上海人民出版社,2004年版,第18-27页。
36[美]罗伯特D·帕特南:《使民主运转起来》,南昌:江西人民出版社,2001年版,第190-217页。
37[美]杜赞奇:《文化、权力与国家:1900-1942年的华北农村》,南京:江苏人民出版社,2003年版,第1-4页,15-25页。
38 Lily Lee Tsai,"Cadres,Temple and Lineage Institutions,and Governance in Rural China",The China Journal,No.48(Jul.,2002),pp.1-27.Accountability without Democracy:Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2007).pp.251-271.
39[法]埃米尔·涂尔干:《社会分工论》,北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店,2000年版,第108-158页。
40 贺雪峰根据社区记忆和经济分化程度划分了四种具有不同关联度的村庄类型,进而论证了村庄关联度与村庄秩序间的关系。具体参见贺雪峰:《乡村治理的社会基础——转型期乡村社会性质研究》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2003年版,第3-27页。
41 仝志辉:《选举事件与村庄政治:村庄社会关联中的村民选举参与》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2004年版,第274-298页。
42 张静:《基层政权——乡村制度诸问题》,杭州:浙江人民出版社,2000年版,第116-120页。
43 阎云翔:《礼物的流动:一个中国村庄中的互惠原则与社会网络》,上海:上海人民出版社,第19-22页。
44 作为晚近几十年影响最大社会理论之一,学者在定义和应用理性选择时的标准并不一致,格林(Donald P.Green)和沙皮罗(Ian Shapiro)认为理性选择涉及功利最大化、偏好结构、不确定条件下的决策等。关于理论选择理论的介绍和批判,参见[美]唐纳德P·格林和爱恩·沙皮罗:《理性选择理论的病变:政治学应用批判》,桂林:广西师范大学出版社,2004年版,第17-63页。[英]帕特里克·贝尔特:《二十世纪的社会理论》,上海:上海译文出版社,2002年版,第198-225页。Mark P.Petracca,“The Rational Choice Approach to Politics:A Challenge to Democratic Theory",The Review of Politics,Vol.53,No.2(Spring,1991),pp.289-319.
45[美]黄宗智:《中国研究的范式问题讨论》,北京:社会科学文献出版社,2003年版,第260-283页。
46 例如,帕特南在研究互惠规范和公民参与网络时,把人际关系网络区分为“横向”和“垂直”两类,“横向”关系网的主体是具有相同权力和地位的人,而“垂直”关系网则将不平等的行为者整合到不对称的等级和依附关系中。参见[美]帕特南:《使民主运转起来》,南昌:江西人民出版社,2001年版,第201-205页。Jonathan Murdoch区分了“垂直网络”和“水平网络”用于研究乡村发展的多样形式,参见Jonathan Murdoch,"Networks—a new paradigm of rural development?",Journal of Rural Studies 16(2000)407-419.Kwang-kuo Hwang在研究中国社会的人际关系时区分出“表达性关系”(Expressive Relationship)和“工具性关系”(Instrumental Relationship),他认为表达性关系更持久、稳定,主要发生于家庭、朋友和类群体间;而工具性关系则不稳定,暂时性的,互动双方把这种关系看作实现目的的手段。参见Kwang-kuo Hwang,"Face and Favor:The Chinese Power Game",The American Journal of Sociology,Vol.92,No.4(Jan.,1987),pp.944-974.
47 关于庇护主义和庇护关系的应用分析,参见John Duncan Powell,"Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics",The American Political Science Review,Vol.64,No.2(Jun.,1970),pp.411-425.James C,Scott,"Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia",The American Political Science Review,Vol.66,No.1(Mar.,1972),pp.91-113."The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Rural Southeast Asia",The Journal of,4sian Studies,Vol.32,No.1(Nov.,1972),pp.5-37.Rene Lemarchand and Keith Legg,"Political Clientelism and Development:A Preliminary Analysis",Comparative Politics,Vol.4,No.2(Jan.,1972),pp.149-178.S.N.Eisenstadt and Louis Roniger,"Patron—Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange",Comparative Studies in Society and History,Vol.22,No.1(Jan.,1980),pp.42-77.Carl H.Lande,"Political Clientelism in Political Studies:Retrospect and Prospects",International Political Science Review/Revue internationale de science politique,Vol.4,No.4,Political Clientelism and Comparative Perspectives(1983),pp.435-454.Sharon Kettering,"The Historical Development of Political Clientelism",Journal of Interdisciplinary History,Vol.18,No.3(Winter,1988),pp.419-447.
