干预事件下的随机需求供应链协调应对研究
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摘要
由于随机的市场需求常常会受到国家政策、突发事件等干预事件的巨大影响,使得供应链系统的随机需求发生变化,导致供应链不再协调甚至遭受致命性的打击.针对这种情况,研究了单周期的供应链协调应对干预事件的理论与方法,并基于数学软件MATLAB作了东营平安管件加工厂的案例分析.主要研究内容如下:
(1)“确定需求下的供应链应对突发事件”已有研究报道,而“具有随机需求的供应链应对突发事件”的研究刚刚开始,针对这种情况,给出了“干预事件下的随机需求供应链协调应对研究”这一更准确的提法,并给出了数学模型框架.
(2)针对基本的供应链契约模型,分析了干预事件造成需求分布变化时对供应链的影响,研究了供应链的最优应对决策,并给出了具有抗干预性的各种供应链协调契约,模型分析验证了最优应对效果.
(3)对于需求与价格具有相关性的供应链,分析了供应链的协调策略.在干预事件造成需求分布发生变化的情况下,研究了与价格相关的供应链如何协调应对干预事件及抗干预性的协调契约.分别利用随机需求与价格的加法关系与乘法关系研究了供应链优化模型的应对决策,并利用MATLAB的模型分析模拟了价格与供应链的关系,验证了与价格相关的供应链应对干预事件的优化结果.
(4)对于需求与努力因素具有相关性的供应链,分析了供应链的协调策略;在干预事件造成需求分布发生变化的情况下,研究了供应链的协调应对决策,给出了抗干预性的协调契约.分别利用随机需求与努力的加法关系与乘法关系研究了供应链的优化应对决策策,并利用MATLAB的模型分析模拟了努力与供应链的关系,验证了与努力相关的供应链应对干预事件的优化结果.
(5)对于一个供应商与多个销售商的供应链,分析并建立了供应链的协调契约模型.在干预事件造成需求分布发生变化的情况下,研究了具有多个销售商供应链的协调应对决策,给出了具有抗干预性的各种供应链协调契约.模型分析了具有多个销售商的供应链系统,并验证了对干预的优化应对效果.
研究工作主要针对协调的供应链契约,通过研究得出主要结论:(1)当干预事件造成市场规模增加或减小不大时,原有协调机制仍然能实现供应链协调,即协调契约下的供应链具有很强的鲁棒性.对于需求与努力相关的供应链,乘法形式的鲁棒区间明显地小于加法形式.(2)当干预事件造成市场规模变化较大时,供应链的最优订购量发生变化,原有协调机制不再实现供应链的协调.研究得到具有抗干预性的契约可以实现对干预事件的协调应对.(3)当干预事件造成市场规模变化不大时,供应链的最优订购量不发生变化,即供应商的生产计划不需要调整.而在基本的批发价格契约模型中,可以将批发价格作出调整,使得最优订购量仍然保持不变.(4)对于需求与价格相关的供应链,应对干预的决策不同于其它情况.当干预事件使得市场规模发生变化时,零售价格相应地发生变化,供应商需及时地调整生产计划才能尽可能好地应对干预.
This thesis is concerned with demand intervention management in supply chain systems which are faced stochastic market demands, it may be broken off by an intervention event such as country policy, natural calamity. Some of numerical models based on MATLAB are made. The main contents of the research are as following:
(1) The supply chain coordination under intervention events with stochastic demand is put forward, which is not yet appear in the supply chain research field, and the research framework of mathematical model is introduced.
(2) Based on the standard newsvendor problem, for the noncoordination contract(i.e. wholesale price contract) we obtain the optimal strategy in the demand intervention environment, and give some numerical examples to illustrate the results to show the importance of intervention management. For the coordination contracts(i.e. returns contract, revenue sharing contract, and rebate and penalty contract ) we analyse the effects of intervention event on the supply chain, obtain the optimal strategy for supply chain to the intervention, and propose the adjusted coordination contracts which have anti-intervention ability. Numerical examples illustrate the effectiveness of the optimal strategy.