48 James C.Scott,"Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia",The American Political Science Review,Vol.66,No.1(Mar.,1972),pp.91-113.
49 John Duncan Powell,"Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics",The American Political Science Review,Vol.64,No.2(Jun.,1970),pp.411-425.
50 S.N.Eisenstadt and Louis Roniger,"Patron—Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange",Comparative Studies in Society and History,Vol.22,No.1(Jan.,1980),pp.42-77.
51 “治理”一词于20世纪80年代末被世界银行提出后,得到广泛应用,但学者间的理解不尽相同。罗伯特·罗茨(Robert Rhodes)归纳了治理的四个基本特征:一组织之间的相互依赖,公共、私人和自愿部门界限模糊;二相互交换资源及协商共同目的导致网络成员之间持续的互动;三互动以信任为基础,并由共同同意的规则来调节;四保持相当程度的相对于国家的自主性。具体参见俞可平:《治理与善治》,北京:社会科学文献出版社,2000年版,第96-97页。
52[美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森:《集体行动的逻辑》,上海:上海人民出版社,1995年版,第31-42页。
53 类似的关于网络结构和制度结构与集体行动关系的分析,参见Jonathan Bendor and Dilip Mookherjee,"Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action",The American Political Science Review,Vol.81,No.1(Mar.,1987),pp.129-154.Douglas D.Heckathom,"Collective Action and Group Heterogeneity:Voluntary Provision Versus Selective Incentives",American Sociological Review,Vol.58,No.3(Jun.,1993),pp.329-350.Brent Simpson and Michael W.Macy,"Collective Action and Power Inequality:Coalitions in Exchange Networks",Social Psychology Quarterly,Vol.64,No.1(Mar.,2001),pp.88-100.Brent Simpson and Michael W.Macy,"Power,Identity,and Collective Action in Social Exchange",Social Forces,Vol.82,No.4(Jun.,2004),pp.1373-1409.
54 与社会运动有关的资源动员理论(Resource Mobilization Theory)认为资源汇集的程度是集体行动的关键。参见 John D.McCarthy and Mayer N.Zald,"Resource Mobilization and Social Movements:A Partial Theory",The American Journal of Sociology,Vol.82,No.6(May,1977),pp.1212-1241.
55 Jean.C.Oi,State and Peasant in Contemporary China:The Political Economy of Village Government(Berkeley Los Angeles Oxford:University of California Press,1989),pp.131-154."Communism and Clientelism:Rural Politics in China",World Politics,Vol.37,No.2.(Jan.,1985).pp.238-266.
56 Antina Chan,Richard Madsen and Jonathan Unger,Chen Village under Mao and Deng(Berkeley Los Angeles Oxford:University of California Press,1992).pp.19-101.
57 Helen Siu,Agents and victims in South China:Accomplices in rural revolution(New Haven:Yale University Press,1989),pp.211.有关集体农业时期乡村庇护主义政治的争论和讨论,参见Young Kyun Yang."Peasants and the State:the Political Economy of a Village in the Maoist and Post-Mao China",Phd dissertation,University of Pittsburgh,2000.pp.254-258.
58 David Wank通过在厦门的田野调查,发现地方政府官员与企业间权力是不平衡的,地方官员仍掌握着资源和机会的配置权,而私营企业通过庇护而获得了权力的资源和保护,双方都这种非正式关系中都获得了利益,Wank称之为“市场庇护主义”,并认为这种共生性庇护关系对中国的市场化具有积极作用。参见David L.Wank,"Private Business,Bureaucracy,and Political Alliance in a Chinese City',The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs,No.33(Jan.,1995),pp.55-71."The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism:Guanxi and Private Business in a South China City",The China Quarterly,No.147(Sep.,1996),pp.820-838.本文借用Wank的分析来概括乡村新富群体与基层干部间的关系。
59 关于民族志研究及其在中国的发展,参见王铭铭:《村落视野中的文化与权力:闽台三村无论》,北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店,1997年版,第359-361页,369-385页。
60 如埃德蒙·利奇(Edmund Leach)认为在中国这样的广大国家,个别社区的微型研究如何概括中国国情。同样,莫里斯·弗里德曼(Maurice Freedman)也认为“小地方难以描述大社会,社区不是社会的缩影”。分别见Edmund Leach,Social Anthropology,Fontana,1983.Maurice Freedman,"A Chinese Phase in Social Anthropology",British Journal of Sociology,1963:1:1-19.转引自王铭铭:《村落视野中的文化与权力:闽台三村无论》,北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店,1997年版,第375-378页。
61 费孝通《江村经济——中国农民的生活》,北京:商务印书馆,2001年版,第326-330页。
62 Jonathan Unger and Anita Chart,"Inheritors of the Boom:Private Enterprise and the Role of Local Government in a Rural South China Township",The China Journal,No.42(Jul.,1999),pp.45-74.
63 Jean C.Oi and Scott Rozelle,"Elections and Power:The Locus of Decision-Making in Chinese Villages",The China Quarterly,No.162,Special Issue:Elections and Democracy in Greater China.(Jun.,2000),pp.513-539.
65 费孝通:《乡土中国 生育制度》,北京:北京大学出版社,1998年版,第24-36页。
66 许多学者对这一时期乡村社会的变化进行了研究,如张乐天的《告别理想:人民公社制度研究》,黄树民的《林村故事:1949年后的中国农村变革》,Antina Chan,Richard Madsen and Jonathan Unger's Chen village under Mao and Deng.Vivienne Shue's Peasant China in Transition:The Dynamics of Development Toward Socialism,1949-1956.Willam L.Parish and Martin K.White's village and family in contemporary China.Jean.C.Oi's State and Peasant in Contemporary China:The Political Economy of Village Government.具体参见[美]费正清 麦克法夸尔:《剑桥中华人民共和国史》(1949-1982),北京:中国社会科学出版社,1992年版,第620-677页。
67 Ezra F.Vogel,"From Friendship to Comradeship:The Change in Personal Relations in Communist China",The China Quarterly,No.21(Jan.-Mar.,1965),pp.46-60.
68 Jean.C.Oi,"Peasant Households between Plan and Market:Cadre Control over Agricultural Inputs",Modern China,Vol.12,No.2(Apr.,1986),pp.230-251.
69 关于村落文化对生育行为的影响,参见李银河:《生育与村落文化》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,1994年版。
70 我通过对T村6组的调查,发现改组适育夫妇80年代生育数平均为3个,虽然他们成功“超生”并不都是在村干部的帮助下实现的,但在国家政策从紧的情况下,能顺利的实现自己的生育愿望,没有村干部的庇护与帮助是不可能的。而且,这一角度和数据也为我们测量庇护关系的规模和程度提供了方便。
72 曹锦清:《黄河边的中国》,上海:上海文艺出版社,2000年版,第61-62页。
73 贺雪峰:《乡村治理的社会基础:转型期乡村社会性质研究》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2003年版,第119-147页。
74 仝志辉:《选举事件与村庄政治:村庄社会关联中的村民选举》,北京:中国社会科学出版社,2004年版第226-252页。
75 Dwayne Benjamin and Loren Brandt,"Markets and Inequality in Rural China:Parallels with the Past",The American Economic Review,Vol.89,No.2,Papers and Proceedings of the One Hundred Eleventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association(May,1999),pp.292-295.James K.S.Kung and Yiu-fai Lee,"So What If There Is Income Inequality? The Distributive Consequence of Nonfarm Employment in Rural China",Economic Development and Cultural Change,Vol.50,No.1(Oct.,2001),pp.19-46.