(3) The supply chain coordination under intervention events by allowing the retailer to choose his retail price in addition to his stocking quantity is extended. The coordination contracts with retail price effects are analysed. And then, the supply chain coordination under interventions is studied, the optimal strategies for supply chain to the intervention events are presented, and the adjusted contracts which have anti-intervention ability are proposed. By supposing the relationship between stochastic demand and price is an additive or a multiplicative fashion, the optimal models of the supply chain under interventions are established, and numerical examples are made to illustrate the effectiveness of the optimal strategy and the impact of retail price to the supply chain coordination.
(4) The supply chain coordination under intervention events by allowing the retailer to exert costly effort to increase demand is extended. The coordination contracts with effort factor are analysed. And then, the supply chain coordination under interventions is studied, the optimal strategies for supply chain to the intervention events are presented, and the adjusted contracts which have anti-intervention ability are proposed. By supposing the relationship between stochastic demand and effort factor is an additive or a multiplicative fashion, the optimal models of the supply chain under interventions are established, and numerical examples are made to illustrate the effectiveness of the optimal strategy and the impact of effort factor to the supply chain coordination.
(5) For a supply chain system with one supplier and multiple competing retailers, the coodination contracts are established. We find wholesale price contract can coordinate the supply chain in the multiple newsvendors case and revenue-sharing contract is equivalent to returns contract in the newsvendors case with a fixed retail price. The supply chain coordination with multiple competing retailers under intervention events is studied, the optimal strategies for supply chain to the intervention events are presented, and the adjusted contracts which have anti-intervention ability are proposed. Numerical examples simulate the optimization of the supply chain with multiple competing retailers and illustrate the effectiveness of the optimal strategy.
Come to conclusions by studying: (1) The researches are mainly aimed at coordination supply chain. When stochastic market scale change is small, keeping the original order plan can achieve the maximum profit of the supply chain. This shows that the original order plan has certain robustness under intervention events. When the relationship between demand and effort factor is a multiplicative fashion or an additive, the robustness region of multiplicative fashion is smaller than the latter. (2) When market scale changes significantly by intervention events, adjusting the order quantity becomes necessary. The original contracts cannot coordinate the supply chain in this case. In this thesis, the adjusted contracts which have anti-intervention ability are proposed, and it can coordinate the supply chain under interventions. (3) When market scale change is small, the original order plan is not changed, and supplier's production plan is not revised ( in the standard wholesale price model, by adjusting wholesale price, the original order quantity is still kept). (4) The supply chain of demand dependent on retail price differs from other cases on the intervention management. Under intervention events, retail price is changing with the market scale, revising the production plan which is the optimal decision becomes necessary.
(1)“确定需求下的供应链应对突发事件”已有研究报道,而“具有随机需求的供应链应对突发事件”的研究刚刚开始,针对这种情况,给出了“干预事件下的随机需求供应链协调应对研究”这一更准确的提法,并给出了数学模型框架.
(2)针对基本的供应链契约模型,分析了干预事件造成需求分布变化时对供应链的影响,研究了供应链的最优应对决策,并给出了具有抗干预性的各种供应链协调契约,模型分析验证了最优应对效果.
(3)对于需求与价格具有相关性的供应链,分析了供应链的协调策略.在干预事件造成需求分布发生变化的情况下,研究了与价格相关的供应链如何协调应对干预事件及抗干预性的协调契约.分别利用随机需求与价格的加法关系与乘法关系研究了供应链优化模型的应对决策,并利用MATLAB的模型分析模拟了价格与供应链的关系,验证了与价格相关的供应链应对干预事件的优化结果.
(4)对于需求与努力因素具有相关性的供应链,分析了供应链的协调策略;在干预事件造成需求分布发生变化的情况下,研究了供应链的协调应对决策,给出了抗干预性的协调契约.分别利用随机需求与努力的加法关系与乘法关系研究了供应链的优化应对决策策,并利用MATLAB的模型分析模拟了努力与供应链的关系,验证了与努力相关的供应链应对干预事件的优化结果.
(5)对于一个供应商与多个销售商的供应链,分析并建立了供应链的协调契约模型.在干预事件造成需求分布发生变化的情况下,研究了具有多个销售商供应链的协调应对决策,给出了具有抗干预性的各种供应链协调契约.模型分析了具有多个销售商的供应链系统,并验证了对干预的优化应对效果.