76 阎云翔通过在下呷村的调查也发现了类似的情况,他认为这是消费主义作为一种文化观进入农村的表现,展现了年轻人的消费欲望和自利性。参见:阎云翔《私人生活的变革:一个中国村庄里的爱情、家庭与亲密关系1949-1999)),上海:上海书店出版社,2006年版,第169-175页、243-251页。
77 蔡晓莉通过对江西和福建不同类型村庄的考察,划分了村干部在社区公共产品供给上可能采取的四种策略。 Lily Lee Tsai,"Cadres,Temple and Lineage Institutions,and Governance in Rural China",The China Journal,No.48(Jul.,2002),pp.1-27.
78 David L.Wank,"Private Business,Bureaucracy,and Political Alliance in a Chinese City',The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs,No.33(Jan.,1995),pp.55-71."The Institutional Process of Market Clientelism:Guanxi and Private Business in a South China City",The China Quarterly,No.147(Sep.,1996),pp.820-838.
79 阎云翔:《私人生活的变革:一个中国村庄里的爱情、家庭与亲密关系》,上海:上海书店出版社,2006年版,第211-236页。
80[美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森:《集体行动的逻辑》,上海:上海人民出版社,1995年版,第41-42页。
81 个人动因包括:理性选择(Rational Choice)、人际关系(Affective Bonding)和顺从规范(Normative conformity),而组织诱因则分为效益诱因(utilitarian incentives)、社会诱因(social incentives),以及规范诱因(normative incentives)。关于这两者的讨论,参见Knoke,David.1988."Incentive in Collective Action Organizations." American Sociological Review 53(3):311-329.转引自 黄诗涵 汤京平:“政府、企业与农村社区发展:一个灾后社区重建个案的省思”,基层民主与社区治理国际研讨会会议论文,上海师范大学,2008。
82 对于农民行为的认知上,存在着两种对立的观点,即斯科特的“道义经济”与波普金的“理性小农”。斯科特强调农民的生存伦理,而波普金则强调其理性计算。双方在对农村共同体、庇护关系、集体反抗与搭便车等问题存在分歧。具体参见[美]詹姆斯·C斯科特:《农民的道义经济学:东南亚的反叛与生存》,南京:译林出版社,2001年版。Samuel Pookin,"The Rational Peasant:The Political Economy of Peasant Society",Theory and Society,Vol.9,No.3(May,1980),pp.411-471.对双方理论的评述,参见郭于华:“重读农民学经典论题——‘道义经济'还是‘理性小农'”,载《读书》,2002年第5期。
85 农村地区公共产品供给的方式,一般分为三种,即由市场来供给、由村落民间组织供给、由政府强制供给。具体讨论,参见贺雪峰罗兴佐:“论农村公共物品供给中的均衡”,载《经济学家》,2006年第1期。
86 黄宗智在研究20世纪前半期华北农村的结构变迁时,也论述了类似的现象。他特别提到了村落中通过婚俗而表现出来的身份地位差别。参见[美]黄宗智:《华北的小农经济与社会变迁》,北京:中华书局,2000年版,第259-283页。
87 Douglas D.Heckathom,"Collective Action and Group Heterogeneity:Voluntary Provision Versus Selective Incentives",American Sociological Review,Vol.58,No.3(Jun.,1993),pp.329-350.
88 孙立平:《现代化与社会转型》,北京:北京大学出版社,2005年版,第357-358页。
89 “地方性知识”是人类学家克利福德·格尔兹(Clifford Geertz)提出的概念,地方性不仅意指“地方、时间、阶级与各种问题,还包括情调——事情发生经过充满地方性并与当地人对事情的想像有关”。这一概念兼具知识论和方法论的意义,格尔兹用它来倡导对本土知识和文化的认知与研究。参见[美]克利福德·格尔兹:《地方性知识:阐释人类学论文集》,北京:中央编译出版社,2000年版,第273页。
90[美]帕特南:《使民主运转起来》,南昌:江西人民出版社,2001年版,第202-203页。
91 关于两派理论的评述,参见刘欣:“市场转型与社会分层:理论争辩的焦点和有待研究的问题”,载《中国社会科学》,2003年第5期。“当前中国社会阶层分化的多元动力基础——一种权力衍生论的解释”,载《中国社会科学》,2005年第4期。Qian Forrest Zhang,"Economic Rewards to Political Office-holders in a Marketizing Economy:the Case of Rural China",Phd dissertation,Yale University,2004.
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