研究工作主要针对协调的供应链契约,通过研究得出主要结论:(1)当干预事件造成市场规模增加或减小不大时,原有协调机制仍然能实现供应链协调,即协调契约下的供应链具有很强的鲁棒性.对于需求与努力相关的供应链,乘法形式的鲁棒区间明显地小于加法形式.(2)当干预事件造成市场规模变化较大时,供应链的最优订购量发生变化,原有协调机制不再实现供应链的协调.研究得到具有抗干预性的契约可以实现对干预事件的协调应对.(3)当干预事件造成市场规模变化不大时,供应链的最优订购量不发生变化,即供应商的生产计划不需要调整.而在基本的批发价格契约模型中,可以将批发价格作出调整,使得最优订购量仍然保持不变.(4)对于需求与价格相关的供应链,应对干预的决策不同于其它情况.当干预事件使得市场规模发生变化时,零售价格相应地发生变化,供应商需及时地调整生产计划才能尽可能好地应对干预.
This thesis is concerned with demand intervention management in supply chain systems which are faced stochastic market demands, it may be broken off by an intervention event such as country policy, natural calamity. Some of numerical models based on MATLAB are made. The main contents of the research are as following:
(1) The supply chain coordination under intervention events with stochastic demand is put forward, which is not yet appear in the supply chain research field, and the research framework of mathematical model is introduced.
(2) Based on the standard newsvendor problem, for the noncoordination contract(i.e. wholesale price contract) we obtain the optimal strategy in the demand intervention environment, and give some numerical examples to illustrate the results to show the importance of intervention management. For the coordination contracts(i.e. returns contract, revenue sharing contract, and rebate and penalty contract ) we analyse the effects of intervention event on the supply chain, obtain the optimal strategy for supply chain to the intervention, and propose the adjusted coordination contracts which have anti-intervention ability. Numerical examples illustrate the effectiveness of the optimal strategy.
(3) The supply chain coordination under intervention events by allowing the retailer to choose his retail price in addition to his stocking quantity is extended. The coordination contracts with retail price effects are analysed. And then, the supply chain coordination under interventions is studied, the optimal strategies for supply chain to the intervention events are presented, and the adjusted contracts which have anti-intervention ability are proposed. By supposing the relationship between stochastic demand and price is an additive or a multiplicative fashion, the optimal models of the supply chain under interventions are established, and numerical examples are made to illustrate the effectiveness of the optimal strategy and the impact of retail price to the supply chain coordination.
(4) The supply chain coordination under intervention events by allowing the retailer to exert costly effort to increase demand is extended. The coordination contracts with effort factor are analysed. And then, the supply chain coordination under interventions is studied, the optimal strategies for supply chain to the intervention events are presented, and the adjusted contracts which have anti-intervention ability are proposed. By supposing the relationship between stochastic demand and effort factor is an additive or a multiplicative fashion, the optimal models of the supply chain under interventions are established, and numerical examples are made to illustrate the effectiveness of the optimal strategy and the impact of effort factor to the supply chain coordination.
(5) For a supply chain system with one supplier and multiple competing retailers, the coodination contracts are established. We find wholesale price contract can coordinate the supply chain in the multiple newsvendors case and revenue-sharing contract is equivalent to returns contract in the newsvendors case with a fixed retail price. The supply chain coordination with multiple competing retailers under intervention events is studied, the optimal strategies for supply chain to the intervention events are presented, and the adjusted contracts which have anti-intervention ability are proposed. Numerical examples simulate the optimization of the supply chain with multiple competing retailers and illustrate the effectiveness of the optimal strategy.
Come to conclusions by studying: (1) The researches are mainly aimed at coordination supply chain. When stochastic market scale change is small, keeping the original order plan can achieve the maximum profit of the supply chain. This shows that the original order plan has certain robustness under intervention events. When the relationship between demand and effort factor is a multiplicative fashion or an additive, the robustness region of multiplicative fashion is smaller than the latter. (2) When market scale changes significantly by intervention events, adjusting the order quantity becomes necessary. The original contracts cannot coordinate the supply chain in this case. In this thesis, the adjusted contracts which have anti-intervention ability are proposed, and it can coordinate the supply chain under interventions. (3) When market scale change is small, the original order plan is not changed, and supplier's production plan is not revised ( in the standard wholesale price model, by adjusting wholesale price, the original order quantity is still kept). (4) The supply chain of demand dependent on retail price differs from other cases on the intervention management. Under intervention events, retail price is changing with the market scale, revising the production plan which is the optimal decision becomes necessary.
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